Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun

Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness

成唯識論

By
Tripitaka–Master Hsüan Tsang

English Translation
By
Wei Tat

漢英對照

PLATE II

The Translator

PLATE I



Tripitaka-Master Hsüan Tsang

成 唯 識 論

CH'ENG WEI-SHIH LUN

THE DOCTRINE OF MERE-CONSCIOUSNESS

By

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Tripitaka-Master of the T'ang Dynasty

Translated from the Chinese Text

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成唯識論

趙聿修題

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Dedicated

to

My good friend

Mr. CHIU LUT-SAU O.B.E., J.P., SB. SJ.

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Lastly, I would like to thank all those of my friends and relatives who have been so kind as to show an interest in this work.

序 一

印順法師

(Foreword by the Venerable Yin-shun)

『成唯識論』，代表了西元七世紀初，印度瑜伽大乘的正義。在瑜伽大乘中，這是最具權威性的，集大成的論書。

論到印度的大乘佛學，不外乎空有二輪——中觀與瑜伽。空有二宗，都從禪慧的修證中來；都是以「正理」來闡明眞義，安立現觀次第，作爲趣入大乘的軌範。在住持正法，適應時代的意義上，二宗有著一致的傾向，那就是尊重初期的佛法，從深一層的解說中，成立時代的佛學，引導當代的大乘佛教，離偏失而歸於中道。龍樹的時代，是「一切皆空說」盛行的時代。龍樹以緣起爲宗，發揮緣起無自性空說，也從空義來成立緣起。彈斥了實有自性說，方廣道人的一切都無說，迷戀「梵王舊說」（婆羅門教的舊說）的「心常」說，而歸於一切法即空的緣起中道論。彌勒的時代，是「境不成實」、與「自性清淨心」——如來藏思想流行的時代。瑜伽大乘的特色，是以剎那生滅的，恆時相續的「一切種子心識」爲依，以種子爲緣起，來成立流轉還滅的一切法。空，是甚深秘密的。鈍根不能依空而立一切法，引起了偏見或誹毀，深刻的損害了佛法。所以依「異法是空，異法不空」說，「假必依實」說，宗承『解深密經』的三性、三無性說，而破斥「惡取空者」。由心性本淨而來的「自性清淨心」（如來藏），解說爲「心之空性」，

「心之眞如」。正智屬依他起性，是無漏種子（種子是刹那生滅的）所生起的。這樣，「常心」與「常智」的經說，被導歸於有爲生滅的緣起論的正義。雖然，中觀是三世幻有者，自空論者；瑜伽是現在幻有者，他空論者，有著教學上的根本區別。然在適應時機，遮遣「惡空」與「常心」，歸宗於釋尊本教——緣起論的立場，是完全一致的。這所以中觀與瑜伽，在印度大乘佛教界，被公認而處於主流的地位。

彌勒的瑜伽大乘，是由無著傳述出來的；根本在廣明三乘的『十七地論』——『瑜伽師地論』「本地分」。在「意地」中，說明心意識，有漏與無漏種子，確立瑜伽唯識學的根本。在「菩薩地」的「眞實義品」中，闡明了性相空有的正義。其次，抉擇「本地分」而作「攝抉擇分」（可能有無著的見解在內）。對阿賴耶識的理論證明，依阿賴耶識而安立流轉與還滅的道理，更明確的表達出來。廣引『解深密經』，對於三性、三無性，「諸識所緣，唯識所現」，作了更廣的抉擇。還有「攝釋分」，「釋異門分」，「攝事分」；特別是「攝事分」，爲『雜阿含經』與『波羅提木叉經』的抉擇。承受初期佛法的精義，進一步的安立大乘瑜伽與唯識學。這一根本的，原始的唯識學的特質，是非常明顯的！彌勒還有稱爲「分別」的三部論——『分別中邊論』，『分別法法性論』，『分別瑜伽論』（未譯），都在共三乘的基石上，安立大乘的唯識學。

無著傳述了彌勒學。又總括『瑜伽論』「本地分」與「抉擇分」的要義，而作精簡的『顯揚聖教論』，這是彌勒學的整理。此外，無著還有自己的論

書，主要是稱爲「大乘」的三部論。一、依『阿毘達磨大乘經』「攝大乘品」，造『攝大乘論』。以十種殊勝來總攝大乘要義，是大乘的「攝」論。二、依『阿毘達磨大乘經』（及『瑜伽師地論』），造『大乘阿毘達磨集論』，這是大乘法相的「集」論。三、依『瑜伽師地論』「菩薩地」，取大乘經說而明大乘唯識，造『莊嚴大乘經論』（舊譯名『大乘莊嚴經論』。本論是無著所造，依呂澂考定），這是大乘的「莊嚴」論。在無著的論書中，更多的引用經部師說。風行當時的如來藏說，在『莊嚴大乘經論』中，也有所引用。然依「性種及習種」，安立「種姓差別」，有畢竟不般涅槃的無性人。可見如來藏是心的空性；緣眞如境起無漏智，是所緣緣，而不是無漏功德的因緣性。關於唯識的體系安立，如『莊嚴論』的『所取及能取，二相各三光』（光是顯現的意思）。這是依阿賴耶種子心識，現起所取的器世間，塵，根身；能取的末那，五識，意識。如『攝論』的以「阿賴耶爲義識」，依此而現起的「所受識」（六塵），「身識」，是「相識」；「身者識」（末那），「受者識」（無間滅意），「能受識」（六識），是「見識」。阿賴耶識重於種子，由此而起的「相識」（所取），「見識」（能取），一切都是識，一切以唯識爲性。這一思想系，演爲後代的「一能變」說。無著的論書，在時代佛教的影響下，重大乘，重唯識。在所依的契經中，特重『阿毘達磨大乘經』。

無著發展了唯識學，無著的弟子（也是無著的親弟）世親，給予更嚴正的叙述。世親對說一切有部系的論師與經師的法義，有最充分的理解（如『俱舍

論』）。到了無著晚年，才回心大乘。世親造了很多的大乘論：解釋大乘經的，如『十地經論』，『寶積經論』等；解釋大乘論的，如『地經論』，『寶集經論』等；觀釋大乘論的，如『分別中邊論』，『攝大乘論』，『莊嚴大乘經論』的釋論（依呂澂考定。『大乘阿毘達磨集論』，由世親弟師子覺造釋論）。創作的論書，主要有稱爲「唯識」的兩部論——『二十唯識論』，『三十唯識論』，都是頌文。『二十唯識論』，重在破斥離心的外境實有說；而『三十唯識論』，成立一切唯識現的正義。無著論的成立唯識，以阿賴耶種子識爲本，現起相識與見識，似乎從一心而現起一切，極可能踏上一因論的歧途。所以世親晚年所作的『三十唯識論』，依「三類識變」立論，重視攝持種子的阿賴耶識現行。這是『解深密經』的傳統，彌勒學的本義。如『分別中邊論』，以「虛妄分別」爲依他起性；「三界心心所，是虛妄分別」，依他起並不限於阿賴耶識。說到識變，「識生變似義，有情我及了」（眞諦譯作「本識生似彼」，解說爲一能變說，而梵本但說是「識」），這與「攝抉擇分」所說：「略說有四種業：一、了別器（「義」）業，二、了別依（「有情」根身）業，三、了別我業，四、了別境業。了此諸別，刹那刹那俱轉可得，是故一識於一刹那，有如是等業用差別，不應道理」相合。阿賴耶識了別器界與根身；末那了別（執）我，六識了別六境。從三類識來說變現，說了別。所以，依阿賴耶識而現起一切，或說依心心所而變現一切，其實都是「各從自種子生」。不離識的唯識學，明確的不同於一因論。在無著論的唯識學中，重在賴耶與末那，這

是需要論證的要點。『三十唯識論』，繼承了瑜伽論以自性、所依、所緣、助伴、作業——五門來分別五識與意地的傳統；結合無著論的精義，而以十門等來分別阿賴耶識、末那識與六識。瑜伽大乘的唯識學，到達了更完整的體系。

在唯識學的流傳中，雖然有隨順『攝大乘論』一意識師的學系，如眞諦三藏所傳的。有隨順『莊嚴大乘經論』，依如來藏（法界）而明大乘行果，如堅慧的『寶性論』（這二系，都不會說從眞淨心而生起無明）。然此後唯識大乘的宏揚，主要是依世親的『唯識三十論』。傳有十大論師的注釋，可以想見當時的盛況！世親的弟子中，安慧是精通阿毘達磨的學者，著有『三十唯識論』釋，現有梵本及西藏的譯本。陳那是新因明的建立者，所以這一學系，有「量論」（認識論），「因明論」（論理學）的特長。陳那的弟子護法，著『二十唯識論』釋（名『唯識寶生論』），『三十唯識論』釋。護法的弟子戒賢，在玄奘到印度時，是一百多歲的老上座，被那爛陀寺的學衆，尊稱爲「正法藏」。戒賢的弟子中，也有『三十唯識論』的注釋。玄奘所傳的唯識，屬於這一學系。以護法說爲宗，而擷取諸大論師的精義，糅合爲一部『成唯識論』。這是代表那一時代，集唯識學大成的論書。

從世親到戒賢、玄奘的時代，有二百多年了。在這長期中，論師們引起了種種問題，提出了種種的解說。經典方面，如來藏與阿賴耶識相結合的，如『入楞伽經』，『大乘密嚴經』等，也非常流行。唯識（唯心）法門，有了種種的異說。反映在中國佛教界，就是地論宗，攝論宗，與玄奘所傳的唯識宗立說不同。

玄奘去印度求法，動機是：「誓遊西方以問所惑，幷取十七地論以釋衆疑」。他的疑惑是：「雙林一味之旨，分成當現二常；大乘不共之宗，析爲南北二道。紛紜諍論……莫有匠決」。玄奘是想直探唯識的本源——『瑜伽十七地論』，以抉了當時中國唯心大乘的論諍。玄奘是傳大乘唯識學（被稱爲唯識宗）的，而重心在『瑜伽論』。所以玄奘見到木叉毱多，就問：「此有瑜伽論不」？玄奘親近戒賢，戒賢爲了傳授『瑜伽論』而沒有捨身；玄奘也就請講『瑜伽論』。在那爛陀寺五年中，「聽瑜伽論三遍」。等到玄奘回國，是貞觀十九年正月。五月九日，開始譯『大菩薩藏經』；而在五月十五日，同時就翻譯『瑜伽師地論』。玄奘傳唯識學，而所重的是『瑜伽師地論』；是以彌勒瑜伽的根本大義，作爲大乘唯識正理的準繩。

彌勒論是唯識學的原始說。無著論發展了唯識學，受時代的影響，略有一心論（一能變說，一意識師，心所卽心似現說）的傾向。世親論立「三類識變」說，而復歸於『瑜伽論』的體系。西元五、六世紀，不但唯識的異義衆多，阿賴識與如來藏相結合的傾向，也越來越顯著。玄奘承受了護法、戒賢的學說，融通陶練了契經的有餘說，十大論師的異說，精密抉擇（玄奘曾從勝軍論師，學『唯識抉擇論』），而集唯識學的大成；這就是『成唯識論』。『成唯識論』不說如來藏，以「心之空性」說心性本淨，是世親『唯識三十論』的立場，符順於彌勒『瑜伽師地論』的本義。『成唯識論』的內容，極其廣大，辨析是極其精密。雖攝取了衆師的異說，種種論義，而對

彌勒的瑜伽唯識來說，是極其純正的！這部代表西元七世紀初，唯識大乘正義的聖典；貫通『阿含』，『般若』，而沒有轉化爲本體論的聖典，留下了永久的不朽的價值！

中國是大乘佛教國，對佛法有過卓越的貢獻，並影響了日本、韓、越的佛教。中國所發展的唯心大乘，是本體論的。如華嚴宗說「性起」，禪宗說「性生」（六祖說：「何期自性能生萬法」）；還有天臺宗說「性具」。與緣起論爲宗本的，玄奘所傳的唯識學，並不相同。中國的大乘佛教，有他自己獨創的特色。然從承受於印度的大乘來說，那就不是臺、賢、禪、淨，而是中觀（三論宗）與瑜伽（唯識宗）了。

佛教進入了世界佛教的時代。中國佛教界，要發揚中國所發展的，也應發揚中國所保存的。從印度傳來，保存了印度佛學的勝義，而爲今日中國所獨有的聖典；將之貢獻於世界，應是中國佛教徒的責任！中國所保有，而爲其他佛教界所沒有的，最重要的是：中觀系的『大智度論』；瑜伽系的『成唯識論』（『瑜伽師地論』，西藏也有譯本，還有梵本的「菩薩地」）；還有說一切有部的『大毘婆沙論』。太虛大師曾經提議，把這三大部譯爲藏文，並由法尊法師先譯『大毘婆沙論』（沒有完成），也就是對中國佛教寶藏的珍重！

民國五十六年秋天，中華學術院，召開華學會議，香港韋兼善教授，來臺灣出席。會議終了，來靜室相訪。取出所譯的『英譯成唯識論』，告訴我譯爲英文本的經過，並請我寫一篇序。我欽佩韋教授爲學

的精誠；並爲這部華文佛教所保存的，代表唯識學正義的論書，將傳布西方而歡喜！我想，還是略敍瑜伽唯識的源流，以確切說明『成唯識論』，爲繼承彌勒瑜伽正義的論書，以表示我對『成唯識論』的讚揚，對韋教授譯爲英文的欽仰！

民國五十八年九月一日印順序於臺北報恩小築

序 二

羅時憲居士

(Foreword by Professor Lo Shi-Hin)

或有問於余曰：兼善之重譯成唯識論，吾子實贊成之。其文雅而達，能讀者衆；又聞兼善將以餘年，翻傳十七地論，且已成數卷矣；世之能讀英語者，將隨所應得聞慈氏、世親之教，誠法門之鴻烈也。雖然，法相、唯識，大乘始教，通、別教耳。今兼善爲利有情，令法久住，不先立乎其大者，乃捨圓、頓之實義，而弘五姓之權宗，詎非輕重倒置乎？余應之曰：子獨不聞佛法以方便爲究竟耶？法本離言，佛巧施設，所謂以俗而說眞也。如言取義，滯於一隅，權且不知，實於何有！若因指見月，則三藏十二分教，皆如語也，皆實語也。維摩經云：「佛以一音演說法，衆生各各隨所解。」小根之人聞大乘經，頓根菩薩聞四諦法，都謂世尊開示自乘教義；惟不定姓人，歷有、空、中次第漸悟，始謂世尊說教三時義別。是以本質唯是一音，影像隨乘自變。教既唯一，何始、何別，何實、何權？羅什三藏立一音教，竟無居士謂教一乘三，沙門太虛標八宗平等，最爲善巧；誰有智者而不宗之！

問者復曰：瑜伽法數六百有餘，世親畧錄，猶存一百；治此學者，耽玩名相，疲於思辨，加行既缺，白首無功；奈何奈何？應之曰：本宗觀行法門，燦然大備；吾子知解非劣，何爲出此武斷之言！今當爲子畧陳四事殊勝，令知不可以末流之弊而掩一宗之美也。

此宗西土名瑜伽行派——瑜伽者，觀行也——以實修觀行爲其所長，辨析法相，祇爲修觀之助，一也。無著祖慈氏（慈氏爲一瑜伽行者，無著之師，有學說流傳於世，不可視爲神話中人）以立宗，後此諸師皆奉其言爲宗極，或釋其頌文，或籀其義理；觀護法衡量衆說，悉依大論，玄奘受業那爛，三聽瑜伽，窺基著述繁忙，日誦菩薩戒本，可以思矣。惜現觀莊嚴一論，奘、淨諸師竟未翻傳，遂使此土慈氏學中獨缺般若，於名相之執，乏排遣之功。今蕃本重譯流通，此宗學人境界更寬，觀行要約，性相互融，精髓充實（太虛大師謂「得斯論而般若之眉目朗，瑜伽之精髓充」），將不曰法相宗、唯識宗等，而曰慈氏宗、慈氏學矣。若此者，義理精微，觀深行廣，實際顯現，功不唐捐，二也。法相、天台、華嚴，號稱教下三家。天台喜言實相，實相豈離般若？今本宗有現觀莊嚴，由此以溝通天台，去其矛盾，將相得而益彰，息諍論於千載。華賢尚談緣起，談緣起者不出緣生如幻與唯心所現二途。觀其義理，蓋於後者爲近。故清涼疏鈔華嚴，取資唯識；而四法界、六相、十玄門諸義，又必解以唯識，方不落玄學窠臼。是則慈氏學有融貫台賢二宗之利，三也。當今民智大開，一切行持軌則，苟無實證爲依，必須理無矛盾。有唯識爲義據，則淨土宗乃不同於神話，祕密宗有異於事火咒龍。言戒律者，首重戒體。自古釋戒體者，或言是色，或言非色非心；至道宣律師，依唯識義，謂受戒時所熏思種子以爲戒體，然後說乃周圓。是則本宗能予律宗以理論依據，四也。

問者復曰：此宗典籍浩繁，文義深奧，諸師異解

或復紛歧，使初學者望洋向若；亦有精實省要之書，堪爲入德之門者乎？應之曰：昔慈氏採三藏十二分教要義，而說大乘婆沙，名曰瑜伽師地；無著採集瑜伽精實而作顯揚聖教、攝大乘、阿毘達磨集論。世親又採諸經論中唯識要義，以造三十伽陀，所謂「集千訓於一言」者也。自爾十師輩出，疏釋聯翩，各據一端，義難偏勝；玄奘、窺基，折中十家之說，奉護法爲指南，去盡繁言，具存精實，是曰成唯識論。吾子之所欲求者，其即此乎！

書成付梓，問序於余；爲省構思，因次是語，以附簡末。

羅　時　憲
一九七三年三月廿日於
法相學會研究室

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

I can remember a time in my early boyhood, and even in my youth, when my mind was filled with wonder at the mystery of life, of the outer world of appearances, and of the inner world of consciousness. While the outer world with its multifarious phenomena and events appeared to be constantly changing and constantly evolving, my inner world appeared to be *terra incognita* out of which mysterious visitors – feelings, thoughts, ideas and fancies, desires and impulses – emerged and vanished, without my knowing whence they came and whither they went. These fleeting mental manifestations may be likened to the flights of a swan as conceived by the illustrious Indian mystic and poet, Kabir:

> Tell me, O Swan, your ancient tale.
> From what land do you come, O Swan?
>   to what shore will you fly?
> Where would you take your rest, O Swan?
>   and what is it you seek?[1]

My desire to understand the mysterious mind and its activities led me to the study of Western philosophy and metaphysics and the Chinese classics, especially the *I-Ching*. The latter took me quite a number of years to unravel its mysteries and to probe its depths.

Later, through the influence of kindred minds among my friends and associates, I became interested in the study of Buddhism. After reading a number of *sutras* and *sastras*, I found the Wei-shih (Mere-Consciousness) School highly important and enlightening and congenial to my disposition.

However, in studying the Wei-shih School, especially the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* of Master Hsüan Tsang, I had a rather tantalizing experience. While its teachings fascinated me, its subtle analysis and its terminology were not easily comprehensible, not that the many Chinese words were unfamiliar, but they were used with different implications and invested with a novel intellectual or spiritual meaning.

A great opportunity for me to understand the doctrines of that school and to solve my doubts about the nature, the characteristics, and the activities of human consciousness was vouchsafed to me in 1937, a few years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, when the Venerable Abbot T'ai-hsu,[2] the most eminent of Buddhist leaders in modern China, came to Hong Kong on his way to Europe for a lecture tour. During his sojourn here, he gave a course of lectures on the Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness at the Hong Kong Buddhist Association, using as his text the booklet, *Pa-shih Kuei-chu Sung*[3] composed byMaster

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[1] R. Tagore, tr., *One hundred Poems of Kabir* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 12

[2] 太虛大師 [3] 八識規矩頌

Hsüan Tsang. I attended the whole series of lectures and became his disciple.

Another opportunity came in 1953 when the Hong Kong Lotus Association[1] invited Professor Lo Shi-Hin,[2] a brilliant and dedicated Buddhist scholar, to conduct regular weekly classes in Chinese for a full exposition of the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun*, the most profound and fundamental treatise on the Yogacara or Vijnaptimatrata School of Buddhism. The whole course covered ten full years. I attended most of the lectures. As supplements thereto, I also studied and consulted books and articles by Chinese and Japanese authors on the same subject, endeavouring to acquire as thorough an understanding of it as possible.

Professor Lo is a graduate of the Chung Shan University, Canton, with a Master of Arts degree in Buddhist philosophy. He first came in contact with Buddhism when he attended the expository lectures of Abbot Pao-ching[3] of the T'ien T'ai School on the *Saddharma-Pundarika Sutra*[4] in Hua-lin Monastery,[5] Canton, in 1924. Thereafter he made a thorough study of the *sutras* and *sastras* of many schools under various dharma-masters, including the Venerable Abbot T'ai-hsu whom he met in Canton and whose lectures on Buddhism in the Sui and T'ang dynasties and on Vasubandhu's *Thirty Stanzas on Mere-consciousness*[6] he attended. Afterwards, he became the Abbot's disciple and, following the latter's personal instructions, devoted himself whole-heartedly to the study of the *sutras* and *sastras* of both the Sunyata and the Yogacara School. He was, however, specially interested in the latter, i.e., the Wei-shih School.

At the Institute of Buddhist Philosophy at the Chung Shan University in Kunming, Professor Lo majored in Buddhism. He studied under Professor Chan Chuk-t'ung,[7] who had at one time studied Buddhist scriptures under Ou-yang Ching-wu[8] in the Chinese Metaphysical Institute (*Chih-na Nei-hsüeh Yüan*[9]), and who later studied Hinayana Buddhism under Professor Taiken Kimura[10] when in Toyko. After the termination of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945, Professor Chan, before returning to his native province, presented to Professor Lo the complete set of lecture notes he had taken in the course of his studies in the Metaphysical Institute. This has facilitated in no small measure Professor Lo's understanding of Mahayana *sastras*.

Coming back to the weekly classes at the Lotus Association here in Hong Kong, I should mention that, at the beginning, the expostion of the first part of the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun*, particularly that part dealing with Dharmagraha[11] and the refutation of the doctrines of the non-Buddhist and the Hinayana Schools, was very difficult to understand, since the arguments were both intricate and abstruse. Then again, K'uei Chi's[12] Preface to the Text, which was replete with metaphysical meanings and historical allusions, was profound enough to bewilder many members of the class. Furthermore, the ancient classical language and style in which Master Hsüan Tsang and Master K'uei

[1] 香海蓮社 [2] 羅時憲 [3] 寶靜法師 [4] 妙法蓮華經 [5] 華林寺 [6] 世親唯識三十頌
[7] 陳竺同 [8] 歐陽竟無 [9] 支那內學院 [10] 木村泰賢 [11] 法執 [12] 窺基大師

Chi composed the Treatise were quite beyond the comprehension of simple and untrained minds. It was in these circumstances that I conceived the idea of rendering the Text into straightforward English, and thus possibly facilitating its comprehension by future students who knew both languages or only English. I resolved to make the attempt. Little by little, the first drafts of my translation accumulated. The work, far from being easy and smooth, involved extensive research on the original Sanskrit terms and expressions corresponding to the Chinese ones. I had also to make an intensive study of K'uei Chi's commentary and other scholars' sub-commentaries as well as of the Sanskrit language and Buddhist Logic in order to gain a clear understanding of the Text and to enable me to embody explanatory quotations from those works in my translation. Then again, there was no complete English translation to which I could refer, only the translation of some portions of the Treatise made by Dr. Wing-Tsit Chan and published in his *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, and the translation of a larger portion embodied in Dr. Derk Bodde's English version of Dr. Fung Yu-lan's *A History of Chinese Philosophy*. The only complete translation was in French — by the late De La Vallée Poussin, but it contains such a host of original Sanskrit terms that the reader, unless he is well versed with Sanskrit, is not greatly enlightened. From all these translations I have derived valuable help, and I am particularly indebted to De La Vallée Poussin for a large number of Sanskrit terms which I was not able to obtain from other sources. In conclusion, I must add that I am well aware of my intellectual limitations for a task of such magnitude and profundity. Fortunately, as the work progressed and as I grew more familiar with the language and meaning of the Text, I made much faster progress, and, by the time I came to Book IX, in which the Five Stages of the Holy Path toward Perfection, with the Ten 'Lands' *(Bhumis)*,[1] the Ten 'Perfections' *(Paramitas)*,[2] and the Four 'Transcendental Wisdoms' *(Jnanas)*,[3] are described and expounded, the translation became not only easier but even absorbing and inspiring.

In the course of those fifteen or more years that have elapsed since I embarked on this great venture, there were two lengthy parentheses. The first was due to my preoccupation with the preparation for publication of my first book, *An Exposition of the I-Ching*, and the second to my conviction that my work, even if completed and published, would, owing to its profound and abstruse character, be read and appreciated only by a very small circle of Buddhologists and scholars. It would, in other words, have been a case of love's labour lost. But, spurred on by the encouragement of Professor Lo and some good friends, I resumed my work and brought it to completion.

While, in this translation, I have given of my best, I cherish no illusions about having done full justice to the original. At least, I hope I have brought out the essential teachings of the lengthy Treatise. If thereby I have, even in a modest way, helped aspirants along the path toward Enlightenment, I shall consider my labours well rewarded.

[1] 十地 [2] 十波羅蜜多 [3] 四智

To conclude, I regret that, in order to facilitate the printing of the Sanskrit terms, I have had to forego the use of letters with diacritical marks except in the case of the original Thirty Stanzas which are contained in the preliminary part of the book.

WEI TAT

Fontana Gardens
Causeway Hill
Hong Kong
January 1973

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INTRODUCTION

In accord with its spiritual tenor, Buddhism was introduced into China in response to a mystic prompting. Ming Ti (58–75 A.D.), Emperor of the Later Han dynasty, one night had a strange dream in which he saw a deity flying in front of his palace and spreading golden rays. The following morning he inquired of his ministers what was the meaning of the dream. One of them ventured the interpretation that the deity might be the Buddha, the Enlightened One, who might be coming from India to China. The Emperor readily accepted this rather bold interpretation. Eager for knowledge and enlightenment, he sent messengers to India to make inquiries. The upshot was the arrival in China in 67 A.D. of Kashyapa Matanga[1] and other Indian scholars bearing with them images of Buddha and Buddhist *sutras*.

Thus was Buddhism introduced into China under royal auspices and in the most favourable circumstances. The new ideas must have created an intellectual ferment and aroused the curiosity of the Chinese. In the following two centuries, more Buddhist teachers came to China from central Asia as well as from India, and some Chinese even attempted to travel to India to study Buddhism. According to the records, the first Chinese who went to India in search of sacred scriptures was Chu Shih-hsing.[2] He left China in 260 and brought back the *Prajna-paramita sutras*,[3] later translated into Chinese as the *Fan Kuang Pan Yo Ching*,[4] whose main teaching is that the self-nature of all things is empty and impermanent. The next Chinese Buddhist pilgrim to India was Fa Hsien.[5] He left for India through central Asia in 399, travelled and studied in that country for nearly ten years, and returned by the sea route in 414. He brought back the *Vinaya*,[6] Rules of Discipline.

The fine examples set by these two pioneers were followed by many other Buddhists in subsequent centuries, but without fruitful results. It was not until the third decade of the 7th century that an eminent figure appeared whose pilgrimage to India was really 'astonishing'.

This was Hsüan Tsang[7] (596–664), a native of Loyang in Honan province. Perhaps influenced by his elder brother who was a Buddhist monk, he entered a monastery when but thirteen years old. He soon developed an intense interest in the study of the Buddhist scriptures, and avidly absorbed the wisdom of the eminent Dharma masters in Loyang and later in Changan in Shensi province. Both cities were simultaneously capitals of China during the T'ang dynasty (618–906), and hence centres of culture. In the course of his studies, however, Hsüan Tsang learned that the Buddhist scriptures available in China were far from complete. Moreover, his penetrating and perspicacious mind detected that there was a wide divergence of doctrinal interpretation on the part of his teachers. He was bewildered and unable to determine which interpretations should be accepted as correct. At the same time, he had heard of the *Yoga-*

[1] 迦葉摩騰 [2] 朱士行 [3] 般若波羅密經 [4] 放光般若經 [5] 法顯 [6] 律藏 [7] 玄奘大師

caryabhumi-sastra[1] which had not as yet been introduced into China and which, he was told, would solve all his doubts and perplexities. This *sastra* was taught by Lord Maitreya[2] (the future Buddha) first to Asanga[3] who later passed it on to his brilliant brother, Vasubandhu.[4] The two brothers lived – according to most authorities – in the latter part of the 4th century A.D. and were co-founders of the Yogacara School, called *Wei-shih* (Mere-Consciousness) School by the Chinese and centred around the doctrine that nothing exists except in the consciousness. This school was one of the two chief schools of Mahayana Buddhism at that time, the other being the Madhyamika or Sunyata School[5] founded by Nagarjuna[6] and called San-lun School[7] by the Chinese The central doctine of the Madhyamika school is that all is void and every object is but an empty show.

With his heart yearning for the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra*, Hsüan Tsang made a firm resolution to go to India to find it and study it at first hand. Prior to his departure, he petitioned the imperial court for permission to leave the country. To his great disappointment, the petition was turned down. Unshaken in his resolution, he then ventured to embark upon the journey secretly.

In 629, at the age of thirty-three, he started from Lanchow in Kansu province with two Chinese monks as escorts. However, no sooner had the journey commenced than the escorts showed signs of succumbing to the hardships and were sent away. He later found a non-Chinese guide who promised aid in overcoming various dangers on the way. After helping him cross a wide river, even the guide became disheartened and asked to be allowed to withdraw. Hsüan Tsang then decided to press on alone. The prospects were dark. He had to pass several watch towers before leaving Chinese territory behind, and he was in constant fear of arrest. Fortunately, some captains of the border guards sympathized with his noble aspirations and helped him on his way, far from hindering him. Nevertheless, innumerable dangers and difficulties were to beset him. For days he trudged along between sky and desert without any sign of living creatures. As water ran low, he once almost died of thirst. At another time, he was sorely harassed by demons. On both occasions, he was saved only by the miraculous intervention of Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara (Kuan Yin),[8] whose *Prajnaparamitahrdaya Sutra* he recited fervently.

After enduring almost unbearable hardships which sorely taxed his physical resistance, he reached a place called Yiwu[9] where he obtained some much-needed relief from some Chinese monks in a monastery. By an even more fortunate chance, an envoy from the king of Kaochang[10] was there and became acquainted with him. Upon hearing of Hsüan Tsang's presence, the king immediately sent envoys to invite him to court. Hsüan Tsang accepted the invitation. When he reached the court, the king was so pleased with his personality and his exposition of the Dharma that he insisted on his giving up his mission and staying on at court. It was only when he went on hunger strike as a protest and was at death's door that the king finally relented and generously smoothed his path. Apart from giving him large quantities of gold and silver and other valuable presents, the king also provided him with escorts and carriers as well as twenty-four letters of introduction to as many kingdoms or khanates through which he had to pass. With such assistance and equipment, Hsüan Tsang naturally pursued his journey with more confidence, but by no means with greater ease and comfort. He still had to cross vast deserts and high snow-laden mountains. In the desert, there was hardly any water to be had. In the mountains, the paths were usually steep and narrow and were sometimes even obstructed for months by ice. Moreover, he and his party were often set upon by robbers. Even after he crossed into India from Afghanistan through the Hindu Kush, he suffered several such attacks. On one such occasion, he lost his belongings; on another, he almost died a martyr to his faith and escaped only by the skin of his teeth.

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[1] 瑜伽師地論 [2] 彌勒世尊 [3] 無著 [4] 世親 [5] 空宗 [6] 龍樹 [7] 三論宗 [8] 觀音
[9] 伊吾 [10] 高昌國

During his long stay in India, he paid homage to all the holy sites associated with the life of the Lord Buddha and worshipped the holy relics. His footprints, therefore, covered a large part of India and Ceylon. He also visited numerous monasteries where he collected *sutras* and *sastras* and, humbly placed himself under the tuition of various Dharma masters.

In 633, after three years of travel, he came to the famous Nalanda Monastery near the city of Rajagrha. The head of the monastery was the Venerable Silabhadra,[1] then 106 years old and noted for his understanding of the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra*. Hsüan Tsang worshipped at his feet and offered himself as a pupil. He was graciously accepted and offered special privileges while staying in the monastery. He thus found himself well placed to gratify the ardent aspiration of his soul, namely, to study the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra*. He stayed in the monastery for a total of about five years – in three separate periods. The Venerable Silabhadra expounded the *sastra* to him three times, and also helped him in the study of other Buddhist scriptures.

While in Nalanda, Hsüan Tsang also had the good luck of becoming a friend of Hsüan Chien,[2] a lay Buddhist. The latter was the patron of Dharmapala,[3] the most celebrated commentator of the *Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-trimsika* by Vasubandhu.[4] After the death of Dharmapala, he presented the commentary to Hsüan Tsang. As will be noted presently, the *Trimsika* later became the basis of Hsüan Tsang's masterpiece, the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun*.

The most memorable and significant event during Hsüan Tsang's long stay in India was his upholding of the Mahayanist doctrines in the debate with the Hinayanist and Brahmanic scholars at a place called Kanyakubja.[5] The occasion was a very solemn one. The debate was attended by eighteen kings in India and by thousands of monks and scholars. As Hsüan Tsang emerged triumphant, his prestige was greatly enhanced and honours and gifts were heaped upon him.

After this great event, Hsüan Tsang decided to return to China, from which he had been absent for seventeen years. Accordingly, he sent a messenger to

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[1] 戒賢 [2] 玄鑑 [3] 護法 [4] 世親唯識三十頌 [5] 曲女城

Changan with a letter to the imperial court. The court in its reply readily pardoned him his past misdemeanour and urged him to return. When, after a long and trying journey, he at last arrived in Changan in 645 with loads of Buddhist scriptures and images of Buddha and numerous gifts, he was accorded a warm and joyous welcome. Not long afterwards, Emperor T'ai Tsung granted him an audience and was greatly impressed by his serene personality and Buddhist learning. The Emperor offered him a high post in the government, but he declined it, saying that he wished to devote the rest of his life to the translation of Buddhist *sutras* and *sastras*. In subsequent years, though he held no official post, he was often invited by the Emperor to stay in the palace for weeks on end. He also frequently accompanied the Emperor in the latter's travels between the two capitals: Loyang and Changan. Few monks in history ever enjoyed such high royal esteem and favour.

Hsüan Tsang worked on his translations under the most favourable auspices. At the outset, the Emperor instructed the prime minister to provide all the necessary facilities. He was first lodged in the Hung Fu Monastery,[1] the best in the capital. Later, the Crown Prince (subsequently known as Kao Tsung), when erecting the Tzu En Monastery[2] in memory of his mother, built a house nearby specially for Hsüan Tsang. Later still, Hsüan Tsang pursued his work in various palaces, including the Chi Tsui Palace[3] in Loyang and the Yu Hua Palace,[4] the Emperor's summer resort in the mountains. Basking thus in the royal favour, he enjoyed full and free scope for the exercise of his profound erudition and the flowering of his genius.

By the end of his life in 664, he had completed the translation of 74 works in 1,355 Chinese volumes (*chüans*), including the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra* in 100 volumes. His favourite and major work is the *Ch'eng Wei-shih-Lun* (Treatise on the Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness) based on the *Trimsika* by Vasubandhu, one of two founders of the Yogacara or Vijnaptimatrata School of Mahayana Buddhism. The *Trimsika* consists of thirty stanzas on the doctrine of Mere-Consciousness. It is composed – according to the best authorities – on the basis of the teachings of six *sutras* and eleven *sastras*. The six *sutras* are 1. the *Avatamsaka Sutra*; 2. the *Samdhinirmocana Sutra*; 3. the *Tathagatagunalamkara Sutra*: 4. the *Mahayanabhidharma Sutra*; 5. the *Lankavatara Sutra*; and 6. the *Ghanavyuha Sutra*.[5] The eleven *sastras* are 1. the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra*; 2. *the Aryadesanavikhyapana-sastra*; 3. the *Mahayana-Sutralamkara-sastra*; 4. the *Pramasamuccaya-sastra*; 5. the *Mahayana-Samparigraha-sastra*; 6. the *Dasabhumi-Sutra-sastra*; 7. the *Vikalpa-Yogacara-sastra*; 8. the *Alambanapariksa-sastra*; 9. the *Vimatikakarika*; 10. the *Madhy-anta-vibhaga sastra*; 11. the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*.[6]

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[1] 弘福寺 [2] 慈恩寺 [3] 積翠宮 [4] 玉華宮

[5] 六 經： 1 大方廣佛華嚴經 2 解深密經 3 如來出現功德經
4 大乘阿毘達磨經 5 楞伽經 6 厚嚴經

[6] 十一論： 1 瑜伽師地論 2 揚顯聖教論 3 大乘莊嚴論 4 集量論
5 攝大乘論 6 十地經論 7 分別瑜伽論 8 觀所緣緣論
9 二十唯識論 10 辨中邊論 11 阿毘達磨集論

Realizing that his *Trimsika* was replete with intricate and profound meanings, Vasubandhu had intended to write his own commentary on it, but he died before attempting to do so. Subsequently the task of expounding the philosophy underlying the thirty stanzas devolved upon a galaxy of ten *sastra*-masters who each composed a commentary on them. These ten *sastra*-masters are 1. Dharmapala; 2. Sthiramati; 3. Cittrabhanu; 4. Nanda; 5. Gunamati; 6. Jinamitra; 7. Jnanacandra; 8. Bandhusri; 9. Shuddhacandra; and 10. Jinapura.[1]

The *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* is a creative and elaborate exposition of the *Trimsika* and a synthesis of its ten commentaries. It received the most careful attention of Hsüan Tsang and his most eminent disciple K'uei Chi.[2] It represents the flower of their literary and spiritual genius. It was received with acclaim by later scholars who extolled it as a work of outstanding excellence and as the cornerstone of the doctrine of the Wei-shih or Yogacara School.

Apart from the translations, Hsüan Tsang had also painted one thousand images of the Lord Buddha and one thousand images of Lord Maitreya in addition to copying certain *sutras* thousands of times, giving alms to more than ten thousand of the poor, lighting thousands of sacrificial lamps, and converting to Buddhism thousands of people in central Asia and India, as well as in China. His abundant achievements, together with his extraordinary experiences while on the way to India and in India, rendered his life resplendent with spiritual glory and significance and entitled him to be respected as a charismatic luminary of the Buddhist world.

It was to K'uei Chi, the most gifted of his many disciples, that Hsüan Tsang entrusted the transmission of the doctrine of Vasubandhu. As a matter of fact, the Fa-hsiang (Dharmalaksana, i.e., Vijinaptimatrata) School was founded chiefly by K'uei Chi, whose five important works, namely, *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun Shu-chi'*[3] *Fa-yüan-i-lin-chang*,[4] *Wei-shih-shu-yao*,[5] *Wei-shih-pieh-ch'ao*,[6] and *Wei-shih Liao-chien*[7] are the fundamental texts of the School. He was also author of the commentaries on the *Wei-shih Erh Shih Lun* (the *Vimsatika*)[8] and the *Abhidharma-samuccaya*.[9]

Hsüan Tsang's personal influence and his vast accumulation of translations no doubt provided a powerful impetus for the propagation of Buddhism in China and prepared the soil for a rich harvest. In fact, during the one hundred and fifty years after his death, Buddhism continued to advance and expand. The steady growth eventually aroused the jealousy of the Confucianists and even more of the Taoists. At the dawn of the 9th century, the Taoist and Confucian scholars began to submit memorials to the Throne denouncing the spread of Buddhism. A reaction thus set in, culminating in the systematic suppression of Buddhism, the secularization of Buddhist monks, and the confiscation of Buddhist properties in the fateful year 845. As a result, Buddhism, and especially the four philosophical schools (Wei-shih, San-lun,[1] T'ien-t'ai,[2] and Hua-yen[3]), declined in the succeeding centuries.

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[1] 十大論師： 1 護法 2 安慧 3 火辨 4 難陀 5 德慧
6 勝友 7 智月 8 親勝 9 淨月 10 最勝子

[2] 窺基 [3] 成唯識論述記 [4] 法苑義林章 [5] 唯識樞要

[6] 唯識別鈔 [7] 唯識料簡 [8] 唯識二十論 [9] 阿毗達磨集論

The decline, however, only meant that Buddhism had lost the political struggle with Taoism and Confucianism. It did not reflect adversely on its intrinsic merits as a religion. In that respect, two facts should be stressed. First, Buddhism continued to exert its influence in China after 845, if only indirectly – through Taosim and Confucianism. It is generally agreed that Taoism borrowed heavily from Buddhism; in fact it was under Buddhist influence that Taoism evolved from a religion to a philosophy. Confucianism, for its part, assumed a new form during the succeeding Sung dynasty under Buddhist influence. Liang Ch'i-ch'iao,[4] an outstanding modern Chinese scholar, went as far as to say that Neo-Confucianism was nothing but Buddhism in disguise.

Secondly, the intrinsic merits of the Wei-shih School of Buddhism actually gave rise to its revival in modern times in China. The prime mover of the revival was Yang Wen-hui,[5] better known as Yang Jen-shan.[6] He was born in Anhwei province in 1837, two years before the outbreak of the Opium War. After the Taiping Rebellion broke out in 1850, his family moved from Peking to Hangchow. One day, while walking along the shores of the West Lake, he noticed in a bookshop a copy of *Ta-ch'eng Ch'i-hsin Lun*[7] (The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana). He bought it and took it home. It made an indelible impression on him. Although he belonged to a family of Confucian scholars, he made up his mind to dedicate himself to the cause of Buddhism. His thirst for more *sutras* and *sastras* led him to seek them everywhere.

While in London in 1878, he met Professor Max Müller and became acquainted with the latter's Japanese pupil, Nanjio Bunjiu,[8] who was at that time preparing a catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka. According to Yang's biography, the *Hsien-tsu Jen-shan-kung chih sheng-p'ing* (The Life of my Grandfather Jen-shan),[9] by Buwai Yang Chao, it was in 1890 that he wrote to Nanjio soliciting his help in collecting Buddhist books for him in Japan. As a result, a kinsman of his wife's, who was an official in the Chinese Embassy in Japan, brought back to him hundreds of Buddhist texts that were not in the Chinese Tripitaka. Strange to relate, the collection actually included K'uei Chi's authoritative commentary (the *Shu Chi*)[10] on Hsüan Tsang's *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* that had long been lost in China. Included in the collection were also the well-known commentary by Tun Lun on the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra*,[11] K'uei Chi's *Fa-yüan-i-lin-chang*, and two works on Buddhist formal logic, namely, Dignaga's *Hetucakra*[12] and K'uei Chi's great commentary on Samkarasvamin's *Nyayapravesaka*.[13] It was some of these great books, especially K'uei Chi's commentary, that brought about the revival of the Wei-shih School of Buddhism in China.

After the publication of K'uei Chi's *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun Shu-chi* in 1901,

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[1] 三論宗 [2] 天台宗 [3] 華嚴宗 [4] 梁啓超 [5] 楊文會 [6] 楊仁山 [7] 大乘起信論

[8] 南條文雄 [9] 先祖仁山公之生平 [10] 述記 [11] 遁倫：瑜伽師地論記

[12] 陳那：因輪論 [13] 窺基：商羯羅主因明入正理論疏

Yang Wen-hui encouraged his two disciples, Ou-yang Ching-wu[1] and Mei Kuang-hsi,[2] to devote themselves to the revival of the Wei-shih School and the propagation of its teachings. Their efforts were greatly reinforced by the participation, if not co-operation, in this same field of activity of Abbot T'ai-hsu,[3] one of the greatest Dharma masters in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Later on, Han Ch'ing-tsing,[4] an eminent scholar already well-known for his profound understanding of the Wei-shih Doctrine, also played an important role in its revival. In this way, the four eminent scholars became the leading figures in the revival of the Wei-shih School. Animating them all was the spirit of Yang Wen-hui, through whose influence such other famous scholars as K'ang Yu-wei,[5] Chang T'ai-yen,[6] Lu Ch'ing,[7] T'an Ssu-t'ung,[8] Liang Ch'i-ch'ao,[9] and Liang Sou-ming,[10] also became interested in the study of Buddhism, particularly the Wei-shih philosophy. His life-mission fulfilled, Yang Yen-hui died in 1911 at the age of seventy-five.

Yang's vow to promote and develop the Wei-shih School was fulfilled in generous measure by his disciples and supporters. Thus, Ou-yang established his Chinese Metaphysical Institute (*Chih-na Nei-hsüeh Yüan*)[11] in Nanking; Han Ch'ing-tsing his *San-shih* Study Society in Peking,[12] and Abbot T'ai-hsu the *Wu-chang Fo-hsüeh Yüan*,[13] for the study and exposition of Wei-shih philosophy. Ou-yang's published works included his introductions to the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra*, K'uei Chi's *Commentary on the Abhidharma-samuccaya*, Vasubandhu's *Commentary on the Samparigraha-sastra*, and the *Buddhabhumi-sutra-sastra*. They included also a biography of Yang Wen-hui, the Nei-Hsüeh,[14] and a booklet on Vijnaptimatrata entitled *Wei-shih Chüeh-tse-t'an*.[15] Han was famous for his *Shu-i-liang*,[16] a book of ten chapters on Wei-shih philosophy, and a detailed commentary on the *Yogacaryabhumi-sastra* known as the *Yu-cha-shih-ti-lun-pi-chin-chi*.[17]

Abbot T'ai-hsu's complete works (*T'ai-hsu-ta-shih Ch'üan-shu*)[18] were published in sixty-four Chinese volumes in Hong Kong in 1953, many of them expounding the Wei-shih School of Buddhist philosophy. Particularly worthy of study is his work in two volumns called *Fa-hsiang Wei-shih Hsüeh*.[19]

It may be added here that Hsüan Tsang's *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* and K'uei Chi's *Shu Chi* also greatly influenced the eminent scholar Hsiung Shih-li's[20] writings on Wei-shih philosophy and enabled him to make a unique contribution to the revival of that philosophy in China. He wrote many books on the doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata, the most outstanding of which are his *Hsin Wei-shih Lun* (New *Wei-shih Lun*),[21] *Shih-li Yu-yao*,[22] and *Fo-chia Ming-hsiang T'ung-shih*.[23]

As a result, since the beginning of the present century, the activities of the Vijnaptimatrata School have become more wide-spread and far-reaching, covering many provinces with centres in Peking, Shanghai, Nanking, Wuchang, Hankow, and Amoy. Buddhist associations and institutes were formed in increasing numbers. The expounding of *sutras* and *sastras* no longer remained the unique privilege of monks in temples but was undertaken by increasing numbers of scholars and lay Buddhists, including such distinguished personalities as Chang T'ai-yen, Huang Ch'an-hua,[1] Ch'en Yin-k'o,[2] Chou Shu-chia,[3] T'ang Yung-t'ung,[4] Chiang Wei-ch'iao,[5] Miu Feng-lin,[6] and Ching Chang-chi.[7] These scholars of the Wei-shih School were untiring in delivering lectures in universities, Buddhist associations, and colleges, writing pamplets, and contributing articles to Buddhist journals and other publications.

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[1] 歐陽竟無 [2] 梅光羲 [3] 太虛大師 [4] 韓清淨 [5] 康有爲 [6] 章太炎 [7] 呂澂
[8] 譚治同 [9] 梁啓超 [10] 梁漱溟 [11] 支那內學院 [12] 三時學會 [13] 武昌佛學院
[14] 內學 [15] 唯識決擇談 [16] 十量義 [17] 瑜伽師地論披尋記 [18] 太虛大師全書
[19] 法相唯識學 [20] 熊十力 [21] 新唯識論 [22] 十力語要 [23] 佛家名相通釋

In Japan, the development of the Wei-shih school of philosophy is progressing rapidly, as is attested by the writings of such eminent scholars as Sir Charles Elliot, Dr. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki,[8] Dr. Junjiro Takakusu,[9] Prof. Taiken Kimura,[10] Dr. Senjo Murakami,[11] and Dr. Taiji Tokiwa.[12] Pramatha's[13] Chinese translation of the Wei-shih treatise, *Chuan-shih Lun*,[14] or *Tenjiki Ron* in Japanese, has recently been translated into English by Mr. Shyuki Yoshimura[15] and Mr. Harold N. Oda. Prior to that a Japanese edition of the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* was published (with Japanese inter-linear annotations) by Bhikshu Seikyo[16] under the title of *Kuan-tao Tseng-pu Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun.*[17] A Mantrayana master, Laifu Gonda[18] by name, also published a Japanese commentary in three volumes on the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* entitled *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun Ping Shu-chi Chang-chung Tu-tuan.*[19]

In Taipei, capital of the Republic of China, many books and pamplets have also been published in recent years expounding the teachings of the Wei-shih school of philosophy, and articles by great scholars have appeared in the three principal Buddhist monthlies there, as well as in the *Hwakang Buddhist Journal*,[20] published by the Institute of Buddhist Philosophy. Of special significance is the brief and understandable commentary on the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* by Abbot P'u-hsing[21] published in serial form in the magazine *Shih-tzu Hou*[22] under the tile of *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun Yen-hsi.*[23]

Finally, it may be mentioned that the study of the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* by Buddhists in Hong Kong led to the formation of the Dharmalaksana Buddhist Institute[24] in 1964. Weekly lectures have been given by its President, Professor Lo Shih-Hin, at which the Samdhinirmocana Sutra[25] is expounded. As mentioned in the translator's Preface, it was his attendance of the weekly Wei-shih sessions over a period of ten full years from 1953 to 1963 (before the formation of that Institute) that led him to attempt the present translation of the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun.*

[1] 黄懺華
[2] 陳寅恪
[3] 周叔迦
[4] 湯用彤
[5] 蔣維喬
[6] 繆鳳林
[7] 景昌極
[8] 大拙鈴木
[9] 高楠順次郎
[10] 木村泰賢
[11] 村上專精
[12] 常盤大定
[13] 眞諦
[14] 轉識論
[15] 茅村修基
[16] 比丘旭雅
[17] 冠導增補成唯識論
[18] 權田雷斧
[19] 成唯識論並述記帳中獨斷
[20] 華岡佛學學報
[21] 普行法師
[22] 獅子吼
[23] 成唯識論研習
[24] 法相學會
[25] 解深密經

SYNOPSIS

In preparing this work for publication, the translator is aware of its intricate nature as well as of its length which may deter the reader. For this reason, he has considered it desirable to preface it by a synopsis of its essential points and thus facilitate comprehension.

Vasubandhu's *Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-trimsika* consists, as its title indicates, of thirty stanzas, of which the first twenty-four are devoted to the explanation of the specific characteristics (*svalaksana*) of all dharmas; the next two to the explanation of the essential nature (*svabhava*) of all dharmas; and the last four to the description of the five stages of the Holy Path leading to the attainment of Buddhahood.

Hs'üan Tsang's *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun*, which is a complete Chinese version of the *Trimsika* with the addition of explanations digested from ten important Indian commentaries, comprises one hundred Chinese volumes (*chüans*), but it may conveniently be divided into nine Books, each dealing with some specified subject or subjects treated in the *Trimsika.*

BOOK I

ATMAN-ADHESION & DHARMA-ADHESION

In Stanzas 1 and 2a, Vasubandhu opens his disquisition with the following pronouncement:

> Concepts of Atman and dharmas do not imply the existence of a real Atman and real dharmas, but are merely fictitious constructions [produced by numerous causes].
>
> Because of this, all varieties of phenomenal appearances and qualities arise.
>
> The phenomena of Atman and dharmas are [all mental representations] based on the manifestation and transformation of consciousness.
>
> Consciousnesses capable of unfolding or manifesting themselves may be grouped in three general categories:
>
> (1) The consciousness whose fruits (retribution) mature at varying times (i.e., the eighth or 'Storehouse' consciousness or Alayavijnana); (2) the consciousness that cogitates or deliberates (i.e., the seventh or thought-centre consciousness or Manas);

> And (3) the consciousness that perceives and discriminates between spheres of objects (i.e., the sixth or sense-centre consciousness or Manovijnaṉa and the five sense consciousnesses).

In his Treatise, Master Hs'üan Tsang introduces two conceptions of 'manifestation of consciousness' in the following terms:

> 1. Manifestation (*parinama*) indicates that what essentially constitutes consciousness (that is to say, its substance, the *samvittibhaga*), when it is born, manifests itself in two functional divisions (*bhagas*), namely, image and perception, i.e., the object perceived (or perceived division) and the perceiving faculty (or perceiving division) (*nimittabhaga* and *darsanabhaga*). These divisions arise out of a third division called the 'self-witness' or the 'self-corroboratory division' (*samvittibhaga*) which constitutes their 'essential substance'. It is on the basis of these two functional divisions that Atman and dharmas are established, for they have no other basis.
>
> 2. Manifestation of consciousness means also that the inner consciousness manifests itself in what seems to be an external sphere of objects. By virtue of the 'perfuming' energy (*vasana*) deposited in the mind by wrong concepts (*vikalpa*) of Atman-dharmas, the consciousnesses, on becoming active, develop into the semblance of Atman and dharmas. Although the phenomena of Atman and dharmas lie within the consciousness, yet, because of wrong mental discrimination or particularization, they are taken to be external objects. That is why all sentient beings, since before the beginning of time, have conceived them as real Atman and real dharmas.

To illustrate the above conceptions, he gives the analogy of a man in a dream, who in that state believes all the images he sees to be real external objects, whereas actually they are only the projections of his own mind.

In trying to refute the belief in the reality of the Atman, the Master first sets forth the following three theories concerning the Atman held by various heterodox schools:

> 1. The Samkhyas and the Vaisesikas hold that the substance of the Atman is eternal, universal, and as extensive as infinite space. It acts everywhere and, as a consequence, enjoys happiness or suffers sorrow.
>
> 2. The Nirgranthas, the Jains, etc., hold that, although the substance of the Atman is eternal, its extension is indeterminate, because it expands and contracts according as the body is large or small (just as a piece of leather expands when it is wet and shrinks when dried in the sun).
>
> 3. The Pasupatas (Animal-Lord worshippers), Parivrajakas (recluses), etc., hold that the substance of the Atman is eternal but

> infinitesimal like an atom, lying deeply embedded and moving around within the body and performing acts of all kinds.

In a lengthy discussion, he then proves all of them to be untenable.

The Master proceeds to set forth two kinds of Atman-adhesion, namely, that which is innate and that which results from mental discrimination or particularization. He defines them and points out that the first kind can be eliminated by meditation and self-cultivation, while the second kind can only be annihilated at the first stage of the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth when the truth-seeker contemplates the 'Bhutatathata' (i.e., Suchness or Ultimate Reality) which is revealed by the voidness of all individualities and dharmas.

The question is raised: If a real Atman does not exist, how can memory, perception of objects, etc., be explained?

In reply to this, the Master expresses the view that 'each sentient being has a fundamental consciousness (Mulavijnana, i.e., Alayavijnana), which evolves in a homogeneous and continuous series and carries within it the "seeds" or "germs" (*bijas*) of all dharmas. This fundamental consciousness and the dharmas act as reciprocal causes on one another, and, because the "perfuming" energy (*vasana*) of the dharmas imprints its essence permanently on the Alayavijnana in the form of "seeds", or Bijas, memory, cognition, etc., are brought into manifestation, the Bijas manifesting themselves as actual dharmas which in turn produce Bijas in the Alaya.'

Further questions are raised: If there is no real Atman, by whom is a deed accomplished? By whom are the fruits of deeds reaped?

In reply, the Master points out the truth that, by virtue of the force of causes and conditions, the mind and its activities (*citta-caittas*) of each sentient being evolve in a continuous uninterrupted series, resulting in the accomplishment of acts and the reaping of their fruits.

Another question is raised: If there is really no Atman, who is it that goes from one state of existence (*gati*) to another in 'cycles of birth and death' (*samsara*)? Again, who is it that is disgusted with suffering and seeks to attain Nirvana?

In reply, the Master expresses the view that 'each sentient being is a continuous physical and mental series which, by the force of vexing passions (*klesas*) and impure acts, turns from one state of existence (*gati*) to another in cycles of transmigration. Tormented by suffering and disgusted with it, he seeks the attainment of Nirvana.

Hence the following general conclusion:

> There is positively no real Atman; there are only various consciousnesses which, since before the beginning of time, have followed one another, the subsequent one arising with the disappearance of the antecedent, and thus a continuous series of causes and effects (karmic seeds – actual dharmas – karmic seeds) is formed. By the perfuming energy (*vasana*) of false thinking, an image of a pseudo-Atman (of the likeness of an

> Atman) arises in the consciousness, and it is this pseudo-Atman which the ignorant take for a real Atman.

Coming to the subject of Dharma-adhesion (belief in the reality of dharmas), the Master sets forth the beliefs and theories held by the heterodox schools or Tirthikas and by the Hinayana Schools, refutes them one by one, and sets forth the correct doctrine.

Thereafter he sets forth two kinds of Dharma-adhesion, namely, that which is innate and that which results from mental discrimination or particularization. He defines them and points out that the first kind can only be annihilated in the course of the 'ten Lands' when the truth-seeker practises repeatedly 'the sublime contemplation of the voidness of dharmas'. As for the second kind of adhesion, it can be eliminated by the truth-seeker when he enters the 'first Land' on the Path and contemplates the 'Bhutatathata (Suchness) of the voidness of all dharmas' (i.e., the Bhutatathata revealed by *dharmasunyata*).

The discussion on Dharma-adhesion leads to the following general conclusion:

> There is no external sphere of objects. It is the internal consciousness which manifests itself in the semblance of external objects. As one of the stanzas of a Sutra says, 'External objects do not really exist as the ignorant imagine. The mind, agitated and defiled by perfuming (*vasana*), develops into what seems to be an external sphere of objects.

In support of the above conclusion, the Master writes as follows:

> This is why Bhagavat, the World-Honoured One, has said: 'Know ye, O Maitreya, that the objects of the various consciousnesses are only appearances or manifestations of consciousness produced by causes and conditions, like magic.'

BOOK II

THE EIGHTH OR ALAYA CONSCIOUSNESS

I. THREE NAMES

Book II begins with the statement that the fundamental consciousness capable of manifestation, in the Mahayana and Hinayana teachings alike, is termed the Alayavijnana or the 'Storehouse Consciousness'. The Alayavijnana is the most important of the eight kinds of consciousness to be discussed in the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun*. It may be understood as the synthesis of the 'Subconscious Mind' and the 'Supermind'. From it there evolve what seem to us to be external phenomena, but at the same time these phenomena act upon the Alaya consciousness in a never-ending cycle.

The name of this consciousness has three meanings:

1. It is actively *alaya*, storehouse, because it plays the active part of storing up the Bijas (seeds) which, being stored, are passively *alaya*.
2. It is passively *alaya* in the sense that it is 'perfumed' by the defiling dharmas of *saṃklesa*. [These dharmas create in it the Bijas, which make of it a storehouse and store themselves in it.]
3. It is the object of attachment. Manas attaches itself to it as to its Atman. In other words, the Alavavijnana and the defiling dharmas of *samklesa* are the cause of one another; sentient beings cling to the Alayavijnana and imagine that it is their inner self.

This basic consciousness has two other names, *Vipaka* and *Sarvabijaka*. Considered as effect it is called *Vipaka*.

It is the *vipakaphala*, the 'fruit of retribution' of good or bad deeds which draw or direct the individual concerned into a certain sphere of existence, into a certain destiny, and into a certain womb (*dhatu, gati, yoni*) for reincarnation. Apart from this consciousness, there is no 'vital principle' nor any *dharma* which can form a perpetual series and be truly and pre-eminently *vipakaphala*.

Considered as cause, the eighth consciousness is called *Sarvabijaka* or the 'seed consciousness', which means that it is endowed or furnished with all the Bijas. It is capable of holding firmly and retaining the Bijas of all dharmas, without allowing them to be lost. Apart from this consciousness, no other dharma is capable of retaining the Bijas of all things.

The Bijas are the different potentialities which are found in the Mulavijnana, root-consciousness, i.e., the Alayavijnana, and which immediately engender their fruit, that is to say, the actual dharmas (i.e., dharmas in activity.)

2. ORIGIN OF BIJAS

In regard to the origin of Bijas, one theory asserts that 'they are all inborn and natural', i.e., innately existing in the Alaya consciousness; none of them come into being as a result of 'perfuming' (*hsun-hsi*). But they are capable of increasing and growing by the action of perfuming. In other words, the seeds from which spring the seeming manifestations of things in the outer world are all of them eternally innate in the Alaya consciousness. They are thus not engendered by the 'perfuming influence' of the other seven kinds of consciousness, namely, Manas, Manovijnana, and the five sense consciousnesses. They are only stimulated in their further growth by this influence.

According to another theory, however, Bijas are all born as a result of perfuming. That which perfumes (actual dharmas) and that which is perfumed (Alayavijnana) have existed since before the beginning of time; hence the Bijas have been created at all times by perfuming. [In other words, there has never been a time when the seeds of the Alayavijnana have not been engendered.]

There is a third theory held by Dharmapala that there are actually two kinds of Bijas. Some Bijas are natural or inborn, and denote those potentialities which have for ever existed innately in the Vipakavijnana by the natural force of things (*dharmata*) and which engender mental elements, sense-organs, and seeming external objects. Other Bijas are those whose existence has had a beginning and come into being as a result of perfuming by actual dharmas, which perfuming has been repeated and repeated from time immemorial.

On the foregoing points, Dharmapala elaborates as follows:

> Let us conclude that sentient beings have been endowed, since before the beginning of time, with pure Bijas which are not produced by perfuming but are in essence inherent in them. In course of time, when the truth-seeker, in his advancement along the Path, arrives at the 'stage of excellence', perfuming causes the Bijas to increase and grow. The pure dharmas which are born when he has entered the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth have these Bijas as their cause. These pure *dharmas* perfume in turn and thus produce new pure Bijas.
>
> It should be understood that the same process of mutual production applies to the Bijas of impure *dharmas*. Thus, some Bijas are innate and natural while others are engendered by perfuming.
>
> This means that the seeds contained in the Alayavijnana, being perfumed by the other seven consciousnesses, are thus caused to grow, resulting in the appearance of things or dharmas. The Alayavijnana (of which the seeds form a part) is what is perfumed; the other seven consciousnesses are the perfuming agents.

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF BIJAS

According to the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, the Bijas have approximately six characteristics:

> 1. The Bijas are momentary, *ksanika*. Only those dharmas can be Bijas which perish immediately after birth and which possess a superior power of activity.
>
> 2. The Bijas are simultaneous with their fruit. Only that dharma is a Bija which is simultaneously and actually connected with its fruit (that is, with the actual dharma which it engenders).
>
> 3. The Bijas form a continuous series. They must, for a long period of time, continue in a homogeneous and uninterrupted series until the final stage, i.e., until the moment when the Holy Path is attained which will counteract and thwart them.
>
> 4. The Bijas must belong to a definite moral species. They must

possess the capacity to engender actual dharmas, good, bad, non-defined: this capacity is determined by the cause of the Bijas, i.e., the actual dharmas, good, bad, non-defined, which have perfumed and created them.

5. The Bijas depend on a group of conditions. To realize their capacity to produce an actual dharma, the Bijas require a concourse of conditions.

6. The Bijas 'lead' to their own fruit. Each Bija leads to the production of its own fruit: a Bija of mind (citta) leads to the manifestation of mind, and a Bija of Rupa leads to the production of Rupa.

A detailed explanation of these six characteristics is given in the Treatise.

4. MODE OF ACTIVITY OF THE ALAYAVIJNANA

In section 3 of the Book, there is a discussion of the 'mode of activity' of the Alayavijnana. The mode of activity is perception or discrimination, because it is in perception or discrimination that consciousness has its mode of activity. The object of perception of the Alayavijnana is twofold: its 'place' (*sthana*) and 'what it holds and receives' (*upadi*). By 'place' is meant the receptacle-world, because it is the place that supports all living beings. The *upadi* in turn is twofold: the Bijas and the 'body with its five sense-organs.' *Upadi* means holding and receiving, that is to say, the Bijas and the physical body are held and received by the Alayavijnana. Both the *upadi* and the *sthana* are the objects of perception (*alambana*) of the Alayavijnana.

Section 3 also explains the various aspects or *bhagas* of the Alaya, especially the 'image-aspect' or *nimittabhaga* and the 'perception-aspect' or the *darsanabhaga.*

Section 4 deals with what are called the Samprayuktas of the Alaya, i.e., its associated mental activities. Vasubandhu says that the Alayvijnana is associated with five mental attributes or *caittas*, namely, (1) mental contact (*sparsa*), (2) attention (*manaskara*), (3) sensation (*vedana*), conception (*samjna*), and volition (*cetana*).

The nature and characteristics of these five *caittas* are described and explained in great detail in the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun.*

5. MORAL SPECIES

Section 5 discusses the moral species of the Alayavijnana and its *caittas.* Vasubandhu says that the Alaya is 'non-defiled' and 'non-defined'. In this connection it may be stated that, from a moral point of view, dharmas are of three kinds: good, bad, non-defined; but, to be more precise, they are of four kinds, because the non-defined can be defiled or non-defiled. The Alayavijnana is exclusively non-defiled and non-defined, because it is 'retribution' (*vipaka*) in its essential nature.

1. If it were good (*kusala*), existence or the cycle of life and death (i.e., suffering) would be impossible; if it were defiled (*akusala*, bad), return and disappearance (i.e., extinction and the way) would be impossible.

2. Again, this consciousness is the point of support or infrastructure for good and defiled dharmas. If it were good or defiled, it would not be capable of supporting good or defiled dharmas, because the consciousness itself and the supported dharmas would be opposed to each other.

3. Again, this consciousness is by nature a perfumable dharma. If it were good or defiled, then, like an object that has an extremely fragrant or offensive smell, it would not be perfumable. Now it is in the perfuming of the Alayavijnana and in the Bijas created by this perfuming that the cause and the fruit of defiled and pure dharmas are to be found. If there were no perfuming, the cause and the fruit of defiled and pure dharmas could not be ascertained. Hence the Alayavijnana is non-defiled and non-defined.

For the same reasons, the five *caittas* of the Alaya are also non-defiled and non-defined.

6. THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Section 6 deals with the Stream of Consciousness. The question is asked: Is the Alayavijnana permanent or impermanent?

The answer is that it is neither permanent nor impermanent, for, says Vasubandhu:

> It is in perpetual evolution like a violent torrent.

1. By 'perpetual' is meant that, since before the beginning of time, this consciousness has evolved in a homogeneous series without interruption, because it is the creative basis of manifestations of the transmigratory course through the three realms of existence (Dhatus), the five directions of reincarnation (Gatis), and the four forms of birth (Yonis), and also because in its essential nature it is firm enough to hold Bijas without allowing them to be lost.

2. By 'evolution' is meant that this consciousness, from before the beginning of time, is born and perishes from one moment to another, ever changing. As cause it perishes and as fruit it is then born. Thus, it never remains continuously a single entity. Through the evolutions of the other consciousnesses, it is perfumed and thus forms seeds.

If it were permanent, like space, it would not be perfumable; if it were not perfumable, the distinction between Samsara (birth and death) and Nirvana (true deliverance) would disappear.

The word 'perpetual' rules out the notion of impermanence or discontinuity; the word 'evolution' indicates that it is not permanent.

Vasubandhu gives an example.

'Like a violent torrent': it is the nature and being (*dharmata*) of 'causation' which is foreign to permanence and impermanence.

In its sequence of cause and effect, it is like a violent torrent which is never impermanent yet never permanent, and which ever flows onward in a continuous series, carrying with it what sometimes floats and sometimes sinks. So too is this Alayavijnana which, from before the beginning of time, is born and perishes, forming a series which is neither permenent nor impermanent, carrying along sentient beings, sometimes floating, sometimes sinking, without allowing them to attain liberation from the cycle of mundane existence.

Again it is like a violent torrent which, though beaten by the wind into waves, flows onward without interruption. So too is this Alayavijnana, which, though it encounters conditions producing the visual and other kinds of consciousness, perpetually maintains its onward flow.

Or yet again it is like a violent torrent, in whose waters fish are borne along below and leaves of grass above, pursuing its onward course without abandoning it. So too is this consciousness, which perpetually follows its onward evolution, carrying with it the perfumed internal Bijas and the external Caittas (Sparsa, etc.).

These comparisons show that the Alayavijnana, from before the beginning of time, has been both cause and effect, and so is neither permanent nor impermanent. They mean that since before the beginning of time this consciousness has been one in which from moment to moment effects are born and causes perish. Because these effects are born, it is not impermanent; because these causes perish, it is not permanent. To be neither impermanent nor permanent: this is the 'principle of conditional causation or dependent origination' (Pratitya-samutpada). That is why it is said that this consciousness is in perpetual evolution like a torrent.

7. CESSATION OF THE ALAYAVIJNANA

Section 7 deals with the cessation of the Alayavijnana. As explained in a preceding section, this basic consciousness has all the time been flowing like a stream without interruption. The question arises: At what moment, in what stage, is it definitely and finally arrested?

Vasubandhu replies:

> The Alayavijnana ends at the stage of Arhatship.

Hsüan Tsang explains:

> The Aryas or the saints of the three Vehicles are called Arhats from the moment (*vajropamasamadhi*) when they have completely cut off the obscuring 'barrier of vexing passions' (*klesavarana*). [The expression 'to cut off completely' signifies: (1) to destroy radically, to eliminate, (2) to subjugate, to put out of action. The saints of the two Vehicles put their vexing passions (*klesa*) beyond the possibility of rebirth, but they have not yet cleared away the 'barrier which impedes Buddha-enlightenment' (*jneyavarana*).] At that moment the coarse dross (i.e., the crude and heavy Bijas) of the vexing passions is dissociated completely and for ever, and it is then said that the Alayavijnana is arrested.

8. PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF ALAYAVIJNANA

Section 8 deals with the proofs of the existence of the eighth or Alaya Consciousness. The question is asked: How can it be ascertained that, apart from the consciousnesses admitted by the Hinayana, there is an eighth consciousness?

The reply is that this is known from the Scriptures of the two Vehicles and by logical reasoning.

MAHAYANA SOURCES

A stanza from the Mahayanabhidharmasutra reads,

> There is a Dhatu (Ultimate Cause or World of Reality) which has existed since before the beginning of time.
> It is the supporting basis for all dharmas.
> From this have come into being different states of existence,
> And because of this the attainment of Nirvana is possible.

The explanation is that the eighth consciousness is subtle in its essential nature and only manifests itself through its activity and effects. The first half of the Stanza characterizes it in so far as it is cause (*hetu*) and condition (*pratyaya*). The last half defines it as supporting and carrying on the cyclic processes of birth and death and the abolition of existence (through the attainment of Nirvana).

1. 'Dhatu' signifies cause (*hetu*): it is a question of the eighth consciousness considered as Bija, the Bijavijnana, which, since before the beginning of time, has been developing itself in a continuous series, immediately engendering all dharmas.

2. The term 'supporting basis' (*samasraya*) signifies condition (*pratyaya*): it is a question of the eighth consciousness considered as the Adanavijnana which 'takes and holds' and which, since before the

beginning of time, has been the supporting basis for all dharmas. By this is meant that the eighth consciousness takes and holds the Bijas and is the supporting basis for the actual dharmas. On the one hand, it develops itself as the receptacle-world and physical bodies with their sense-organs: it is the support of both. On the other hand, it is the supporting basis for the other consciousnesses: (1) it 'takes and holds' the five material sense-organs in dependence upon which the first five consciousnesses, the eye-consciousness, etc., manifest themselves; (2) it is also the supporting basis for Manas which, in its turn, is the support of Manovijnana. It should be known that Manas and Manovijnana, being both 'evolving consciousnesses' (*pravrttivijnanas*), must, like the first five consciousnesses, support themselves on the sense faculties (*indriyas*) which are simultaneous with them, and that the eighth, being a consciousness, must also have a supporting basis, which is Manas.

Such is the activity of the eighth consciousness as cause (*hetu*) and as condition (*pratyaya*).

3. The words 'from this' in the Stanza signify 'By reason of the existence of this consciousness'.

4. The phrase 'have come into being different states of existence' means that there are good and bad destinies (*gatis*). It is by reason of the existence of this eighth consciousness that dharmas or Bijas favourable to 'samsaric existence' [birth and death (*pravrtti*)] are taken and held in such a manner that sentient beings continue to proceed in cycles of birth and death.

5. The phrase 'attainment of Nirvana' in the Stanza signifies that, by reason of the existence of this eighth consciousness, the realization and attainment of Nirvana can take place. In fact, it is this consciousness that takes and holds all the 'dharmas of abolition or annihilation': that is to say, the pure Bijas which cause the actual Path of Attainment to be born to enable the truth-seeker to arrive at Nirvana.

Source of the Lesser Vehicle

The sutras of other Schools also, although in veiled language, say that there is an Alayavijnana of a special nature.

1. In the Agamas of the Mahasamghikanikaya, it is, in an 'esoteric' manner, designated by the term 'Mulavijnana', 'root consciousness'. In fact, it is the point of support for the consciousnesses of the eye, etc., just as the root of a tree is the origin and support of its stem, branches, etc. The consciousnesses of the eye, etc., cannot have the virtues of a root.

2. In the sutras of the Sthaviras and the Vibhajyavadins, it is, in an 'esoteric' manner, designated by the term 'Bhavangavijnana'. By *bhava* is meant the triple mode of existence (in the three Dhatus); by *anga* is meant cause (*hetu*). Only Alaya, being eternal and universal (existing in the three Dhatus in contradistinction to the eye-consciousness), can be 'the cause of the triple existence'.

3. The Mahisasakas call it the 'Skandha which lasts right up to the end of Samsara' (*samsarakotinisthaskandha*), because the Alayavijnana lasts right up to Vajropama. Apart from the eighth consciousness, there is no *skandhadharma* which lasts without discontinuity right up to the end of Samsara.

4. The Sarvastivadins, in their Ekottaragama, have a text which, in an esoteric manner, designates the eighth consciousness by the term 'Alaya'. The text says that sentient beings 'have deep affection for the Alaya, are very fond of the Alaya, take much delight in the Alaya, and rejoice greatly in the Alaya.'

LOGICAL ARGUMENTS

Citta as bearer of Bijas – The Sutra says: It is named Citta because it is there that the Bijas of defiled and pure dharmas are accumulated and produced.

Apart from the eighth consciousness, there is no Citta which can hold the Bijas firmly. The various philosophers of the School of Sutras and the Mahasaṃghika, the Sthavira and the Sarvastivadin Schools have only unacceptable theories.

Whatever the philosophers may think, Bijas are not held by the five Skandhas.

1. The Pravrttivijnanas (the first seven consciousnesses to the exclusion of the Alaya) are not the Citta spoken of by the Sutra.

The Pravrttivijnanas are interrupted in the Nirodhasamapatti and in the four other states of mental inactivity: therefore they cannot hold the Bijas perpetually. They are born by means of the sense-organs, the objects perceived and attention (*manaskara*); they are occasionally of different natures, good, bad, etc.; they arise and disappear easily; therefore they cannot perfume one another. Like the flash of lightning, they are not firm and stable: therefore they are not perfumable. Nor are they capable of receiving and holding Bijas. They are not the Citta in which defiled and pure Bijas are accumulated and produced.

On the contrary, the Alayavijnana is of one single species, always uninterrupted, and firm and stable like a grain of sesame seed (which absorbs the odour of flowers) or a piece of hemp (which absorbs colour):

therefore, susceptible to perfuming, it corresponds to the Citta spoken of by the Sutra. By denying the existence of a Citta that is capable of carrying Bijas, one contradicts not only the Scriptures but also pure reason.

On the one hand, the actual dharmas, that is, defiled or pure thoughts, in the absence of a perfumable Citta, will not create Bijas and cause an increase of pre-existing Bijas: therefore they will be absolutely useless. On the other hand, if the actual dharmas are not born of Bijas, how will they be born? Do you admit, with the Tirthikas, that they are born spontaneously and by themselves?

2. Rupa and Viprayuktas are not perfumable; nor do they hold Bijas.

They are not mental in their essential nature: like sound, light, etc., they cannot be perfumed by internal dharmas, defiled or pure. How, then, can they hold Bijas?

Furthermore, they have no real self-nature apart from consciousness. How can they be held to be the supporting basis for internal Bijas?

3. The Caittas.

The Caittas associated with the Pravrttivijnanas are subject to interruption, being born in such and such a manner or not born at all. They are neither autonomous nor mental in their essential nature, being Caittas only. Therefore, they are not capable of holding Bijas; nor are they capable of being perfumed.

One is therefore obliged to recognize the existence of a Citta, distinct from the Pravrttivijnanas, which holds Bijas.

Vipakacitta. – According to the Sutra, there is a Vipakacitta, 'a mind which is retribution', created by good or bad acts. If the eighth consciousness is lacking, this Vipakacitta should have no existence.

1. The six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness . . . Manovijnana) are subject to interruption; they are not always the fruit of acts. Like the flash of lightning, they are not Vipakacitta.

We know for a fact that dharmas which are Vipaka, once cut off, do not continue any more; for example, the 'root of life' (*jivitendriya*), once cut off, does not continue.

The six consciousnesses, when they are created by acts, are like sound, odour, etc., which do not form a perpetual series; therefore they are *vipakaja*, 'born of retribution', but not real Vipaka.

2. We must admit the existence of a real Vipakacitta which corresponds to acts that lead to the ripening of the fruit, which may be found in all the three Dhatus, which is perpetual, which manifests itself as the receptacle-world and the physical body with its sense-organs, and which is the supporting basis for the living being.

Gatis and Yonis. – The Sutra teaches that sentient beings transmigrate ceaselessly through the five states of existence or destinies (*gati*) [infernal beings, hungry ghosts, animals, human beings, *devas*] and the four forms of birth (*yoni*) [(1) viviparous, as with mammals; (2) oviparous, as with birds; (3) moisture or water born, as with worms and fishes; (4) metamorphic, as with moths from the chrysalis, or with devas, or with infernal beings].

If they do not possess this eighth consciousness, one does not see what Gati and Yoni can consist of; that is to say, the Gati-yoni entity should not exist at all.

1. The Gati-yoni entity must be a real thing (and not an ideal dharma like the 'vital principle'), perpetual (i.e., non-interrupted), universal (that is to say, it can be found in all the three Dhatus), and non-mixed. Only a dharma with such attributes can be established as the real Gati-yoni entity.

2. Only the Vipakacitta and its Caittas possess the four characteristics of reality, perpetuity, universality, and homogeneity, and constitute the real Gati and Yoni.

Theory of Upadana. – According to the Sutra, the 'material body with its sense-organs' is appropriated (*upatta*), i.e., 'held and borne'. If there is no eighth consciousness, where is one to find the *upadatar* of this body, 'that which appropriates the body'?

If the five material organs (*rupindriya*), with the matter that serves as their support (altogether nine material *ayatanas* excluding sound) are appropriated, it is certainly by reason of a mind that appropriates them to it. To the exclusion of the six Pravrttivijnanas (visual consciousness – Manovijnana), this mind can only be the Vipakacitta. The latter, in fact, is projected by former acts; it is neither good nor defiled, but non-defined; it can be found throughout the three Dhatus; and it exists in a continuous series.

Life, Heat, and Consciousness. – According to the Sutra, life, heat, and consciousness last in a continuous series by supporting one another. We say that the eighth consciousness is the only consciousness capable of serving as a support for life and heat.

1. The Pravrttivijnanas are discontinuous and variable like sound, wind, etc.; they are incapable of constantly operating as a support. Therefore they are not the consciousness discussed by the Sutra. But the eighth consciousness, the Vipakavijnana, like life and heat, is not discontinuous or variable. Hence one may attribute to it this supporting operation; hence it is the consciousness that sustains life and heat.

2. The Sutra teaches that these three dharmas support one another, and it is admitted that life and heat are homogeneous and constitute a continuous series. Is it reasonable to think that the consciousness in

question is the Pravrttivijnana which is neither homogeneous nor continuous?

3. Life and heat are certainly impure dharmas (*sasrava*): hence the consciousness which supports them is not pure (*anasrava*).

If you do not admit the existence of the eighth consciousness, say which consciousness will support the life of a being of the Arupyadhatu who produces pure Pravrttivijnanas.

Hence there exists a Vipakavijnana, homogeneous (always non-defined), continuous, being found throughout the three Dhatus, and capable of supporting life and heat: that is the eighth consciousness.

The Mind at Conception and at Death. – The Sutra says that, at conception and at death, sentient beings are undoubtedly in a state of mental confusion and distraction, not in mindless meditation (*nirodhasamapatti*). The mind at the moment of conception and at that of death can only be the eighth consciousness.

At these two moments, the mind and the body are stupefied as in dreamless sleep or extreme stupor. The quick and perceiving Pravrttivijnana (that is to say, the Manovijnana) cannot arise.

At these two moments, one cannot attribute to the six Pravrttivijnanas conscious acts of knowledge or the recognition or apprehension of objects: that is to say, these consciousnesses are not in operation, just as they are not in operation in the mindless state. For, if the mind at conception or at death is, as you maintain, a Pravrttivijnana, its activity and object must, as at all other times, be perceived and known.

The case of the eighth consciousness is entirely different. As it is extremely subtle, it is not perceived in its activity or in its object. Being the result of acts which project or lead to the existence in question, it is truly retribution (*vipaka*): it constitutes, for a determined period of time (i.e., for the duration of the existence), a perpetual and homogeneous series. It is this consciousness that is designated by the name of 'mind at conception' and 'mind at death'. It is on its account that the sentient being, at these two moments, is in a state of 'mental confusion and distraction'.

Cessation Meditation (Nirodhasamapatti). – According to the Sutra, 'Of him who dwells in the meditation of cessation' (*nirodhasamapatti*), the activities (*samskaras*) of body, of voice and of mind are all destroyed (*nirodha*); but his life is not destroyed; he is not bereft of his bodily heat; his sense-organs do not deteriorate; and his consciousness does not leave his body.

The only consciousness which does not leave the body in the course of the meditation of cessation is the eighth consciousness.

All the other consciousnesses (the visual consciousness, etc.) are, in their act of perception and knowledge, coarse and inconsistent. He in whom these consciousnesses manifest themselves in the perception

> of objects necessarily becomes tired and upset; hence he becomes disgusted and seeks to stop them for a time. Gradually he subdues and expels them up to the moment when they cease entirely [for a day or for a week or, according to the Mahayana, for a kalpa or even longer]. The truth-seeker who attains this cessation is said to dwell in the meditation of cessation. Hence, in this Samadhi, all the other consciousnesses, i.e., the seven Pravrttivijnanas, are entirely inactive.
>
> If we do not admit the existence of an actual consciousness that is subtle, homogeneous (always non-defined), eternal, universal (existent in all the three Dhatus), and capable of holding and sustaining life, the organs, etc., which consciousness is the Sutra referring to when it says that 'the consciousness does not leave the body'?

From the sacred teachings and the logical reasoning set forth above, it is abundantly clear that the eighth consciousness or Alayavijnana exists.

BOOK III

THE SEVENTH OR MANAS CONSCIOUSNESS

The *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* says that this evolving consciousness manifests itself with the Alayavijnana as its basis and support and takes that consciousness as its object. It has the nature and character of cogitation or intellection. In the sacred teachings this consciousness is given the special name of Manas, because, in its perpetual practice of intellection, it surpasses the other consciousnesses. Inasmuch as it perpetually thinks about the ego (Atman), to which it clings, it has close relationship with the four fundamental *Klesas* or vexing passions (sources of affliction and delusion). These four are 'Self-delusion or Atman-ignorance and Self-belief, together with Self-conceit and Self-love.'

> (1) Self-delusion means lack of understanding. It is ignorance of the true character of the Atman, and delusion as to the principle that there is no Atman (Nairatmya, egolessness). Therefore it is called Self-delusion.
>
> (2) Self-belief means adhering to the view that Atman exists, erroneously imagining certain dharmas to be the self when they are not so. Hence it is called Self-belief.
>
> (3) Self-conceit means pride. Basing itself on the belief in an Atman, it causes the mind to feel superior and lofty. It is therefore called Self-conceit.
>
> (4) Self-love means a greedy desire for the self. Because of its belief in the Atman it develops deep attachments to it. It is therefore called Self-love.

> The words 'together with' indicate that Self-conceit and Self-love accompany Self-belief and that Self-love accompanies Self-conceit: an association which is not admitted by the Sarvastivadins.
>
> These four *klesas*, by their constant manifestation, disturb and pollute the innermost mind (Alayavijnana) and cause the outer (i.e., the remaining seven) transforming consciousnesses to be perpetually defiled. Because of this, sentient beings are bound to the cycle of birth and death (transmigration) without being able to liberate themselves from it. Hence they are called vexing passions or *klesas*.

Like the Alayavijnana, Manas is accompanied also by five universal mental associates, namely, mental contact, attention, sensation, conception, and volition, and it is associated with only one sensation, that of indifference.

As regards the moral species of Manas, the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* says that it is exclusively 'defiled-non-defined'. The reason is that 'the four *klesas* associated with Manas, being defiled dharmas, are an obstacle to the Holy Path (*arya-marga*); they impede and obscure the mind (i.e., Manas which is their lord); they are therefore defiled. On the other hand, they are neither good nor bad; they are consequently non-defined.'

But, when Manas has been revolutionized at the first stage on the Path and transformed into Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana), it is exclusively good.

The question arises: To what Dhatu or Bhumi (Land) are the Caittas or mental associates of Manas bound and confined?

The Stanza in Vasubandhu's Trimsika says:

> Manas is active in the *dhatu* or *bhumi* (land) in which the sentient being is born and to which he is bound.

> When the eighth consciousness is born in Kamadhatu or the World of Sensuous Desires, the Caittas (e.g., Self-belief) associated with Manas are confined to Kamadhatu. This is true for all Bhumis up to Bhavagra, for they are spontaneous, taking always as their object the Alayavijnana of their particular Bhumi and considering it as the Atman; they never take as their object the dharmas of other Bhumis.

THE CESSATION OF MANAS

Section 6 of Book III deals with the cessation of Manas. Since before the beginning of time, this defiled Manas has continued in a perpetual series. In what state is it absolutely or temporarily cut off?

Vasubandhu replies to this question thus:

> Manas ceases to exist at the stage of Arhatship, in the meditation of annihilation (state of complete extinction of thought and other mental qualities), and on the Supramundane Path.

Arhats are the Asaiksas of the three Vehicles. In the state of Arhatship, defiled Manas, both actual and in Bija-form, has been entirely annihilated. Hence one says that it does not exist.

As regards the Saiksas, in the state of 'meditation of annihilation' (Nirodhasamapatti) and while they are treading the Supramundane Path, defiled Manas is provisionally 'subdued' (i.e., incapable of actualizing itself). Hence one says that it does not exist.

PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF MANAS

Section 7 sets forth the proofs of the existence of Manas.

How do we know that Manas, the seventh consciousness, is a consciousness apart from the first six consciousnesses? We acquire this knowledge from the sacred teachings and by the exercise of logical reason.

I. Arguments drawn from Sacred Teachings

1. The World-Honoured One (Bhagavat, the Buddha), in many passages of His Sutras, teaches that Citta (mind), Manas (intellection), and Vijnāna (consciousness) have different meanings: that which accumulates and produces (all things) is called Citta (mind), that which reasons or cogitates is called Manas (intellection), and that which discriminates is called Vijnana (consciousness).

These three terms apply to all the eight consciousnesses; but, in accordance with the characteristics of each of them, they apply with particular appropriateness to the three following categories respectively: The eighth is called *citta*, because in it the Bijas of all dharmas are accumulated and from it all things arise. The seventh is called *manas*, because it takes as its object the Alayavijnana and, through its perpetual intellection, regards it as Atman, etc. The remaining six are called consciousness, because their functions are those of perceiving and discriminating – even though crudely, unstably, and with interruptions – the six special spheres of sense-objects.

One of the Gathas or stanzas of the Lankavatara Sutra says:

The Alayavijnana is called *citta* (mind);
The cogitating principle is called *manas*;
Those that can discriminate various sense-objects
Are called *vijnanas* (consciousnesses).

Furthermore, it is said in many other Mahayana Sutras that there is a seventh consciousness. Hence this consciousness must exist, because we have proved that the Mahayana Sutras are the highest authorities.

2. Besides, a *muktakasutra*, recognized by the Lesser Vehicle, also affirms the existence of the seventh consciousness. In this Sutra, the following stanza is found:

'The defiled Manas always comes into being and perishes with the *klesas*; when it is emancipated from the *klesas*, it will not only cease to exist but will have neither a past nor a future.'

2. THE TWO PRATYAYAS OF MANOVIJNANA

The Sutra says: 'By reason of the eyes and the colours there is born the eye-consciousness . . .; by reason of Manas and the dharmas there is born the sixth consciousness or Manovijnana.' What is this Manas, causal condition (*pratyaya*) of Manovijnana, but the seventh consciousness?

In reality the five consciousnesses must of necessity have an organ (*indriya*) as *pratyaya*, an organ that is the 'condition quâ agent' (*adhipatipratyaya*) which is special for each consciousness (eye for visual consciousness, and so forth) which is simultaneous with consciousness, not immediately anterior to it. Manovijnana, being comprised in the first six consciousnesses, must have a supporting basis (*asraya*) of this type. If there is no seventh consciousness, Manas, there will be no such basis.

On the basis of these logical inferences, we may conclude that the perfectly-established Manovijnana, being one of the six perfectly-established consciousnesses, must, like any one of these six, have a particular support (distinct from the eighth consciousness), a support which serves as a base (*ayatana*) for its name.

This support or *asraya* is our seventh consciousness.

3. THE NAME OF MANAS

The Sutra says: 'The faculty of cogitation is called Manas', attributing to Manas a present action. What is this Manas that thinks, but the seventh consciousness?

Hence there is a seventh consciousness, distinct from the six, which is perpetually 'thinking' or 'cogitating', and which is called Manas.

4. THE TWO SAMAPATTIS

The Sutra distinguishes two meditations (*samapattis*), the Asamjnisamapatti and the Nirodhasamapatti. 'Defiled Manas' does not cease in Asamjnisamapatti but ceases entirely in Nirodhasamapatti. If a defiled Manas does not exist, there should be no difference between these two *samapattis*. The idea is that in both these meditations there is cessation (*nirodha*) of the first six consciousnesses and their Caittas; the twenty-two kinds of mental properties and their nature are the same in both cases. If there is no 'defiled Manas', how can we distinguish the one *samapatti*, in which there remains the defiled Manas, from the other, in which there is no defiled Manas but only a purified Manas?

The Sarvastivadins will say that the difference between the two *samapattis* lies in the difference in the preparatory exercises (*prayoga*), in the sphere (*dhatu*) and 'land' (*bhumi*) where they are practised, and in the persons who practise them. But this explanation is inadmissible, because the cause of all these differences lies in the presence or the absence of Manas. If Manas does not exist, the cause of these differences will, likewise, not exist.

Hence, positively, this Manas must exist.

5. ABSENCE OF ATMAN-ADHESION

The Sutra teaches that a Prthagjana, no matter whether his thoughts are good, bad, or non-defined, still embraces Atmagraha. That presupposes the existence of Manas. If Manas is non-existent, such Atmagraha will likewise be non-existent.

Prthagjanas have thoughts of three natures (good, bad, and non-defined). While externally producing, by the power of the first six consciousnesses, various acts of a corresponding nature, they produce, internally and in a continuous manner, through the influence of Manas, Atmagraha, adhering to their Atman. Because of this Atmagraha, all their actions through the six consciousnesses, such as their practice of the Six Paramitas, – Dana Paramita, i.e., charity, Dhyana Paramita, i.e., meditation and contemplation, etc. – are not free from *nimitta*, i.e., attachment to the image-aspect of the mind.

This is why the Yogasastra, 51, explains that defiled Manas is the supporting basis for the first six consciousnesses. As long as it is not destroyed, there is the 'binding or entrammelling of the perception-aspect (*darsanabhaga*) of the mind by the image-aspect (*nimittabhaga*)', with the result that deliverance or emancipation cannot be attained. As soon as defiled Manas is destroyed, liberation from the fetters of the image-aspect (*nimitta-bandhana*) is achieved.

In what does this enchainment of the mind consist? It consists in our inability to understand the true nature and character of external objects as having the same mode of existence as illusions and mirages. In consequence of this, the perception-aspect of the mind is fettered by the image-aspect. Being fettered, it cannot attain freedom or self-mastery.

It is in this sense that a stanza (*gatha*) reads: 'Defiled Manas is the supporting basis for consciousness. As long as it is not destroyed, the bondage of consciousness can never be broken.'

Conclusion

Good dharmas, etc., are rendered impure by a Manas which, without cessation, produces Atmagraha. If this Manas is non-existent, the good dharmas cannot be impure. Hence this seventh consciousness must exist separately.

BOOK IV

THE FIRST SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

Hsüan Tsang in his Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun says:

Having next dealt with the evolving consciousness of intellection, we should explain the characteristics of the evolving consciousness which perceives and distinguishes (seemingly external) objects.

These six categories of consciousness are classified in accordance with the six sense-organs (*indriyas*) and their respective spheres of objects (*visaya*). They are known as the visual consciousness (*caksurvijnana*) and so on down to the sense-centre consciousness (*manovijnana*). [Thus the consciousnesses which distinguish by the senses the objects of the external world are of six varieties: the five senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch), plus a sixth faculty, the sense-centre consciousness, which unifies and coordinates the percepts derived from the five senses.]

As regards the conditions in which these six consciousnesses manifest themselves, Stanzas 15 and 16 say:

> In dependence upon the root consciousness (i.e., the eighth
> consciousness, Alayavijnana),
>
> The five consciousnesses (of the senses) manifest themselves
> in accordance with various causes and conditions,
>
> Sometimes together, sometimes separately,
>
> Just as waves manifest themselves in dependence upon the
> conditions of the water.
>
> But the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana) manifests itself at
> all times,

> Except for beings born into the 'heavenly world without thought' (among Asamjnidevas in whom thinking has entirely ceased),
>
> Except also for those in the two mindless Samapattis (two forms of meditation in which there is no more activity of thought) and
>
> Those who are in states of stupor or unconsciousness.

In Section 2 of the Book, the 'essential nature' and 'mode of activity' of the first six consciousnesses are explained. The *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun says*:

> All these six consciousnesses have the perception and discrimination of objects as their essential nature, and they make use of this same perception and discrimination as their main characteristic. This enables us to understand why these special names are established and given to the first six consciousnesses in contradistinction to the seventh and the eighth. They are called consciousnesses because they perceive or distinguish the six spheres of objects.
>
> As the Sutra says: 'What is visual consciousness? It is that consciousness which, depending on the visual organ for support, perceives and distinguishes various colours and forms (*rupas*) . . . What is Manovijnana? It is that consciousness which, depending on the Manas-organ for support, perceives and distinguishes all dharmas.'

MORAL SPECIES

Section 3 deals with the moral species of the six consciousnesses. As is taught in Stanza 8, the six consciousnesses are good, bad, and neither the one nor the other. The expression 'neither the one nor the other' means 'non-defined', i.e., neither good nor bad.

We call 'good' (*kusala*) that which is profitable and beneficial to the present life and to future lives.

We call 'bad' (*akusala*) that which is detrimental and disadvantageous to the present life and to future lives.

We call 'non-defined' (*avyakrta*) that which cannot be defined as good or bad, profitable or unprofitable.

When the six consciousnesses have been 'revolutionized' upon entry into the Path and transformed into 'Perfect Achievement Wisdom' (Krtyanusthanajnana), they are exclusively good.

SAMPRAYUKTAS

Section 4 sets forth and explains the Samprayuktas or mental associates of the six consciousnesses.

The mental associates (Caittas) are so called because they always arise in dependence upon the mind (Citta), are associated with the mind, and are subordinate to and affiliated with the mind.

SIX CLASSES OF MENTAL ASSOCIATES (CAITTAS)

Although all the Caittas are similarly designated, all of them being called 'Caittas', and although they all mean the same thing, namely, mental properties, yet they are divided into six different classes:

1. Universal Caittas, which are definitely found with all the eight consciousnesses.

2. Special Caittas, which are born when perceiving certain special characteristics of an object.

3. Good Caittas, which are born only with a good Citta.

4. Klesas, which, by their very nature, are comprised in the *mulaklesas*, i.e., fundamental *klesas*.

5. Upaklesas, which, while being of the same nature as the *klesas*, are the efflux of those *klesas*.

6. Indeterminate Caittas, which can be found with a good Citta, a defiled one, etc., but which cannot be determined as belonging either to the one or to the other.

1. The five universal Caittas are: Mental contact, attention, sensation, conception, and volition.

2. The five special Caittas are: Desire, resolve, memory, meditation, and discernment.

3. The eleven good Caittas are: Belief, sense of shame, sense of integrity, non-covetousness, non-anger, non-delusion, zeal, composure of mind, vigilance, equanimity, and harmlessness.

4. The six vexing passions (*klesas*) are: Covetousness, anger, delusion, conceit, doubt, and erroneous views.

5. The twenty secondary vexing passions (*upaklesas*) are: Fury, enmity, concealment or hypocrisy, vexation, envy, parsimony, deception, duplicity or fraudulence, harmfulness, pride, shamelessness, non-integrity, agitation or restlessness, torpid-mindedness, unbelief, indolence, idleness, forgetfulness, distraction, and non-discernment.

6. The four indeterminate mental associates are: Remorse, drowsiness, reflection, and investigation.

All these fifty-one Caittas are fully explained and problems relating to them discussed in great detail in the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun.*

These Caittas are all associated with the three sensations (Vedanas) of joy, sorrow, and indifference.

> The experience of the agreeable characteristics of an object, comforting the body and gladdening the heart, is called 'joyful sensation' (*sukha vedana*). The experience of the disagreeable characteristics of an object, disconcerting and molesting the body and the mind, is called 'sorrowful sensation' (*duhkha vedana*). The experience of the neutral characteristics, producing neither comfort nor discomfort to the body and the mind, is called 'sensation that is neither joyful nor sorrowful' (*aduhkhasukha vedana*).
>
> As to what has been said previously regarding the varying characteristics of the different consciousnesses, this conforms to a worldly kind of reasoning (*yuktisamvrti*); it is not Ultimate Truth (*paramartha-paramartha*). From the latter point of view, the eight consciousnesses can neither be thought or spoken of.
>
> As is said in a stanza of the Lankavatara Sutra: 'From a popular point of view, the mind (Citta), intellection (Manas), and the other consciousnesses, eight kinds in all, have different characteristics; but, from the point of view of Ultimate Truth, they have not. For neither their own characteristics (*laksana*) nor those things on which they confer characteristics (*laksya*) have any existence.'

BOOK V

MERE-CONSCIOUSNESS (VIJNAPTIMATRATA)

It has been explained in the first four Books

> that each of the eight consciousnesses is the basis or infrastructure for a twofold manifestation, the perceived division and the perceiving division (*nimittabhaga* and *darsanabhaga*). It has been asserted that Atman and dharmas are merely conventional designations of this double manifestation of consciousness, of its Nimittabhaga and Darsanabhaga; that they are not real entities apart from these two Bhagas; and that, in consequence, 'all is mere consciousness' or 'nothing exists but consciousness'. How should one understand this thesis?

Stanza 17 of Vasubandhu's Trimsika says:

> The various consciousnesses manifest themselves in what seem to be two divisions:
>
> Perception (*Darsanabhaga*) and the object of perception (*nimittabhaga*).
>
> Because of this, Atman and dharmas do not exist.
>
> For this reason, all is mere consciousness.

Hsüan Tsang is his *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* says:

> 'The various consciousnesses' refer to the three evolving categories of consciousness previously discussed and their mental qualities. The term 'evolving' is applied to them because they are all capable of evolving into two seeming aspects: that of the perceiving division and that of the perceived division.
>
> The perceiving division manifested is termed 'discrimination', because it apprehends the perceived division.
>
> The perceived division manifested is termed 'that which is discriminated', because it is apprehended by the perceiving division.
>
> According to this correct principle, there are definitely no 'real' Atman or dharmas aside from what is thus evolved from consciousness. For, apart from what thus apprehends or is apprehended, there exists nothing else; there are no 'real' things apart from these two aspects (Bhagas). Therefore, everything phenomenal (Samskrta) and noumenal (Asamskrta), everything seemingly 'real' and 'false' alike, is inseparable from consciousness. The word 'mere' (in the term Mere-Consciousness) is used to deny that there are any 'real' things aside from consciousness (Atman and dharmas existing as such), but not to deny that the mental functions (Caittas), the two Bhagas, Rupa, Tathata, etc., in so far as they are inseparable from consciousness, do exist.
>
> Therefore, everything is Mere-Consciousness (or Representation-Only or Mere Ideation).

The doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata is established on the basis of sacred texts and by processes of logical reasoning.

The sacred texts which affirm Vijnaptimatrata are numerous. A few of them are quoted here.

1. Dasabhumaka: 'In the Three Worlds (Dhatus) there is nothing but mind.'

2. Samdhinirmocana: 'Objects of perception are merely manifestations of consciousness.'

3. Lankavatara: 'All dharmas are inseparable from mind.'

4. Vimalakirti: 'Sentient beings become pure or impure in accordance with the mind.'

The Sutra teaches that Bodhisattvas who have perfected the Four Wisdoms (*jnana*) will, following their enlightenment, penetrate the truth of Vijnaptimatrata and of the absolute non-existence of real objects (*visaya*).

These Four Wisdoms are:

(1) The mystic knowledge of the cause of contradictory concepts: This means that the same thing perceived by ghosts, human beings, and deities (*devas*) appears differently to them according to their past deeds. If there is really an external sphere of objects, how can this diversity be possible?

(2) The wisdom which verifies that consciousness deprived of object permits clear perception:

This means that the past, the future, images in dreams, things imagined, etc., have no real, objective bases. They are possible because they are manifestations of consciousness. If these objective bases are non-existent, the rest is also non-existent.

(3) The wisdom which understands exactly without effort:

This means that if the intelligence of ignorant people is able to perceive the real sphere of objects, they should naturally achieve freedom from perverted views and should be able to achieve emancipation without any effort. [Since they are not emancipated, it shows that the objective spheres they perceive are not real at all.]

(4) The wisdom that changes with the following three wisdoms:

a. Changing with the wisdom of the Bodhisattva who has attained mastery of mind. This means that the Bodhisattva of the Eighth Land who has attained 'mastery of mind' is capable of changing and transforming things at will, changing earth [into gold] and so forth without fail according to his desires. If an external sphere really exists, how can such a transformation be possible?

b. Changing with the wisdom of the Sravaka or Pratyekabuddha who meditates and has attained the power of inner perception: This means that, when the Sravaka or the Pratyekabuddha, who has achieved supreme calmness (*samapatti*) and has practised the meditation of the Dharma, meditates on one sphere of objects, the various characteristics of the objects appear before him: impermanence, suffering, etc. If the sphere is real, why does it change according to his mind?

c. Changing with the wisdom of pure intuition or knowledge of the fundamental identity of all things (*nirvikalpakajnana*). This means that, when a Bodhisattva has attained the fundamental, non-discriminating wisdom of pure intuition which reveals the true nature of things, all spheres of objects and their characteristics will cease to appear.

If there are real spheres of objects, why should they cease to appear?
The Bodhisattva who has achieved the Four Wisdoms will definitely understand and penetrate the principle of Vijnaptimatrata.

5. Ghanavyuha Sutra: One Stanza says,
'The objects of mind, Manas, and the other consciousnesses are not distinct from their own nature (*svabhava*).
'Therefore, I declare that all things are mere consciousness and there is nothing else [which is external to the mind].'
Numerous indeed are the sacred texts which bear testimony to the truth of this doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata.

2. Reasoning

1. Each of the five 'commonly acknowledged' consciousnesses (the eye-consciousness, etc.), like the other four, does not directly perceive any object distinct from itself. [In other words, the eye-consciousness does not perceive sound; nor does the ear-consciousness perceive form or colour, and so forth. However, this is not the case with the eye-consciousness of the Buddha, or of the Bodhisattva in his final incarnation.]

2. The other 'commonly acknowledged' consciousness, – the sixth, i.e., Manovijnana, – because it is a consciousness, like the Five, does not directly perceive dharmas distinct from itself either.

3. The immediate object of the six consciousnesses is not distinct from these consciousnesses, because it is one of their two Bhagas (i.e., the *nimittabhaga*), just as the perceiving division (i.e., the *darsanabhaga*) is not distinct from consciousness since it is consciousness in its essential nature.

4. The immediate object of consciousness, because it is an object, like the associated mental activities, is definitely not separable from Citta and Caittas.
Arguments and philosophical reasoning to prove this doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata are numerous. We should therefore believe deeply in and accept it.

The conclusion is that the Atman and dharmas are non-existent; Tathata (the Void or Emptiness) and consciousness are not inexistent. Atman and dharmas lie outside the category of existence; Tathata and consciousness lie outside the category of non-existence. We have, therefore, in this doctrine, the Middle Way.

BOOK VI

CAUSALITY AND SAMSARA

If only consciousness exists, without any external causation, from what are generated the many kinds of distinctions (e.g., the eight consciousnesses, the Samprayuktas, the two Bhagas, the Viprayuktas)?

The Stanza in Vasubandhu's Trimsika says:

> From the consciousness which contains all Bijas (seeds) (the Alayavijnana)
>
> Such-and-such evolution or transformation takes place.
>
> Through the force of the mutual co-operation of the actual Dharmas
>
> Such-and-such kinds of distinction are engendered.

Hsüan Tsang in his *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* explains:

> Though there is no external causation, yet, because of the differing evolutions of all the Bijas present in the Alayavijnana, and by the force of the mutual assistance of the eight actual consciousnesses, etc., such-and-such kinds of distinction are produced. Why assume an external cause to explain their birth?
>
> The birth of pure dharmas should be understood in the same manner. They are produced by the pure Bijas of the Alayavijnana and through the activity of the pure actual consciousnesses.

The Alayavijnana contains both pure and impure seeds. The pure seeds spontaneously produce pure dharmas or things, and the impure seeds impure dharmas. Thus, from the Alaya are produced all dharmas, pure and impure alike, and these in turn react upon the Alaya by 'perfuming' it. This is why the Treatise says: 'The Alayavijnana and the impure dharmas interact on one another as cause and effect, just as the wick and the flame (interact to) produce the incandescence (of a lamp), or bundles of reeds (stacked side by side) support one another. It is only through these two (the Alaya and the impure dharmas) that causality is established. There need be no other causality.' Precisely the same process of reciprocal causation also operates between the Alaya and the pure dharmas. Thus, the Alaya is in itself both cause and effect, and in itself is capable of producing all things, both pure and impure. What need, then, to look for external causation? The fact that all sentient beings are bound to the perpetual flux of life and death springs from internal causation, independent of external causes. Therefore, there is nothing but Consciousness.

THE FOUR PRATYAYAS

It has been said that the various kinds of distinction (Vikalpas) are born through having as conditioning factors (Pratyayas) the Bijas and the actual dharmas. In what way should we understand this causality?

The Pratyayas (conditioning factors) are four in number, Hetupratyaya, Samanantarapratyaya, Alambanapratyaya, and Adhipatipratyaya.

1. CONDITION QUÂ CAUSE

(Hetupratyaya)

Hetupratyaya (causative condition) means that the conditioned dharams (*samskrta*) produce without mediation their own fruit. The substance of this Pratyaya is twofold: (1) the Bijas that engender and (2) the actual dharmas that perfume.

1. Bijas. Bijas are the different powers or potentials (*sakti*) of the Mulavijnana, good, bad, non-defined, of all Dhatus, of all Lands, of Rupa, of non-Rupa, etc. The Bijas are Hetupratyaya in a double action: on the one hand, they lead to the production of Bijas which are of the same species and which are subsequent to them (the Bija creates a Bija similar to itself); on the other hand, they produce actual consciousnesses of the same species which are simultaneous with them.

2. Actual dharmas. Actual dharmas refer to the seven evolving or transforming consciousnesses or Pravrttivijnanas (*samvittibhagas*), with their Caittas, their two Bhagas, good, bad, etc., of all Dhatus, of all Lands, pure, impure, etc. – with the exception of the good dharmas of the Buddha and the non-defined extremely-weak dharmas – which perfume the Mulavijnana and engender Bijas of their own species. The actual dharmas are Hetupratyaya in this single operation only.

2. CONDITION QUÂ ANTECEDENT

(Samanantarapratyaya)

Samanantarapratyaya, a condition quâ antecedent, means that the eight actual consciousnesses (*darsana* and *samvittibhaga*) and their Caittas (to the exclusion of Rupa, the Viprayuktas, the Bijas, and the Asamskrtas) constitute a preceding group which passes away to give place to a subsequent group of the same species, opening the way to that group and acting in such a way that it immediately comes into being.

3. CONDITION QUÂ PERCEIVED OBJECT
(Alambanapratyaya)

Alambanapratyaya is the 'condition quâ perceived object'. By this is meant the dharma that exists, on which the mind and its associates are based, and which is perceived and known by the mind that is born similar to it.

Alambana is of two kinds: immediate and remote.

4. CONDITION QUÂ CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR
(Adhipatipratyaya)

Adhipatipratyaya is the 'condition quâ contributory factor', 'condition in general', a real dharma (conditioned or unconditioned, as opposed to imaginary dharmas), possessing potent energy and capable of promoting (first nine *hetus*) or counteracting (tenth *hetu*) the evolution of another dharma.

The dharmas which are Hetu, Alambana, Samanantarapratyaya, are also Adhipatipratyaya; but, for the purpose of indicating the variety of modes of causality (*pratyaya*), a fourth category is established under the name of Adhipatipratyaya for all those dharmas which are Pratyayas regardless of their causality quâ Hetu, etc.

BOOK VII

SAMSARA AND THE THREE VASANAS

The question is asked: Although internal consciousness exists, how, in the absence of external Pratyayas, is one to explain the uninterrupted succession of births and deaths of sentient beings?

Stanza 19 of Vasubandhu's Tṛimsika says:

> Owing to the habit-energy (Bijas or *vasana*) of various previous deeds,
>
> Together with the habit-energy of the two 'Apprehensions' (Grahas),
>
> As previous retribution (karma of previous existences) is exhausted,

> Succeeding retribution (maturing in subsequent existences) is produced.

Hsüan Tsang in his *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* explains:

> 'Various deeds' refer to those deeds which are meritorious, unmeritorious, and 'non-changing' [i.e., deeds which are performed in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu and which do not change in certain states or situations]. What is involved here are good but impure deeds and bad deeds proceeding from volition (*cetanakarman*).
>
> Although the deed perishes immediately after having come to birth and one may not therefore admit that it is capable, by itself, of creating the fruit, nevertheless, this deed impresses on the Mulavijnana the potentials or Bijas which will produce their own fruit. These potentials receive the name of habit-energy or 'perfuming energy' (*vasana*). They are in fact the vapours, the energy, the emanation of the deed; and they are produced by the perfuming or impregnating influence of the act.
>
> These potentials constitute a continuous series right up to the moment when they are ripe. At that moment, the final potential creates the fruit.
>
> The continuous procession of births and deaths (Samsara) is due to the operation of various Vasanas – in other words, the Bijas. Vasanas are of three different kinds:
>
> 1. *Ming-yen* Vasana, the perfuming energy created by 'names and concepts'. By this are meant the immediate Bijas of each of the conditioned dharmas (Samskrtas).
>
> Names and concepts are of two kinds:
>
> (1) That which expresses the meaning and makes it known to others; a certain kind of vocal sound that is capable of indicating the meaning.
>
> (2) That which reveals or causes the object to be present, that is, the Cittas-Caittas which perceive the object.
>
> The Bijas which, by reason of these two kinds of 'names and concepts', are imprinted on the Mulavijnana (*nimittabhaga*), are the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of each of the conditioned dharmas.
>
> 2. Vasana of Atman-adhesion (Atmagraha): the Bijas which proceed from the false concept of 'I-and-mine'. Atman-adhesion is of two kinds:
>
> (1) Innate Atman-adhesion [belonging to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses], which is to be cut off by the 'path of meditation and self-cultivation' (*bhavanaheya*).
>
> (2) Atman-adhesion of discrimination or speculation (*vikalpita*), [belonging to the sixth consciousness], which is abandoned or cut off by the 'path of insight into Transcendent Truth' (*darsanaheya*).
>
> The Bijas created and perfumed by these two Atman-adhesions have

as a result the distinction between the self and the non-self in relation to sentient beings, etc.

3. Vasana of Bhavanga: the Bijas which proceed from deeds, *karma-bijas*, which bring about retribution in the three Dhatus. Bhavanga is of two kinds:

(a) Impure-good deeds which produce agreeable fruits.
(b) Bad deeds which produce disagreeable fruits.

The Bijas created and perfumed by these two Bhavangas have as a result the contrast between the fruits of retribution, i.e., between good and bad destinies.

BOOK VIII

THE THREE NATURES

How can the doctrine of Mere-Consciousness be reconciled with the doctrine of 'Three Natures' which Bhagavat teaches in many passages of the Sutras?

It should be understood that these three natures are all inseparable from consciousness.

Stanzas 20 and 21 of Vasubandhu's Trimsika say:

> Because of such and such imaginations,
>
> Such and such things are imagined, [i.e., conceived by the imagination].
>
> What is conceived by this imagination (*parikalpitasvabhava*)
>
> Has no nature of its own.
>
> The self-nature which results from dependence on others (*paratantra*)
>
> Consists of discriminations produced by causes and conditions.
>
> The difference between the nature of Ultimate Reality (*parinispanna*) and the nature of dependence on others (*paratantra*)
>
> Is that the former is eternally free from the *parikalpita*-nature (conception by the imagination) of the latter, that is, the Paratantra (dependence on others for manifestation).

There are three aspects or natures of existence or being, under which all things may be regarded, depending upon the degree of true understanding which we ourselves possess of these things. They are called: (1) nature of mere-imagination (*parikalpitasvabhava*), (2) nature of dependence on others for manifestation (*paratantrasvabhava*), (3) nature of Ultimate Reality (*parinispannasvabhava*). These three aspects are generally known as the 'Three Natures' or the 'Three Svabhavas'.

The first form of knowledge by which the reality of things is assumed is called Parikalpita, 'imagined', that is, imagination in its ordinary sense. This is an illusion, for things are imagined to exist really where in fact there are none. It is like seeing a mirage which vanishes as one approaches. Imagined (*parikalpita*) objects have, therefore, no objective reality.

'The second form of knowledge by which we examine existence is Paratantra, 'depending upon another'. This is a kind of scientific knowledge based on analysis. Buddhists make use of this knowledge to disprove the substantiality of individual objects, that is, the *svabhavatva* of things. According to them, there is nothing self-existing in the world, everything depends for its existence on something else, things are universally mutually conditioned, endlessly related to one another.

The imagined view (*parikalpita*) of reality does not give us a true knowledge of it, and the relativity view (*paratantra*) reduces it into nothingness. There is a third way of viewing existence, called Parinispanna, 'perfected', which allows us to become truly acquainted with reality as it is. It is this 'perfected' knowledge whereby we are enabled to see really into the nature of existence, to perceive rightly what is meant by Svabhava, and to declare that there is no Svabhava as is imagined by the ignorant and that all is empty (*sunya*).

Perfect or 'perfected' knowledge issues from Prajna, or Aryajnana, or sometimes simply Jnana, seeing into the suchness of things. It perceives things as they are, because going beyond the realm of being and non-being which belongs to discrimination, it dives into the abyss where there are no shadows. This is called self-realization. As the wise see reality with their eye of Prajna, they ascertain definitely what it is, i.e., in its self-nature and not as is seen by the ignorant whose eye is never raised beyond the horizon of relativity.

1. NATURE OF MERE-IMAGINATION
(Parikalpitasvabhava)

The first *pada* or line of Stanza 20 describes the consciousness that imagines. The second *pada* describes the object which is imagined by the imaginative consciousness.

The last two *padas* say that the self-nature of Atman or dharmas conceived or grasped by the imaginative consciousness absolutely does not exist, because we have already sufficiently demonstrated the non-existence, as such, of the Atman and dharmas.

Conclusion: Only the sixth and seventh consciousnesses are possessed of the faculty of imagination.

The question is asked: What are the things on which imagination exercises itself?

> According to the Samgraha, this thing is the *nimittabhaga*, i.e., the image-division of the mind, because this Bhaga is the 'condition quâ object' (*alambanapratyaya*) of the mind that imagines.

2. NATURE OF DEPENDENCE ON OTHERS (PARATANTRASVABHAVA)

It should be understood that the definition given in the Stanza whereby 'Paratantra consists of discriminations produced by causes and conditions', refers only to the defiled Paratantra, i.e., the Vikalpa. Pure Paratantra is not, in fact, termed Vikalpa; it is as much Parinispanna as Paratantra.

The second opinion is that all minds and their attributes, whether defiled or pure, are designated in the Stanza by the term *vikalpa*, because they are all capable of apprehending and perceiving objects. Thus, the definition given in the Stanza includes all Paratantras, pure as well as defiled.

3. ULTIMATE REALITY (PARINISPANNASVABHAVA)

Parinispanna or Ultimate Reality is the complete and perfect 'real nature' of all dharmas which is revealed by the two 'Voids' (*sunyas*).

The expression *pari-nis-panna* indicates: (1) universality, i.e., the omnipresence ('nowhere is it lacking') of this nature; (2) eternity, i.e., its non-birth-non-destruction; (3) its reality, i.e., its non-falseness. It is different from the 'individual character' of dharmas, which is not universal; from the 'common character', which is not eternal; and from space and the Atman, which are not real.

These three 'Natures' (*svabhava*) are all inseparable from the mind and its attributes (Citta-Caittas). That is to say:

a. The mind and its attributes, together with the manifestations produced by it (*darsana* and *nimittabhaga*), are engendered through numerous conditioning factors, and are thus like the phenomena produced by a magician's tricks, which, not really existing though they seem to exist, deceive the ignorant. All this is called the 'nature of dependence on others (Paratantra).

b. The ignorant thereupon perversely believe in them as Atman and as dharmas, which exist or do not exist, are identical or different, are inclusive or exclusive, etc. But, like 'flowers in the sky', etc., they are

> non-existent both in inner nature and external aspect. All this is called the 'nature of mere-imagination' (Parikalpita).
>
> c. These things which are thus dependent on others and are wrongly regarded as Atman and as dharmas, are, in reality, all void (sunya). The genuine nature of consciousness thus revealed by this 'voidness' (*sunyata*) of Atman and dharma is called the 'nature of Ultimate Reality' (Parinispanna).
>
> Thus, these three natures are all inseparable from mind.

THE THREE NATURES AND THE THREE NIHSVABHAVATAS

> If there are three natures, why does Bhagavat teach that 'all dharmas are without self-nature?' In other words, if dharmas exist in three ways, as Parikalpita, Paratantra, and Parinispanna, why does Bhagavat teach that they are empty, that they do not exist, that they are *sunya*, *nihsvabhava*?

Hsüan Tsang in his Treatise says:

> It is on the basis of the above-mentioned three natures of Existence that the three natures of Non-Existence are established, that is to say, non-existence as regards characteristics, non-existence as regards origination, and non-existence as regards Supreme Truth. For this reason, the Buddha preaches, with a secret intention, that all dharmas are without self-nature (*svabhava*), without reality. This, however, does not mean that self-nature is absolutely lacking.
>
> The latter two Svabhavas, i.e., Paratantrasvabhava and Parinispannasvabhava, are, in fact, not natures of non-existence. Ignorant people, however, impose upon things their own false belief that these really have a nature of their own as Atman or as dharmas, and this is called belief in their 'nature of mere-imagination' (Parikalpitasvabhava). In order to eradicate this belief, therfore, the World-Honoured One (Bhagavat) has applied the term 'non-existence' both to what (really) exists (the so-called second and third forms of non-existence), and to what does not exist (the first form).
>
> Parinispanna is the *paramartha* of all dharmas, because it is their *paramarthasatyr*. It is also the Bhutatathata (*Chen Ju*).

Chen means genuine and real. It indicates that Parinispanna is not baseless and false. *Ju* means being constantly thus. It indicates that Parinispanna does not evolve or change. The meaning is that this Reality remains, under all conditions, constantly thus in its nature. Therefore it is called *Chen-ju* (Bhutatathata), which conveys the idea that it is profoundly immovable, not baseless, and not false.

Parinispanna is also the 'real nature of Vijnaptimatrata'. In fact, Vijnaptimatrata is of two kinds: (1) false, i.e., Parikalpita; (2) real, i.e., Parinispanna. To indicate this difference, it is said that Parinispanna is the real Vijnaptimatrata.

Conclusion: The three Stanzas 23–25 show that the statement in the Sutras about the three natures of non-existence is not the revelation of ultimate truth, and those who are wise should not rely on it; they should be careful not to understand it in its literal sense, i.e., that, broadly speaking, dharmas have no self-nature (Svabhava).

BOOK IX

THE HOLY PATH OF ATTAINMENT

The holy path involves five stages as follows:

1. The stage of 'moral provisioning' (*sambharavastha*). This means cultivation of the Moksabhagiyas of the Mahayana, i.e., the spiritual qualities leading to liberation from delusion. This period extends from the first 'production of the mind and heart of Mahabodhi (*bodhicittotpada*)' up to the production of the ten dedications (*usmagata*).

2. The stage of intensified effort (*prayogavastha*). This means cultivation of the Nirvedhabhagiyas of the Mahayana, i.e., the decision and selection between the true and the false. This period extends from the cultivation of the four 'good roots' (*kusalamulas*), the ten dedications, etc., to the end of the first kalpa, i.e,, the end of the Adhimukticaryabhumi (the Bhumi of Mental Resolution).

3. The stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding (*prativedhavastha*). This means the position of insight into Transcendent Truth Darsanamarga) held by the Bodhisattvas and refers to the 'thought of entrance into the first Bhumi'.

4. The stage of exercising cultivation (*bhavanavastha*). This means the stage of exercising cultivation (Bhavanamarga) held by the Bodhisattvas. This period extends from the 'thought of residence in the first Bhumi' up to the Diamond Samadhi (Vajropamasamadhi).

5. The stage of final attainment or ultimate realization (*nisthavastha*). This means abiding in the Anuttara Samyaksambodhi (Supreme Enlightenment).

1. THE STAGE OF MORAL PROVISIONING
(Sambharavastha)

Hsüan Tsang in his Treatise says:

> Starting from the production of the profound and firm 'mind and heart of Mahabodhi' up to the production of the Nirvedhabhagiyas and the effort to abide in the truly transcendental principle of Vijnaptimatrata: all this is comprised in the stage of moral provisioning.
>
> This stage is called *sambhara*, 'provision', 'equipment', because, with a view to attaining Anuttarasamyaksambodhi (Supreme Enlightenment), the Bodhisattva accumulates diverse and excellent 'moral provisions'.
>
> This stage is also called Moksabhagiya, the stage of 'liberation' or 'deliverance', because the Bodhisattva makes constant efforts to seek the deliverance of sentient beings.

2. THE STAGE OF INTENSIFIED EFFORT
(Prayogavastha)

Hsüan Tsang in his Treatise says:

1. The Bodhisattva, in the course of the first Asamkhyeyakalpa (innumerable kalpas, i.e., countless aeons), has equipped himself well with the spiritual provisions (*sambhara*) of meritorious achievements, noble virtues, and transcendental wisdom (*jnanaprajna*).

> The dharmas of deliverance are now complete. With a view to entering the Darsanamarga, the path of spiritual discernment, and installing himself thus in Vijnaptimatrata, he practises the Prayoga, the preliminary exercise; he suppresses and eradicates the two Grahas, i.e., the conceptions of object and subject (*grahyagraha* and *grahakagraha*): that is to say, he cultivates 'Usmagata, the Murdhanas, Ksanti, and the Laukikagradharmas.'
>
> 2. These four attributes receive the general name of Nirvedhabhagiyas, for they lead to true and pure intelligence (*nirvedha*).
>
> Inasmuch as they are near the Darsanamarga, they are given the special name of *prayoga*, i.e., the preliminary or preparatory stage of intensified effort. This does not mean that the preceding stage of Sambhara is not also preliminary and characterized by intensified efforts.
>
> 3. The four Nirvedhabhagiyas (Usmagata, etc.) are composed of

four reflections, *paryesanas*, and four 'exact realizations'. The first two Nirvedhabhagiyas are reflections while the last two are exact realizations.

The four reflections (*paryesanas*) consist in the examination or study of the 'names' (*naman*) and 'essences' (*vastu*) of things, together with their self-natures (*svabhava*) and differences (*visesa*). In this way, the novice discovers that all these are only supposed to exist and that they they do not exist as realities.

The four 'exact realizations' consist in the recognition with absolute certainty that these four dharmas do not exist apart from consciousness and that the consciousness that knows them does not exist either. These realizations are called 'exact knowledge in accordance with real truth'.

4. What is the object of the meditation of Prayogavastha?

In this particular stage, the Bodhisattva studies and meditates both on the *vyavasthitasatya* (i.e., the Four Noble Truths) and on the *avyavasthitasatya* (i.e., Ultimate Reality either in itself or as a function of the two Sunyatas) to prepare himself for the Darsanamarga in its two forms and to suppress the two kinds of speculative Avaranas which will be eliminated at the Darsana. Principally, unlike the truth-seekers of the two Vehicles who meditate only on the *vyavasthitasatya*, he applies himself to the *avyavasthitasatya*.

3. THE STAGE OF UNIMPEDED PENETRATING UNDERSTANDING

(Prativedhavastha)

Hsüan Tsang in his Treatise says:

> [In this stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding,] the Bodhisattva attains, with reference to an object, the non-discriminating transcendental wisdom called Nirvikalpakajnana, which does not cling to the objective world, and accepts no kind of sophistry about its seeming appearance (*prapancanimitta*). He is now said really to abide in the genuine and transcendent nature of Vijnaptimatrata, that is to say, he experiences the Bhutatathata (Absolute Reality). His wisdom and the Bhutatathata are on the same plane, both being equally divorced from the aspects of subject and object (*grahaka* and *grahya*). Both aspects constitute discrimination, being the sophistic manifestations of that mind which clings to something as its object.
>
> [In this stage, then, there is an 'abiding' in Mere-Consciousness; for now at last the novice 'experiences the Bhutatathata'. The path of self-cultivation has virtually reached its goal; all that is needed is further practice.]

4. THE STAGE OF EXERCISING CULTIVATION
(Bhavanavastha)

What are the characteristics of Bhavanavastha, the stage of exercising cultivation?

Hsüan Tsang in his Treatise says:

> The Bodhisattva, from the time when he has achieved the preceding stage of insight into Truth, now constantly cultivates the Non-discriminating Wisdom, in order to clear away the remaining barriers and gain the experience of the 'revolution' or 'inner transformation' (*asrayaparavrtti*). This Wisdom, far removed from all sophistry, is said to grasp nothing; and, being marvellous in its functioning and difficult to fathom, it is termed inconceivable.
>
> Alternatively, it is described as being 'without perception', because it is exempt from all frivolous discussions or false appearances (*prapanca*), and as being 'inconceivable and incomprehensible', because its mysterious activity is unfathomable.
>
> How are the two kinds of 'revolution' (*asrayaparavrtti*) to be obtained? In the ten Bhumis or Lands, by practising the ten excellent moral exercises (*paramitas*), by clearing away the ten barriers (*avaranas*), by experiencing and attaining the ten Tathatas. In this way will the two kinds of Asrayaparavrtti be obtained.
>
> The Ten Bhumis –
>
> 1. Pramudita Bhumi. The Land of Great Joy, so called because, for the first time, the Bodhisattva enters into possession of the nature of an Arya, realizes the two Sunyatas, and is in a position to benefit himself and others, thus engendering great joy.
>
> 2. Vimala Bhumi. The Immaculate Land or Land of Perfect Purity, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva is already possessed of a very pure morality. As a result of his strict observance of the commandments, he has already got rid of the impurity of coarse immorality. He has also discarded the 'impurity of the klesas' which can produce minor faults, such as a slight violation of the commandments and so forth.
>
> 3. Prabhakari Bhumi. The Luminous Land or the Land of Further Enlightenment, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva has succeeded in providing himself with the excellent meditation (*samadhi* and *samapattis*) of the Mahadharmadharani, and is therefore capable of producing the infinite light of the wonderful transcendental wisdom (Prajna).

4. Arcismati Bhumi. The Land of Glowing Wisdom, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva, well installed in the most excellent Dharmas of Bodhi (*bodhipaksyadharma*), burns up the firewood of klesas and upaklesas (the innate *satkayadrsti* of the sixth consciousness, etc.) thanks to the increase of the glowing flame of Prajna.

5. *Sudurjaya Bhumi.* The Land of Mastery of Utmost Difficulties, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva accomplishes a most difficult task, that of synthesizing the two wisdoms, namely, the *tattvajnana* or metaphysical wisdom and the *samvrtijnana* or worldly wisdom, whose characteristics are by nature mutually contradictory. Because of the necessity of causing these two Jnanas to be born at the same time and to bear on the same object, this stage is extremely difficult to conquer.

6. Abhimukhi Bhumi. The Land of Eternal Presence, so called because, at this stage, the wisdom which bears on Pratityasamutpada (origination dependent on causes and conditions) brings about and gives rise to the supreme Prajna which is free from discrimination and speculation.

7. Duramgama Bhumi. The Land of Long Journeys, i.e., the Land whence one goes far, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva's meritorious activities reach great heights and remote regions. He arrives at *nirnimittavihara* (that is to say, he dwells in a state of mind which is void and is therefore free from Nimitta, i.e., the perceived division of consciousness). This Land marks the end of *abhoga* (function or effort) [for the next Land is exempt from Abhoga (effort), that is to say, the Bodhisattva's activities in the eighth Bhumi are all spontaneous and effortless]. This Land is beyond all worldly paths and the paths of the two Vehicles.

8. Acala Bhumi. The Land of Non-agitation or Perfect Tranquillity, so called because, at this stage, the Wisdom of non-discrimination (*nirvikalpakajnana*) proceeds spontaneously in a continuous series without the klesas, which include Nimitta and Abhoga, being able to agitate it.

9. Sadhumati Bhumi. The Land of Superb Discriminating Wisdom, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva has successfully acquired the mysterious four unhindered powers of interpretation and reasoning, with which he can penetrate the ten regions, preaching the Dharma perfectly.

10. Dharmamegha Bhumi. The Land of Dharma-Clouds, so called because, in this final stage, the clouds of Mahadharmajnana, bearing 'waters of all virtues', conceal the *dausthulya* (crude dross, i.e., inaptitudes

or infirmities) of the two Avaranas (just as clouds conceal space) and fill the Dharmakaya.

The Ten Paramitas –

1. Dana. Gifts or charity.
Gifts are of three kinds: (1) material gifts, sustaining the body; (2) gifts of security or freedom from fear, sustaining the mind; and (3) gifts of Dharma, sustaining the good Dharma.

2. Sila. Morality or observance of commandments.
Commandments are of three kinds: (1) Commandments governing personal conduct; (2) commandments for the acquisition of good Dharma; and (3) commandments for the bestowal of benefits and advantages on sentient beings.

3. Ksanti. Patient endurance.
Patient endurance is of three kinds: (1) to endure patiently resentment and injury; (2) to accept quietly sorrow and suffering; and (3) to examine patiently and adhere to the Dharma.

4. Virya. Zeal in making progress.
Zeal in making progress is of three kinds: (1) zeal in producing great resolutions; (2) zeal in acquiring good spiritual dharmas; and (3) zeal in promoting the well-being and happiness of sentient beings.

5. Dhyana. Meditation and contemplation.
Meditation is of three kinds: (1) meditation leading to Samadhi; (2) meditation leading to the unfoldment of supernatural powers; and (3) meditation leading to the successful accomplishment of great tasks.

6. Prajna. Discernment.
Prajna is of three kinds: (a) Pudgalasunyata-non-discriminating Prajna (intuitive discernment of the voidness of the Atman); (b) Dharmasunyata-non-discriminating Prajna (intuitive discernment of the voidness of all dharmas); (c) Pudgalasunyata-dharmasunyata-non-discriminating Prajna (intuitive discernment of the voidness of Atman and all dharmas).

7. Upayakausala. Skill in resorting to appropriate expedients.
Skill in resorting to appropriate expedients is of two kinds: (a) Skill in turning the mind towards Mahabodhi (Supreme Enlightenment); and (b) skill in delivering sentient beings from suffering.

8. Pranidhana. Pious vows.
Pious vows are of two kinds: (a) pious vows for attaining Bodhi; and

(b) vows for promoting the well-being and happiness of sentient beings.

9. Bala. Power of fulfilment.

Power of fulfilment is of two kinds: (a) the power of cogitation; and (b) the power of self-cultivation. These powers are exercised in order that the first six Paramitas may never be interrupted.

10. Jnana. Transcendental Wisdom.

[According to the Samgraha Sastra, this Jnana is evolved as a result of the practice of the first six Paramitas.] It is of two kinds: (a) wisdom with which the Bodhisattva enjoys the 'felicity of Dharma'; and (b) wisdom with which he enables sentient beings to reach 'spiritual maturity'.

The Ten Avaranas (barriers) –

1. Prthagjanatvavarana, the barrier constituted by the nature of Prthagjana (ordinary person unenlightened by Buddhism).

This barrier is formed by those constituent parts of the two Avaranas, *klesavarana* and *jneyavarana*, which arise 'by speculation and discrimination': their Bijas are the basis on which the nature of Prthagjana is established.

2. Mithyapratipattyavarana, the barrier of bad or perverse conduct. This refers to a part of Jneyavarana with the three offensive deeds (of body, speech, and thought) which produce this part.

3. Dhandhatvavarana, the barrier of unintelligence and failure of memory.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which causes failure of memory of the dharmas of audition, of reflection, and of meditation.

4. Suksmaklesasamudacaravarana, the barrier which consists in the manifestation of subtle klesas.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which comprises the erroneous 'I-and-mine' view (*satkayadrsti*), etc., of the sixth consciousness. It is said of this klesa that it is very subtle. This is because it belongs to the lowest category; because it does not proceed from an act of attention, being born spontaneously; and because it has been in manifestation since before the beginning of time.

5. Hinayanaparinirvanavarana, the barrier that consists in attachment to the Parinirvana of the Hinayana School.

It is a part of innate Jneyavarana, which causes the Bodhisattva to have a horror of Samsara (rounds of birth and death) and aspire after

Nirvana, just as people of the two lower Vehicles have a horror of suffering and rejoice in its destruction.

6. Sthulanimittasamudacaravarana, the barrier which consists in the presence of crude characteristics.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana and consists in the erroneous belief that there are in manifestation crude characteristics of impurity and purity.

7. Suksmaninimittasamudacaravarana, the barrier which consists of the presence of subtle characteristics.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana and consists in the erroneous belief that there are in manifestation subtle characteristics of birth and destruction.

This barrier impedes the 'wonderful path free from characteristics' of the seventh Bhumi, and is absolutely cut off upon entry into this Bhumi.

8. Nirnimittabhisamskaravarana, the barrier which consists in indulging in mental functions in a contemplation that should be free from concepts or characteristics.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana, which prevents *nirnimitta* contemplation (i.e., contemplation free from concepts) from proceeding spontaneously.

9. Parahita-carya-akamana-avarana, the barrier which consists in an absence of desire to do anything for the benefit of others.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which causes the Bodhisattva to have no desire to apply himself diligently to the service of sentient beings and to take pleasure only in cultivating his own good.

10. Dharmesuvasitapratilambhavarana, the barrier which consists in lack of completeness in respect of the mastery of all dharmas.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which hinders the achievement of complete mastery of the various dharmas (that is to say, the Dharanis, Samadhis, meritorious activities, etc.).

The Ten Tathatas –

1. The universal Tathata, which is revealed by the two Sunyatas or Nairatmyas. There is not one single dharma which is not void from these two points of view. [Tathata realized in the first Bhumi].

2. The most sublime Tathata, so called because it is provided with infinite sublime qualities, and is the most sublime of all dharmas. [Tathata realized in the second Bhumi].

3. The 'excellent-efflux' Tathata, so called because the teachings flowing out from this Tathata are the most excellent of all teachings. [Tathata realized in third Bhumi].

4. The independent and self-contained Tathata, so called because it is not susceptible of being 'appropriated'. This Tathata has no 'relations and dependents', because it is not a supporting basis for concepts of the 'I' (*atmagraha*, etc.), and because it is not 'taken' by these concepts. [Tathata realized in the fourth Bhumi].

5. The Tathata of subjective non-differentiation, so called because it does not present any difference of species, because it does not diversify like the eye, etc. [It constitutes a single substance (*dravya*); Samsara and Nirvana are one, i.e., identical with each other]. [Tathata of the fifth Bhumi].

6. The Tathata that is above differences of impurity and purity. The truth is that this Tathata is essentially non-defiled, and it cannot be said of it that it is defiled first and pure afterwards. [Tathata of the sixth Bhumi].

7. The Tathata of objective non-differentiation, so called because this Tathata is without differences although it may be diversely defined. [The texts define it as Paramartha, Dharmadhatu, *Kusala*, *Akusala*, etc.]. [Tathata of the seventh Bhumi].

8. The Tathata that transcends all notions of increase or decrease (that is to say, it is invariable, i.e., can be neither added to nor taken from). It does not increase through purity or diminish through defilement. Whether good or bad dharmas increase or diminish, it rests eternally as it is.

This Tathata is also designated as the Tathata that is the supporting basis for the mastery which permits the creation or modification of phenomena (gold, silver, etc.) and of lands (*ksetras*); mastery obtained in the eighth Bhumi. This signifies that when the Bodhisattva has attained this Tathata, he becomes an adept in the manifestation of phenomena or lands of all descriptions. [Tathata of the eighth Bhumi].

9. The Tathata that is the supporting basis for the mastery of transcendental wisdom, that is to say, of the Pratisamvids (unhindered powers) (ninth Bhumi). It signifies that the Bodhisattva, when he has attained this Tathata, obtains mastery of the 'unhindered power of interpreting the Dharma'.

10. The Tathata that is the supporting basis for the mastery of all supernatural activities. The truth is that when the Bodhisattva has

attained this Tathata, he becomes the master of physical-vocal-mental activities, supernatural powers, Dharanimukhas and Samadhimukhas (tenth Bhumi).

Asrayaparavrtti and its Fruits. –

Thus, in the course of the ten Bhumis, the Bodhisattva has energetically practised the ten excellent Paramita-virtues, cut off the ten barriers (*avaranas*), and realized the ten Tathatas. As a result of this, he becomes capable of achieving the two inner transformations (*asrayaparavrttis*), that is to say, he can attain Nirvana and Mahabodhi.

Generally speaking, there are six kinds of Asrayaparavrtti (transformation):

1. Transformation by reducing or smashing the force of impure Bijas and increasing the power of pure Bijas. During the first two periods, i.e., in the first two stages of the Path (*sambhara* and *prayoya*), through the practice of resolution and judgment (*adhimoksa*), the sense of shame and integrity (*hri* and *apatrapa*), the Bodhisattva reduces the force of the defiled Bijas which are found in the Mulavijnana and increases the power of the pure Bijas which are stored in it. Although he has not yet cut off the Bijas of the Avaranas and achieved Asrayaparavrtti, nevertheless, since he gradually suppresses the actual manifestation of the Avaranas, it can be said that he has achieved Asrayaparavrtti.

2. Prativedhaparavrtti, inner transformation through unimpeded penetrating understanding. In the course of the third stage, through insight into Truth (Darsanamarga), the Bodhisattva realizes Bhutatathata, thereby cutting off the crude dross (*dausthulya*) of the two Avaranas arising from discrimination and speculation. Thereupon he realizes and achieves, partially, real Asrayaparavrtti.

3. Bhavanaparavrtti, transformation through meditation and constant practice of the highest virtues. In the course of the period of Bhavana, by repeated practice of the Paramita-deeds of the ten Bhumis, the Bodhisattva progressively cuts off the crude dross of the two innate Avaranas. Thus, gradually, he realizes and attains real Asrayaparavrtti.

4. Phalaparipuriparavrtti or transformation through perfection of the fruit in the final stage of the Path (*nisthavastha*). By virtue of the accumulation, in the course of the three Mahakalpas (Asamkhyeyas), of an infinite number of difficult practices and excellent practices, the Bodhisattva, at the moment of Vajropamasamadhi, cuts off absolutely all the innate *dausthulyas* (crude dross) of the Avaranas and realizes at one stroke the perfect Asrayaparavrtti, that is, the 'Buddha fruit', which will last until the end of the ages for the welfare and happiness of all sentient beings.

5. Hinaparavrtti or inferior transformation achieved by the two Vehicles, namely, the Sravakas and the Pratyekabuddhas. These truth-seekers (a) have in view only their personal advantage; (b) are disgusted with suffering and pleased with mental quietude; (c) are capable of penetrating Bhutatathata only in the measure wherein that is manifested by the voidness of Atman (*pudgalasunyata*), for they do not know the voidness of dharmas (*dharmasunyata*). Consequently, they cut off only the Bijas of *klesavarana*, the cause of rebirth, and fail to cut off the Bijas of *jneyavarana* which obstructs Mahabodhi. Thus, they realize Bhutatathata only in so far as it is Pratisamkhyanirodha (Nirvana); they do not realize Mahabodhi (the Dharmakaya, the perfect Asraya-paravrtti). They have no eminent faculties and are foreign to the excellent qualities of omniscience, etc. Hence the name 'hinaparavrtti' or 'inferior transformation'.

6. Vipulaparavrtti, the great transformation which is achieved by the abandonment of the crude dross of the two Avaranas, and of which the present Trimsika of Vasubandhu speaks. The Mahayana Bodhisattvas hasten to Mahabodhi for the well-being of others, have neither disgust for existence nor relish for Nirvana, penetrate the Bhutatathata revealed by the two Sunyatas, cut off absolutely the Bijas of Jneyavarana and Klesavarana, realize instantaneously supreme Bodhi and Nirvana, and possess eminent faculties. Hence the name 'Vipulaparavrtti' or 'great transformation'.

Mahaparinirvana. –

That which the Bodhisattva acquires as a result of revelation by Paravrtti is Mahaparinirvana.

In fact, from all times, Nirvana is pure by nature; but it is 'covered' by adventitious barriers or veils which cause it to remain unmanifested. The true Holy Path, in being born, [like a strong wind], clears away the barriers, [like clouds], and causes the character of Nirvana, [like the moon], to manifest itself. That is what is called the attainment of Nirvana.

The word Nirvana means the Bhutatathata which has been disentangled from the barriers. Hence the substance of Nirvana is the pure Dharmadhatu.

However, one has to distinguish four different meanings of Nirvana:

1. The Anadikalika-prakrtisuddha-nirvana, i.e., the Nirvana that is pure in its essential nature:

This is the Bhutatathata, the ultimate principle or essential nature of all dharmas. Despite adventitious contamination, it is: (a) pure in itself; (b) possessed of innumerable and measureless excellent qualities; (c) free from birth and destruction, being absolutely tranquil and placid, like space; (d) equal and common for all sentient beings; (e) neither identical with all dharmas nor different from them (for it is the Dharmata); (f) free from all nimitta (because it is not apprehensible: the *grahyanimitta* is lacking in it); (g) free from all *vikalpa* (mental discrimination) (because it does not apprehend; the *grahakavikalpa* is lacking in it); (h) beyond the path of the intellect (that is to say, it is 'realized' internally; it transcends ideation and ratiocination); (i) beyond the path of names and words; and (j) realized internally by true Aryas (saints and sages).

This Tathata – which is the second of the seven Tathatas – being 'essentially peaceful', receives the name of Nirvana.

2. The Sopadhisesanirvana, i.e., Nirvana possessed of some remaining *upadi* (supporting basis):

This is the Bhutatathata that has emerged from the barrier of vexing passions. There still remains some *upadi*: although the dharmas of retribution, which are the supporting basis for some subtle suffering, have not yet been destroyed, nevertheless the klesas have been completely and forever tranquillized. Hence Nirvana.

3. The Nirupadhisesanirvana, i.e., Nirvana without any remaining *upadhi*:

This is the Bhutatathata which has emerged from the suffering of birth and death (Samsara). On the one hand, the *klesas* have been exhausted; on the other, all remaining *upadhi*, which can serve as a supporting basis for suffering, has equally been destroyed. All sufferings have come to an end. Hence Nirvana.

4. The Apratisthitanirvana, i.e., Nirvana in which the Bodhisattva does not stay or reside:

This is the Bhutatathata that has emerged from Jneyavarana, 'the barrier which obstructs Supreme Enlightenment (i.e., Bhutatathata)'. [This Tathata is consequently manifested in its integrity and perfection] and is always assisted by Mahakaruna (great compassion) and Mahaprajna (great transcendental wisdom). From this it follows that the Bodhisattva who has realized this Tathata, by reason of his Mahaprajna, does not reside in Samsara; nor does he, by reason of his Mahakaruna, any longer reside in Nirvana. He dedicates himself, with his compassion and wisdom, to service for the well-being and happiness of all sentient beings until the end of all ages. Though fully occupied in such activities, he is always perfectly peaceful. Hence Nirvana.

Mahabodhi. –

What the Bodhisattva acquires 'by birth or production' is Mahabodhi. From all times, [among people who are possessed of the Gotra of Bodhisattvas], there exist Bijas that can produce Mahabodhi; but these

Bijas do not produce it as long as Jneyavarana represents a barrier to them. When this barrier is cleared away by the force of the Holy Path, Mahabodhi is born from its Bijas; that is what is called the attainment of Mahabodhi. Once born, it continues without interruption until the end of all ages.

1. What is Mahabodhi? It is the various classes of mental attributes associated with the four transcendental wisdoms (Jnanas), namely, the Great Mirror Wisdom (*mahadarsajnana*), the Universal Equality Wisdom (*samatajnana*), the Profound Contemplation Wisdom (*pratyaveksanajnana*), and the Perfect Achievement Wisdom (*krtyanusthanajnana*).

2. Although all these four Wisdoms have a bearing on all dharmas, nevertheless, their activity presents varieties.

(a) The Mirror Wisdom (Adarsajnana) manifests the Svasambhogakaya (the functioning glorious body for the Buddha's own use) with its pure Land; it carries the pure Bijas (i.e., the pure qualities of the fruit of Buddha).

(b) The Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana) manifests the Parasambhogakaya (the functioning glorious body for the spiritual benefit of others) with its pure Land.

(c) The Perfect Achievement Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana) manifests the transformation body (Nirmanakaya) with its Land (pure or impure).

(d) The Profound Contemplation Wisdom (Pratyaveksanajnana) observes and examines the virtues and vices of the self and others; it rains the 'rain of the great Dharma'; it breaks through the net of doubts; it actualizes the well-being and happiness of all sentient beings.

5. THE STAGE OF ULTIMATE REALIZATION
(Nisthavastha)

What are the characteristics of the stage of final attainment or ultimate realization (Nisthavastha)?

Stanza 30 of Vasubandhu's Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-trimsika says:

> This is the Pure Dhatu (the undefiled storehouse realm)
>
> Which is inconceivable and incomprehensible, good and eternal,
>
> Where one is in a state of blissfulness with one's emancipated body (*vimuktikaya*);
>
> This is the Law of 'Great Silence' (*mahamuni*), the Dharmakaya, realized by the great Buddha, Sakyamuni.

Hsüan Tsang in his Treatise says:

It should be understood that the 'revolution' or inner transformation (*asrayaparavrtti*) which is achieved during the preceding stage of exercising cultivation represents the stage of final attainment or ultimate realization. The word 'this' in the Stanza refers to the two fruits (Nirvana and Mahabodhi) resulting from the revolution of the preceding stage. These fruits constitute the Pure Dhatu (undefiled storehouse realm) of final attainment (in contradistinction to the Dhatu of the four preceding stages of 'moral provisioning', etc., and to the Dhatu of the two Vehicles).

This is 'pure Dharmadhatu'.

The Buddhabhumi Sutra teaches that the *Buddhabhumi* is made up of five dharmas, namely, the pure Dharmadhatu and the four Transcendental Wisdoms. The Buddhabhumi Sastra studies this pure Dharmadhatu.

The fruit of Asrayaparavrtti presents four characteristics:

1. It is 'inconceivable' and 'incomprehensible', because it is beyond mind and expression; because, sublime and profound, it is realized by the Bodhisattva in himself; and because no worldly comparison can give any idea of it.

2. It is good, because it is of the nature of white dharmas.

In fact, the pure Dharmadhatu (that is to say, the Tathata which is realized as the fruit of Buddhahood), exempt from birth and destruction, is very secure and solid.

3. It is eternal, because it never exhausts itself.

As for the pure Dharmadhatu, it is exempt from birth and destruction, and its nature is immutable. Hence it is said to be eternal.

4. It is blissful, for it does not torment.

The pure Dharmadhatu is blissful, being the cessation of all perception and ideation.

The four Wisdoms are forever exempt from pain and suffering; hence they are described as blissful.

Mahabodhi and Nirvana, which are the two fruits of Asrayaparavrtti, are both described as blissful, because they are by nature non-tormenting and are capable of promoting the bliss and beatitude of all sentient beings.

Dharmakaya. –

Bhagavat Mahabuddha, being possessed of the supreme qualities of Muni (tranquillity and silence), is named Mahamuni. The two fruits obtained by this Muni, being completely and forever dissociated from the two Avaranas, are designated by the term Dharmakaya. They are in fact embellished by *dharmas* of great qualities (*mahagunadharmas*), immeasurable and infinite, for instance, the ten powers, the four intrepidities, etc.

The term *kaya* has the triple meaning of self-nature (*svabhava*), support (*asraya*), and accumulation (*samcaya*).

Therefore the Dharmakaya consists of five dharmas, namely, pure Dharmadhatu and the four Wisdoms. It is not only the pure Dharmadhatu that is named Dharmakaya, for the fruits of the two *paravrttis* are included in the Dharmakaya.

The Dharmakaya is triple, consisting of three bodies (*kayas*) [which are all bodies of *mahagunadharmas*].

1. *Svabhavikakaya*, the body of self-nature, [so named because it is the essential nature (*svabhava*) of the Buddhas]. It is the pure Dharmadhatu of the Tathagatas, the immutable supporting basis for the two Sambhogakayas and the Nirmanakaya, free from the ten nimittas, peaceful, beyond words and concepts, possessed of infinite real and eternal qualities. It is the immutable and identical nature of all dharmas.

This Svabhavikakaya receives also the name of Dharmakaya, because it is the supporting basis for *mahagunadharmas*.

2. Sambhogakaya, which is of two kinds.

(a) Svasambhogakaya. This consists of the infinite real qualities created by the accumulation of immeasurable merits and wisdom cultivated by the Tathagatas during three Asamkhyeyakalpas; it is a material body (*rupakaya*), perfect, pure, eternal and omnipresent; it forms a continuous series and is always profound and clear; it will last until the end of all future ages; it itself perpetually enjoys the ample beatitude of the Dharma [which is procured by infinite merits.]

(b) Parasambhogakaya. The Tathagata, by means of his transcendental Wisdom of Universal Equality (*Samatajnana*), manifests a body possessed of subtle and pure qualities, which inhabits a completely pure land; this body, thanks to his Profound Contemplation Wisdom (*Pratyaveksanajnana*), displays for the Bodhisattvas of the ten Bhumis a spectacle of mystical and supernatural powers; turns the Wheel of Dharma, and breaks through the net of doubts, thus enabling the Bodhisattvas to enjoy the beatitude of the Mahayana Dharma.

These two bodies therefore constitute the Sambhogakaya, the 'body of beatitude'.

3. Nirmanakaya. The Tathagatas, by means of their Wisdom of Perfect Achievement (*Krtyanusthanajnana*), cause to appear innumerable and varied transformation bodies (*nirmanakayas*), which inhabit pure

and dirty lands in accordance with the nature and characteristics of the various classes of sentient beings. For the advantage of those Bodhisattvas who have not yet attained the Bhumis, the devotees of the two Vehicles, and the Prthagjanas, these Nirmanakayas, taking into account the needs of each one, display their supernatural powers and teach the Dharma in such a manner that all these people obtain well-being and good fortune.

These three Kayas, although possessed of infinite meritorious qualities, are different from one another.

The Svabhavikakaya is absolutely real, eternal, blissful, supreme, and pure. Free from all contaminations, it is the supporting basis for all that is good. Possessed of unconditioned non-active qualities (hence eternal and exempt from birth and destruction), it has neither the character nor the activity of Rupa, Citta and Caittas.

The Svasambhogakaya is possessed of immeasurable, multifarious real qualities, Rupa, Citta, Caittas.

As to the last two Bodies, namely, the Parasambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya, they are possessed of infinite apparent qualities which are active for the benefit and happiness of others, – apparent Rupa, Citta and Caittas.

The Svabhavikakaya, from the direct point of view, is 'for personal benefit' since it is peaceful, blissful, immobile and inactive. From the indirect point of view, it is also 'for the benefit of others' since it is the 'sovereign condition' (*adhipratyaya*) which causes sentient beings to obtain well-being and happiness. Furthermore, as the supporting basis for both the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya, it is both for personal good and the good of others.

The Svasambhogakaya is solely for personal good, while the Parasambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya are for the good of others since they are manifestations for others.

The Svabhavikakaya and its Land are 'realized' in an identical manner by all Tathagatas. No distinction is possible between the Svabhavikakaya of a Buddha and those of other Buddhas.

A Svasambhogakaya with its Land belongs to each Buddha as his own particular property: each, for himself, attains supreme enlightenment, develops a body and a land of personal Sambhoga. Although the transformations of these bodies and lands are different, yet all of them are infinite and do not represent obstacles to one another.

As to the last two bodies, they are relative to the sentient beings that the Buddhas have to convert. These beings, for their conversion, depend on several Buddhas or on one single Buddha. From this it follows that the last two bodies are either common to several Buddhas or peculiar to one Buddha.

> It is in the nature of things that certain karmic relations have existed between Buddhas and sentient beings since before the beginning of time; several Buddhas will together save a certain being; or a certain Buddha, all alone, will save several beings. The beings to be converted rely, therefore, either on one Buddha or on several Buddhas. If it were otherwise, what is the use of many Buddhas remaining together in the world for such long aeons, each working in his own way, since one single Buddha would be able to save all beings?

VIJNAPTIMATRATA

> The Nimittabhaga (perceived division), being a manifestation evolved on the basis of consciousness, is not, like consciousness itself, a real thing (Parinispanna) included in Paratantra or the 'nature of dependence on others'. Were it considered to be real, the principle of *Vijnaptimatrata*, 'Mere-Consciousness', would not be established, since both consciousness and the internal object (*artha*) would then be real.

> The present treatise, which consists of three parts, Stanzas 1 and 2a, Stanzas 2b–25, and Stanzas 26–30, establishes the doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata. It is therefore named Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-sastra, 'Treatise on the Doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata'.
>
> It is also named Vijnaptimatratavisuddhi, 'purification of Vijnaptimatrata', because it is a perfectly clear and pure exposition of the meaning of Vijnaptimatrata. [Just as Mount Sumeru, with all its jewels, has to wait for the noonday sun in order to shine with full brilliance, just as precious stones have to be cut and polished, so this doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata has to be 'purified' by the sacred teaching and logical reasoning . . . K'uei Chi].
>
> The original work on which the present treatise is a commentary is named Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-trimsika, because, in thirty stanzas, it expounds the meaning of Vijnaptimatrata in its perfection, without adding anything to it or taking anything away from it.

The general exposition of the nature and characteristics of the Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness on the basis of the Buddhist sacred teachings and logical reasoning has now been completed. It is the translator's fervent hope that those who read this Introduction with understanding will gain a substantial knowledge or at least some approximate idea of the contents of the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun and will be able to follow more easily the lengthy discussions and subtle arguments set forth in the following pages.

Hsüan Tsang ends his Treatise with the following Invocation:

> May the merits of this work be bestowed on all living beings; and may all living beings attain Supreme Enlightenment together and with all possible speed.

三 十 頌

THE THIRTY STANZAS

THE VIJNAPTIMĀTRATĀSIDDHI-TRIṂŚIKĀ
BY VASUBANDHU
THE ORIGINAL THIRTY STANZAS IN SANSKRIT

1

ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate/
vijñānapariṇāme ‘sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā/

2

vipāko manyanākhyaś ca vijñaptir viṣayasya ca/ /
tatrālayakhyāṃvijñānam vipākaḥ sarvabījakam/ /

3

asaṃviditakopādisthānavijñaptikaṃ ca tat /
sadā sparśamanaskāravitsaṃjñācetanānvitam / /

4

upekṣā vedanā tatrānivṛtāvyākṛtaṃ ca tat /
tathā sparśādayas tac ca vartate srotasaughavat / /

5

tasya vyāvṛttir arhattve tad āśritya pravartate /
tadālambaṃ manonāma vijñānaṃ manyanātmakam / /

6

kleśaiś caturbhiḥ sahitaṃ nivṛtāvyākṛtaiḥ sadā /
atmadṛṣṭyātmamohātmamānātmasnehasaṃjñitaiḥ / /

7

yatrajas tanmayair anyaiḥ sparśādyaiś cārhato na tat /
na nirodhasamāpattau mārge lokottare na ca / /

8

dvitiyaḥ pariṇāmo 'yaṃ tṛtīyaḥ ṣaḍvidhasya yā /
viṣayasyopalabdhiḥ sā kuśalākuśalādvayā / /

9

sarvatragair viniyataiḥ kuśalaiś caitasair asau /
saṃprayukta tathā kleśair upakleśais trivedanā / /

10

ādyāḥ sparśādayaḥ chandādhimokṣasmṛtayaḥ saha /
samādhidhībhyāṃ niyatāḥ śraddhātha hrīr apatrapā / /

11

alobhāditrayaṃ vīryaṃ praśrabdhiḥ sāpramādikā /
ahiṃsā kuśalāḥ klesā rāgapratighamūḍhayaḥ /

12

mānadṛgvicikitsāś ca krodhopanahane punaḥ /
mrakṣaḥ pradāśa irṣyātha mātsaryaṃ saha māyayā / /

13

saṭhyaṃ mado vihiṃsāhrīr atrapā styānam uddhavaḥ /
āśraddhyam atha kausidyaṃ pramādo muṣitā smṛtiḥ / /

14

vikṣepo 'saṃprajanyaṃ ca kaukṛtyaṃ middham eva ca /
vitarkaś ca vicāraś cety upakleśāh dvaye dvidhā/ /

15

pañcānāṃ mūlavijñāne yathāpratyayam udbhavaḥ /
vijñānānāṃ saha na vā taraṅgāṇāṃ yathā jale / /

16

manovijñānasaṃbhūtiḥ sarvadāsaṃjñikād ṛte /
samāpattidvayān middhān mūrchanād apy acittakāt / /

17

vijñānapariṇamo 'yaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate /
tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam /

18

sarvabījaṃ hi vijñāṇaṃ pariṇāmas tathā tathā /
yāty anyonyavaśād yena vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate / /

19

karmaṇo vāsanā grāhadvayavāsanayā saha /
kṣiṇe pūrvavipāke 'nyadvipākaṃ janayanti tat / /

20

yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate /
parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate / /

21

paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ /
niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā /

22

ata eva sa naivānyo nānanyaḥ paratantrataḥ /
anityatādivad vācyo nādṛṣṭe 'smin sa dṛśyate /

23

trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhāṃ niḥsvabāvatām /
saṃdhāya sarvadharmāṇāṃ deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā / /

24

prathamo lakṣaṇenaiva niḥsvabhāvo 'paraḥ punaḥ /
na svayaṃbhāva etasyety aparā niḥsvabhāvatā / /

25

dharmāṇāṃ paramārthaś ca sa yatas tathatāpi saḥ /
sarvakālaṃ tathābhāvāt saiva vijñaptimātratā / /

26

yāvad vijñaptimātratve vijñānaṃ nāvatiṣṭhate /
grāhyagrāhakānuśayas tāvan na vinivartate / /

27

vijñaptimātram evedam ity api hy upalambhataḥ /
sthāpayann agrataḥ kiṃ cit tanmātre nāvatiṣṭhate / /

28

yadā tv ālambanaṃ jñānaṃ naivopalabhate tadā /
sthitaṃ vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt / /

29

acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaraṃ ca tat /
aśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulyahānitaḥ / /

30

se evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ /
sukho vimuktikāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yaṃ mahāmuneḥ /

। अथ त्रिंशिकाविज्ञप्तिकारिकाः

आत्मधर्मोपचारो हि विविधो यः प्रवर्तते ।
विज्ञानपरिणामे ऽसौ परिणामः स च त्रिधा ॥ १ ॥
विपाको मननाख्यश्च विज्ञप्तिर्विषयस्य च ।
तत्रालयाख्यं विज्ञानं विपाकः सर्वबीजकम् ॥ २ ॥
असंविदितकोपादिस्थानविज्ञप्तिकं च तत् ।
सदा स्पर्शमनस्कारवित्संज्ञाचेतनान्वितम् ॥ ३ ॥
उपेक्षा वेदना तत्रानिवृताव्याकृतं च तत् ।
तथा स्पर्शादयस्तच्च वर्तते स्रोतसौघवत् ॥ ४ ॥
तस्य व्यावृतिरर्हत्वे तदाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते ।
तदालम्बं मनोनाम विज्ञानं मननात्मकम् ॥ ५ ॥
क्लेशैश्चतुर्भिः सहितं निवृताव्याकृतैः सदा ।
आत्मदृष्ट्यात्ममोहात्ममानात्मस्नेहसंज्ञितैः ॥ ६ ॥
यत्रजस्तन्मयैरन्यैः स्पर्शाद्यैश्चार्हतो न तत् ।
न निरोधसमापत्तौ मार्गे लोकोत्तरे न च ॥ ७ ॥
द्वितीयः परिणामो ऽयं तृतीयः षड्विधस्य या ।
विषयस्योपलब्धिः सा कुशलाकुशलाद्वया ॥ ८ ॥
सर्वत्रगैर्विनियतैः कुशलैश्चैतसैरसौ ।
संप्रयुक्ता तथा क्लेशैरुपक्लेशैस्त्रिवेदना ॥ ९ ॥
आद्याः स्पर्शादयश्छन्दाधिमोक्षस्मृतयः सह ।
समाधिधीभ्यां नियताः श्रद्धाथ ह्रीरपत्रपा ॥ १० ॥
अलोभादि त्रयं वीर्यं प्रश्रब्धिः साप्रमादिका ।
अहिंसा कुशलाः क्लेशा रागप्रतिघमूढयः ॥ ११ ॥
मानदृग्विचिकित्साश्च क्रोधोपनहने पुनः ।
म्रक्षः प्रदाश ईर्ष्याथ मात्सर्यं सह मायया ॥ १२ ॥
शाठ्यं मदो ऽविहिंसाह्रीरत्रपा स्त्यानमुद्धवः ।
आश्रद्ध्यमथ कौसीद्यं प्रमादो मुषिता स्मृतिः ॥ १३ ॥
विक्षेपो ऽसंप्रजन्यं च कौकृत्यं मिद्धमेव च ।
वितर्कश्च विचारश्चेत्युपक्लेशा द्वये द्विधा ॥ १४ ॥

पञ्चाना मूलविज्ञाने यथाप्रत्ययमुद्भवः ।
विज्ञानाना सह न वा तरङ्गाणां यथा जले ॥ १५ ॥
मनोविज्ञानसंभूतिः सर्वदासंज्ञिकादृते ।
समापत्तिद्वयान्मिद्धान्मूर्छनादप्यचित्तकात् ॥ १६ ॥
विज्ञानपरिणामो ऽयं विकल्पो यद्विकल्प्यते ।
तेन तन्नास्ति तेनेदं सर्वं विज्ञप्तिमात्रकम् ॥ १७ ॥
सर्वबीजं हि विज्ञानं परिणामस्तथा तथा ।
यात्यन्योन्यवशाद् येन विकल्पः स स जायते ॥ १८ ॥
कर्मणो वासना ग्राहद्वयवासनया सह ।
क्षीणे पूर्वविपाके ऽन्यद्विपाकं जनयन्ति तत् ॥ १९ ॥
येन येन विकल्पेन यद्यद् वस्तु विकल्प्यते ।
परिकल्पित एवासौ स्वभावो न स विद्यते ॥ २० ॥
परतन्त्रस्वभावस्तु विकल्पः प्रत्ययोद्भवः ।
निष्पन्नस्तस्य पूर्वेण सदा रहितता तु या ॥ २१ ॥
अत एव स नैवान्यो नानन्यः परतन्त्रतः ।
अनित्यतादिवद् वाच्यो नादृष्टे ऽस्मिन् स दृश्यते ॥ २२ ॥
त्रिविधस्य स्वभावस्य त्रिविधां निःस्वभावताम् ।
संधाय सर्वधर्माणां देशिता निःस्वभावता ॥ २३ ॥
प्रथमो लक्षणेनैव निःस्वभावो ऽपरः पुनः ।
न स्वयंभाव एतस्येत्यपरा निःस्वभावता ॥ २४ ॥
धर्माणां परमार्थश्च स यतस्तथतापि सः ।
सर्वकालं तथाभावात् सैव विज्ञप्तिमात्रता ॥ २५ ॥
यावद्विज्ञप्तिमात्रत्वे विज्ञानं नावतिष्ठति ।
ग्राहद्वयस्यानुशयस्तावन्न विनिवर्तते ॥ २६ ॥
विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदमित्यपि ह्युपलम्भतः ।
स्थापयन्नग्रतः किंचित् तन्मात्रे नावतिष्ठते ॥ २७ ॥
यदालम्बनं विज्ञानं नैवोपलभते तदा ।
स्थितं विज्ञानमात्रत्वे ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहात् ॥ २८ ॥
अचित्तो ऽनुपलम्भो ऽसौ ज्ञानं लोकोत्तरं च तत् ।
आश्रयस्य परावृत्तिर्द्विधा दौष्ठुल्यहानितः ॥ २९ ॥
स एवानस्रवो धातुरचिन्त्यः कुशलो ध्रुवः ।
सुखो विमुक्तिकायो ऽसौ धर्माख्यो ऽयं महामुनेः ॥ ३० ॥

त्रिंशिकाविज्ञप्तिकारिकाः समाप्ताः ॥
कृतिरियमाचार्यवसुबन्धोः]

THE ORIGINAL THIRTY STANZAS WRITTEN IN SANSKRIT BY SRI SWAMI CHINMAYANANDA

अथ त्रिंशिका विज्ञप्तिकारिका:

आत्मधर्मोपचारोहि विविधो यः प्रवर्तते ।
विज्ञानपरिणामे ऽसौ परिणामः स च त्रिधा ॥

= 2 =

विपाको मननाख्यश्च विज्ञप्तिर्विषयस्य च ।
तत्रालयाख्यं विज्ञानं विपाकः सर्वबीजकम् ॥

= 3 =

असंविदितकोपादिस्थानविज्ञप्तिकं च तत् ।
सदा स्पर्शमनस्कारवित्संज्ञाचेतनान्वितम् ॥

= 4 =

उपेक्षा वेदना तत्रानिवृताव्याकृतं च तत् ।
तथा स्पर्शादयस्तच्च वर्तते स्रोतसौघवत् ॥

= 5 =

तस्य व्यावृतिरर्हत्वे तदाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते ।
तदालम्बं मनोनाम विज्ञानं मननात्मकम् ॥

= 6 =

क्लेशैश्चतुर्भिः सहितं निवृताव्याकृतैः सदा ।
आत्मदृष्ट्यात्ममोहात्ममानात्मस्नेहसंज्ञितैः ॥

= 7 =

यत्रजस्तन्मयैरन्यैः स्पर्शाद्यैश्चार्हतो न तत् ।
न निरोधसमापत्तौ मार्गे लोकोत्तरे न च ॥

= 8 =

द्वितीयः परिणामोऽयं तृतीयः षड्विधस्य या ।
विषयस्योपलब्धिः सा कुशलाकुशलाद्वया ॥

= 9 =

सर्वत्रगैर्विनियतैः कुशलैश्चैतसैरसौ ।
संप्रयुक्ता तथा क्लेशैरुपक्लेशैस्त्रिवेदना ॥

= 10 =

आद्याः स्पर्शादयश्छन्दाधिमोक्षस्मृतयः सह ।
समाधिधीभ्यां नियताः श्रद्धाथ ह्रीरपत्रपा ॥

= 11 =

अलोभाति त्रयं वीर्यं प्रश्रब्धिः साप्रमादिका ।
अहिंसा कुशलाः क्लेशा रागप्रतिघमूढयः ॥

= 12 =

मानदृग्विचिकित्साश्च क्रोधोपनहने पुनः ।
म्रक्षप्रदाश ईर्ष्याथ मात्सर्यं सह मायया ॥

= 13 =

शाठ्यं मदोऽविहिंसाह्रीरत्रापा स्त्यानमुद्धवः ।
अश्राद्ध्यं अथ कौसिद्यं प्रमादो मुषिता स्मृतिः ॥

= 14 =

विक्षेपोऽसंप्रजन्यं च कौकृत्यं मिद्धमेव च ।
वितर्कश्च विचारश्चेत्युपक्लेशा द्वये द्विधा ॥

= 15 =

पञ्चानां मूलविज्ञाने यथा प्रत्ययमुद्भवः ।
विज्ञानानां सह न वा तरङ्गाणां यथा जले ॥

= 16 =

मनोविज्ञानसंभूतिः सर्वदासंज्ञिकादृते ।
समापत्तिद्वयान्मिद्धान्मूर्छनादप्यचित्तकात् ॥

= 17 =

विज्ञानपरिणामोऽयं विकल्पो यद्विकल्प्यते ।
तेन तन्नास्ति तेनेदं सर्वं विज्ञप्तिमात्रकम् ॥

= 18 =

सर्वबीजं हि विज्ञानं परिणामस्तथा तथा ।
यात्यन्योन्यवशाद् येन विकल्पः स स जायते ॥

= 19 =

कर्मणो वासना ग्राहद्वयवासनया सह ।
क्षीणे पूर्वविपाकेऽन्यद्विपाकं जनयन्ति तत् ॥

= 20 =

येन येन विकल्पेन यद्यद् वस्तु विकल्प्यते ।
परिकल्पित एवासौ स्वभावो न स विद्यते ॥

= 21 =

परतन्त्रस्वभावस्तु विकल्पः प्रत्ययोद्भवः ।
निष्पन्नस्तस्य पूर्वेण सदा रहितता तु या ॥

= 22 =

अत एव स नैवान्यो नानन्यः परतन्त्रतः ।
अनित्यतादिवद् वाच्यो नादृष्टेऽस्मिन् स दृश्यते ॥

= 23 =

त्रिविधस्य स्वभावस्य त्रिविधां निःस्वभावताम् ।
संधाय सर्वधर्माणां देशिता निःस्वभावता ॥

= 24 =

प्रथमो लक्षणेनैव निःस्वभावोऽपरः पुनः ।
न स्वयंभाव एतस्येत्यपरा निःस्वभावता ॥

= 25 =

धर्माणां परमार्थश्च स यतस्तथतापि सः ।
सर्वकालं तथाभावात् सैव विज्ञप्तिमात्रता ॥

= 26 =

यावद्विज्ञप्तिमात्रत्वे विज्ञानं नावतिष्ठति ।
ग्राहद्वयस्यानुशयस्तावन्न विनिवर्तते ॥

= 27 =

विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवेदमित्यपि ह्युपलम्भतः ।
स्थापयन्नग्रतः किंचित् तन्मात्रे नावतिष्ठते ॥

= 28 =

यदालम्बनं विज्ञानं नैवोपलभते तदा ।
स्थितं विज्ञानमात्रत्वे ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहात् ॥

= २९ =

अचित्तोऽनुपलम्भोऽसौ ज्ञानं लोकोत्तरं च तत् ।
आश्रयस्य परावृत्तिर्द्विधा दौष्ठुल्यहानितः ॥

= ३० =

स एवानास्रवो धातुरचिन्त्यः कुशलो ध्रुवः ।
सुखो विमुक्तिकायोऽसौ धर्माख्योऽयं महामुनेः ॥

त्रिंशिकाविज्ञप्तिकारिकाः समाप्ताः ॥
[कृतिरियमाचार्य वसुबन्धोः]

三十頌

由假說我法，　有種種相轉，
彼依識所變。　此能變唯三，

謂異熟思量，　及了別境識。
初阿賴耶識，　異熟一切種。

不可知執受，　處了常與觸，

THE THIRTY STANZAS

I

Concepts of Atman and dharmas do not imply the existence of a real Atman and real dharmas, but are merely fictitious constructions [produced by numerous causes].

Because of this, all varieties of phenomenal appearances and qualities arise.

The phenomena of Atman and dharmas are [all mental representations] based on the manifestation and transformation of consciousness.

Consciousnesses capable of unfolding or manifesting themselves may be grouped in three general categories:

2

(1) The consciousness whose fruits (retribution) mature at varying times (i.e., the eighth or 'Storehouse' consciousness or Alayavijnana); (2) the consciousness that cogitates or deliberates (i.e., the seventh or thought-centre consciousness or Manas);

And (3) the consciousness that perceives and discriminates between spheres of objects (i.e., the sixth or sense-centre consciousness or Manovijnana and the five sense consciousnesses).

The first is the Alayavijnana (i.e., storehouse or repository consciousness).

It is also called Vipakavijnana (retributive consciousness) and Sarvabijakavijnana (the consciousness that carries within it all Bijas or seeds).
[It brings to fruition all seeds (effects of good and evil deeds).]

3

It is impossible to comprehend completely (1) what it 'holds and receives' (*upadi*).

作意受想思。　相應唯捨受。

是無覆無記。　觸等亦如是。
恒轉如暴流，　阿羅漢位捨。

次第二能變，　是識名末那，
依彼轉緣彼，　思量爲性相。

四煩惱常俱，　謂我癡我見，
幷我慢我愛，　及餘觸等俱。

(2) Its 'place' or 'locality' (*sthana*), and (3) its power of perception and discrimination (*vijnapti*). It is at all times associated with five mental attributes (*caittas*), namely, mental contact (Sparsa),

Attention (Manaskara), sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna), and voliton (Cetana).

But it is always associated only with the 'sensation of indifference' (Upeksa).

4

It belongs to the 'non-defiled-non-defined moral species'.

The same is true in the case of mental contact (Sparsa) and so forth.

It is perpetually manifesting itself like a torrent,

And is renounced (i.e., it ceases to be called the Alaya) in the state of Arhatship (the state of the saint who enters Nirvana).

5

Next comes the second evolving consciousness.

This consciousness is called Manas.

It manifests itself, with the Alayavijnana as its basis and support, and takes that consciousness as its object.

It has the nature and character of cogitation or intellection.

6

It is always accompanied by four klesas or vexing passions (sources of affliction and delusion),

Namely, Self-delusion (*atmamoha*), Self-belief (*atmadrsti*)

Together with Self-conceit (*atmamana*) and Self-love (*atmasneha*).

It is also accompanied by the other mental associates (*caittas*), namely, mental contact (Sparsa) and so forth [attention, sensation, conception, and volition].

有覆無記攝，　隨所生所繫。
阿羅漢滅定，　出世道無有。

次第三能變，　差別有六種，
了境爲性相，　善不善俱非。

此心所徧行，　別境善煩惱，
隨煩惱不定，　皆三受相應。

初徧行觸等，　次別境謂欲，
勝解念定慧，　所緣事不同。

7

It belongs to the 'defiled-non-defined moral species' (neither good nor bad but defiled).

It is active in the dhatu or bhumi in which the sentient being is born and to which he is bound.

It ceases to exist at the stage of Arhatship, in the 'meditation of annihilation' (state of complete extinction of thought and other mental qualities),

And on the supramundane path.

8

Next comes the third evolving consciousness

Which is divided into six categories of discrimination.

Their nature and character consist of the perception and discrimination of spheres of objects.

They are good, bad, and neither good nor bad.

9

They are associated with the universal caittas,

The special caittas, the good caittas, the klesas (vexing passions or mental qualities),

The upaklesas (secondary vexing passions or mental qualities), and the Aniyatas (indeterminate mental associates).

They are all associated with the three sensations (Vedanas) [joy, sorrow, and indifference].

10

First, universal caittas, mental contact and so forth (attention, sensation, conception, volition).

Next, special caittas, that is, desire (Chanda).

善謂信慚愧，　無貪等三根，
勤安不放逸，　行捨及不害。

煩惱謂貪瞋，　癡慢疑惡見。
隨煩惱謂忿，　恨覆惱嫉慳，

誑諂與害憍，　無慚及無愧，
掉舉與惛沈，　不信并懈怠，

Resolve (Adhimoksa), memory (Smrti), meditation (Samadhi), and discernment (Prajna).

The objects perceived by the special caittas are particular and varied.

11

The good caittas refer to belief (Sraddha), sense of shame (Hri), sense of integrity (Apatrapa),

The three roots of non-covetousness (Alobha) and so forth [non-anger (Advesa) and non-delusion (Amoha)],

Zeal or diligence (Virya), composure of mind (Prasrabdhi), vigilance (Apramada),

Equanimity (Upeksa), and harmlessness or non-injury (Avihimsa).

12

The klesas are covetousness (Raga), anger (Pratigha),

Delusion (Moha), conceit (Mana), doubt (Vicikitsa), and false views (Kudrsti).

The upaklesas (secondary vexing passions) are (1) fury (Krodha);

(2) Enmity (Upanaha); (3) concealment or hypocrisy (Mraksa) (4) vexation (Pradasa); (5) envy (Irsyr); (6) parismony Matsarya);

13

(7) Deception (Sathya); (8) duplicity or fraudulence (Maya); (with) (9) harmfulness (Vihimsa); (10) pride (Mada);

(11) Shamelessness (Ahri); (12) non-integrity (Atrapa or Anapatrapya);

(13) Agitation or restlessness (Uddhava); (with) (14) torpid-mindedness (Styana);

(15) Unbelief (Asraddha); (16) indolence (Kausidya);

放逸及失念，　散亂不正知。
不定謂悔眠，　尋伺二各二。

依止根本識，　五識隨緣現，
或俱或不俱，　如濤波依水。

意識常現起，　除生無想天，
及無心二定，　睡眠與悶絶。

是諸識轉變，　分別所分別，
由此彼皆無，　故一切唯識。

14

(17) Idleness (Pramada); (18) forgetfulness (Musitasmrtita);

(19) Distraction (Viksepa); and (20) non-discernment or thoughtlessness (Asamprajanya).

The indeterminate mental qualities refer to remorse (Kamkrtya), drowsiness (Middha),

Reflection (Vitarka), and investigation (Vicara); these two couples can be of two kinds.

15

In dependence upon the root consciousness (i.e., the eighth consciousness, Alayavijnana)

The five consciousnesses (of the senses) manifest themselves in accordance with various causes and conditions,

Sometimes together, sometimes separately,

Just as waves manifest themselves in dependence upon the conditions of the water.

16

But the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana) manifests itself at all times,

Except for beings born into the 'heavenly world without thought' (among Asaṁjnidevas in whom thinking has entirely ceased),

Except also for those in the two mindless Samapattis (two forms of meditation in which there is no more activity of thought) and

Those who are in states of stupor or unconsciousness.

17

The various consciousnesses manifest themselves in what seem to be two divisions:

Perception (*Darsanabhaga*) and the object of perception (*nimittabhaga*).

由一切種識，　如是如是變，
以展轉力故，　彼彼分別生。

由諸業習氣，　二取習氣俱，
前異熟既盡，　復生餘異熟。

由彼彼徧計，　徧計種種物，
此徧計所執，　自性無所有。

依他起自性，　分別緣所生，
圓成實於彼，　常遠離前性。

Because of this, Atman and dharmas do not exist.

For this reason, all is mere consciousness.

18

From the consciousness which contains all Bijas (seeds) (the Alayavijnana)

Such-and-such evolution or transformation takes place.

Through the force of the mutual co-operation of the actual Dharmas

Such-and-such kinds of distinction are engendered.

19

Owing to the habit-energy (Bijas or vasana) of various previous deeds,

Together with the habit-energy of the two 'Apprehensions' (Grahas),

As previous retribution (karma of previous existences) is exhausted,

Succeeding retribution (maturing in subsequent existences) is produced.

20

Because of such and such imaginations,

Such and such things are imagined, [i.e., conceived by the imagination].

What is conceived by this imagination (*parikalpitasvabhava*)

Has no nature of its own.

21

The self-nature which results from dependence on others (*paratantra*)

Consists of discriminations produced by causes and conditions.

故此與依他，　非異非不異，
如無常等性，　非不見此彼。

卽依此三性，　立彼三無性，
故佛密意說，　一切法無性。

初卽相無性，　次無自然性，
後由遠離前，　所執我法性。

The difference between the nature of Ultimate Reality (*parinispanna*) and the nature of dependence on others (*paratantra*)

Is that the former is eternally free from the parikalpita-nature (conception by the imagination) of the latter, that is, the Paratantra (dependence on others for manifestation).

22

Thus, the nature of Ultimate Reality and the nature of dependence on others

Are neither different nor non-different,

Just as impermanence is neither different nor non-different from impermanent dharmas.

One does not perceive the nature of dependence on others as long as one has not perceived that of Ultimate Reality.

23

On the basis of the three natures of existence

Are established the three natures of non-existence (*nihsvabhava*).

For this reason the Buddha preached, with a secret intention,

That all dharmas have no nature of their own.

24

The first is non-existence as regards characteristics (*laksananihsvabhava*) [since they are but products of the imagination].

The second is non-existence as regards innate nature or origination (*utpattinihsvabhava*) [since it is the result of discrimination].

The last is [non-existence as regards the supreme truth about all dharmas (*paramarthanihsvabhava*)] which is far removed from the first 'nature of mere-imagination',

In which things are believed to be a real Atman and real dharmas.

此諸法勝義，　亦卽是眞如，
常如其性故，　卽唯識實性。

乃至未起識，　求住唯識性。
於二取隨眠，　猶未能伏滅。

現前立少物，　謂是唯識性，
以有所得故，　非實住唯識。

若時於所緣，　智都無所得，
爾時住唯識，　離二取相故。

無得不思議，　是出世間智，

25

This supreme truth about all dharmas (*dharmaparamartha*).
Is also Bhutatathata (*chen-ju*, genuine thusness, absolute reality),
Because it is immutable, remaining constantly thus in its nature.
This is the true nature of Mere-consciousness (*vijnaptimatrata*).

26

As long as the consciousness (of wisdom) has not arisen
To seek to abide in the state of Vijnaptimatrata,
The 'attachment' and 'drowsiness' (*anusayas*) arising from the two 'apprehensions' (*grahas*)
Cannot, as yet, be suppressed and obliterated.

27

As long as one places something before himself and, taking it as an object,
Declares that it is the nature of Mere-consciousness,
He is really not residing in the state of Mere-consciousness,
Because he is in possession of something.

28

If, in perceiving the sphere of objects,
Wisdom (*jnana*) no longer conceives any idea of the object,
Then that widom is in the state of Vijnaptimatrata,
Because both the object to be apprehended and the act of apprehending by consciousness are absent.

29

Without perception, inconceivable and incomprehensible,
This is transcendental supramundane wisdom (*jnana*).

捨二麤重故，　便證得轉依。

此卽無漏界，　不思議善常，
安樂解脫身，　大牟尼名法。

Because of the abandonment of the crude dross of the two barriers (*avaranas*),

Inner transformation (*asrayaparavrtti*) into perfect wisdom is achieved.

30

This is the Pure Dhatu (the undefiled storehouse realm)

Which is inconceivable and incomprehensible, good and eternal,

Where one is in a state of blissfulness with one's emancipated body (*vimuktikaya*);

This is the Law of 'Great Silence' (*mahamuni*), the Dharmakaya, realized by the great Buddha, Sakyamuni.

BOOK I

ATMAGRAHA AND DHARMAGRAHA

(ATMA-ADHESION AND DHARMA-ADHESION)

我 執 法 執

本　頌

稽首唯識性，　滿分清淨者，
我今釋彼說，　利樂諸有情。

STANZA OF HOMAGE

I pay homage to the Beings that are either completely
or partially purified by Vijnaptimatrata.
For the welfare and happiness of all sentient
beings, I now explain what Vasubandhu
has said in his Treatise in Thirty
Stanzas on Vijnaptimatrata.

造論意旨

今造此論爲於二空有迷謬者生正解故。

〔述記：安慧等欲顯論主爲令生解斷障得果所以造論。〕

生解爲斷二重障故。

由我法執二障具生，若證二空，彼障隨斷。[3]

斷障爲得二勝果故。

由斷續生煩惱障故證眞解脫；由斷礙解所知障故得大菩提。

又爲開示謬執我法迷唯識者令達二空。於唯識理如實知故。

〔述記：火辨等意明論主令達二空悟唯識性所以造論。〕

復有迷謬唯識理者，

〔述記：護法等明造本論破諸邪執顯唯識理。〕

或執外境如識非無。

〔述記：薩婆多等。〕

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[1] 述記：正解故者，入見道前資糧加行二位之時……此卽第一加行位也。

[2] 述記：此卽第二通達位也。

[3] 述記：此卽第三修習位也。

[4] 述記：顯金剛心斷煩惱障證眞解脫，斷所知障得大菩提故，此卽第四究竟位也。

THE PURPOSE OF THE TREATISE

1. ACCORDING TO STHIRAMATI

VASUBANDHU wrote the Trimsika (Thirty Stanzas) for those who misunderstood or made nothing of the Doctrine of the two Sunyatas or Voids,[1] in order that they might acquire a correct understanding of it.[2] A correct understanding of this doctrine is essential if one is to eliminate the two heavy *avaranas* or barriers [i.e., (1) *klesavarana,* the barrier of vexing passions which obstructs one's way to Nirvana or true deliverance, and (2) *jneyavarana,* the barrier which impedes Mahabodhi or Supreme Enlightenment].[3] Both these *avaranas* are due to a belief in the subjective existence of the Atman or individual ego (*atmagraha,* Atman-adhesion) and to a belief in the objective existence of dharmas or phenomenal entities (*dharmagraha,* dharma-adhesion). If the two Sunyatas are realized, both barriers will be removed.[4] The sundering of the two barriers has as its excellent fruits the attainments of true deliverance or Nirvana and of Supreme Enlightenment or Mahabodhi.[5] The former is the result of eliminating the barrier of vexing passions which cause rebirth, while the latter is the result of eliminating the barrier which hinders Absolute Knowledge.[6]

2. ACCORDING TO CITTRABHANU AND OTHERS

The Trimsika was composed to instruct those who had erroneously admitted the reality of Atman and dharmas, misunderstood the Doctrine of Vijnaptimatra (Mere-Consciousness), or had been unable to assimilate the truth that 'nothing exists apart from Consciousness' (Vijnana), and thus enable them to pierce the two Voids and know the true principles of Vijnaptimatra.

3. ACCORDING TO DHARMAPALA

Inasmuch as there were certain classes of scholars who misunderstood or were ignorant of the principles of Vijnaptimatra, for instance:

(1) Scholars who considered that external objects existed in the same way as consciousness did – in other words, that both outer objects and inner consciousness were co-existent [as did the Sarvastivadins],

---

[1] The two Sunyatas are: *pudgalasunyata,* voidness of Atman or ego, and *dharmasunyata,* voidness of all dharmas or external things.

[2] This corresponds to the first two of the five stages of the Path leading to Vijnaptimatrata, namely, the stage of moral provisioning (*sambharavastha*) and the stage of intensified effort (*prayogavastha*).

[3] This corresponds to the third stage of the Path, namely, the stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding (*prativedhavastha* or *darsanamarga*).

[4] This corresponds to the fourth stage of the Path, namely, the stage of exercising cultivation (*bhavanavastha* or *bhavanamarga*).

[5] This corresponds to the fifth (i.e., the last) stage of the Path, namely, the stage of final attainment or ultimate realization (*nisthavastha*). See Section on *The Path* in Book IX.

[6] This corresponds to the moment of Vajropamasamadhi or diamond meditation, that of the last stage of the Bodhisattva, characterized by firm, indestructible knowledge and attained after all vestiges of illusion have been shed. See Section on *The Path* in Book IX.

或執內識如境非有。
〔述記：卽學中百清辨等師。〕

或執諸識用別體同。
〔述記：卽大乘中一類菩薩。〕

或執離心無別心所。
〔述記：經部師說佛說五蘊，故離心外唯有三心所一受二想三思。〕

爲遮此等種種異執。

令於唯識深玅理中得如實解，故作斯論。

(2) Those who considered that internal consciousness was non-existent in the same way as external objects were non-existent – in other words, that inner consciousness and outer objects were both non-existent [as did Master Bhavaviveka and others],

(3) Those who considered that the various consciousnesses were all of one and the same substance despite the variety of their activities [as did a certain class of Mahayana Bodhisattvas],

(4) Those who considered that, apart from mind (*citta* or *vijnana*) and three of its mental properties, sensation, conception, and volition, no other associated mental properties (*caittas*) existed [as did the Sautrantikas],

the Trimsika was composed to refute their erroneous views in order to enable them to reach a true understanding of those profound and wonderful principles.

依教廣成
明唯識相
我執法執

若唯有識，云何世間及諸聖教說有我法？

頌曰：

由假說我法，有種種相轉，

彼依識所變。此能變唯三，

謂異熟思量，及了別境識。

論曰：

世間聖教說有我法但由假立，非實有性。我謂主宰，法謂軌持。

〔述記：軌謂軌範可生物解，持謂任持不捨自相。〕

彼二俱有種種相轉。

ATMAGRAHA AND DHARMAGRAHA

BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE OF REAL ATMAN AND REAL DHARMAS

If consciousness alone exists, and nothing apart from it, why is it that people all over the world and the various Scriptures declare that Atman and dharmas exist?

The Stanzas say:

1

> Concepts of Atman and dharmas do not imply the existence of a real Atman and real dharmas, but are merely fictitious constructions [produced by numerous causes].
>
> Because of this, all varieties of phenomenal appearances and qualities arise.
>
> The phenomena of Atman and dharmas are [all mental representations] based on the manifestation and transformation of consciousness.
>
> Consciousnesses capable of unfolding or manifesting themselves may be grouped in three general categories:

2a

> (1) The consciousness whose fruits (retribution) mature at varying times (i.e., the eighth or 'Storehouse' consciousness or Alayavijnana); (2) the consciousness that cogitates or deliberates (i.e., the seventh or thought-centre consciousness or Manasvijnana);
>
> And (3) the consciousness that perceives and discriminates between spheres of objects (i.e., the sixth or sense-centre consciousness or Manovijnana and the five sense consciousnesses).

The Treatise says:

1. Conceptions of Atman and Dharmas

People all over the world and the various Scriptures declare that Atman and dharmas exist, but, in point of fact, they have no reality of their own, being mere fictitious constructions based on false ideas. 'Atman' ~~implies~~ ownership or lordship or controlling power, while 'dharma' means a norm or something that adheres to its nature as something particular.

The idea of Atman and dharmas may assume many forms with specific

我種種相謂有情命者等，預流一來等。

法種種相謂實德業等，蘊處界等。

轉謂隨緣施設有異。

問　徵

如是諸相若由假說，依何得成？

彼相皆依識所轉變而假施設。

別解識及變

識謂了別。此中識言亦攝心所，定相應故。

變謂識體轉似二分。

〔述記：護法等云，謂諸識體卽自證分，轉似相見二分而生。〕

相見俱依自證起故。依斯二分施設我法，彼二離此無所依故。

或復內識轉似外境。我法分別熏習力故，諸識生時變似我法。

〔述記：卽是難陀親勝等義。〕

此我法相雖在內識，而由分別似外境現。

諸有情類無始時來，緣此執爲實我實法。

characteristics. For example, Atman may assume the forms of *sattva* (sentient beings), of *jiva* (living things), etc., or of *srotaapanna* (disciples who have 'entered the stream' of holy living), of *sakrdagamin* (those in their penultimate return to mortality), etc. On the other hand, dharmas may appear in the form of *dravya* (substance), *gunas* (qualities), *karman* (actions), etc., or *skandhas* (aggregates), *ayatanas* (sense-spheres), *dhatus* (planes of existence), etc.

(In the original Sanskrit stanza) the word *pravartate* (arising) signifies that different structures assumed by Atman and dharmas are produced in accordance with their causes and conditions.

2. Objection: Question and answer

If such various phenomena of Atman and dharmas are mere subjective elaborations, what is their real basis? What is their *raison d'être?*

They are the result of the evolution and manifestation of consciousness (*vijnanaparinama*). As such, they are subjective and conventional elaborations or constructions.

3. Consciousness defined

The word 'consciousness' means perception and mental discrimination, i.e., of 'external things'; in the present treatise it is understood as the mind and its associated activities (*citta* and *caittas*), since the latter are necessarily associated with consciousness.

4. Manifestation of consciousness

What is meant by 'the manifestation of consciousness'?

There are two theories.

First answer: according to Dharmapala and Sthiramati

'Manifestation' (*parinama*) indicates that what essentially constitutes consciousness (that is to say, its substance, the *samvittibhaga*), when it is born, manifests itself in two functional divisions (*bhagas*), namely, image and perception, i.e., the object perceived (or perceived division) and the perceiving faculty (or perceiving division) (*nimittabhaga* and *darsanabhaga*). These divisions arise out of a third division called the 'self-witness' or the 'self-corroboratory division' (*samvittibhaga*) which constitutes their 'essential substance'. It is on the basis of these two functional divisions that Atman and dharmas are established, for they have no other basis.

Second answer: according to Nanda, Bandhusri, etc.

Manifestation of consciousness means also that the inner consciousness manifests itself in what seems to be an external sphere of objects. By virtue of the 'perfuming' energy (*vasana*) deposited in the mind by wrong concepts (*vikalpa*) of Atman-dharmas, the consciousnesses, on becoming active, develop into the semblance of Atman and dharmas. Although the phenomena of Atman and dharmas lie within the consciousness, yet, because of wrong mental discrimination or particularization, they are taken to be external objects. That is why all sentient beings, since before the beginning of time, have conceived them as real Atman and real dharmas.

夢　喻

如患夢者患夢力故心似種種外境相現 。 緣此執爲實有外境。

世俗諦及勝義諦

愚夫所計實我實法都無所有 。 但隨妄情而施設故說之爲假。

內識所變似我似法雖有而非實我法性 。 然似彼現故說爲假。

外境隨情而施設故，非有如識。

〔述記：徧計所執心外實境，由隨妄情施設爲假，體實都無，非與依他內識相似。〕

內識必依因緣生故，非無如境。

〔述記：由內識體是依他故，必依種子因緣所生，非體是無如徧計境。〕

由此便遮增減二執。

〔述記：由此內識體性非無，心外我法體性非有，便遮外計離心之境實有增執，及遮邪見惡取空者撥識亦無損減空執，卽離空有說唯識教。有心外法輪迴生死，覺知一心生死永棄可謂無上處中道理。〕

境依內識而假立故唯世俗有 ， 識是假境所依事故亦勝義有。

云何應知實無外境唯有內識似外境生？

實我實法不可得故。

THE DREAM ANALOGY

An analogy is that of a man in a dream, who, under the influence of that dream, in which his mind produces what seem to be external objects of all sorts, believes that these images are real external objects.

The two truths: relative and absolute

What the ignorant imagine to be a 'real' Atman and 'real' dharmas are devoid of all objective existence. They are simply fictitious constructions based on erroneous opinions and conceptions. Hence we say that they are 'fictitious constructions' (i.e., relative truths).

Thus, the seeming Atman and the seeming dharmas which evolve out of internal consciousness, although they exist as a product of various causes, are not really of the nature of a real Atman and real dharmas, despite their semblance. This, then, is the reason for calling them 'fictitious constructions'.

In other words, what we take to be external objects are the result of our erroneous opinions, and do not 'exist' in the same way as consciousness does; [that is to say, external objects are illusory (*parikalpita*)].[1]

On the other hand, internal consciousness, born by reason of causes and conditions, and responsible for the appearance of external objects, is not, in its essential nature, non-existent in the same way as are external objects; [it is *paratantra*].[2] Thus, we exclude the two heterodox doctrines, namely, that which affirms the additional reality of objects apart from the mind and that which, because it wrongly believes in 'voidness', sets aside consciousness itself as non-existent, thus reducing everything to voidness or emptiness.

External objects, since they are mere fictitious constructions arising from internal consciousness, exist purely from a worldly point of view. On the other hand, inasmuch as consciousness is the essential basis from which false appearances of an external world spring, it really exists.

5. Objection answered

How do we know that in reality there is no external sphere of objects, but only internal consciousness which brings forth what seem to be real external spheres of objects?

We know this because the existence of a real Atman or real dharmas cannot be affirmed beyond doubt.

Let us now examine, in proper sequence, the different ways of conceiving Atman and dharmas.

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[1] See Section on 'The Three Natures' in Book VIII.

[2] See Section on 'The Three Natures' in Book VIII.

我執

如何實我不可得耶？

諸所執我略有三種。

一者執我體常周徧量同虛空。
〔述記：此謂數論勝論等計，即是僧佉吠世史迦義。〕
隨處造業受苦樂故。
二者執我其體雖常而量不定。隨身大小有卷舒故。
〔述記：如一牛皮日乾水漬，日炙便卷，水濕便舒。此即無慚之類計也。謂尼虔子，今言昵犍陀。〕
三者執我體常至細如一極微。潛轉身中作事業故。
〔述記：謂有外道名播輸鉢多，翻爲獸主。復有外道名波利呾囉拘迦，翻爲徧出，徧能出離諸俗世間，即是出家外道之類。〕

別破

初且非理。所以者何？
執我常徧量同虛空，應不隨身受苦樂等。

又常徧故應無動轉，如何隨身能造諸業？

又所執我一切有情爲同爲異？
若言同者，一作業時一切應作，一受果時一切應受，一得解脫時一切應解脫，便成大過。
若言異者，諸有情我更相徧故，體應相雜。

又一作業一受果時與一切我處無別故，應名一切所作所受。

若謂作受各有所屬無斯過者，理亦不然。
業果及身與諸我合，屬此非彼不應理故。

ATMAGRAHA
Atman-Adhesion

BELIEF IN THE REALITY OF THE ATMAN

WHY is it impossible to establish the existence of a real Atman?

1. THREE THEORIES OF ATMAN-ADHESION

Theories of the Atman held by various heterodox schools may be reduced to three as follows:

1. The Samkhyas and the Vaisesikas hold that the substance of the Atman is eternal, universal, and as extensive as infinite space. It acts everywhere and, as a consequence, enjoys happiness or suffers sorrow.
2. The Nirgranthas, the Jains, etc., hold that, although the substance of the Atman is eternal, its extension is indeterminate, because it expands and contracts according as the body is large or small (just as a piece of leather stretches when it is wet and shrinks when dried in the sun).
3. The Pasupatas (Animal-Lord worshippers), Parivrajakas (recluses), etc., hold that the substance of the Atman is eternal but infinitesimal like an atom, lying deeply embedded and moving around within the body and performing acts of all kinds.

Refutation

The first theory is contrary to reason. Why?

If it is held that the so-called Atman is eternal and universal, and as extensive as infinite space, it should not enjoy happiness or suffer sorrow along with the body.

Again, since it is eternal and universal, it should be motionless. Being motionless, how can it perform individual acts along with the body of an individual?

Furthermore, is the Atman as so conceived common to all sentient beings or has each a separate Atman? If it is common, then, when one individual being performs deeds or reaps the fruits of his deeds or attains emancipation, all individual beings should at the same time do the same. What a serious error! If they are different and separate, the Atmans of all sentient beings would universally interpenetrate each other (since, being universal, all of them are omnipresent): then the substance of all Atmans would be mingled. Moreover, since all Atmans would occupy the same space, the deeds of one individual being or the fruits of his deeds should likewise be the deeds or fruits of all beings. To argue that deeds and fruits belong to each being separately and that there would be no error, such as the one just described, would be no less contrary to reason, because deeds, fruits, and body are identified with all Atmans, and it is unreasonable for them to belong to one Atman and not to another.

一解脫時一切應解脫，所修證法一切我合故。

中亦非理。所以者何？
我體常住，不應隨身而有舒卷。

既有舒卷，如橐籥風，應非常住。
又我隨身應可分析，如何可執我體一耶？

故彼所言如童豎戲。
後亦非理。所以者何？
我量至小如一極微，如何能令大身偏動？
〔述記：如何小我一刹那中能令色究竟天萬六千由旬大身動轉？〕

若謂雖小而速巡身如旋火輪，似偏動者，
則所執我非一非常，諸有往來非常一故。

又所執我復有三種。
一者卽蘊。
二者離蘊。
三者與蘊非卽非離。

別破

初卽蘊我理且不然，我應如蘊如常一故。
又內諸色定非實我，如外諸色有質礙故。

From this it follows that, when one being attains emancipation, all other beings should also attain it, for the Dharma (Truth) practised and realized is identical with all Atmans.

The second theory is also contrary to reason. Why?

If the substance of the Atman is eternal and immutable, it cannot expand or contract with the size of the body in which it lives. Even if it were capable of expanding and contracting like the air in a bellows, it would never remain in the same state.

Furthermore, if the Atman follows the body in its expanding and contracting, it should be divisible. How, then, can it be held that the substance of the Atman is one in essence [i.e., in a state of absolute unity and oneness of being]?

What this school teaches is mere childish play.

The last theory is also contrary to reason. Why?

Since the Atman is infinitesimal like an atom, how can it, at one moment, set in motion the whole large body [of the Deva that extends throughout the highest plane of the Rupa World and measures sixteen thousand yoginas]?[1]

If it is argued that, although small, it goes rapidly through the body, like the fire-brand of an *alatacakra* (whirling torch) so that the whole body seems to move, then the Atman as so conceived is neither one in essence nor eternal, for what comes and goes is neither eternal nor one in essence.

2. ATMAN THEORY FROM ANOTHER POINT OF VIEW

From another point of view, that of the Buddhist doctrine of Skandhas (aggregates),[2] the Atman may also be conceived in three ways:

The first theory holds that the Atman is identical with the Skandhas. (aggregates), (namely, material form, sensations, conceptions, predispositions, and consciousness).

The second theory holds that it is separate from the Skandhas.

The third theory holds that it is neither identical with nor separate from the Skandhas.

Refutation

The first theory.

(1) To say that the Atman is identical with the Skandhas is contrary to reason, for, were it identical, it would, like the Skandhas, be neither eternal nor one in essence.

(2) Besides, internal matter (*rupa*), that is to say, the five sense-organs,

---

[1] A yogina is a measure of distance, about ten miles (30 li).

[2] The five Skandhas or aggregates, i.e., the components of an intelligent being, especially a human being, are: (1) *rupa*, material form, the physical form related to the five organs of sense; (2) *vedana*, reception, sensation, feeling, the functioning of the mind or senses in connection with affairs and things; (3) *samjna*, conception or thought, the functioning of mind in distinguishing; (4) *samskara*, predisposition; (5) *vijnana*, consciousness, the mental faculty in regard to perception and cognition, discrimination of affairs and things. The first is said to be physical, the other four mental qualities; (2), (3), and (4) are associated with the functioning of the mind; (5) is associated with the faculty or nature of the mind.

心心所法亦非實我，不恒相續待衆緣故。
〔述記：前破心所卽行蘊少分，行蘊少分中不相應行旣與心所別，故應別破之。〕

餘行餘色亦非實我，如虛空等，非覺性故。
〔述記：心所法外餘行外處及無表色亦非實我，非覺性故，如虛空等。〕
〔述記義演：外處者，卽外五塵。如前破色蘊但約內色，今破不相應行兼破外色及無表色，卽法處所攝色也。〕

中離蘊我理亦不然，應如虛空無作受故。
〔述記：破僧佉等計也。〕

後俱非我理亦不然。
〔述記：破犢子等也。〕

許依蘊立非卽離蘊，應如瓶等非實我故。

又旣不可說有爲無爲，亦應不可說是我非我，故彼所執實我不成。

總　破

又諸所執實有我體爲有思慮，爲無思慮？
若有思慮，應是無常，非一切時有思慮故。若無思慮，應如虛空，不能作業亦不受果。故所執我理俱不成。

又諸所執實有我體爲有作用，爲無作用？若有作用，如手足等，應是無常。

若無作用，如兔角等，應非實我。故所執我二俱不成。

又諸所執實有我體爲是我見所緣境不？

is surely not the Atman, for it is corporeal, having extension and resistance, like external matter, (This refers to the Rupaskandha[1] of the five Skandhas).

(3) Furthermore, the mind and its associated activities (*citta* and *caittas*: Vedanaskandha, sensation; Samjnaskandha, conception; Vijnanaskandha, consciousness; and part of Samskaraskandha, predisposition) are not the real Atman either, for they do not continue in an uninterrupted series; their manifestation depends on various causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*).

(4) The other 'conditioned' Samskaras, that is to say, the *viprayuktasamskaras*, and the *rupa* of Avijnapti, are not the real Atman either, for, like empty space, they are without intelligence.

The second theory (held by the Samkhyas etc.) that the Atman is separate from the Skandhas is no less illogical, for the Atman would then be like empty space, which neither acts nor reaps the fruits of action.

The third theory (held by the Vatsiputriyas) that the Atman is neither identical with nor separate from the Skandhas is also contrary to reason. This theory admits that the Atman is established on the basis of the Skandhas but is neither identical with nor separate from them. In that case, the Atman would not be a real Atman at all; it has only a nominal existence like a vase [which, depending on clay for its construction, is neither clay nor separate from clay].

Further, since it is impossible to say whether the so-called Atman is produced by causes (i.e., 'conditioned', *samskrta*) or not so produced (i.e., 'unconditioned', *asamskrta*), it should also be impossible to say whether it is an Atman or not. Therefore the existence of a real Atman as conceived by this theory cannot be established.

3. GENERAL REFUTATION

1. Against the heterodox schools

Is the Atman, grasped as a real entity by the various heterodox schools, possessed of cogitation or not? If it is, it would not be eternal, because it does not cogitate all the time. If it is not, then it would be like empty space, which neither acts nor reaps the fruits of action. Therefore, on the basis of logical reason, the real existence of an Atman as so conceived cannot be established.

Again, does this substance of the real Atman as conceived by the various schools perform any function or not? If it does, it would be like hands and feet and would not be eternal. If it does not, it would be like the illusory horns of a hare [things that exist in imagination only] and would not be a real Atman. Therefore, in either case, the theory of the Atman which they conceive cannot be established.

2. Against the Vatsiputriyas

Is the substance of the real Atman as conceived by the various schools an object of 'Atmadrsti' (Self-belief or Atman-view) or not? If it is not, how do

---

[1] *Rupa* refers to form, colour, appearance, phenomenon, etc.

若非我見所緣境者，汝等云何知實有我？

若是我見所緣境者，應有我見非顛倒攝，如實知故。

若爾，如何執有我者所信之教皆毀我見稱讚無我？

言無我見能證涅槃，執著我見沈淪生死。豈有邪見能證涅槃，正見翻令沈淪生死？

又諸我見不緣實我，有所緣故，如緣餘心。

我見所緣定非實我，是所緣故，如所餘法。

是故我見不緣實我，但緣內識變現諸蘊隨自妄情種種計度。

我執伏斷位次

然諸我執略有二種。
一者俱生，二者分別。

俱生我執無始時來虛妄熏習內因力故恒與身俱，不待邪教及邪分別任運而轉故名俱生。

此復二種，
一常相續，在第七識緣第八識起自心相執爲實我。

二有間斷，在第六識緣識所變五取蘊相或總或別起自心相執爲實我。

此二我執細故難斷，後修道中數數修習勝生空觀方能滅除。

the advocates of the theory know that an Atman really exists? If it is, then there should be an 'Atmadrsti' that does not consist of perverted views, for that would be knowledge of what really is. In that case, how is it that the perfectly true doctrines believed in by those holding the theory of the Atman all denounce Atmadrsti and praise its absence, declaring that he who is free from Atmadrsti will attain Nirvana while he who adheres to it will be engulfed in the sea of birth and death (*samsara*, transmigration)? How can it be that an erroneous view (*mithyadrsti*) leads to Nirvana and a correct view (*samyagdrsti*), on the contrary, leads to wallowing in the sea of birth and death (transmigration)?

Furthermore, the various views of Atman (Atmadrsti) actually do not take the real Atman as an object, because they have objects which are not the Atman itself, just as the mind takes other things (such as external matter) as its objects. The object of Atmadrsti is definitely not the real Atman, because it itself (Atmadrsti) is an object perceivable like other dharmas.

We consider, therefore, that 'Atmadrsti' does not take the real Atman as its object; that it takes as its objects only the Skandhas evolved by inner consciousness; and that, in accordance with the erroneous opinions of each individual, it interprets these Skandhas as the diverse forms of Atman.

4. CESSATION OF ATMAN-ADHESION
Atmagrahavibhanga

Atman-adhesion is, generally speaking, of two kinds:– 1. that which is innate (*sahaja*) and 2. that which results from mental discrimination or particularization (*vikalpita*).

1. The innate Atman-adhesion is perpetually present in the individual, owing to the internal causal influence of a false perfuming (*vasana*) which has been going on since before the beginning of time. Thus, without depending on external false teachings or discriminations, it spontaneously operates. That is why it is called innate.

This Atman-adhesion, however, is again subdivided into two kinds:

The first is constant and continuous, and pertains to the seventh consciousness or Manas, which, directing itself to the eighth consciousness or Alayavijnana, produces from this an individualized mental image to which it adheres as though there were a real Atman.

The second kind is at times interrupted and pertains to the sixth consciousness or Manovijnana which, directing itself to the five 'tenacious aggregates' (*upadanaskandhas*) that are evolved from consciousness, *in toto* or in part, produces out of them an individualized mental image to which it adheres as though there were a real Atman.

These two kinds of innate Atman-adhesion, being subtle, are difficult to eliminate. It is only later, on the Path of Meditation and Self-cultivation (Bhavanamarga), that a Bodhisattva, by repeatedly practising the 'sublime contemplation of the voidness of individuality' (*pudgalasunyata*), is able finally to annihilate them.

分別我執亦由現在外緣力故，非與身俱。要待邪教及邪分別然後方起故名分別。

唯在第六意識中有。

此亦二種。

一緣邪教所說蘊相起自心相分別計度執爲實我。

二緣邪教所說我相起自心相分別計度執爲實我。

此二我執麤故易斷，初見道時觀一切法生空眞如卽能除滅。

如是所說一切我執，自心外蘊或有或無。自心內蘊一切皆有。

是故我執皆緣無常五取蘊相妄執爲我。

然諸蘊相從緣生故是如幻有，妄所執我橫計度故決定非有。

故契經說，苾芻當知世閒沙門婆羅門等所有我見一切皆緣五取蘊起。

假設外徵釋諸妨難

實我若無，云何得有憶識誦習恩怨等事？

所執實我既常無變，後應如前，是事非有。

2. As for the Atman-adhesion caused by mental discrimination, it is derived from the force of external factors and so is not innate in the individual. It must wait for false teachings or discriminations before it can arise. That is why the term 'mental discrimination' is applied to it. It pertains exclusively to the sixth consciousness or Manovijnana.

This Atman-adhesion is also of two kinds:

The first pertains to the sixth consciousness, Manovijnana, which, taking as its object the 'aggregates' spoken of in one school of false teaching, produces within itself an individualized image to which, as a result of discrimination and speculation, it adheres as though there were a real Atman.

The second kind also pertains to the sixth consciousness, Manovijnana, which, taking as its object the various Atman-concepts or characteristics as defined by one school of false teaching, produces within itself an individualized image to which, through discrimination and speculation, it adheres as though there were a real Atman.

These two kinds of Atman-adhesion are crude and, consequently, easy to interrupt. When an ascetic attains the first stage of the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth (*Darsanamarga*), he can finally annihilate them by contemplating the 'Bhutatathata (Suchness) which is revealed by the voidness of all individualities and dharmas' (*sarvadharmapudgalasunyatabhutatathata*).

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In examining the various Atman-adhesions and their objects, we find that, in certain but not all cases, Atman-adhesion has as its object the 'aggregates' external to the mind, while in all cases it is the 'aggregates' within the mind that form that point of support for Atman-adhesion.

Let us therefore conclude that all Atman-adhesions take as their object the impermanent five 'tenacious aggregates' (*Upadanaskandhas*) which are internal images (*nimittabhaga*) of the mind, and falsely adhere to it as to a real Atman.

These five aggregate-images, arising as they do from causes and conditions (*pratyaya*), exist as illusory phenomena only. As for the Atman which is merely a false interpretation of the aggregates (like the interpretation of magic), it has definitely no real existence whatsoever.

This is why the Sutra says: 'Know ye, O Bhiksus, that all beliefs in the Atman (*satkayadrsti*) of the Brahmins and Sramanas are only produced by reason of the five Upadanaskandhas.'

5. REFUTATION OF OBJECTIONS

1. If a real Atman does not exist, how do you explain memory, perception of objects, reading of books, meditation on texts, favours, hatred, etc.?

Since the so-called real Atman is eternal and immutable, its post-manifestation state should be the same as its pre-manifestation state;[1] then memory,

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[1] Philosophers of the Samkhya School believe in an Atman which manifests itself as 23 dharmas, the Mahat, the Ahamkara, etc., which are constituted by the union of the three Gunas, namely, *sattva, rajas, tamas*.

前應如後，是事非無，以後與前體無別故。

若謂我用前後變易非我體者，理亦不然。

用不離體應常有故，體不離用應非常故。

然諸有情各有本識，一類相續任持種子，與一切法更互爲因，熏習力故得有如是憶識等事。故所設難於汝有失，非於我宗。

若無實我，誰能造業，誰受果耶？
所執實我旣無變易，猶如虛空，如何可能造業受果？
若有變易，應是無常。

然諸有情心心所法因緣力故相續無斷，造業受果於理無違。

我若實無，誰於生死輪迴諸趣？誰復厭苦求趣涅槃？

所執實我旣無生滅，如何可說生死輪迴？常如虛空非苦所惱，何爲厭捨求趣涅槃？故彼所言常爲自害。

cognition, etc., which were non-existent in the latter, should also be non-existent in the former. Conversely, since its pre-manifestation state should be the same as its post-manifestation state, memory, cognition, etc., which exist in the latter, should have existed also in the former. These are the two logical conclusions of the Atman-theory and neither of them explains memory, cognition, etc., satisfactorily, since it is held that there is no difference between the two states in question.

If it is said, as a rejoinder, that the activity (*yung*, *karitra*) of the Atman is variable, but that its substance (*t'i*, *svabhava*) is immutable, the reply is that this theory is just as illogical. Since the activity is not separable from the substance, it (the activity) should also be constant (i.e., unchangeable). Conversely, since the substance is not separable from the activity, it (the substance) should not be permanent.

(1) Correct explanation of memory, cognition, etc.

The truth is that each sentient being has a fundamental consciousness (Mulavijnana, i.e., Alayavijnana), which evolves in a homogeneous and continuous series and carries within it the 'seeds' or 'germs' (*bijas*) of all dharmas. This fundamental consciousness and the dharmas act as reciprocal causes on one another, and, because the 'perfuming' energy (*vasana*) of the dharmas imprints its essence permanently on the Alayavijnana in the form of 'seeds', or Bijas, memory, cognition, etc., are brought into manifestation, the Bijas manifesting themselves as actual dharmas which in turn produce Bijas in the Alaya. Hence the point raised about memory, cognition, etc., indicates that there are faults in your Atman theory, not in our doctrine of consciousness.

2. If there is no real Atman, by whom is a deed accomplished? By whom are the fruits of deeds reaped?

Since your Atman is, by definition, immutable, like space, how can it act and reap the fruits of action? If it performs deeds and reaps their fruits, that is, if it varies, it is not permanent.

(2) Correct explanation of actions

The truth is that, by virtue of the force of causes and conditions, the mind and its activites (*citta-caittas*) of each sentient being evolve in a continuous uninterrupted series, resulting in the accomplishment of acts and the reaping of their fruits This explanation is logical.

If there is really no Atman, who is it that goes from one state of existence (*gati*) to another in 'cycles of birth and death' (*samsara*)? Again, who is it that is disgusted with suffering and seeks to attain Nirvana?

Since your real Atman is free from birth and destruction, how can you speak of 'cycles of birth and death'? Since your Atman is as eternal as space, it cannot be tormented by suffering: how, then, can it be disgusted with suffering, expel suffering and seek the attainment of Nirvana?

Hence all the objections you have raised turn against your own Atman theory.

然有情類身心相續，煩惱業力輪迴諸趣，厭患苦故求趣涅槃。

由此故知定無實我，但有諸識無始時來前滅後生因果相續，由妄熏習似我相現，愚者於中妄執爲我。

(3) Correct explanation of Samsara and Nirvana

The truth is that each sentient being is a continuous physical and mental series which, by the force of vexing passions (*klesas*) and impure acts, turns from one state of existence (*gati*) to another in cycles of transmigration. Tormented by suffering and disgusted with it, he seeks the attainment of Nirvana.

(4) General conclusion

Hence we conclude that there is positively no real Atman; that there are only various consciousnesses which, since before the beginning of time, have followed one another, the subsequent one arising with the disappearance of the antecedent, and thus a continuous series of causes and effects (karmic seeds – actual dharmas – karmic seeds) is formed; and that, by the perfuming energy (*vasana*) of false thinking, an image of a pseudo-Atman (of the likeness of an Atman) arises in the consciousness, and it is this pseudo-Atman which the ignorant take for a real Atman.

法 執

如何識外實有諸法不可得耶 ？ 外道餘乘所執外法理非有故。

外道所執云何非有？

1. 外道各宗

一· 數論師

且數論者執我是思 ， 受用薩埵剌闍答摩所成大等二十三法。

然大等法三事合成是實非假，現量所得。

彼執非理。所以者何？

大等諸法多事成故，如軍林等，應假非實。

如何可說現量得耶？

又大等法若是實有，應如本事非三合成。

薩埵等三即大等故，應如大等亦三合成。
轉變非常爲例亦爾。

又三本事各多功能體亦應多，能體一故。

三體既徧，一處變時餘亦應爾，體無別故。

DHARMAGRAHA

Dharma-Adhesion

BELIEF IN THE REALITY OF DHARMAS

How is it that, apart from consciousness, there are no real dharmas, i.e., things in themselves?

Because the so-called 'real dharmas' affirmed by the heterodox schools (the Tirthikas) and the Hinayana Schools, if examined in the light of reason, do not exist at all.

Why do they not exist?

[Let us examine some of their theories.]

I. THEORIES OF THE TIRTHIKAS

Non-Buddhist Schools

1. SAMKHYAS

In the Samkhya School, they believe in an Atman which is Will (*cetana*) and which 'enjoys' the twenty-three dharmas, Mahat, Ahamkara, etc., which are constituted by the union of the three Gunas, namely, *sattva, rajas, tamas*. They hold that, although composed of these three things, the twenty-three dharmas are real entities, not creatures of reason or imagination: in consequence, they are knowable by direct apprehension.

Refutation

This doctrine is contrary to reason for the following reasons:

1. As regards the 'constituted' dharmas

The dharmas (Mahat, Ahamkara, etc.), being composed of a multiplicity of things (the three Gunas), are not real but fictitious, like an army or a forest (which are only fictitious designations for a number of soldiers or trees). How can it be said that they are knowable by direct apprehension? Again, if Mahat and the other dharmas really exist, they should, like their constituent elements, be a product that is not constituted by the combination of three things.

2. As regards the constituent elements, that is to say, the three Gunas

(1) Alternatively, if the three Gunas – Sattva etc. – are identical with Mahat etc., they should, like Mahat etc., be constituted by the combination of three things. Applying the same process of reasoning as above, we can prove that they are not eternal, but, like Mahat, subject to change.

Again, as each of the three 'fundamental things' has numerous activities, its substance should also be multiple, since activity and substance are one and the same thing.

The substance of the three Gunas being universal, when they transform

許此三事體相各別，如何和合共成一相？
不應合時變爲一相，與未合時體無別故。

若謂三事體異相同，便違己宗體相是一。體應如相冥然是一，相應如體顯然有三，故不應言三合成一。

又三是別，大等是總，總別一故，應非一三。

此三變時若不和合成一相者，應如未變，如何現見是一色等？

若三和合成一相者，應失本別相，體亦應隨失。

不可說三各有二相一總二別，總卽別故，總亦應三，如何見一？

若謂三體各有三相和雜難知故見一者，

旣有三相，寧見爲一？

themselves into dharmas in one place they should likewise transform themselves in other places, because their substance is identical everywhere.

(2) If they admit that the three Gunas differ in substance and in character, let us ask how they can, by combination, constitute a dharma of homogeneous character. It cannot be said that by combination the different characteristics become one characteristic, because their substance after combination is not different from that before combination.

If they say that the three Gunas differ in substance but are identical in character, then they contradict the doctrine of their own School which affirms the identity of substance and character. The substance of the three Gunas must therefore be the same as their character. That is to say, it should 'potentially' be one, not triple, which contradicts the essential thesis of Samkhya. Similarly, the character of the three Gunas must be the same as their substance. That is to say, it should 'manifestly' be triple, not one, which likewise contradicts the basic thesis of Samkhya. It cannot, therefore, be admitted that by combination the three Gunas constitute unities.

3. Consideration of the Gunas and the Dharmas

(1) The three Gunas are 'elements', having each a nature of its own; Mahat and the other dharmas are 'compounds', because they constitute single and indivisible dharmas. However, as Mahat, Ahamkara, etc., are composed of the three Gunas, the compounds and the elements are identical. Since the compound is identical with the elements, it should be three, not one. Conversely, since the elements are identical with the compound, they should be one, not three. You must then either deny the unity of Mahat or deny the triple nature of the Gunas.

(2) If the three Gunas, when they transform themselves into Mahat, do not combine in such a way as to constitute a single character, that of Mahat, then they should remain what they were before the transformation. How, then, can we perceive them as unities (Mahat, colour, etc.)?

If they combine to constitute a single character, they lose their original individual characteristics, which were the elements, and, at the same time, they also lose their substance (because it is admitted that substance and character are identical).

(3) You cannot say that each of the three Gunas possesses two characters: one general and the other particular, because the general is identical with the particular [since it is the three particular Gunas that constitute the general dharmas (Mahat etc.)]. It follows from this that the general character should be triple like the particular. How, then, can we perceive it as a unity?

(4) The Samkhyas will say that the substance of each Guna comprises three characteristics (that is to say, the characteristics of the three Gunas), but that, through combination, they are so amalgamated as to make any distinction almost impossible; hence they appear as one.

To this we reply as follows:

(1) Since there are three distinct characteristics, how can they appear as one?

復如何知三事有異？

若彼一一皆具三相，應一一事能成色等，何所闕少待三和合？

體亦應各三，以體卽相故。

又大等法皆三合成，展轉相望應無差別。

是則因果唯量諸大諸根差別皆不得成。

若爾，一根應得一切境，或應一境一切根所得。

世間現見情與非情淨穢等物現比量等皆應無異，便爲大失。

故彼所執實法不成，但是妄情計度爲有。

二· 勝論師

勝論所執實等句義多實有性，現量所得。

彼執非理。所以者何？

諸句義中且常住者若能生果應是無常，有作用故，如所生果。

若不生果，應非離識實有自性，如兔角等。

諸無常者若有質碍，便有方分應可分析，如軍林等，非實有性。

若無質礙，如心心所，應非離此有實自性。

(2) Again, how can we differentiate one Guna from the other (since all of them have the same three characteristics)?

(3) If each Guna is endowed with three characteristics, then each Guna should be capable of transforming itself into rupa etc. What more, then, is needed? Why is the combination of three Gunas necessary for the constitution of dharmas?

(4) Each of these Gunas should be triple in substance since it is triple in character: because substance and character are identical.

(5) Again, since Mahat and the other dharmas are all composed of the three Gunas, there should be no difference between one dharma and another.

It follows then that there can be no difference between cause (Mahat) and effect (Ahamkara or ego), between the various Tanmatras (the five subtle elementary particles), between the various *Mahabhutas* (five gross elements), and between the various Indriyas (sense-organs).

If such is the case, one sense-organ should be capable of perceiving all sense-objects; alternatively, one sense-object might be perceived, without any difference, by all sense-organs. Nor would there be any difference between such things as living beings and inanimate objects, the pure and the impure, direct apprehension and inference, etc., [although their dissimilarities are unmistakably perceived by direct cognition and confirmed by universal opinion.] What a fallacious doctrine!

Hence what the Samkhyas accept as real dharmas are, in fact, not real entities. They are nothing but the outcome of speculation based on false concepts.

2. VAISESIKAS

Most of the Categories (or Elements, *padarthas*), such as Dravyas (substance) etc., postulated by the Vaisesika School are held to be real entities knowable by direct perception.

1. General refutation of the various categories (*padarthas*)

Such a theory is illogical for the following reasons:

(1) Among the categories accepted by this School, some are defined as eternal and immutable [e.g., the *paramanus*, i.e., 'parent-atoms' and atoms of earth, water, fire, and air]. If these eternal elements can produce fruits (son-atoms), they are as non-eternal as the fruits which they produce, since activity is attributed to them. If they do not produce fruits, then, like the illusory 'horns of a hare' etc., they have no real nature of their own apart from consciousness.

(2) As regards those categories defined as non-eternal (i.e., the son-atoms), if they are corporeal, they occupy space and are therefore divisible. Like an army or a forest, they are not real entities [that is to say, they are mere collective terms]. If they are incorporeal, like mind and mental properties, they have no real nature of their own apart from mind and mental properties.

2. Refutation of *Dravyas* (substances) and *Gunas* (qualities)

又彼所執地水火風應非有礙實句義攝，身根所觸故，如堅濕煖動。

〔述記：地水火風實句所攝性是有礙，堅濕等法是德句中觸德所攝而是無礙。俱身根所得故，今翻覆爲量破之，以實地等即德堅等。量云，地水火風非有質礙實句所攝，身根取故，如堅濕等。〕

即彼所執堅濕煖等應非無礙德句義攝，身根所觸故，如地水火風。

地水火三對青色等俱眼所見，準此應責。

故知無實地水火風與堅濕等各別有性，亦非眼見實地水火。

又彼所執實句義中有礙常者皆有礙故，如麤地等，應是無常。

諸句義中色根所取無質礙法應皆有礙，許色根取故，如地水火風。

又彼所執非實德等應非離識有別自性，非實攝故，如石女兒。

非有實等應非離識有別自性，非有攝故，如空華等。

彼所執有應離實等無別自性，許非無故，如實德等。

若離實等應非有性，許異實等故，如畢竟無等。

如有非無，無別有性，如何實等有別有性？

The four elements, earth-water-fire-air, accepted by the Vaisesikas, should not be comprised in the category of corporeal *dravyas* (substance), because, like the qualities of solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion, they are touchable by the organs of the body [i.e., the organ of contact (*kayendriya*)].

Conversely, what this School accepts as solidity, fluidity, heat, and motion should not be comprised in the category of non-corporeal *gunas* (qualities), because, like earth-water-fire-air,[1] they are touchable by the organs of the body [i.e., the organ of contact].

The same criticism should apply to the three elements earth-water-fire in their relation to the colours green, yellow, etc., all of them being visible to the eye.

Hence it is proved that, apart from solidity, fluidity, etc., there exist no real earth-water-fire-air with a separate existence of their own, and that the eye does not see real earth, real water, real fire, and real air.

3. Further refutation of the various categories (*padarthas*)

Again, among the *dravyas*, some substances are defined as corporeal (i.e., having resistance) and eternal. But, being corporeal, like the gross earth, they should be classified as non-eternal.

Among the various categories, those incorporeal dharmas which are described as perceivable by the five material sense-organs (e.g., colour, sound, odour, taste, etc.) should be corporeal, since it is admitted that, like earth-water-fire-air, they are perceivable by the material sense-organs.

As regards categories which are not *dravyas*, that is, those which are *gunas* etc., they cannot have a distinct nature of their own apart from consciousness, because they are not comprised in the *Dravya* category; hence they have no more existence than 'the sons of a barren woman'.

Those categories, such as Dravyas etc., which are not *Satta* (existence), can have no distinct nature of their own apart from consciousness, because they are not comprised in *Satta*; hence they exist only like a phantasmagoric flower in the sky [which has no existence apart from optic illusion].

4. Refutation of *Satta* (existence), *Dravyatva* (substance), *Samavaya* (coherence), etc.

(1) Existence (*Satta*)

The *Satta* or 'existence' category has no distinct nature of its own apart from *Dravya* etc., because it is admitted that *Satta*, like *Dravya*, Guna, etc., is not non-existent.

If *Satta* has an existence apart from *Dravya* etc., then it is no longer *Satta*, because it is admitted that *Satta* differs from *Dravya* etc., like something which absolutely does not exist (e.g., the hairs of a tortoise).

Since *Satta* can exist in itself without having to have a separate *Satta* to account for its existence, why should *Dravya* etc. need a separate *Satta* to account for its existence?

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[1] This School classifies under the Guna category the four elements in the Dravya category and their four attributes, solidity, fluidity, etc. The above two arguments demonstrate that what they call Dravyas are not really Dravyas but Gunas, and vice versa.

若離有法有別有性，應離無法有別無性。

彼既不然，此云何爾？

故彼有性唯妄計度。

又彼所執實德業性異實德業理定不然，勿此亦非實德業性異實等故，如德業等。

又應實等非實等攝，異實等性故，如德業實等。

地等諸性對地等體更相徵詰，準此應知。

如實性等無別實等性，實等亦應無別實性等。

若離實等有實等性，應離非實等有非實等性。
彼既不爾，此云何然？
故同異性唯假施設。

又彼所執和合句義定非實有，非有實等諸法攝故，如畢竟無。

彼許實等現量所得，以理推徵尚非實有，況彼自許和合句義非現量得而可實有？

設執和合是現量境，由前理故，亦非實有。

然彼實等非緣離識實有自體現量所得，許所知故，如龜毛等。

又緣實智非緣離識實句自體現量智攝，假合生故，如德智等。

If apart from 'existence' dharmas, there is a separate Satta or 'existence' category, then, apart from non-existence dharmas, there should also be a separate 'non-existence' category (*Asatta*). If the postulation of this separate category is not necessary in the latter case, why is it necessary in the former?

Hence the *Satta* nature of the Vaisesika School is nothing but the outcome of false speculation.

(2) Generality and Particularity (*Visesa*)

Again, they hold that, apart from *dravya* (substance), *guna* (quality) and *karman* (action), there is a separate nature of *dravya, guna* and *karman* (called *visesa* or 'generality and particularity'). In other words, they admit *dravyatva, gunatva, karmatva* apart from *dravya, guna, karman.* This is certainly illogical. Why do they not say that this *dravyatva* is not *dravyatva* since it is distinct from *dravya*, like *guna* and *karman*?

Again, why do they not say that *dravya* is not *dravya* since it differs from *dravyatva*, like *guna* and *karman*?

The same objection applies to the separate nature of earth etc. in its relation to the substance of earth itself etc. and vice versa.

Since they admit that, apart from the nature of *dravya* (*visesa*) etc., there is no other *visesa* (*dravyatva, gunatva, kamatva*), they should also admit that, apart from *dravya* etc., there is no separate nature of *dravya* etc.

If they admit that, apart from *dravya* etc., there is a separate nature of *dravya* etc., they should also admit that, apart from *non-dravya* etc., there should be a separate nature of *non-dravya* etc.) i.e., *non-visesa, adravyatva, agunatva, akarmatva*). If that (*non-visesa*) is not necessary, why is this (*visesa*) necessary?

Hence *visesa* is nothing but a fictitious designation.

(3) The Coherence Category (*Samavaya*)

The coherence category (*samavaya*) accepted by this School has definitely no real existence, because they admit that it is not *satta* (existence) and that it is not comprised in the dharmas called *dravyas* etc., like something which absolutely does not exist.

The Vaisesikas hold that the *dravyas* etc. are knowable by direct apprehension; yet, when examining them from a rational point of view, we have proved logically that they do not really exist. A fortiori, Coherence (*samavaya*) cannot have real existence, since the Vaisesikas themselves admit that it cannot be known by immediate apprehension. Even if they were to claim that Coherence is within the reach of direct apprehension, we can also prove, by the same process of reasoning resorted to above (in the refutation of *dravya* etc.), that its existence is not real.

The Categories not existent apart from Consciousness

The nine categories of dharmas, *dravyas* etc., cannot be perceived by the immediate discernment which perceives real things existent apart from consciousness, because, as admitted by the Vaisesikas themselves, they are known only in the mind, like the hairs of a tortoise (an imaginary product).

Conversely, the discernment (literally, wisdom, *jnana*) which perceives the *dravyas* is not comprised in that immediate discernment which perceives the

廣說乃至緣和合智非緣離識和合自體現量智攝，假合生故，如實智等。

故勝論者實等句義亦是隨情妄所施設。

三· 事大自在天者

有執有一大自在天體實偏常，能生諸法。

彼執非理所。以者何？
若法能生必非常故，諸非常者必不偏故，
諸不偏者非眞實故。
體旣常偏具諸功能，應一切處時頓生一切法。
待欲及緣方能生者，違一因論。
或欲及緣亦應頓起，因常有故。

四· 七外道論師

餘執有一大梵，時，方，本際，自然，虛空，我等，常住實有具諸功德能生一切法，皆同此破。

五· 二聲論師

有餘偏執明論聲常，能爲定量表詮諸法。
有執一切聲皆是常，待緣顯發方有詮表。
彼俱非理。
所以者何？
且明論聲許能詮故，應非常住，如所餘聲。

substance or essential nature of *dravyas* existent apart from consciousness, because this discernment arises (by their own admission) from a combination of many fictitious dharmas, like the discernment of Gunas etc. The same process of reasoning may be extended to other categories until we come to the discernment of Coherence (*samavaya*). This discernment is not comprised in that immediate discernment which perceives the essential nature of Coherence existent apart from consciousness, because it arises from a combination of many fictitious dharmas, like the discernment of *dravyas* etc.

We conclude, therefore, that the Dravya Category etc. of the Vaisesikas is also the product of false speculation based upon false ideas.

3. MAHESVARA

A certain school holds that there is a God, Mahesvaradeva, whose substance is real, omnipresent and eternal, and who can engender all dharmas.

Refutation

This theory is illogical for the following reasons:

1. That which engenders is not eternal; that which is not eternal is not omnipresent; that which is not omnipresent is not real.

2. Since Mahesvara is eternal and omnipresent, and complete with all kinds of energies and capacities, he should, at all times, in all places, and at one stroke, produce all dharmas.

3. If they say that Mahesvara's creation depends on desire to produce or on certain conditions, then they contradict their own doctrine of 'single cause'. Alternatively, we may say that desire and conditions, too, should arise instantaneously, since they are eternally existent in omnipresent Mahesvara.

4. DOCTRINES OF NON-BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

Some other schools hold that there is one Mahabrahma, one Time, one Space, one First Cause, one Svabhava, one Ether, one Atman, etc. Each of those is alleged to be unique, eternal and real, possessing all energies and capacities and capable of producing all dharmas. We may refute all these doctrines as we do the doctrine of Mahesvara.

5. DOCTRINES OF THE TWO MIMAMSA SCHOOLS

One of these two Schools holds that only the sound of Veda is eternal: it is the norm of all dharmas and it manifests them. The other School holds that all sounds are eternal, but that the manifestation or production thereof depends on causes and conditions; it is only then that they indicate any meaning.

Both these theories are inadmissible for the following reasons:

1. The sound of Veda, since it is admitted to be indicative, is, like other sounds, not eternal.

餘聲亦應非常聲體，如瓶衣等，待衆緣故。

六· 順世外道論師

有外道執地水火風極微實常能生麤色，所生麤色不越因量，雖是無常而體實有。

〔述記：此是順世外道所計。此唯執有實常四大生一切有情，一切有情禀此而有更無餘物，後死滅時還歸四大。……執實，執常，執能生麤色，此是因也。〕

彼執非理。所以者何？

所執極微若有方分，如蟻行等，體應非實。

若無方分，如心心所，應不共聚生麤果色。

既能生果，如彼所生，如何可說極微常住？

又所生果不越因量，應如極微，不名麤色。

則此果色應非眼根色等所取，便違自執。

若謂果色量德合故，非麤似麤，色根能取。

所執果色既同因量，應如極微無麤德合。

或應極微亦麤得合，如麤果色。處無別故。

若謂果色徧在自因，因非一故可名麤者，則此果色體應非一，如所在因，處各別故。

既爾，此果還不成麤，由此亦非色根所取。

若果多分合故成麤，多因極微合應非細，足成根境，何用果爲？

2. The other sounds (as held by the second School) are not eternal either, since, like a pitcher and clothing, they depend on causes and conditions for their production.

6. LOKAYATIKAS

A certain heterodox school, the Lokayatikas, holds that the atoms of the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air, – parent-atoms, subtle matter, primary or causal matter, – are real and eternal. They can produce massive or gross matter – son-atoms, secondary or resultant matter. The massive matter thus produced does not exceed the extension of its causes (the atoms). Although massive matter is not eternal, its substance exists absolutely.

Refutation

This theory is also contrary to reason. Why?

1. As to those parent-atoms accepted by them as eternal, do they occupy space? If they do, then, like a line of ants (which is divisible), their substance is not real. If they do not, then, like the mind and its properties, they cannot produce secondary gross matter by aggregation. Since they can produce fruits, they are as impermanent as the fruits they produce: how can you say that the atoms are eternal and immutable?

2. As to the aggregated gross matter:

(1) Since it does not exceed the extension of its causes, it should not, like the atoms, be called 'massive matter'. It should also be imperceptible to the material organs, the eye etc. But to admit these two logical conclusions is to refute your own definitions.

(2) It may be argued that, because it is closely connected with the quality called Extension, secondary matter is in appearance massive although actually it is not so and that, in consequence, it is perceptible to the material organs.

This is a poor explanation! Secondary matter, since it has the same dimensions as its causes, cannot be closely connected with the quality 'massive extension', just as the atoms are not connected with it in that way. Alternatively, the atoms themselves should be closely connected with that quality, like massive-secondary matter, since the space occupied by them is the same.

(3) It may also be argued (as the Vaisesikas and the Lokayatikas do) that each unit of secondary matter pervades or fills the space of its own cause (that is, a single atom), and that, since the causes are multiple, the term 'massiveness' or 'grossness' is justified.

But, on this hypothesis, secondary matter would be multiple in substance, like the causes in which it resides, since the positions of the causes are separate. If this is so, secondary matter has not even the quality of massiveness. Consequently, it should not be accessible to perception by the sense-organs (the eye etc.) either.

(4) Should it be argued that, through the combination of numerous units of secondary matter, massiveness would be constituted, we would retort that the combination of numerous atoms would cease to be subtle, and that it would

既多分成，應非實有，則汝所執前後相違。

又果與因俱有質礙，應不同處，如二極微。

若謂果因體相受入，如沙受水，藥入鎔銅，誰許沙銅體受水藥？

或應離變非一非常。

又麤果色體若是一，得一分時應得一切，彼此一故，彼應如此。

不許違理，許便違事，

故彼所執進退不成，但是隨情虛妄計度。

七· 總破外道

然諸外道品類雖多，所執有法不過四種。

一執有法與有等性其體定一，如數論等。

彼執非理，所以者何？勿一切法卽有性故，皆如有性體無差別。

便違三德我等體異，亦違世間諸法差別。

又若色等卽色等性，色等應無青黃等異。

be massive enough to become the object of sense-organs: What, then, is the use of postulating secondary matter engendered by primary matter?[1]

Since secondary matter is composed of many units, it cannot be considered as a real entity. Hence your second affirmation is in contradiction with your first that its substance exists absolutely.

(5) Again, since secondary matter (massive matter) and primary matter (atoms) are both corporeal, they are reciprocally impenetrable; so they cannot occupy the same space any more than can two individual atoms.

It may be argued that secondary matter and primary matter receive and penetrate each other just as sand absorbs water and alchemical ingredients penetrate melting copper.

This argument is worthless, for who will admit that the substance of sand absorbs water? [Water enters the empty space between the grains of sand, and not the substance of the sand.] And who will admit that the substance of copper receives the alchemical ingredients? [The ingredients do not enter the atoms of the copper. They only cause the atoms to be transmuted into gold.]

[Now let us assume that your two analogies are admissible. When secondary matter penetrates the atoms], the atoms will be separated and transmuted just as sand is separated by water and the copper-atoms are transmuted by the ingredients; then where is the unity and eternity of these atoms? [Note: Things separable have no unity; things transmutable are not eternal.]

(6) Finally, if this massive-secondary matter constitutes a 'unity', not a 'multiplicity', then, when we acquire one part of it, we should have acquired all its other parts as well, since that part which we have acquired and those which we have not yet acquired are one and the same. If you reject this conclusion, you contradict logic; if you accept it, you contradict facts.

Hence your theory leads to a dilemma and does not bear examination. It is nothing but a construction of pure fantasy, a figment of the mind.

7. General Refutation of Various Theories

Although the varieties of heterodox schools (Tirthikas) are numerous, their theories of existent dharmas, i.e., the *saddharmas* accepted by them, are of only four kinds.

The first, like the Samkhyas and others, holds that existent dharmas (*saddharmas*) and the nature of existence or being (*satta*) and so forth are definitely identical in substance.

Their theory is contrary to reason. Why? Because it must not be held that all dharmas, by the very fact that they are *satta*, would be identical among themselves (i.e., the same in substance), and, like *satta*, would be undifferentiated. This would contradict the Samkhya theory that the three qualities (*gunas*) and the Atman and so forth are different in substance. It would also contradict the fact that the various dharmas of the world are different. Furthermore, if colour and so forth are identical with the nature of colour and so forth, they should not be differentiated as green, yellow, and the like.

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[1] The Lokayatikas believe that, in spite of combination, atoms are still subtle and imperceptible.

二執有法與有等性其體定異，如勝論等。

彼執非理，所以者何？ 勿一切法非有性故， 如已滅無體不可得。

便違實等自體非無，亦違世間現見有物。

又若色等非色等性，應如聲等非眼等境。

三執有法與有等性亦一亦異，如無慙等。

彼執非理，所以者何？一異同前一異過故。

二相相違體應別故，

一異體同俱不成故，

勿一切法皆同一體。

或應一異是假非實， 而執爲實， 理定不成。四執有法與有等性非一非異，如邪命等。

彼執非理，所以者何？

非一異執同異一故。

非一異言爲遮爲表？

若唯是表，應不雙非。若但是遮，應無所執。

亦遮亦表，應互相違。非表非遮，應成戲論。

又非一異違世共知有一異物 ， 亦違自宗色等有法決定實有。

The second, like the Vaisesikas and others, holds that existent dharmas (*saddharmas*) and the nature of existence (*satta*) and so forth are definitely different in substance.

Their theory is also contrary to reason. Why? Because it must not be held that all dharmas, by the very fact that they are not *satta*, cannot, like things extinct and no longer existent, possess any substance. This would contradict the Vaisesika theory that substance (*dravya*) and other categories are not without a nature of their own. It would also contradict the fact that in the physical world things evidently exist. Furthermore, if colour and so forth are not identical with the nature of colour and so forth, they, like sound and so forth, would not be objects of visual consciousness and so forth.

The third, like the Nirgranthas (literally, 'without-shame') and others, holds that existent dharmas and the nature of existence (i.e., their inherent nature) and so forth are both identical and different.

This theory is inadmissible. Why?

(1) Because they are mistaken as regards identity in the first school, and as regards difference in the second.

(2) The two characteristics of identity and difference, like pleasure and suffering, are mutually contradictory and should be different in substance.

(3) It is impossible for identity and difference to be present in the same substance.

(4) It must not be held that all dharmas are of the same substance or that they should simultaneously be identical and different.

(5) Alternatively, the so-called identity and difference are fictitious and not real; but the Nirgranthas have mistaken a fiction for a real entity. Their theory is definitely contrary to reason.

The fourth school, like the Ajivikas and some other schools, holds that existent dharmas are neither identical with nor different from the nature of existence (*satta*) and so forth.

Their theory is also inadmissible. Why?

(1) Because the theory that existent dharmas are neither identical with nor different from the nature of existence is virtually the same as the theory that existent dharmas are both identical with and different from the nature of existence.

(2) Is the expression 'neither identical nor different' an affirmation or a denial?

If it is purely an affirmation, the double negation is inadmissible. If it is purely a denial, then no theory can be held. If it is both an affirmation and a denial, it is self-contradictory. If it is neither an affirmation nor a denial, it is frivolous talk.

(3) Further, the doctrine that existent dharmas are neither identical nor different not only contradicts the universal opinion that things are either identical with or different from other things, but also contradicts the Ajivakas' own doctrine that existent dharmas such as colour etc. are definitely real.

是故彼言唯矯避過，諸有智者勿謬許之。

II. 小乘各宗

餘乘所執離識實有色等諸法，如何非有？

彼所執色不相應行及諸無爲，理非有故。

一· 色 法

且所執色總有二種，一者有對，極微所成，二者無對，非極微成。

（一） 有對色

A. 破諸部有對色

彼有對色定非實有，能成極微非實有故。

謂諸極微若有質礙，應如瓶等，是假非實。
若無質礙，應如非色，如何可集成瓶衣等？

又諸極微若有方分，必可分析，便非實有。
若無方分，則如非色，

云何和合承光發影？
日輪纔舉照柱等時，東西两邊光影各現。
承光發影處旣不同，所執極微定有方分。

Hence we conclude that the doctrines of the heterodox schools are nothing but vain attempts to deceive people and to evade the errors of their systems. Men of wisdom should not accept them.

II. DHARMA THEORIES OF HINAYANA SCHOOLS

The other 'Vehicles' (that is, the various Hinayana Schools) hold that there are real dharmas – Rupa etc. – which exist apart from consciousness. Why do we affirm that, in reality, they do not exist at all?

Because, logically, the three categories of dharmas admitted by them, namely, the *Rupas* (matter or material form), the *Viprayuktas* (unassociated dharmas), and the *Asamskrtas* (unconditioned non-active dharmas), have no real existence apart from consciousness.

1. RUPAS
Matter or Material Form

The Hinayana Schools distinguish two kinds of Rupa (matter or material form):

1. Resistant Rupa (Rupa *sapratigha*), which is composed of atoms;
2. Non-Resistant Rupa (Rupa *apratigha*), which is not composed of atoms.

In other words, material and immaterial Rupa.

(1) Rupa Sapratigha
Resistant Matter

A. Dilemmas

It is certain that Resistant Rupa (Rupa *sapratigha*) has no real existence, because the atoms of which it is composed are not real.

[We pose two dilemmas: either the atoms are substantially resistant or they are not; either the atoms occupy space or they do not.]

1. If atoms are corporeal and substantially resistant, their existence is fictitious and not real, like the pitcher etc. If they are not, they will be in the same position as Arupa (non-matter); how can they aggregate to constitute a pitcher, a coat, etc.?

2. Again, if, as the Sautrantikas believe, they occupy space, they are divisible and, in consequence, not real. If, as the Sarvastivadins believe, they do not occupy space, they will be the same as Non-rupa (Arupa) and this raises five difficulties:

(1) If they are the same as Non-rupa, i.e., that which is not agglomerated matter, how can they receive light and create a shadow? When the rising sun shines on a pillar or some other object, there appear on the two sides, east and west, sunlight and shade respectively. Since the place where the sunlight is received and the place where the shadow is cast are different, atoms must

又若見觸壁等物時，唯得此邊不得彼分。
旣和合物卽諸極微，故此極微必有方分。

又諸極微隨所住處必有上下四方差別，不爾便無共和集義。

或相涉入，應不成麤，由此極微定有方分。

執有對色卽諸極微，若無方分，應無障隔。
若爾便非障礙有對。
是故汝等所執極微必有方分。有方分故，便可分析，定非實有。

故有對色實有不成。

B. 五識所依所緣

五識豈無所依緣色？

雖非無色，而是識變。

謂識生時內因緣力變似眼等色等相現，卽以此相爲所依緣。

〔述記：謂八識生時內因緣種子等力，第八識變似五根五塵。眼等五識依彼所變根緣彼本質塵雖親不得，要託彼生，實於本識色塵之上變作五塵相現。卽以彼五根爲所依，以彼及此二種五塵爲所緣。五識若不託第八所變便無所緣，所緣之中有親疏故。〕

occupy space. If they do not, how do we account for the fact that they can receive the sunlight and at the same time cast a shadow?

(2) When we see or touch a wall or some other object, we can contact only this side and not the opposite side. Since the aggregated object (i.e., the wall etc.) and the atoms are identical, the latter must occupy space.

(3) The atoms, wherever they are, must be different according to their situation in the east, south, west, north, the zenith and the nadir. If there is no such differentiation, it will be impossible to maintain the theory of the formation of gross matter either by agglomeration of atoms (as the Vibhasa School believes) or by combination of atoms.

(4) The only alternative way out of the above difficulty is to maintain that atoms penetrate one another. But, in that case, they cannot form massive Rupa (gross matter). Hence they must occupy space.

(5) The Sarvastivadins hold that Resistant Rupa is identical with the atoms. Such being the case, if atoms do not occupy space, Resistant Rupa should not do so either; then how can it form an obstruction or cause a separation? If it cannot, it is neither obstructive nor resistant. Hence these atoms admitted by you (the Sarvastivadins) must occupy space and, consequently, they are divisible. Being divisible, it is certain that they are not real entities.

We conclude, therefore, that the real existence of Resistant Rupa cannot be established.

B. Essential Basis and Object of the First Five Consciousnesses
Asraya and Alambana

Is there no Rupa to constitute the essential basis or infrastructure (*asraya*) and the perceived objects (*alambana*) of the first five consciousnesses (Vijnanas)? Surely, the first five consciousnesses (those of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body) have as their basis and point of support (*asraya*) the sense-organs (*indriya*) which are Rupa, and as their objects (*alambana*) external things (*artha*) which are Rupa.

It would be wrong to say that the *asraya* and *alambana* are not Rupa, but this Rupa is nothing but the development and transformation of consciousness. That is to say: when the eight consciousnesses (to be exact, their *samvittibhaga*[1]) are born by the force of internal causes (*hetupratyaya*: that is to say, the Bijas or germs of the *indriyas* and the *arthas*), the eighth consciousness manifests itself as images which appear on the one hand like the eye, the ear, etc., and on the other like form, colour, etc. It is these images which the five consciousnesses take as their support and their object, *asraya* and *alambana*.

[Relying on the *indriyas* (eye etc.) which are the manifestation of the eighth consciousness, the five consciousnesses (the visual consciousness etc.) take as their object (alamb) the five 'dusts' (form-colour etc.) which are the development of the eighth. They do not immediately perceive or grasp those 'dusts' (archetypes), but they transform themselves into images similar to them (images

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[1] See Theory of Bhagas.

然眼等根非現量得，以能發識比知是有。此但功能，非外所造。

外有對色理旣不成，故應但是內識變現。

發眼等識名眼等根，此爲所依生眼等識。

此眼等識外所緣緣理非有故，決定應許自識所變爲所緣緣。

(1) 破正量部

謂能引生似自識者，汝執彼是此所緣緣。
非但能生，勿因緣等亦名此識所緣緣故。

〔述記：以能生識故是所緣緣者，其因緣等應是所緣緣。等者等取等無間增上緣等。〕

(2) 破經部

眼等五識了色等時，但緣和合，似彼相故。

非和合相異諸極微有實自體，分析彼時似彼相識定不生故。

彼和合相旣非實有，故不可說是五識緣。

which are their own *nimittabhaga*). Thus, the five consciousnesses have as their basis and support the five *indriyas*, as their 'remote' object the five 'dusts' of the eighth, and as their 'proximate' object a replica of those five 'dusts' ('K'uei Chi).]

1. Summary Discussion of Asraya

Since the *cakshur-indriya* (the visual organ proper, not the physical eye) and the other sense indriyas cannot be known by direct perception, we deduce their existence from their activity: they produce consciousness. They are only faculties, not external things constituted of matter derived from the four major elements (*mahabhutas*). Since Resistant Rupa exterior to the mind is rationally inadmissible, the five organs, like their five objects, – in a word, the ten *ayatanas*, – are only the manifestation of internal consciousness.

However, although all this is integrated with the mind or the development of consciousness, yet the activities of the sense-organs are diversified. The 'organ of the eye', *caksur-indriya*, is so called because it produces visual consciousness and so forth. It is with this visual organ and the others as support that the visual consciousness and the other four sense-consciousnesses are born.

2. Discussion of Alambana

Inasmuch as an *alambanapratyaya*, 'condition quâ object', exterior to the mind, of the five sense-consciousnesses is rationally inadmissible, we have to admit that the *alambanapratyaya* of these sense-consciousnesses is the manifestation of the consciousness of each sense-organ. In other words, the five sense-consciousnesses take their own manifestations as their 'condition quâ object'.

(1) Definition of Alambanapratyaya

The Hinayana Schools, with the exception of the Sammitiyas, formulate the definition: 'That which produces a consciousness similar to itself is the *alambanapratyaya* of that consciousness'.

One cannot, with the Sammitiyas, say that the *alambanapratyaya* of a consciousness is that which engenders it without anything else, because, according to this definition, not only that which produces the consciousness, but the other conditions also, – conditions quâ cause, quâ immediate antecedent, quâ agent (*hetu, samanantara, adhipatipratyaya*), – for example, the *indriyas* or sense-organs, would be conditions quâ object, *alambanapratyaya*, (since all of them can produce consciousness).

(2) Doctrine of the Sautrantikas

This School holds that that which is perceived by the five consciousnesses is the agglomeration of atoms, and that, since individual atoms are imperceptible, the five consciousnesses, when perceiving form-colour etc., can only perceive an image similar to that of the agglomeration.

But the image of agglomeration, being different from that of atoms, does not correspond to a reality, because, when it is divided into several parts, the consciousness which perceives the image of agglomeration definitely cannot arise. This is what is admitted by the Sautrantikas, for whom massive matter has only a practical existence. Since the image of agglomeration is not a real

勿第二月等能生五識故。

(3) 破薩婆多

a. 古薩婆多

非諸極微共和合位可與五識各作所緣。此識上無極微相故。

非諸極微有和合相，不和合時無此相故。

非和合位與不合時此諸極微體相有異。

故和合位如不合時色等極微，非五識境。

b. 新薩婆多

有執色等一一極微不和集時非五識境，共和集位展轉相資有麤相生爲此識境，彼相實有爲此所緣。

彼執不然。

共和集位與未集時體相一故。

瓶甌等物極微等者，緣彼相識應無別故。

共和集位一一極微各各應捨微圓相故。

非麤相識緣細相境，勿餘境識緣餘境故。

一識應緣一切境故。

許有極微，尙致此失，況無識外眞實極微。

entity, it cannot be said that the agglomeration is the 'condition quâ object' of the five consciousnesses. The 'condition' which engenders consciousness must be a reality. A non-existent thing, – a 'second moon' (produced by optic illusion), for example, – is not capable of producing the five consciousnesses.

(3) Doctrine of the Sarvastivadins

a. Ancient Sarvastivadins

It is not true, as the old School of Sarvastivadins thinks, that the atoms, taken *not* individually but as an agglomeration, may become the 'condition quâ object' of each of the five consciousnesses, because the character or image of the individual atom is not reflected in the consciousness.

It is not true either that, collectively, the atoms possess an 'agglomeration image', because, in a state of non-agglomeration, this image does not exist.

Neither can it be true that the substance and character of the atoms become different through agglomeration or non-agglomeration, because in both these states they remain the same.

Hence, in a state of agglomeration, as in a state of non-agglomeration, the atoms of Rupa etc. are not sense-objects of the five consciousnesses.

b. *Neo-Sarvastivadins – System of Apeksa (Samghabhadra)*

The Neo-Sarvastivadins, like Master Samghabhadra, hold that atoms of Rupa etc., taken individually and not combined, are not the object of the five consciousnesses; but, in the stage of combination, they assist one another, thus producing a massive image or character, which is the object of these consciousnesses. As this character is real, it is the 'condition quâ object', *alambanapratyaya*, of consciousness.

This theory cannot be true for the following five reasons:

(a) Whether combined or non-combined, the atoms have the same substance and the same character.

(b) [If it is true that, through mutual assistance, individual atoms grouped together may become the condition quâ object], then, in the case of a pitcher and a bowl or any other couple of objects, composed of equal quantities of atoms, the consciousness which perceives them should see no difference between them.

(c) In a state of combination, each atom has lost its original characteristics of subtlety and sphericity.

(d) We cannot admit that the consciousness which perceives the massive image of a pitcher is the same consciousness that perceives the subtle image of an atom, for, in this hypothesis, the consciousness which perceives one sense-object [sound, for instance] would also perceive another sense-object [form-colour, for example].

(e) [Since they admit that things of opposite character are perceived by one consciousness at the same time], one consciousness (e.g., the visual) should perceive all sense-objects at the same time (that is, form-colour, sound, smell, taste, etc.)

Even if we assume the existence of atoms, we still find so many errors in this theory. All the more inadmissible, therefore, is this theory since we have proved that, apart from consciousness, atoms have no real existence of their own.

由此定知自識所變似色等相爲所緣緣。

見託彼生，帶彼相故。

然識變時隨量大小頓現一相，非別變作衆多極微合成一物。

爲執麤色有實體者，佛說極微令其除析，非謂諸色實有極微。

諸瑜伽師以假想慧於麤色相漸次除析至不可析，假說極微。

雖此極微猶有方分而不可析，若更析之便似空現不名爲色，故說極微是色邊際。

由此應知諸有對色皆識變現，非極微成。

（二） 無對色

餘無對色是此類故，亦非實有。或無對故，如心心所，定非實色。

諸有對色現有色相，以理推究離識尙無，況無對色現無色相，而可說爲眞實色法。

Correct Doctrine of *Alambanapratyaya*

From the above we conclude that consciousness takes as its *alambanapratyaya* (condition quâ object) the image which has a close resemblance to Rupa etc., and which is the transformation-manifestation of the eighth consciousness itself.

The 'perception-aspect' of consciousness arises on the basis of this image (this is the meaning of 'pratyaya') and it incorporates this image as its 'image-aspect' (*nimittabhaga*) (this is the meaning of 'alambana').

Correct Theory of Atoms.

When consciousness manifests itself, a complete image appears instantaneously, large or small, according to the size of the 'image-aspect' (*nimittabhaga*). It does not develop fractionally in a multitude of atoms which, by combination, constitute an object (as the Sarvastivadins believe).

Nevertheless, the Buddha speaks of atoms. He teaches the atomic theory to those who believe in the reality of massive Rupas in order that, by splitting up the massive Rupas into so-called atoms, they may know their unreal nature and so rid themselves of this belief. But he does not teach that within the Rupas there are real atoms.

The Yogacharyas (Yoga-masters), resorting to their 'faculty of discernment and imagination' divide and sub-divide the massive Rupa, step by step, until it reaches a state in which it is no longer divisible. To this state they give the fictitious name of 'atom'. They believe that, although it occupies space, the atom is no longer divisible, for, if one continues the dissection, what resembles empty space will appear. In that case, it can no longer be called Rupa. This is why it is said that 'the atom is the limit of Rupa.'

From the above we should conclude that Resistant Rupa (Rupa *sapratigha*) or Impenetrable Matter is only the 'transformation-manifestation' of consciousness and does not consist of atoms.

(2) Rupa Apratigha
Non-resistant Matter.

Of Non-Resistant Rupa (Rupa *apratigha*) we may say that, being Rupa like 'resistant' Rupa (*sapratigha*), it is not a real entity. Or we may say that, being immaterial and non-resistant (*apratigha*), like mind and mental properties, it cannot be real Rupa.

We have ascertained through rational examination that Resistant Rupa, which presents all the characteristics of Rupa (materiality, form-colour, etc.), cannot be regarded as a real entity apart from consciousness. We should, therefore, all the more so refuse to regard Non-Resistant Rupa, which does not present these characteristics, as a real and actual Rupadharma.

[For the Sarvastivadins, Non-Resistant Rupa is 1. indicative Rupa (*vijnaptirupa*, i.e., that which indicates something) which is of two kinds: (1) indication by the body (*kayavijnapti*) or corporeal indicative act; (2) indication by the voice (*vagvijnapti*) or vocal indicative act; 2. non-indicative Rupa (*avijnaptirupa*, i.e., corporeal or vocal act which does not indicate anything).

表無表色豈非實有？
此非實有。
所以者何？

且身表色若是實有，以何爲性？
若言是形，便非實有，可分析故，長等極微不可得故。
〔述記：初破薩婆多。實有形故言非實有，可分析故，如瓶等物 〕

若言是動，亦非實有，纔生卽滅，無動義故。
〔述記：次破正量部。彼計身業以動爲體。〕

有爲法滅，不待因故。
滅若待因，應非滅故。

若言有色非顯非形，心所引生，能動手等，名身表業。
理亦不然。
〔述記：此破日出論者，卽經部本師。〕

此若是動，義如前破。
若是動因，應卽風界，風無表示，不應名表。
又觸不應通善惡性。
非顯香味，類觸應知。故身表業定非實有。

然心爲因，令識所變手等色相生滅相續轉趣餘方似有動作，表示心故假名身表。

語表亦非實有聲性。
一刹那聲無詮表故。
多念相續便非實故。

We must see whether the two indicative acts (corporeal and vocal) and the non-indicative act are or are not really Rupa, and explain the real value of these 'three acts'.]

Is it not true that Indicative Rupa and Non-Indicative Rupa really exist?

No, it is not true. They do not really exist.

Why?

(1) Corporeal Indicative Rupa Refuted

Let us first of all deal with Corporeal Indicative Rupa. If it really exists, what is its nature?

a. According to the Sarvastivadins, this Rupa is 'form' or 'figure'. But form, being divisible, is not real. If this Rupa is composed of atoms that have length, breadth, etc., then such Rupa is non-existent, because atoms are (by general admission) round. Hence Rupa 'form' is not real.

b. According to the Sammitiyas, Corporeal Indicative Rupa is movement. If it is movement, it cannot exist absolutely, because it belongs to the category of conditioned things (*samskrta dharmas*), and, as such, it perishes or passes away immediately and at the same spot where it is born, which means that there is no movement at all in the real sense of the word. This passing away or destruction of conditioned things needs no cause: hence its immediacy. If destruction depends upon a cause, then, strictly speaking, it is not destruction.

c. According to the Darstantikas, Corporeal Indicative Rupa is a special kind of Rupa which is neither colour nor form, but is produced by the mind. This Rupa gives movement to the hands and the other members. Hence it is called 'act of indication by the body' or 'corporeal indicative act'.

This theory is also inadmissible. If this Rupa is 'movement', we have already refuted it. If it is the cause of movement, then it should be the air element. As air does not indicate anything, it cannot receive the name 'indication'. Besides, the sense-sphere of touch ('contact *ayatana*' in which the air element is classified) is neither of a good nor of a bad ethical nature, and, in consequence, it cannot be indicative.

Since the so-called 'Indicative Rupa', like the air element of the sense-sphere of touch, is neither colour, nor smell, nor taste, the 'act of indication by the body' is definitely not a real entity.

d. Correct Doctrine.

With mind as its cause, the Rupa of the hand etc., which is the transformation-manifestation of consciousness, is born and perishes in a continuous series and is propagated in a particular space as if it has movement and action. By the spatial prolongation of its series, the Rupa of the hand indicates, in fact, the mind, not the body. Hence it is given the fictitious name 'Corporeal Indication' or 'indication by the body'.

(2) Vocal Indicative Rupa Refuted

The act which we call 'vocal' indication has not the real nature of sound, because the sound of one moment of time (ksana) does not indicate any meaning, while a continuous series of moments of sound is not a real thing, it being divisible and, after division, becoming the same as the sound of one moment.

外有對色前已破故。

然因心故識變似聲，生滅相續似有表示，假名語表於理無違。

表旣實無，無表寧實？

然依思願善惡分限假立無表，理亦無違。

謂此或依發勝身語善惡思種增長位立。

或依定中止身語惡現行思立，故是假有。

世尊經中說有三業，撥身語業，豈不違經？

不撥爲無，但言非色。
能動身思說名身業，能發語思說名語業。
審決二思意相應故，作動意故，說名意業。

起身語思有所造作，說名爲業，是審決思所遊履故，通生苦樂異熟果故，亦名爲道。

故前七業道亦思爲自性。

或身語表由思發故假說爲業，思所履故說名業道。
由此應知實無外色，唯有內識變似色生。

We have already refuted the theory of the existence of external Resistant Rupa, and so the 'indicative act of sound' is disproved.

Correct Doctrine

With mind as its cause, the so-called 'sound' which is only the transformation-manifestation of consciousness, arises and passes away in a continuous series, appearing as if it has some meaning to express (*vijnapti*). To this series the fictitious name 'Vocal Indication' is given, and there is nothing to be said against this metaphorical designation.

(3) Non-Indicative Rupa Refuted

Since Indicative Rupa does not really exist, how can Non-Indicative Rupa really exist?

But there is nothing in logic to forbid the application of this fictitious name 'Non-Indication' to volitions (*cetanas*) or resolutions (*pranidhis*) to practise good or bad acts for a certain period of time. In other words, this designation may be applied either to the increasing and growing state of the Bijas (seeds) of good or bad volitions which produce superior corporeal and vocal acts, or to those volitions which are no longer just potential but have actually manifested themselves to inhibit corporeal or vocal acts of a bad nature during Samadhi (ecstatic contemplation).

Hence, we conclude that 'Non-Indication' has only a fictitious existence.

(4) The Three Acts: Corporeal, Vocal, and Mental

Our adversary replies: 'In the Sutras, Bhagavat, the World-Honoured One, preaches that there are three acts: acts of the body, acts of the voice, and acts of the mind (Manas). In denying the acts of the body and of the voice, are you not contradicting the Sutras?'

We do not deny these acts: we only say that they are not real Rupa.

By 'corporeal act' or 'act of the body', we mean the volition which moves the body to action. By 'vocal act' or 'act of the voice', we mean the volition which produces speech. By 'mental act' or 'act of the mind', we mean the two volitions (*cetanas*), deliberation and judgment, because they are associated (*samprayukti*) with Manas (the seventh consciousness) and because they stir Manas into activity.

When the volition which moves the body and produces speech is active, we call it 'act' (*karman*). It is also called the 'path' (*karmapatha*): (a) because it is trodden, like a path, by the volitions of deliberation and judgment; (b) because it leads to the production of fruits and suffering and pleasure; in other words, it is the path of agreeable and disagreeable retribution.

It follows from this that the first seven of the ten *karmapathas* or act-paths (i.e., three bodily acts, four vocal acts, and three mental acts) also have volition (*cetana*) as their fundamental nature (*svabhava*), like the last three mental ones.

Another explanation is this: the corporeal indication and the vocal indication, being produced by volition, receive the fictitious name 'act'; and, being trodden by volition like a path, they are called 'act-paths'.

From the above we conclude that, in reality, there is no external Rupa and that there is only internal consciousness which, transforming and manifesting itself, produces the appearance of Rupa.

二· 不相應行法

〔述記：不相應者，簡非色心及諸心所，不相似故，行簡無爲。〕

不相應行亦非實有。
所以者何？

得非得等非如色心及諸心所體相可得。
非異色心及諸心所作用可得。
由此故知定非實有，但依色等分位假立。

此定非異色心心所有實體用，如色心等，許蘊攝故。

或心心所及色無爲所不攝故，如畢竟無，定非實有。

或餘實法所不攝故，如餘假法，非實有體。

(一) 得與非得

且彼如何知得非得異色心等有實體用？

〔述記：初破本薩婆多等。〕

契經說故，如說如是補特伽羅成就善惡，聖者成就十無學法。

又說異生不成就聖法，諸阿羅漢不成就煩惱。

2. VIPRAYUKTASAMSKARAS

Unassociated Dharmas

[The *cittaviprayuktasamskaras* or 'mentally-unassociated dharmas' are those dharmas that belong neither to the category of Rupa, not being colour etc., nor to the category of Citta (mind), not being mind (*citta*) or the associates of mind (*caittas*).]

The Unassociated Dharmas (*viprayuktasamskaras*), too, have no real existence. Why?

GENERAL REFUTATION

1. Because Prapti (acquisition), Aprapti (non-acquistion) and the other Viprayuktas do not possess substance and characteristics of their own in the same way as do Rupa, mind and mental properties.

2. Because they have no activities of their own distinct from rupa-citta-caittas (Rupa, mind and mental properties). Hence we are assured that they are positively not real existences, but only fictitious names for certain states of *rupa-citta-caittas.*

3. Because these Viprayuktas (unassociated dharmas) do not possess real substance and real activities distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas*, because it is admitted that they are comprised in the Skandhas, like *rupa-citta-caittas.* [They are comprised in the Samskaraskandha.]

4. Because they are not comprised in the categories of *Citta, Caittas, Rupa* and *Asamskrtas*, like things which have absolutely no existence. Hence they are not real existences.

5. Alternatively, because, like the other fictitious dharmas, they are not comprised in the other real dharmas. Hence they have no real existence.

PARTICULAR REFUTATION

(1) Prapti and Aprapti
Acquisition and Non-Acquisition

Theory of the Sarvastivadins.

How do they (the Sarvastivadins) know that Prapti or 'acquisition' and Aprapti or 'non-acquisition' have real substance and real activity distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas*?

They assume the authority of the Sutra which says: 'Such and such a pudgala (person) possesses good or bad dharmas. The Aryas (Saints) possess the ten Asaiksa-dharmas (non-learner dharmas)[1], i.e., the noble virtues of the Arhat who has completed his course of learning. Again the Sutra says: 'Prthagjanas

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[1] These are the noble virtues of the Asaiksa or Arhat who has completed his course of learning and has attained to perfect truth and freedom from all illusion, with nothing more to learn. The ten virtues are: right views, right thought, right speech, right action, right means of livelihood, right exertion or right endeavour right memory or right remembrance, right meditation, right emancipation, and right wisdom.

成不成言，顯得非得。

經不說此異色心等有實體用，爲證不成。

亦說輪王成就七寶，豈即成就他身非情。

若謂於寶有自在力假說成就，於善惡法何不許然而執實得？

若謂七寶在現在故可假說成。

寧知所成善惡等法離現在有？離現實法理非有故。

現在必有善種等故。

又得於法有何勝用？

若言能起，

應起無爲。

一切非情應永不起。

(ordinary people) do not possess Arya-dharmas. Arhats do not possess klesas (vexing passions).' The words 'possess' and 'do not possess' in the Sutra refer to Prapti and Aprapti; that is to say, it is by virtue of Prapti that one possesses, and by virtue of Aprapti that one does not possess, such and such dharmas.

1. Discussion.

The Sutras do not teach that Prapti and Aprapti have real substance and real activity distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas*; hence your demonstration is not conclusive.

(1) The Sutra also says that a Cakravartin ('wheel-king') 'possesses' seven royal treasures [i.e., the golden wheel; elephants; swift horses; jewels of women; loyal generals; able ministers of the treasury; and a queen]. If the word 'possess' refers to Prapti which means 'acquisition', the Sutra would mean that it is possible for a person (e.g., the wheel-king) to 'acquire' the body of another person (the queen or the general) or an inanimate object (the jewel or the wheel). [But it is admitted by your School that the acquisition of the body of another person or of an inanimate object is impossible.]

If you say that the Cakravartin simply exercises the right of lordship over these treasures and that the word 'possess' is used in a metaphorical sense only, we will reply: 'Why do you not allow the same interpretation to apply to the expression in the Sutra: "possession of good or bad dharmas"? Why do you insist that 'possession' in this particular case refers to Prapti and that Prapti is one of the real dharmas?'

The Sarvastivadin rejoins: The seven treasures exist in fact at the present time. Therefore, the Sutra in question can employ metaphorically the word 'possess' to indicate that the Cakravartin controls and manages the treasures. But this is not the sense in which the Sutra speaks of dharmas possessed by a pudgala: past dharmas and future dharmas over which he cannot exercise any right of lordship. There, in the Sutras which we have quoted, it is a question of Prapti.

We ask: How do you know that, apart from the present time, the good, the bad and other dharmas that are 'possessed' can exist? Logically, a real dharma cannot exist apart from the present time.

[The Sarvastivadin rejoins: If there is no Prapti, the dharmas which have not yet been acquired or have already been lost and the Asamskrtadharmas (unconditioned dharmas) will never be acquired.]

We reply: The actual dharmas which have already been lost or have not yet been acquired have Bijas (seeds), good Bijas, bad Bijas, etc. Hence it may be said, metaphorically, that the pudgala will acquire them.

(2) We would also like to know what are the special activities or functions which the Sarvastivadin attributes to Prapti in its relation to the dharmas.

If he says that it can produce dharmas, then

a. It ought to be able to produce 'unconditioned dharmas' (Asamskrtas), which are not produced.

b. Inanimate objects (which, according to the doctrines of his School have no Prapti) should never be produced.

未得已失應永不生。

若俱生得爲因起者，

所執二生便爲無用。
〔述記：汝宗有情數法二生應無用，許有能得故。〕

又具善惡無記得者，善惡無記應頓現前。

若待餘因，得便無用。

若得於法是不失因，有情由此成就彼故。
〔述記：正理師救。〕

諸可成法不離有情，若離有情實不可得。

故得於法俱爲無用。

得實無故，非得亦無。

然依有情可成諸法分位假立三種成就。

一種子成就，二自在成就，三現行成就。

翻此假立不成就名。

此類雖多，而於三界見所斷種未永害位假立非得名異生性。

於諸聖法未成就故。

（二） 實同分

復如何知異色心等有實同分？

c. The dharmas not yet acquired [e.g., the higher states of self-realization] and those already lost through transmigration from one sphere of existence to another should, for want of Prapti, never arise.

The Sarvastivadin rejoins: The Prapti which produces the dharmas that have been lost or have not yet been acquired is a Prapti 'which is born with the dharmas' (i.e., *Sahajata Prapti*).

We reply: If Sahajata Prapti is the cause of the production of these dharmas, then the two 'Births' (birth of beings and birth of numbers) accepted by your School serve no purpose and are therefore superfluous.

Again, if Sahajata Prapti is the cause of production, then, in the case of those pudgalas who possess the 'Prapti of good, bad, and non-defined dharmas', all these dharmas should simultaneously and immediately manifest themselves.

If the Sarvastivadin says that the actual appearance of a dharma depends on diverse causes, plus Sahajata Prapti, then their theory of Prapti is evidently superfluous.

The Neo-Sarvastivadins rejoin that Prapti is the cause which keeps the dharmas and preserves them from being lost, for it is by virtue of Prapti that sentient beings become possessors of the dharmas.

Our reply is that all dharmas which are attainable (i.e., present dharmas, Bhutatathata, etc.) are always with, and not separate from, sentient beings. If dharmas were separate from sentient beings, they would be really unattainable. We have already shown that past and future dharmas do not exist in the real sense of 'Existence'; hence Prapti, in its relation to the dharmas (as the factor either producing or sustaining them), is unnecessary in both cases.

Since Prapti is not a real entity, Aprapti, likewise, does not exist.

2. Correct Doctrine of Prapti and Aprapti

In relation to the various modes or states of dharmas which are attainable by sentient beings, three kinds of possession are conventionally distinguished, namely, (1) Bija or 'seed' possession, (2) 'mastership' possession, and (3) 'actuality' possession.

In contradistinction to 'possession' (Prapti), the name 'non-possession' (Aprapti) is fictitiously formed. There are numerous varieties of Aprapti, but the name is applied figuratively to that state in which the Bijas of the dharmas (dharma-seeds) of the three Dhatus (planes of existence) which ought to have been cut off and abandoned by the *Darsanamarga* (Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth) have not yet been absolutely destroyed. This name of Aprapti (non-acquisition) is applied to 'the nature of Prthagjana' (the nature of ordinary people, i.e., those who have not yet become Aryas), because those ordinary people 'have not yet acquired' the various Arya-dharmas (noble achievements of a saint).

(2) Sabhagata
Similarity of Characteristics

1. The Sarvastivadin is asked:

Again, how do you know that there exists, apart from *rupa-citta-caittas*, a

契經說故， 如契經說此天同分此人同分， 乃至廣說。

此經不說異色心等有實同分，爲證不成。
若同智言因斯起故知實有者，則草木等應有同分。

又於同分起同智言，同分復應有別同分。

彼既不爾，此云何然？

若謂爲因起同事欲知實有者。

理亦不然， 宿習爲因起同事欲， 何要別執有實同分？

然依有情身心相似分位差別假立同分。

（三） 命 根

復如何知異色心等有實命根？

契經說故， 如契經說壽煖識三， 應知命根說名爲壽。

此經不說異色心等有實壽體，爲證不成。

又先已成色不離識，應此離識無別命根。

real entity called *Sabhagata*, 'similarity of characteristics', a certain nature which characterizes a category of living beings?

The Sarvastivadin answers: Because the Sutra says so. It says: 'This is the *Sabhagata* of celestial beings (devas), and this is the *Sabhagata* of human beings,' and so forth.

This argument has no value, because the Sutra does not say that this Sabhagata really exists apart from *rupa-citta-caittas*. Therefore, your demonstration is not conclusive.

2. The Sarvastivadin formulates an argument in the light of reason: *Sabhagata* really exists, because, through it, common intelligence and common speech emerge among living beings.

The argument is far-fetched. If it is correct, then there should also be a *Sabhagata* for the weeds and one for the trees, since they also have similar characteristics among themselves.

Again, if common intelligence and common speech can only arise through *Sabhagata*, then *Sabhagata* itself should also require a separate *Sabhagata* in order to produce itself. If *Sabhagata* is not necessary in the latter case, why is it necessary in the former?

3. The Neo-Sarvastivadin argues that *Sabhagata* is a real entity, because it causes human beings to pursue similar occupations and cherish similar desires.

This cannot be logically true either. Habits of past lives will satisfactorily account for the similarity of occupations and desires: why is it necessary to postulate a separate real dharma under the name of 'Sabhagata'?

Correct Definition of Sabhagata

Sabhagata is a term used figuratively in the Scriptures to designate the various mental and physical similarities among living beings of various categories. It is not a real entity distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas*.

(3) Jivitendriya
The Principle of Life

1. The Sarvastivadin is asked:

Again, how do you know that there exists, apart from *rupa-citta-caittas*, a real entity called *Jivitendriya*, the vital principle or the principle of life?

He answers: Because the Sutra says so. It says: 'Life, Heat, and Consciousness (*Vijnana*): these three support one another.' The word 'Life' here refers to *Jivitendriya*.

Refutation

The Sutra does not teach that, apart from *rupa-citta-caittas*, there is a *Jivitendriya* which is the real substance of life. Hence, your proof is not conclusive. We have already established that Rupa does not exist apart from consciousness: hence heat, which belongs to Rupa, does not exist apart from consciousness. Since *Jivitendriya* consists of heat etc., we know by inference that, apart from consciousness, there is no separate Jivitendriya. Besides, if

又若命根異識實有，應如受等，非實命根。

若爾，如何經說三法？

義別說三，如四正斷。

住無心位壽煖應無。

豈不經說識不離身？

既爾，如何名無心位？

彼滅轉識，非阿賴耶。

有此識因，後當廣說。

此識足爲界趣生體，是徧恒續異熟果故，無勞別執有實命根。

然依親生此識種子由業所引功能差別住時決定，假立命根。

（四） 二無心定及無想異熟

復如何知二無心定無想異熟，異色心等有實自性？

若無實性，應不能遮心心所法令不現起。

若無心位有別實法異色心等能遮於心名無心定，

Jivitendriya has an existence of its own apart from consciousness, then, like sensation (*vedana*) and the other mental properties, it is not real *Jivitendriya.*

2. (1) If there is no *Jivitendriya,* why does the Sutra mention these three dharmas: Life, Heat, and Consciousness?

The Sutra mentions these three dharmas in order to point out separately the various connotations of the word 'Vijnana' or Consciousness, just as the Scriptures distinguish four 'right abandonments' (*samyakprahanas*) all of which refer to one single dharma, i.e., Vigilance (*virya*).

(2) The Sarvastivadin says: If so, then, when a man remains in the state of Mindlessness (*asamjnisamapatti*) in which consciousness is missing, he should be without life and heat.

We reply: Does the Sutra not say that consciousness never leaves the body?

He asks: If so, why is it called the state of Mindlessness?

We reply: In that state, the variable consciousnesses (*pravrttivijnanas,* the first isx or seven) are stopped, but the eighth consciousness or Alayavijnana continues to be active. Hence, the continued demonstration of life and heat. As to the reasons why this Alayavijnana exists, we shall deal with them later on in detail.

3. (1) In reality, the Alayavijnana is sufficient to constitute the substance of the three Dhatus (spheres of existence), the six Gatis (modes of existence), and the four Yonis (ways of birth), since it forms a universal and perpetual series and is the fruit of retribution (*vipakaphala*). Hence there is no need to postulate the separate existence of a *Jivitendriya.*

Correct Definition of Jivitendriya

(2) *Jivitendriya* is a metaphorical term used in the Scriptures to designate the various kinds of body-sustaining powers which are produced by past acts and based on those Bijas which are the direct cause of the eighth consciousness: it is these powers that enable *rupa-citta-caittas* to maintain themselves in a certain existence for a certain period of time.

(4) The two Mindless Samapattis and Asamjnika
Mindless Meditations and Non-Ideation

The Sarvastivadin is asked:

Again, how do you know that the two Mindless Samapattis (meditations) (the *Asamjni-Samapatti* and the *Nirodha-Samapatti*) and the retributive fruit of Asamjnika (non-ideation) are real entities distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas?*

He replies: We know that they exist, because, in 'the state of mindlessness', there must be separate and real dharmas which are distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas* and which suppress the activity of the mind; and these dharmas are called Mindless Samapattis. In other words, if there are no such real dharmas, it will be impossible to suppress the mind and its activities.

1. Discussion

If, in the state of mindlessness, there are separate real dharmas distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas,* which are capable of suppressing the activity of the mind,

應無色時有別實法異色心等能礙於色名無色定。彼既不爾，此云何然？

又遮礙心何須實法？如隄塘等假亦能遮。

謂修定時於定加行厭患麤動心心所故，發勝期願遮心心所。

令心心所漸細漸微。

微微心時熏異熟識成極增上厭心等種。

由此損伏心等種故，麤動心等暫不現行，依此分位假立二定。

此種善故定亦名善。

無想定前求無想果，故所熏成種招彼異熟識，依之麤動想等不行，於此分位假立無想。

〔述記：如許無心唯依本識，即依本識上立此無心。無心實非異熟，親依異熟立得異熟名。〕

依異熟立得異熟名。

故此三法亦非實有。

（五） 有爲相

復如何知諸有爲相異色心等有實自性？

and if these dharmas are called Mindless Samapattis, then one must admit that, in the Arupa Dhatu (plane of existence without Rupa or matter), there should also be separate and real dharmas distinct from *rupa-citta-caitta* which are capable of obstructing the manifestation of Rupa, and these dharmas should be called 'Arupa Samapattis'. As such Arupa Samäpattis are not necessary, why should Mindless Samapatti be necessary?

Again, why are real dharmas required to suppress or obstruct the mind? 'Objects of relative existence' may do it very well just as an embankment or the like, which has no real existence in itself, is capable of obstructing a flood.

2. Correct Doctrine of the State of Mindlessness

At the preparatory stage (*prayogavastha*) of the practice of Dhyana (meditation and contemplation), the ascetic, being disgusted with the gross and unstable states of the mind and its properties, makes an excellent resolution to suppress them for a certain period of time, with the result that he gradually causes them to become finer and finer and more and more subtle. All this is preparatory (*prayoga*). When the mind is in a superfine stage (i.e., at the last moment before he enters into Samadhi), it 'perfumes' the Retributive Consciousness (*vipaka-vijnana*, Alaya), creating in this consciousness very powerful Bijas (seeds) of thoughts of disgust.

By virtue of these Bijas which crush and subdue the mind and its properties, the gross and unstable mind and its properties temporarily cease their activity. This state of inactivity is metaphorically designated as the two *Samapattis*. As the Bijas are of a good ethical nature, the two *Samapattis* are also said to be good.

The Fruit of Non-Ideation

At the preliminary stage of the practice of the Dhyana of Non-Ideation, the clarified mind of the ascetic aspires to the fruit of Non-Ideation, with the result that Bijas of Non-Ideation are produced through perfuming (*vasana*). These Bijas in turn produce a consciousness which is retributive (*vipakavijnana*), that is, the eighth consciousness, Alaya. This consciousness is such that it cannot serve as the support or base for gross and unstable thoughts which, therefore, become inactive. This state of non-manifestation of the first six consciousnesses (*pravrttivijnanas*) receives metaphorically the name of *Asamjnika* (Non-Ideation). As it has its basis and support in the eighth consciousness, which is truly retributive (*vipaka*), it also receives, improperly, the name of 'retributive' – 'improperly', because, in reality, it is only 'born of retribution' (*vipakaja*, born of the eighth consciousness) and is not itself retributive (*vipaka*) itself.

Hence we conclude that these three dharmas (i.e., the two Samapattis and the fruit of Asamjnika) do not really exist.

(5) Samskrtalaksanas
Characteristics of Conditioned Dharmas.

The Sarvastivadin is asked:

Again, how do you know that the various 'characteristics of conditioned dharmas' have a real nature of their own distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas*?

契經說故，如契經說有三有爲之有爲相乃至廣說。

〔述記：此中應言有三有爲之相……說三相者，謂一生二滅三住異性。〕

此經不說異色心等有實自性，爲證不成。

〔述記：大乘四相與色心等非一非異。〕

別　破

非第六聲便表異體，色心之體卽色心故。

〔述記：彼立量云，之有爲相言別有體，有第六囀言故，如天授之衣祠授之鉢等。〕

〔述記：外人救云，其能相體非卽所相，說能所相故，如煙表火等。大士相等爲別亦爾，卽能所相定各有異，故知生等與法定別。〕

非能相體定異所相，勿堅相等異地等故。

若有爲相異所相體，無爲相體應異所相。

又生等相若體俱有，應一切時齊興作用。

若相違故用不頓興。

體亦相違，如何俱有？

又住異滅用不應俱。

He answers:

The Sutra says so. It says; 'There are three characteristics of conditioned dharmas. They are birth, duration-deterioration, and destruction'. The Sarvastivadins take advantage of the Sutra to affirm that these three characteristics are real entities distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas.*

We reply: The Sutra does not say that these characteristics have a real nature of their own distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas*; so your proof is not conclusive. [For us, the characteristics are neither identical with nor distinct from *rupa-citta-caittas.*]

Discussion

1. The Sarvastivadin argues:

[Does not the genitive in the text just quoted indicate that there is a substantial distinction between the characteristics and the conditioned dharmas? Just as Devadatta and his garments are different, so are conditioned dharmas and their characteristics.]

We reply:

This reasoning is not correct and does not prove that the birth of a dharma is distinct from the dharma that is born, because the substance of Rupa-citta is definitely *Rupa-citta* and so forth.

2. The Sarvastivadin says:

[The terms *laksana* (distinctive characteristics) and *laksya* (the characterized subject) imply a difference: smoke (*laksana*) is the indication of fire (*laksya*); the thirty-two distinguishing marks indicate a great man.]

We reply:

In speaking of the solidity of the earth, we also use the genitive; we conceive a *laksana* (solidity) which specifies a *laksya* (earth). However, the solidity is not distinct from the earth. Hence the substance of *laksana* is not distinct from the *laksya.*

3. If the *laksana* of a conditioned dharma is distinct from the substance of its *laksya*, then the substance of the *laksana* of an unconditioned dharma should be distinct from its *laksya.*

4. The Sarvastivadin again argues:

If the characteristics of birth, duration, etc., in themselves, are simultaneous, they will always exercise their activities simultaneously (that is to say, birth, duration-deterioration, and destruction will all occur at the same time).

The activities of birth, duration, etc., are contradictory. Therefore they are not simultaneous.

We reply:

The characteristics, in themselves, are also contradictory, like their activities. Such being the case, how can they be simultaneous?

Again, the activities of duration-deterioration and destruction are contradictory and, therefore, cannot exist simultaneously. If they could so co-exist, the characteristic 'duration' would at the same time cause the two characteris-

能相所相體俱本有，用亦應然，無別性故。

若謂彼用更待因緣，所待因緣應非本有。

又執生等便爲無用。

所相恒有而生等合，應無爲法亦有生等。

彼此異因不可得故。

又去來世非現非常，應似空華非實有性。

生名爲有，寧在未來？

滅名爲無，應非現在。

〔述記：彼復救言，誰言滅相其體是無令成過去？〕

滅若非無，生應非有。

又滅違住，寧執同時。住不違生，何容異世？

故彼所執，進退非理。

然有爲法因緣力故，本無今有，暫有還無，表異無爲假立四相。

本無今有有位名生，生位暫停卽說爲位，住別前後復立異名，暫有還無無時名滅。

tics 'deterioration' and 'destruction' to become non-deterioration and non-destruction. We cannot admit this argument.

5. The Sarvastivadin says:
The substance of the characteristics (birth etc.) and the characterized dharma exist at all times. Likewise, the activities of the characteristics must also exist at all times, because substance and activity are not of different essence.
We reply:
If it is said that their activity depends on causes and conditions and that it is therefore intermittent, we reply that this is to admit that the causes and conditions do not exist at all times. This is also to confess that the characteristics (birth etc.) are useless, since the causes and conditions are sufficient.

6. If conditioned dharmas (which are the *laksya*, the characterized), although existing at all times, are endowed with birth etc. (that is to say, the *laksanas* or characteristics), then unconditioned dharmas (*asamkrta*) should also be endowed with birth etc. One does not see why the first would be endowed with characteristics, and the second not at all.

7. The past and the future are not present and not eternal; like flowers in the sky, they are not realities.
Birth is called existence. The future being non-existent, how can birth (which is existence) find itself in the future which is non-existence?
Besides, since the present is existence, the past should be called non-existence. The nature of 'destruction' is that the dharma does not exist; hence 'destruction' cannot be present; hence the characteristic 'destruction' is in the past, [and not in the present, as the Sarvastivadin says].
The Sarvastivadin replies: We do not admit that the nature of 'destruction' is non-existence, from which it follows that 'destruction' is of the past.
If 'destruction' is not non-existent, 'birth' will not be existent: because destruction and birth are contradictory.
On the other hand, 'destruction' contradicts 'duration'; these two cannot be simultaneous. 'Duration' does not contradict 'birth', because these two produce the dharma. Why could they not be simultaneous?
We conclude that all these theories held by the Sarvastivadins are absurd.

Correct Doctrine

By the force of causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*), the 'conditioned' (*samskrta*), at first non-existent, now comes into existence; after having existed for a certain period of time, it returns to non-existence. Hence to distinguish them from the 'unconditioned' (*asamskrta*), it is proper to attribute to them four 'characteristics' (*laksana*).

1. Not existing at first, the dharma now comes into existence: this is the state of existence called birth. The dharma rests for a time in this state: this is what is called duration. The dharma, being different from its preceding and succeeding states and having endured for a time, changes: this is what is called transformation or deterioration or old age. After having existed for a certain period

前三有故同在現在，後一是無故在過去。

如何無法與有爲相？

表此後無，爲相何失？

生表有法先非有，滅表有法後是無，異表此法非凝然，住表此法暫有用。

故此四相於有爲法雖俱名表，而表有異。

此依刹那假立四相，一期分位亦得假立。

〔述記：一刹那立同薩婆多，一期等立同正量部，合二立者同經部師。〕

初有名生，後無名滅，生已相似相續名住，卽此相續轉變名異。

是故四相皆是假立。

（六） 名句文

復如何知異色心等有實詮表，名句文身？

契經說故，如契經說佛得希有名句文身。

此經不說異色心等有實名等，爲證不成。

別破

若名句文異聲實有，應如色等非實能詮。

謂聲能生名句文者，此聲必有音韻屈曲，

of time, the dharma returns to non-existence: this period of non-existence is called destruction.

Birth, duration, and deterioration, being existent, are in the present; destruction, being non-existent, is in the past.

2. But how is it that destruction, if it is 'non-existent', can be a characteristic (*laksana*) of the unconditioned, of a thing existing in the present?

Why, we shall reply, is it wrong to indicate that the future non-existence of this thing is a characteristic? Why can this future non-existence not be one of its characteristics? The characteristic 'birth' shows that the dharma which exists in the present did not exist previously; the characteristic 'destruction' indicates that, later on, it will no longer exist; the characteristic 'deterioration' shows that it is not immutable; the characteristic 'duration' indicates that it is endowed with activity for a certain period of time. Hence the four characteristics, although all of them designate and indicate the conditioned dharma, emphasize different aspects of the dharma.

3. Thus, the four characteristics can be attributed to 'the moment' (*ksana*), from the conventional point of view. But one may also attribute them to a prolonged period; or else, as affirmed by the Sautrantikas, to a moment and a prolonged period. The commencement of a series is called 'birth'; the subsequent non-existence is called 'destruction'; the homogeneous development of the series after birth is called 'duration'; the continuous transformation and decay is called 'deterioration'.

Let us conclude that the four characteristics are not realities in themselves, but mere conventional designations or mental representations.

(6) Namapadavyanjana
Names-Phrases-Syllables.

The Sarvastivadin is asked:

Again, how do you know that there exist, apart from *rupa-citta-caittas,* certain 'indicative' entities by virtue of which one who speaks indicates what he wishes to say, entities called names-phrases-syllables, *namakaya, padakaya,* and *vyanjanakaya?*

He replies:

The Sutra says so. It says: 'In becoming Buddha, He comes into possession of rare and extraordinary 'names-phrases-syllables' (*namapadavyanjanakayas*).

This Sutra does not affirm that, apart from *rupa-citta-caittas,* there are real entities called *namakaya* (names) etc. Your proof is therefore not conclusive.

Discussion

1. If the names, phrases, and syllables are, as you say, real entities distinct from sound, then, like colour (which is distinct from sound) etc., they are not indicatory.

2. The Sarvastivadin says that sound can engender names, phrases, and syllables. But, as he admits, only the sound which is characterized by inflexions

此足能詮，何用名等。

〔述記：薩婆多雖有名由聲顯生二義，今取生破，顯類破之。〕

若謂聲上音韻屈曲卽名句文異聲實有。

〔述記：正理師救。〕

所見色上形量屈曲應異色處別有實體。

若謂聲上音韻屈曲如絃管聲非能詮者。

此應如彼聲，不別生名等。

又誰說彼定不能詮？

〔述記演義：或可化人語聲林說法等聲皆是因俱聲，皆以心爲因，皆由諸佛諸菩薩心所起故。〕

聲若能詮，風鈴聲等應有詮用。

此應如彼不別生實名句文身。

若唯語聲能生名等，如何不許唯語能詮？

何理定知能詮卽語？

寧知異語別有能詮？

語不異能詮，人天共了。執能詮異語，天愛非餘。

正義

然依語聲分位差別，而假建立名句文身。

名詮自性，句詮差別，文卽是字爲二所依。

此三離聲雖無別體，而假實異，亦不卽聲。

and modulations of tone (that is, the human voice) engenders them. These tonal inflexions and modulations are sufficient to indicate. Why imagine *naman, pada* (names, phrases), etc.?

3. But Samghabhadra rejoins: 'The inflexions and modulations of tone that are found in sound are precisely the names, phrases, and syllables. They are real entities distinct from sound.'

In reply to this, we shall say that, according to this principle, the 'variations of form or figure' [short, long, square, round, (written words etc.)] that we see in visible Rupa should be real entities distinct from visible matter (*rupayatana*).

4. The Sarvastivadin renounces the above-expressed third opinion and specifies the second one. He says: 'The inflexion of our voice is not indicatory, because it is inflexion that is found in sound, like the notes of a stringed musical instrument or of a flute. [But the inflexion of the voice engenders names etc. which are indicatory].'

We reply that the voice with its various inflexions and modulations, like the sound of a flute, does not engender the names etc. Besides, who can say that the voice by itself is not indicatory of meanings?

5. The Sarvastivadin rejoins: 'If all sounds are indicatory, then the sound of wind or of a bell should also be indicatory. This cannot be true. In my opinion, only the human voice is indicatory, because it engenders names etc.'

We reply: 'It is true that, as you admit, the sound of wind or of a bell does not create real names, phrases, and syllables (*namakayas, padakayas*, and *vyanjanakayas*); one cannot see how other sounds can create them. But, if the human voice can create names etc., why do you not admit that this voice by itself is capable of indicating without the help of names etc.?'

6. The Sarvastivadin insists: 'By what reason do you affirm that that which indicates is the human voice, not the *namakaya* etc.?'

We reply: Let us ask you. How do you know that, apart from the human voice, there exist separate indicatory entities called names etc.? That that which indicates is the human voice itself is a truth understood by all devas and men. That it is something distinct from the human voice is a belief held only by those pitiable stupid people whose existence in the world is due to the special love and compassion of the devas.

Correct Doctrine

1. In accordance with the different modes or states presented by vocal sound, we distinguish and form, conventionally, names, phrases, and syllables, the names indicating the essential nature of dharmas, the phrases indicating their modalities and characteristic differences, and the syllables or words serving as the supporting basis of the names and phrases.

2. These three have no real substance of their own apart from sound (*sabda*). However, vocal sound is real, while names-phrases-syllables have only a

〔述記：名等是假，聲是實有，假實異故，故名等三非卽是聲，非聲處攝。但是差別之聲，義說名等以詮義故，是不相應。無別種子生，故言卽聲。〕

由此法辭二無礙解境有差別。

〔述記：卽此緣故二境有異，法無礙解緣假名等，辭無礙解緣實聲等。〕

聲與名等蘊處界攝亦各有異。

且依此土說名句文依聲假立，非謂一切。

諸餘佛土亦依光明妙香味等假立三故。

（七）隨眠

有執隨眠異心心所是不相應行蘊所攝。

〔述記：此是大衆彌沙塞計。〕

彼亦非理，名貪等故，如現貪等，非不相應。

執別有餘不相應行，準前理趣皆應遮止。

三· 無爲法

諸無爲法離色心等決定實有理不可得。

總破

且定有法略有三種。

一現所知法，如色心等。

〔述記：卽是五識身他心智境，謂色等五塵及心心所。〕

二現受用法，如瓶衣等。

如是二法世共知有，不待因成。

conventional existence. This is why names-phrases-syllables are classified under the category of *samskaraskandha* among the Viprayuktas (unassociated dharmas), and are not part of audible sound (*sabdayatana*).

3. In our system there is no confusion between the all-penetrating intelligence that understands all dharmas (names-phrases-syllables) and the all-penetrating intuition that understands all sounds (the languages and dialects of all sentient beings). The objects of understanding in these two cases are different, the former having as their object merely conventional expressions: the latter, real meanings.

Further, vocal sounds, on the one hand, and names-phrases-syllables, on the other, are not ranged in the same *skandha, ayatana,* and *dhatu* ('aggregate', 'abode', and 'sphere').

4. Furthermore, it is only in our universe, in this Buddhakshetra where we live, that names-phrases-syllables are conventionally formed on the basis of sound. This is not the general rule for all Buddhakshetras. In other Buddhakshetras, light, smell, taste, etc., serve as supporting bases for names-phrases-syllables.

(7) Anusayas etc.
Drowsiness and Mental Haziness.

According to certain schools (notably Mahasamghikas and Mahisasakas), the Anusayas (drowsiness and mental haziness) are not mental properties (*caittas*), but Viprayuktas (unassociated dharmas).

This opinion is inadmissible as we can see by the names of those Anusayas which are called covetousness etc. Like the actual passions, they are not Viprayuktas.

Certain scholars admit other Viprayuktas. We should refute their theories according to the principles expounded above.

3. ASAMSKRTAS
Unconditioned Non-Active Dharmas

The Unconditioned Non-Active Dharmas (*asamskrtadharmas*), apart from *rupa-citta-caittas*, are definitely not real entities as the Sarvastivadins and others say. We do not, by our reason, recognize such Asamskrtas as real entities.

1. General Refutation

Dharmas that exist are classified under the following three categories:

(1) Dharmas known by evidence, like Rupa which is known by the five consciousnesses, and like mind and its properties (*citta-caittas*) which are known by the 'knowledge of other minds'.

(2) Dharmas the enjoyment of which is evident, like a pitcher or a garment (which are not known by evidence, being 'fictitious' things).

The world in general knows the existence of these two kinds of dharmas without having recourse to reason.

三有作用法，如眼耳等，由彼彼用證知是有。

無爲非世共知定有，又無作用如眼耳等。

設許有用，應是無常，故不可執無爲定有。

然諸無爲所知性故，或色心等所顯性故。
如色心等，不應執爲離色心等實無爲性。
〔述記：色心等非離色等實無爲性，故以色等爲其同喻。〕

別破

又虛空等爲一爲多？
若體是一，偏一切處。
虛空容受色等法故，隨能合法體應成多。
一所合處餘不合故。
不爾，諸法應互相偏。
若謂虛空不與法合，應非容受，如餘無爲。

又色等中有虛空不？
有應相雜，無應不偏。

一部一品結法斷時，應得餘部餘品擇滅。
〔述記：若擇滅體是一者，且如五部，一部九品一品結斷時應得餘未斷四部八品擇滅無爲，以體是一故。〕

一法緣闕得不生時，應於一切得非擇滅。執彼體一，理應爾故。

若體是多，便有品類，應如色等非實無爲。虛空又應非偏容受。

餘部所執離心心所實有無爲，準前應破。
又諸無爲許無因果故，應如兔角，非異心等有。
〔述記：大衆等四部立九無爲。〕

正義

然契經說有虛空等諸無爲法，

(3) Dharmas whose existence we know by reasoning and because of their activity, like the organ of sight or of hearing, subtle and invisible matter which is not perceived by the senses.

Now the world does not know the existence of the Asamskrtas (unconditioned dharmas), for the Asamskrtas are not endowed with activity like that of the eye or of the ear to prove their existence. Besides, if they are active, they are not eternal. Hence we cannot maintain that the Asamskrtas are real entities apart from mind.

Because the Asamskrtas are of a knowable nature or because their nature is revealed by *rupa-citta-caittas*, – like *rupa-citta-caittas*, – we cannot maintain that there is a real nature of Asamskrta apart from *rupa-citta-caittas*.

2. Refutation of Akasa (space) etc.

(1) Is space (Akasa), unity or multiplicity, one or many? If it is unity, it penetrates all places. But, inasmuch as it affords room to dharmas (Rupa etc.) for their occupation, it should, in accordance with the dharmas which occupy it, be multiple. Another reason for its multiplicity is that the space occupied by one thing is not occupied by another. If it were not so, all things would interpenetrate. If it is said that space is not occupied by things, then space does not afford room for them any more than the other Asamskrtas do.

Again, will you explain whether or not there is space in things? If there is, there is an intermixture of spaces; if there is not, space is not omnipenetrating.

(2) If Pratisamkhyanirodha or discrimination-annihilation (i.e., Nirvana as a result of the annihilation of desire and other vexing passions by means of discriminating wisdom) is unity, then, when the ascetic eliminates by means of his discriminating wisdom one of the nine categories or one of the five classes of 'ties' or vexing passions, he eliminates all the other categories and all the other classes.

(3) The same applies to Apratisamkhyanirodha (Non-discrimination-annihilation) if it is a unity. When one dharma becomes incapable of being born [not as a result of discrimination but] for want of the conditions essential for its birth – that is to say, when one obtains the Apratisamkhyanirodha in relation to one dharma, the same Apratisamkhyanirodha is obtained for all dharmas.

(4) On the other hand, if the Asamskrtas are, by their very nature, multiple, they will be divided into different kinds and categories. In that case, like Rupa etc., they are not real Asamskrtas. Then space should no longer be omnipenetrating; nor will it afford room for all things.

(5) In the same way we refute the Asamskrtas of the other Schools.

(6) Finally, the Sarvastivadins say that the Asamskrtas have none of the six causes and none of the five fruits. It follows from this that, like the horns of a hare, they do not exist outside the mind and its attributes (*citta-caittas*).

3. True Doctrine

The Sutra teaches three Asamskrtas, namely, Akasa (space), Pratisamkhyanirodha (discrimination-annihilation), and Apratisamkhyanirodha (non-discrimination-annihilation).

略有二種。

一依識變假施設有。

謂曾聞說虛空等名，隨分別有虛空等相。

數習力故，心等生時似虛空等無爲相現。

此所現相前後相似，無有變易假說爲常。

二依法性假施設有。

謂空無我所顯眞如，有無俱非，心言路絕，與一切法非一異等。

是法眞理，故名法性。

釋法性名

〔述記：性者體也，諸法眞理故名法性。如何依此假說空等。〕

離諸障礙，故名虛空。

由簡擇力滅諸雜染究竟證會，故名擇滅。

不由擇力本性清净或緣闕所顯，故名非擇滅。

苦樂受滅，故名不動。

想受不行，名想受滅。

此五皆依眞如假立，眞如亦是假施設名。

〔述記：而眞如體非如非不如，故眞如名亦是假立。〕

遮撥爲無，故說爲有。
遮執爲有，故說爲空。
勿謂虛幻，故說爲實。

Here are the two ways in which we should understand them.

(1) The three Asamskrtas exist as fictitious constructions dependent on the evolution of consciousness. One has heard (from the Buddha or the Bodhisattvas) the names of Akasa and of other Asamskrtas. Having heard these names, one has ratiocinated and conceived certain characteristics of Akasa and other Asamskrtas. By the power of habit, the mind, when it is directed towards these objects, manifests itself in the semblance of these characteristics: a mental image in which there is no activity, no sense of touch, no extended matter, etc. This image is *samskrta*, conditioned; but it always appears like itself, without any change at any time before or after. For this reason one thinks that Akasa is eternal.

(2) The three Asamskrtas exist as fictitious constructions of the true nature of dharmas, *dharmata*, also called Bhutatathata.

For the Bhutatathata which is revealed by the realization of Voidness and Pudgalasunyata (Non-Atman or Egolessness), there is neither 'being' nor 'non-being'. It is sundered both from the 'road of mind' and 'road of words'. [In other words, it transcends all possibilities of mental conception and vocal interpretation.] It is neither identical with, nor different from, all the dharmas. As it is the genuine principle of all dharmas, it is called Dharma-nature (Dharmata).

4. Various designations of Bhutatathata

[How can Bhutatathata be designated by the names of Akasa, of Pratisamkhyanirodha, of Apratisamkhyanirodha, and also by those of Aninjya (emotional immobility) and Samjnaveditanirodha (annihilation of ideation) which are the two Asamskrtas added by the School to the three traditional Asamskrtas]?

(1) Inasmuch as it is free from all barriers or obstacles (*avarana*), it is called Akasa (space).

(2) Inasmuch as it is ultimately realized and attained by the ascetic when he has completely destroyed all impure dharmas by the power of wisdom, it is called Pratisamkhyanirodha (discrimination-annihilation) [or Nirvana].

(3) Inasmuch as it is immaculately pure in its essential nature, independent of the power of wisdom, and as it is revealed by the total absence of causes and conditions, it is called Apratisamkhyanirodha (non-discrimination-annihilation).

(4) Inasmuch as it is the annihilation of all sensations of joy and suffering, it is called Aninjya (emotional immobility).

(5) Inasmuch as it is the cessation of ideation and sensation, it is called Samjnaveditanirodha (annihilation of ideation and sensation).

All these five Asamskrtas, Akasa etc., are only fictitious constructions formulated on the basis of the significations of Bhutatathata. But Bhutatathata itself is also only a fictitious designation (like food, oil, worm, etc.). In order to refute the idea that it does not exist, it is said to exist (refuting thus the 'Sunyata' doctrine held by some schools). [In fact, it is neither existence nor non-existence.] In order to refute the idea that it exists, it is said to be void or empty (*sunya*). In order that one may not say of it that it is baseless or illusory,

理非妄倒，故名眞如。

不同餘宗離色心等有實常法名曰眞如。

故諸無爲非定實有。

四· 所取能取

外道餘乘所執諸法異心心所非實有性，是所取故，如心心所。

能取彼覺亦不緣彼，是能取故，如緣此覺。

諸心心所依他起故，亦如幻事，非眞實有。

爲遣妄執心心所外實有境故說唯有識。

若執唯識眞實有者，如執外境，亦是法執。

五· 斷法執

然諸法執略有二種，一者俱生，二者分別。

俱生法執無始時來虛妄熏習內因力故恆與身俱，

it is said to be real. [In fact, it is neither reality nor non-reality.] Because its principle is neither false nor perverted, it is called Bhutatathata.

We are not like the other schools according to which a real eternal dharma exists, apart from matter, mind, etc., which is called Bhutatathata.

Hence the Asamskrtas are not real entities.

4. GRAHYA AND GRAHAKA

Object and Subject of Knowledge

1. Object and subject of knowledge

The dharmas conceived by the Tirthikas (Non-Buddhist Schools) or the Hinayana Schools as distinct from mind and its attributes have not the nature of real entities, because they are 'apprehended' (*grahya*), that is to say, they are perceived 'objects', like the mind and its attributes which themselves are 'apprehended' or perceived by that mind and its attributes (mind perceiving mind).

The consciousness which 'apprehends' or perceives the Rupas etc., does not perceive the Rupas in themselves but only their appearance or the mental image, because it is the apprehending agent (*grahaka*), that is, the perceiving 'subject' or perceiving mind like the consciousness which perceives that mind and its attributes. [The perceiving mind can only perceive the appearance or the image of Rupas etc. arising in that mind; it cannot perceive the Rupas in themselves that are distinct or apart from that mind and its attributes.]

2. Knowledge

All minds with their attributes, being activated 'in dependence on other things', are like the phenomena produced by a conjurer's tricks, which have no genuine existence.

3. Vijnaptimatra

[It follows from the above that there is no difference, from the point of view of Reality, between the mind (*citta*) and its object (*visaya*). Why do you say that there is 'Consciousness only' or 'Nothing but mere Consciousness' (Vijnanamatra)?]

In order to refute the false belief that external to the mind and its attributes there exist real objects, it is said that there is nothing but Mere-Consciousness. But to believe in the genuine existence of Mere-Consciousness is like believing in that of external objects; it too is a kind of dharma-adhesion (Dharmagraha).

5. CESSATION OF DHARMA-ADHESION

Dharmagrahavibhanga

'Dharma-adhesion' or 'belief in the reality of dharmas' is, generally speaking, of two kinds: – (1) that which is innate (*sahaja*) and (2) that which results from mental discrimination or particularization (*vikalpita*).

1. Innate dharma-adhesion is perpetually present in the individual, owing to the internal causal influence of a false perfuming (*vasana*) which has been

不待邪教及邪分別任運而轉，故名俱生。

此復二種。
一常相續，在第七識緣第八識起自心相執爲實法。

二有間斷，在第六識，緣識所變蘊處界相或總或別起自心相執爲實法。

此二法執細故難斷，後十地中數數修習勝法空觀方能除滅。

分別法執亦由現在外緣力故，非與身俱。
要待邪教及邪分別然後方起故名分別。
唯在第六意識中有。
此亦二種。
一緣邪教所說蘊處界相起自心相分別計度執爲實法。

二緣邪教所說自性等相起自心相分別計度執爲實法。

此二法執麤故易斷，入初地時觀一切法法空眞如卽能除滅。

如是所說一切法執，自心外法或有或無。

自心內法一切皆有。

是故法執皆緣自心所現似法執爲實有。

going on since before the beginning of time. Thus, without depending on external false teachings or discriminations, it operates spontaneously. That is why it is called innate.

This dharma-adhesion may again be sub-divided into two kinds:

The first is constant and continuous, and pertains to the seventh consciousness or Manas, which, directing itself to the eighth consciousness or Alayavijnana, produces from this a mental image to which it adheres as a real dharma.

The second kind is at times interrupted and pertains to the sixth consciousness or Manovijnana, which, directing itself to the skandha-ayatana-dhatus that are evolved from consciousness, *in toto* or in part, produces from them a mental image to which it adheres as a real dharma.

These two kinds of innate dharma-adhesion, being subtle, are difficult to cut off. It is only later, in the course of the 'ten Lands' (Bhumis) [on the Path of Meditation and Self-Cultivation (Bhavanamarga)] that the ascetic, by practising repeatedly 'the sublime contemplation of the voidness of dharmas' (*dharmasunyata*), is able to annihilate them.[1]

2. As for the dharma-adhesion which results from mental discrimination, it is derived from the force of external factors and so is not innate in the individual. For its production, the influence of false teachings and discriminations is necessary. It resides exclusively in the sixth consciousness, Manovijnana.

This dharma-adhesion is also of two kinds: The first pertains to the sixth consciousness or Manovijnana, which, taking the *skandha-ayatana-dhatus* explained in one school of false teaching (the Hinayana School) as its object, produces in itself an interior image to which, through discrimination and speculation, it adheres as a real dharma.

The second kind pertains also to the Manovijnana, which, taking as object the essential nature (*pradhana*), the categories or elements (*padathas*), etc., explained in one school of false teaching (Samkyas etc.), produces in itself an image to which, through discrimination and speculation, it adheres as a real dharma.

These two kinds of dharma-adhesion are crude and, consequently, easy to eliminate. When an ascetic enters the 'first Land' on the Path, he can finally annihilate them by contemplating the 'Bhutatathata (Suchness) of the voidness of all dharmas' (i.e., the Bhutatathata revealed by *dharmasunyata*).

CONCLUSION

In examining all the varieties of dharma-adhesion, we find that, in certain but not all cases, dharma-adhesion has, as its object, dharmas exterior to the mind (the archetypes), while in all cases it is the dharmas interior to the mind that form the supporting basis for dharma-adhesion.

We can therefore aver with precision that all dharma-adhesion has as its object the seeming dharmas which are manifestations of the mind, but which

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[1] As he advances from land to land, the Bodhisattva cuts off the varieties of dharma-clinging of the Manovijnana which hinder his attainment of supreme Enlightenment. As regards the dharma-clinging of Manas, this is suppressed and cut off only at the final stage prior to his attainment of Buddhahood.

然似法相從緣生故是如幻有。

所執實法妄計度故決定非有。

故世尊說，慈氏當知諸識所緣唯識所現，依他起性如幻事等。

總　結

如是外道餘乘所執離識我法皆非實有。
故心心所決定不用外色等法爲所緣緣。

緣用必依實有體故。

現在彼聚心心所法非此聚識親所緣緣，如非所緣，他聚攝故。

同聚心所亦非親所緣，自體異故，如餘非所取。

由此應知實無外境，唯有內識似外境生。
是故契經伽他中說，如愚所分別外境實皆無，習氣擾濁心，故似彼而轉。

火 人 喻

有作是難，若無離識實我法者假亦應無。

〔述記：此吠世師難也。〕

謂假必依眞事似事共法而立。

are falsely adhered to as real dharmas.

These seeming dharmas, arising as they do from causes and conditions (*pratyaya*), exist as illusory phenomena only. The 'real dharmas', the objects of dharma-adhesion, being false imaginations and speculations, are definitely non-existent.

This is why Bhagavat, the World-Honoured One, has said: 'Know ye, O Maitreya, that the objects of the various consciousnesses are only appearances or manifestations of consciousness produced by causes and conditions, like magic.'

GENERAL CONCLUSION

1. Hence the Atman-Dharmas, which the Tirthikas and the Hinayana Schools conceive as existing apart from consciousness, are not real entities. Consequently, the mind and its attributes (*citta-caittas*) definitely do not make use of such external dharmas as Rupa etc., as a 'condition quâ immediate object', *alambanapratyaya,* because the activity which consists in perceiving or apprehending an immediate object must, of necessity, depend on, or find support in, a reality.

2. The citta-caittas of a certain group are not the immediate object of consciousness of another group, just as sound is not the object of the visual consciousness, because they are comprised in a different group.

The *caittas* (mental properties) of a certain group are not the immediate object of the *citta* (mind) of that group, because they are distinct from the same *citta,* like the others (the organ of the eye etc.) which are not apprehended by the mind.

3. Let us conclude that there is no external sphere of objects. It is the internal consciousness which manifests itself in the semblance of external objects. As one of the stanzas of a Sutra says, 'External objects do not really exist as the ignorant imagine. The mind, agitated and defiled by perfuming (*vasana*), develops into what seems to be an external sphere of objects.'

UPACARA

Metaphorical Expression
Fire-Man Metaphor

1. Objection of the Vaisesikas

If, apart from internal consciousness, no external things exist, – a real Atman and real dharmas, – we cannot see how the names of Atman and dharmas can be metaphorically employed to designate the development of consciousness. There should not be such metaphorical designations.

Three things are required to make metaphorical designations possible: (1) a real thing with which a comparison can be made; (2) a thing which resembles the first one and which we can compare with it; (3) a quality (or dharma) common to the two things and which justifies the comparison.

如有眞火有似火人有猛赤法，乃可假說此人爲火。

假說牛等，應知亦然。

我法若無依何假說？無假說故似亦不成，如何說心似外境轉？

彼難非理，離識我法前已破故。

依類依實假說火等，俱不成故。

依類假說理且不成，猛赤等德非類有故。

若無共德而假說彼，應亦於水等假說火等名。

若謂猛等雖非類德而不相離故可假說，此亦不然。

人類猛等現見亦有互相離故。

類旣無德，又互相離。

然有於人假說火等，

故知假說不依類成。

依實假說理亦不成，猛赤等德非共有故。

謂猛赤等在火在人其體各別，所依異故。

無共假說，有過同前。

若謂人火德相似故可假說者，理亦不然。

說火在人，非在德故。

由此假說不依實成。

又假必依眞事立者，亦不應理。

Being given (1) real fire, (2) a man resembling fire, and (3) the qualities of red or of fieriness common to fire and to man, the metaphorical expression 'upacara' (fire-man) is justified. We can say: 'This man is fire.' In the same way a man can be called a bull.

But, if Atman and dharmas do not exist, what real thing will be the supporting basis for the comparison? Since this thing is missing, how can its name be employed metaphorically? If the comparison is missing, how can we say 'resembling'? How can we say that the mind develops itself in the semblance of an external thing?

2. *Refutation*

This objection is unreasonable, because we have already shown that Atman and dharmas do not exist apart from mind. Further, the metaphor (*upacara*) of fire etc. is not justified, whether you are considering a species, an individual, or a thing.

(1) This metaphor is not justified even from the logical point of view, because the qualities (*gunas*) of redness and fieriness are not qualities of the 'fire' species. [Red is a quality of colour; the fieriness of fire is its strength. Redness and fieriness are qualities found in fire but are not specific qualities.] If you establish that metaphor in the absence of common qualities, you can just as well give water, by metaphor, the name of fire.

But, you will say, although the qualities of fieriness and redness are not specific to fire, they always accompany fire.

All right. We agree. But these qualities are not necessarily tied to the species of man. Very often they are separate from each other. So, on the one hand, they are not specific to fire, and, on the other hand, they have no definite concomitance with man. Nevertheless, there are people who say metaphorically of man that he is fire. From this it is clear that the metaphors of the world are not necessarily treated on the basis of species.

(2) The metaphorical expression (*upacara*) of fire based on an individual, a *dravya* (substance), or a thing, cannot, in reason, be established either, because the qualities of fieriness, redness, etc., are not common to man and to fire. If you examine the differences between the entities (e.g., man and fire) that embody these qualities, you will find that the same qualities are not involved. The truth is that the fieriness and redness are not the same in the two cases. Thus, for want of common qualities, you cannot designate the man metaphorically by the name of fire.

It *can* be done, you will say, because the qualities of redness and fierceness in man resemble those of fire.

The answer to this is No, because, when some one says that a man is fire, this does not mean that the qualities of the man resemble those of fire; it means that the man is like fire.

Hence the metaphorical expression (*upacara*) does not rest on the thing (*dravya*) just as it does not rest on the species.

3. True Nature of Upacara

It is illogical to affirm that the *upacara* rests on three given real entities,

眞謂自相，假智及詮俱非境故。

謂假智詮不得自相，唯於諸法共相而轉。

亦非離此有別方便，施設自相爲假所依。

然假智詮必依聲起。
聲不及處，此便不轉。

能詮所詮俱非自相。

故知假說不依眞事。
由此但依似事而轉。
似謂增益，非實有相。聲依增益似相而轉，故不可說假必依眞。

是故彼難不應正理。
然依識變對遣妄執眞實我法，說假似言。
由此契經伽他中說，爲對遣愚夫所執實我法故於識所變假說我法名。

〔述記：卽厚嚴經。〕

namely, that to which comparison is made, that which is compared, and the resemblance.

(1) By reality is meant the nature proper (*svalaksana*) of a thing, the thing in itself. Being known only by 'direct perception', by the intuition that is freed from words and all intellectual activities, reality is not the object of the fallacious intellect and the expression. This intellect and the expression do not reach the *svalaksana*, the thing in itself; they move in the realm of generalities or common characteristics of all dharmas. They function in the realm of relativity, not in the world of Absolute Reality.

But, apart from this intellect, there is no means of designating the *svalaksana*. Consequently we say that the *svalaksana* is the supporting basis of the intellect (relative knowledge) and the expression.

(2) However, the intellect and the expression, at least in Kamadhatu (the world of sensuous desire), must of necessity depend on sound (human speech) in order to manifest themselves.

Now, if odour, taste, and the tangible are revealed by contact with the sense-organs that correspond to them, sound does not reach the nature proper of divers *ayatanas*. It follows from this that the intellect and the expression, which depend on sound, do not reach the *svalaksana* of odour, taste, etc. In other words, they do not move in the realm of reality. On the other hand, the expression (the name, *naman*) and that which is expressed (the dharma) are not that *svalaksana*, [because the name is known, not by hearing, but by the Manovijnana; because the sound, perceived by the organ of hearing, is not the thing designated by the name.] We can therefore conclude that metaphorical discourses ['That man is fire', for instance] are not based on realities. It follows from this that they are produced on the basis of 'seeming entities' only.

By 'seeming entities' are meant the characteristics (*laksanas*) which are ascribed to the real entities (*svalaksana*) and which are not absolutely existent, i.e., not the things in themselves. On the basis of these characteristics and the seeming entities, sound comes into being. Therefore, it cannot be said that metaphorical discourses, relative knowledge and expressions, must of necessity be based on realities.

Thus, the objections of the Vaisesikas are not in agreement with right principles.

Bhagavat has employed the terms Atman and Dharma: this does not indicate the real existence of the Atman and dharmas. Bhagavat wants to convert the men who believe in the Atman and dharmas as realities; so he uses these metaphorical expressions on the basis of the evolutions of consciousness.

Thus, one of the *gathas* of the Ghanavyuha Sutra reads: 'It is to address the stupid ones and to refute the real Atman and real dharmas in which they believe that Bhagavat uses metaphorically the terms Atman-Dharmas in regard to the evolutions of consciousness (Vijnanaparinama).'

能變義

識所變相雖無量種，而能變識類別唯三。

一謂異熟，即第八識，多異熟性故。

二謂思量，即第七識，恆審思量故。

三謂了境，即前六識，了境相麤故。

及言，顯六合爲一種。

此三皆名能變識者，能變有二種。

一因能變，謂第八識中等流異熟二因習氣。

等流習氣，由七識中善惡無記熏令生長。

異熟習氣，由六識中有漏善惡熏令生長。

二果能變謂前二種習氣力故，有八識生，現種種相。

VIJNANAPARINAMA

Transformation and Manifestation of Consciousness

The forms in which consciousness manifests itself are infinite in variety, but consciousnesses that are capable of transformation and manifestation are of three kinds only.

1. The first is the consciousness in which fruits (retribution) ripen at varying times. It is the eighth consciousness. It is called 'retribution', *vipaka*, or literally, the 'varyingly maturing consciousness', because it possesses in abundance the nature that matures at varying times and in varying categories, that is to say, it is *vipaka* in the largest number of cases.

2. The second is the consciousness that cogitates or deliberates, i.e., the consciousness of intellection. It is the seventh consciousness or Manas. It is called 'cogitation' or 'deliberation' because it cogitates or deliberates at all times without interruption in contradistinction to the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana), which is subject to interruption. [The eighth consciousness and the first five are exempt from cogitation.]

3. The third kind is the consciousness that perceives or discriminates spheres of objects. It is the same as the first six consciousnesses (the five sense-consciousnesses, – eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, – and Manovijnana which is the sense-centre consciousness). It is so called because it perceives and discriminates between gross spheres of objects.

The word 'and' in the second Stanza (2a) shows that the first six consciousnesses together form one single group, the consciousness that perceives and discriminates between objects.

These three kinds of consciousness are all called 'consciousnesses that are capable of transformation and manifestation' (*parinami vijnana*).

The manifestation (parinama) of consciousness is of two kinds: manifestation with respect to cause (*hetuparinama*) and manifestation with respect to effect (fruit) (*phalaparinama*).

1. 'Cause-manifestation', *hetuparinama*, refers to the two kinds of seed-impressions or energies (*vasana*) stored up in the eighth consciousness, namely, the 'similar efflux energy', *nisyandavasana*, and the 'retributive energy', *vipakavasana*, which are the *cause* of manifestation.

The 'similar efflux energy' (*nisyandavasana*) is engendered and developed by the 'perfuming' influence of the good, bad, and non-defined qualities of the seven consciousnesses.

The 'retributive energy' (*vipakavasana*) is engendered and developed by the perfuming influence of the impure qualities, good and bad, of the first six consciousnesses.

2. 'Effect-manifestation', *phalaparinama*, signifies that, on the strength of the above-mentioned two energies (*vasanas*), the eight consciousnesses are born and

等流習氣爲因緣故，八識體相差別而生。名等流果，果似因故。

異熟習氣爲增上緣，感第八識酬引業力恆相續故，立異熟名。

感前六識酬滿業者，從異熟起名異熟生，不名異熟，有間斷故。

即前異熟及異熟生名異熟果，果異因故。

此中且說我愛執藏持雜染種能變果識名爲異熟，非謂一切。

evolve their multifarious characteristics. [In other words, the eight consciousnesses are the *effect* of this manifestation.]

With the 'similar efflux energy' as 'the condition quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*), the eight consciousnesses are born in the diversity of their substance and characteristics. These eight consciousnesses are called 'similar efflux fruit' (*nisyandaphala*), because this fruit bears a resemblance to the cause.

With the 'retributive energy' as 'the condition quâ contributory agent' (*adhipatipratyaya*), the eighth consciousness is created. This receives the name of 'retribution' (*vipaka*) because it 'repays' for the *aksepaka* deeds (the karma which determines the type, *e.g.*, man, deva, etc., of any incarnation) of past incarnations and because it constitutes a perpetual series. With the same energy as a contributory agent are also created the first six consciousnesses. These 'repay' for the *paripuraka* deeds (the karma which fills out the details of various stages of any incarnation) of past incarnations. Inasmuch as they arise from retribution (*vipaka*), they are called *vipakaja* (i.e., born of retribution). They are not called *vipaka* because they are subject to interruption. However, both *vipaka* and *vipakajas* are called *vipakaphala* (retributive fruit), because they are different from their causes.

[The seventh consciousness is created with the *nisyandavasana* as *hetupratyaya*. It does not create karma and is not born of past karma.]

In the present treatise the name of *vipaka* is given only to that consciousness which is capable of manifestation as fruit (*phalaparinama-vijnana*), that is to say, the actual eighth consciousness, which is 'the place of attachment to the self', and which carries within it the defiling Bijas of *samklesa*. It does not mean that all consciousnesses can be called *vipaka*.

BOOK II

THE ALAYAVIJNANA

(STOREHOUSE CONSCIOUSNESS)

阿 賴 耶 識

阿賴耶識

雖已略說能變三名，而未廣辯能變三相，且初能變其相云何？

頌曰：

初阿賴耶識　異熟一切種
不可知執受　處了常與觸
作意受想思　相應唯捨受
是無覆無記　觸等亦如是
恒轉如暴流　阿羅漢位捨

THE ALAYAVIJNANA
STOREHOUSE CONSCIOUSNESS

WE have briefly explained the names of the three kinds of consciousness, but have not yet dwelt in detail upon their characteristics. The first kind, the consciousness that is retribution (*vipaka*), is called the Alayavijnana (i.e., the eighth consciousness). Now what are the characteristics of this consciousness?

The Stanzas say:

2b

> The first is the Alayavijnana (i.e., storehouse or repository consciousness).
>
> It is also called Vipakavijnana (retributive consciousness) and Sarvabijakavijnana (the consciousness that carries within it all Bijas or seeds).
> [It brings to fruition all seeds (effects of good and evil deeds).]

3

> It is impossible to comprehend completely (1) what it 'holds and receives' (*upadi*),
>
> (2) Its 'place' or 'locality' (*sthana*), and (3) its power of perception and discrimination (*vijnapti*)'[1] It is at all times associated with five mental attributes (*caittas*), namely, mental contact (Sparsa),
>
> Attention (Manaskạra), sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna), and voliton (Cetana).
>
> But it is always associated only with the 'sensation of indifference (Upeksa)'.

4

> It belongs to the 'non-defiled-non-defined moral species'.
>
> The same is true in the case of mental contact (Sparsa) and so forth.
>
> It is perpetually manifesting itself like a torrent,
>
> And is renounced (i.e., it ceases to be called the Alaya) in the state of Arhatship (the state of the saint who enters Nirvana).

---

[1] That is, its mode of activity (*akara*) and the objects of its perception (*alambana*).

第一章· 阿頼耶識自相

一· 阿頼耶

論曰，初能變識大小乘教名阿賴耶。

此識具有能藏所藏執藏義故。

謂與雜染互爲緣故，有情執爲自內我故。

此即顯示初能變識所有自相。

攝持因果爲自相故。

此識自相分位雖多，藏識過重，是故偏說。

〔述記：由二義說阿賴耶。由此自相雖有三位，以彼藏名三位之中初位所攝。（義演：三位者，第一我愛執藏，第二善惡業果，第三相續執持。）〕

二· 異熟

此是能引諸界趣生善不善業異熟果故，說名異熟。

離此 命根衆同分等恒時相續勝異熟果不可得故。

〔述記：化地部等離此別有窮生死蘊。〕

此即顯示初能變識所有果相。

此識果相雖多位多種，異熟寬不共，故偏說之。

〔述記：由此本識具三四果，故言多種。此識果相雖多位多種，以異熟之名一寬，二不共，故偏說之。三位通二位，五位通四位，故說言寬。有餘三果可通餘法，唯異熟果不通餘法，故言不共。〕

§ 1. LAKSANAS (NATURE) OF THE ALAYAVIJNANA

1. ALAYA

THE Treatise says:

The first consciousness capable of transformation and manifestation is, in the Mahayana and Hinayana teachings alike, termed the Alaya-vijnana or the Alaya consciousness.

The name of this consciousness has three meanings:

1. It is actively *alaya*, storehouse, because it plays the active part of storing up the Bijas (seeds) which, being stored, are passively *alaya*.

2. It is passively *alaya* in the sense that it is 'perfumed' by the defiling dharmas of *samklesa*. [These dharmas create in it the Bijas which make of it a storehouse and store themselves in it.]

3. It is the object of attachment. Manas attaches itself to it as to its Atman.

In other words: The Alayavijnana and the defiling dharmas of *samklesa* are the cause of one another; Sentient beings hold on to the Alayavijnana and imagine that it is their inner sell.

The present treatise defines, by the word Alaya, the specific nature (*svalaksana*) of the eighth consciousness. This consciousness has the characteristics of being both cause and effect: its 'self-nature' (*svalaksana*) is to 'concentrate' on these two characteristics and to depend on them.

The self-nature of this consciousness admits of many variations according to the three stages of spiritual progress. The name of Alaya is appropriate for this consciousness only when it is in the first stage which is characterized by its being 'grasped' by Manas as the inner self. It is generally, and incorrectly, designated by this name [and not by the other names of *Vipaka* and *Sarvabijaka*] precisely because of this and also because of its serious fault in storing up all the defiling elements which are the Bijas.

2. VIPAKA

Considered as effect, the eighth consciousness is called *Vipaka* It is the *vipakaphala*, the 'fruit of retribution' of good or bad deeds which draw or direct the individual concerned into a certain sphere of existence, into a certain destiny, and into a certain womb (*dhatu, gati, yoni*) for reincarnation. Apart from this consciousness, there is no 'vital principle' nor any dharma – such as the immortal Skandha of the Mahisasakas – which can form a perpetual series and be truly and pre-eminently *vipakaphala*.

By the term *vipaka*, the author indicates all the ways in which the eighth consciousness becomes the fruit (*phala*) of past actions etc. The fruit of this consciousness assumes many forms and is of many kinds according to the different stages of spiritual life. We must distinguish these different stages: the eighth consciousness of the Buddha is not *vipaka*, but it is *vipaka* in all other sentient beings. It is also the only dharma which is really *vipaka*, none of the

三· 一切種

此能執持諸法種子令不失故，名一切種。

離此，餘法能徧執持諸法種子不可得故。

此即顯示初能變識所有因相。

此識因相雖有多種，持種不共，是故偏說。

初能變識體相雖多，略說唯有如是三相。

other consciousnesses being entitled to that name. Furthermore, this name is extensively used to cover four of the five stages of spiritual progress. For this reason, the eighth consciousness is designated generally by the term 'Vipaka'.

3. SARVABIJAKA

Considered as cause, the eighth consciousness is called *sarvabijaka* or the 'seed consciousness', which means that it is endowed or furnished with all the Bijas ('seeds' or 'germs'). It is capable of holding firmly and retaining the Bijas of all dharmas, without allowing them to be lost. Apart from this consciousness, no other dharma is capable of retaining the Bijas of all things.

By using this term. the author has the intention of indicating all the ways in which the eighth consciousness is cause. It is a cause in many ways; but to it alone belongs that causality which is the carrying or retention of Bijas, a capacity which is shared by none of the other consciousnesses. Hence it can generally be defined as *sarvabijaka.*

These are, in general, only three ways of considering the eighth consciousness as effect and as cause, although this consciousness has a great variety of aspects.

第二章・種相分別

一・ 約體分別

一切種相應更分別，此中何法名爲種子？

謂本識中親生自果功能差別。

此與本識及所生果不一不異。
體用因果理應爾故。

雖非一異而是實有，假法如無，非因緣故。

〔述記：生等假法如龜毛等，體是無法，非因緣故。種子望法，即是因緣，故體實有。〕

此與諸法既非一異，應如瓶等是假非實。

若爾，眞如應是假有，許則便無眞勝義諦。

〔述記：設彼救言，眞如亦假，不起故，如空華。許則便無眞勝義諦。眞勝義諦若許無者，約誰說有世俗諦耶？何有涅槃而有造修求成佛等。蘊處界等通眞俗諦，眞如唯眞名眞勝義。〕

然諸種子唯依世俗說爲實有，不同眞如。

種子雖依第八識體，而是此識相分非餘。

〔述記：此言種子依識自體，自體即是所受薰處。〕

見分恒取此爲境故。

〔述記：此護法釋。見分恒緣故是相分。〕

§ II. THEORY OF BIJAS

We should study in greater detail the definition of Alayavijnana as *sarvabijaka.*

1. Definitions

1. What kind of dharma is called Bija?

The Bijas are the different potentialities which are found in the Mulavijnana, root-consciousness, i.e., the Alayavijnana, and which immediately engender their fruit, that is to say, the actual dharmas (i.e., dharmas in activity).

2. Reality of the Bijas

The Bijas, in relation to the root-consciousness and the fruit, are neither identical nor different. Such is, in reality, the mode of relation between the substance (*svabhava*), consciousness, and the activity (*karitra*), Bija; between the cause (*hetu*), Bija, and the fruit (*phala*), actual dharma.

However, although neither identical with consciousness and the fruit nor different from them, the Bijas are real entities. In fact, that which has only a nominal existence – the horns of a hare and the hairs of a tortoise – like things which do not exist at all, cannot be a 'condition quâ cause', *hetupratyaya.*

Such is not the doctrine of Sthiramati, in whose opinion the Bijas, being neither identical with the actual dharmas nor different from them, have a 'nominal existence', like a pitcher, and are not real.

But, according to this reasoning, the Bhutatathata will also have a nominal existence, [because the Bhutatathata or Dharmata, 'substance of dharmas', is neither identical with dharmas nor different from them.] – [To this, Sthiramati replies: The Bhutatathata has a nominal existence, because, like a flower in the sky, it is not produced]. We say that, on this hypothesis, there is no real, eternal Truth (*paramartha paramarthasatya*). [Then in relation to what is worldly truth (*samvrtisatya*) established? How will there be Nirvana? . . . Wherefore all the aspirations and endeavours for supreme enlightenment, for Buddhahood? The Skandhas, Ayatanas, and Dhatus are simultaneously *paramartha* and *samvrtisatya*; the Bhutatathata alone is called *paramarthaparamarthasatyr* . . . K'uei Chi].

However, when we say that the Bijas, pure and impure, are real entities, it is from the worldly point of view (*samvrti*). The Bijas are, in reality, not the same as the Bhutatathata.

3. Bhagas

The Bijas depend or are based on the 'substance' of the eighth consciousness [on the 'self-nature' of this consciousness, that is to say, on the *samvittibhaga* which is 'perfumable' and of which the Bijas are the potentialities]. However, they are part of the *nimittabhaga*, the object-aspect, because, says Dharmapala, the *darsanabhaga*, the perception-aspect, always takes them as its object.

諸有漏種與異熟識體無別故，無記性攝。

因果俱有善等性故亦名善等。

諸無漏種，非異熟識性所攝故，因果俱是善性攝故唯名爲善。

若爾，何故决擇分說二十二根一切皆有異熟種子，皆異熟生？

雖名異熟而非無記，依異熟故名異熟種。異性相依，如眼等識。

或無漏種由熏習力轉變成熟立異熟名，非無記性所攝異熟。

二· 種子新熏本有分別

護月義

此中有義，一切種子皆本性有，不從熏生。由熏習力但可增長。

如契經說，一切有情無始時來有種種界，如惡义聚，法爾而有。

〔述記：大莊嚴論亦引此經名無盡意。〕

界即種子差別名故。

〔述記：此下第二是阿毗達磨經，即大乘通用。〕

又契經說，無始時來界一切法等依。

界是因義。

〔述記：此下所引如瑜伽論第三卷說。〕

瑜伽亦說，諸種子體無始時來性雖本有，而由染淨新所熏發。

諸有情類無始時來若般涅槃法者一切種子皆悉具足，不般涅槃法者便闕三種菩提種子。

如是等文誠證非一。

4. Moral species of the Bijas

The impure Bijas (*sasrava*), being integrated in the Vipakavijnana (not having a 'substance' distinct from this consciousness), and being in consequence of the same species, are 'non-defined'. Nevertheless, their causes (i.e., the actual consciousnesses which perfume the Vipakavijnana) and their fruits (i.e., the actual consciousnesses which are born of the Bijas) are good, bad, etc. Hence these impure Bijas are also said to be good, bad, etc.

The pure Bijas (*anasrava*), inasmuch as they are not integrated in the Vipakavijnana, not being of its species, and as they are born of good causes and produce good fruits, are good.

Question: If so, why is it said in a passage of the Yogasastra, Book 57, that all the twenty-two *indriyas* (the last three of which are pure), have *vipakabijas* and are born of vipaka (*vipakaja*)?

Answer: Although called *vipaka*, the Bijas of the last three *indriyas* are not non-defined, because they are not, by their very nature, *vipaka*. The Sastra calls them *vipakabijas* because they depend on the eighth consciousness, which is *vipaka*. We know that consciousnesses of three species (good, bad, etc.) depend on the non-defined Alayavijnana just as the five sense consciousnesses (the eye-consciousness etc.), which are of three species, depend on their respective indriyas which are all non-defined. Furthermore, the pure Bijas are, in a certain sense, *vipaka*, because, by being perfumed, they are developed and ripen. But the Sastra does not say that they are *vipaka* by nature, that they are non-defined.

2. ORIGIN OF BIJAS

CANDRAPALA

According to the first masters, all Bijas, pure as well as impure, are inborn and natural, i.e., innately existing (from the beginning); none of them come into being as a result of 'perfuming'. But they are capable of increasing and growing by the action of perfuming.

1. This doctrine is based on several texts which treat of Bijas in general.

(1) Aksayamatisutra: 'All sentient beings, since before the beginning of time, have different kinds of *dhatus* which are inherent in them and which, like heaps of myrobalan grains, exist by their own specific nature (*dharmata*). The term 'dhatu' is another name for Bija.

(2) Abhidharmasutra: 'Since before the beginning of time, *dhatu* has been the basis and support for all dharmas.' The term *dhatu* signifies cause, *hetu*, (and *hetu* signifies Bija).

(3) Yogasastra: 'The Bijas, although innately existing since before the beginning of time, are perfumed and developed anew by pure and impure deeds.' Again: 'The sentient beings who are "destined to attain Nirvana" have, since before the beginning of time, been endowed with all the Bijas; if they are "not destined to attain Nirvana", they will be devoid of three kinds of Bodhibijas.'

The texts relating to the same doctrine are numerous.

又諸有情既說本有五種姓別，故應定有法爾種子不由熏生。

〔述記：即是十卷入楞伽第二卷。〕

又瑜伽說，地獄成就三無漏根是種非現。

〔述記：即瑜伽論五十七卷。〕

又從無始展轉傳來法爾所得本性住姓。

〔述記：此地持善戒經菩薩地……。〕

由此等證無漏種子法爾本有不從熏生。

有漏亦應法爾有種，由熏增長，不別熏生。

如是建立因果不亂。

〔述記：即諸法種子初但有一物，後生果時可無雜亂。若更有新熏或唯新熏者，種子便多，後生果時從何種起？新熏法爾功能既齊，有生不生，因果便亂。若二種子共生一芽，外麥豆等例亦應爾……如我所立因果無亂。然無漏種未增長位名本性住姓，後增長已名習所成姓。有漏亦爾。〕

難陀及勝軍義

有義種子皆熏故生。

所熏能熏俱無始有，故諸種子無始成就。

種子既是習氣異名，習氣必由熏習而有，如麻香氣，華熏故生。

2. As regards the pure Bijas

(1) Since the Lankavatara and other Sutras say that sentient beings are naturally divided into five Gotras (families), there must necessarily be *dharmatabijas*, i.e., Bijas 'which exist by the natural force of things', and which are not born as a result of perfuming.

(2) According to the Yogasastra, 57, infernal beings are endowed with three pure *indriyas*. It is evidently a question of *indriyas* in the state of Bijas, not actual *indriyas*.

(3) Bodhisattvabhumi: 'The natural Gotras of the Bodhisattvas, acquired by the natural force of things, have passed on in an uninterrupted line since before the beginning of time.'

From these authorities we have derived sufficient proof that the pure Bijas are original and exist by the natural force of things, and are not born as a result of perfuming.

3. As regards the impure Bijas, they are also *dharmata* Bijas (that is to say, they exist by their own specific nature). They are *nourished* and *developed* by perfuming, and are not *created* by perfuming.

Thus, cause and effect (fruit) are established without confusion.

[The rationale of this system is explained by K'uei Chi as follows:

The Bijas of all dharmas are primordial and innate. When, later, fruit is born, there is no confusion. If certain Bijas are new and created by perfuming (as held by Dharmapala), if all Bijas are new and created by perfuming (as held by Nanda), the Bijas are numerous. When, later, fruit is born, of which Bijas are they born? Since, owing to the natural force of things, the new Bijas are endowed with equal efficacy, when some develop as fruit and others do not, cause and effect will be confused. Further, one cannot admit that two Bijas produce one sprout at the same time . . . In the present system, there is no confusion . . . The pure Bijas, when they have not yet started growing, are called 'natural Gotras'; when they have already started growing, they are called 'Gotras born of perfuming'. The same with the impure Bijas].

[In other words, the doctrine of Candrapala is that the 'seeds' (Bijas) from which spring the seeming manifestations of things in the outer world are all of them eternally innate in the Alayavijnana. They are thus not engendered by the 'perfuming influence' of the other seven consciousnesses, but only stimulated in their further growth by that influence.]

NANDA AND SRISENA

According to the second masters, Bijas are all born as a result of perfuming.

That which perfumes (actual dharmas) and that which is perfumed (Alayavijnana) have existed since before the beginning of time; hence, the Bijas have been created at all times since before the beginning of time by perfuming. [In other words, there has never been a time when the seeds of the Alayavijnana have not been engendered.]

Since Bija is another name for *vasana*, the repetitive influence which comes from 'impregnation' and perfuming, *vasana* is undoubtedly produced by

如契經說， 諸有情心染淨諸法所熏習故， 無量種子之所積集。

〔述記：此引即是多界經也。〕

論說內種定有熏習，外種熏習或有或無。

〔述記：攝論第二卷。〕

又名言等三種熏習，總攝一切有漏法種。

彼三既由熏習而有，故有漏種必籍熏生。

無漏種生亦由熏習。
說聞熏習聞淨法界等流正法而熏起故。

〔述記：攝論第三卷。〕

是出世心種子性故。

〔述記：攝論說， 聞熏地前既是有漏爲出世法之種子性 故知無有法爾無漏種，唯以有漏爲見道因故。〕

有情本來種性差別，不由無漏種子有無。

但依有障無障建立。

如瑜伽說， 於眞如境若有畢竟二障種者立爲不般涅槃法姓， 若有畢竟所知障種非煩惱者一分立爲聲聞種姓一分立爲獨覺種姓， 若無畢竟二障種者即立彼爲如來種姓。

perfuming just as the odour of the hemp plant is engendered by the perfuming of its flowers.[1]

1. Texts are not lacking that affirm this doctrine:

(1) Bahudhatukasutra: 'The mind of sentient beings, being perfumed by pure and impure dharmas, is an accumulation of Bijas without number.'

(2) Samgraha: 'Internal Bijas must be perfumed to engender fruit. External Bijas (e.g., trees and grasses) are sometimes perfumed and sometimes not.'

(3) The three kinds of *vasana*, names, words, etc., include the Bijas of all impure dharmas. Since they all come into being as the result of perfuming, the Bijas of all impure dharmas must necessarily depend on perfuming for their birth.

(4) The Bijas of pure dharmas are also born as the result of perfuming. For it is said in Samgraha: 'When one listens to the Good Law which is the efflux of the pure Dharmadhatu, perfuming which proceeds from audition (*srutavasana*) is produced.

And again: ['The *srutavasana* is impure before the ascetic has entered into the Lands (the various stages of Bodhisattvahood); but it is purified by perfuming after his entrance and] becomes the Bija of pure or supramundane dharmas.'

From these texts we conclude that the natural division of sentient beings into different Gotras or families does not depend on the existence or non-existence of pure Bijas existing originally by the natural force of things (*dharmata-anasravabijas*).

2. Refutation of the arguments of Candrapala.

[Since before the beginning of time, sentient beings have belonged to certain Gotras: but this is not due to the presence or the absence of pure Bijas.] It is, in fact, due to the presence or the absence of 'barriers' (*avaranas*). The Yogasastra, 52, teaches that:

'Those sentient beings who, in regard to the Bhutatathata, are impeded by the Bijas of the two *avaranas* or barriers, *klesavarana* (barrier of vexing passions) and *jneyavarana* (barrier that impedes the realization of Mahabodhi), belong to the Gotra of those who will not attain Nirvana.

'Those beings who are impeded by the *jneyavarana* but are free from *klesavarana* belong either to the Gotra of Sravaka or to that of Pratyekabuddha according as their moral faculties are superior or inferior.

'Those who are free from the Bijas of both *avaranas* belong to the Gotra of Tathagata.'

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[1] *Vasana* comes from the root *vas*, meaning 'to dwell', 'to stay', or 'to perfume', and in the Mahayana sutras it is used in the two senses combined, that is, in the sense of a perfuming energy that leaves its essence permanently behind in the things it has perfumed. The Chinese translators generally use *hsi-ch'i* for this term; *hsi* meaning 'habit', 'long-usage', or 'repeated experience'. Vasana, therefore, is a kind of supersensuous energy mysteriously emanating from every thought, every feeling, or every deed one has done or does, which lives latently in the store-house called Alayavijnana.

In modern psychology, we might say that Vasana corresponds to memory in its widest sense. This perfuming or leaving of impressions is sometimes known as sowing seeds (*bija*). Thus the Bijas are memory-seeds or habit-energies.

故知本來種姓差別依障建立，非無漏種。

所說成就無漏種言，依當可生，非已有體。

護法義

有義種子各有二類。

一者本有，謂無始來異熟識中法爾而有生蘊處界功能差別。

世尊依此說諸有情無始時來有種種界如惡义聚法爾而有。餘所引證廣說如初。

〔述記：此引經證，同護月也。〕

此即名爲本性住種。

二者始起，謂無始來數數現行熏習而有。

世尊依此說有情心染淨諸法所熏習故無量種子之所積集。諸論亦說染淨種子由染淨法熏習故生。

此即名爲習所成種。

(一) 破護月義

若唯本有，轉識不應與阿賴耶爲因緣性。

如契經說，諸法於識藏，識於法亦爾，更互爲果性，亦常爲因性。

〔述記：此引阿毗達磨經也。〕

此頌意言，阿賴耶識與諸轉識於一切時展轉相生，互爲因果。

攝大乘說，阿賴耶識與雜染法互爲因緣。

如炷與燄展轉生燒，又如束蘆互相依住。

唯依此二建立因緣，所餘因緣不可得故。

Hence the natural distinction of the Gotras is due to the *avaranas*, not to pure Bijas.

The text relating to 'infernal beings endowed with three pure *indriyas*' (Yogasastra, 57, quoted by the first masters) refers to the pure Bijas that will be born, not to those already existing.

DHARMAPALA

Bijas are of two kinds.

1. Natural or inborn Bijas: these refer to the potentialities which have innately existed since before the beginning of time in the Vipakavijnana by the natural force of things (*dharmata*) and which engender Skandha-ayatana-dhatus.

It is in regard to these Bijas that Bhagavat (the World-honoured One) has said in the Aksayamati-sutra: 'All sentient beings, since before the beginning of time, have had different kinds of *dhatus* (Bijas) which are inherent in them and which, like heaps of myrobalan grains, exist by their own specific nature (*dharmata*).' It is to these Bijas that the arguments of Candrapala refer.

These Bijas are called 'natural Bijas residing or inherent in the basic nature'.

2. Bijas whose existence has had a beginning:

These Bijas have come into being as a result of perfuming (*vasana*) by actual dharmas which has been repeated and repeated since before the beginning of time.

It is in regard to these Bijas that Bhagavat has said: 'The mind of sentient beings is perfumed by defiled and pure dharmas. Hence it is an immense accumulation of Bijas.' – The Sastras also say: 'Defiled and pure Bijas are born by reason of perfuming by defiled and pure dharmas.'

These Bijas are called 'Bijas born by reason of perfuming' (*bhavnamayabijas*).

1. Refutation of Candrapala

If Bijas are exclusively 'primordial', the first seven consciousnesses (*pravrttivijnanas*) should not be the 'condition quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*) of the Alayavijnana.

Now the Samgraha cites a gatha from the Mahayanabhidharma: 'The dharmas (that is to say, the seven consciousnesses) adhere to consciousness (that is to say, the eighth consciousness, the Alayavijnana). Likewise, consciousness adheres to the dharmas. They are, reciprocally, effect, and also always cause.' The meaning of this gatha is that the Alayavijnana and the seven consciousnesses engender each other perpetually, and are reciprocally cause and effect.

The Samgraha teaches the same doctrine: 'The Alayavijnana and the defiled dharmas of *samklesa* are reciprocally condition quâ cause (*hetupratyaya*), just as the flame is born of the candle (: the dharmas are born of the Bijas of the Alayavijnana) and the candle is kept alight by the flame (: in the Alayavijnana the Bijas are created and perfumed by the dharmas), and just as the bundles of reeds support each other reciprocally.' In this reciprocal relation between the Bijas and the dharmas is found the true causality, the condition quâ cause. It is found nowhere else but in this mutual relation.

若諸種子不由熏生，如何轉識與阿賴耶有因緣義？

非熏令長可名因緣，勿善惡業與異熟果爲因緣故。

又諸聖教說有種子由熏習生，皆違彼義，故唯本有理教相違。

(二) 破難陀及勝軍義

若唯始起，有爲無漏無因緣故應不得生。

有漏不應爲無漏種，勿無漏種生有漏故。

許應諸佛有漏復生，善等應爲不善等種。

(三) 破分別論

分別論者雖作是說，心性本淨，客塵煩惱所染汙故名爲雜染，離煩惱時轉成無漏，故無漏法非無因生。

而心性言，彼說何義？

若說空理，空非心因，常法定非諸法種子。

以體前後無轉變故。

若即說心，應同數論，相雖轉變而體常一。

惡無記心又應是善。

許則應與信等相應。

不許便應非善心體。尚不名善，況是無漏。

有漏善心既稱雜染，如惡心等性非無漏，故不應與無漏爲因。

Hence the Bijas are born as a result of perfuming. If not, how can the seven consciousnesses be the condition quâ cause of the Alayavijnana?

It cannot be said that the seven consciousnesses are that kind of condition because their perfuming causes the primordial Bijas to increase and grow. For, on that account, good and bad deeds would be the condition quâ cause (*hetupratyaya*) of the eighth consciousness, which is Vipaka; this cannot be true, because they are only the condition quâ agent (*adhipatipratyaya*).

Besides, the sacred teachings (Sutras and Sastras) say that there are Bijas which are born as a result of perfuming. These teachings are all contradictory to the doctrine of Candrapala. In other words, the doctrine of Candrapala is contradictory to logical reason and the Scriptures.

2. Refutation of Nanda and Srisena

If pure innate Bijas do not exist, if all Bijas have a beginning as products of perfuming, then the first pure actual dharma, i.e., the first moment of insight into Transcendent Truth (*darsanamarga*) will not have any 'condition quâ cause' and will not be born. One cannot admit that impure dharmas are the cause or Bija of a pure dharma. Nor can it be admitted that pure Bijas can engender impure dharmas. Otherwise, impure dharmas could be born again in the Buddhas, and good Bijas (*kusala*) could engender bad dharmas (*akusala*).

Hence there are natural, innate Bijas.

3. Refutation of the System of Immaculate Mind

However, the Vibhajyavadins do not admit the existence of pure innate Bijas as the cause (*hetupratyaya*) of pure actual dharmas. They think that these dharmas have a cause of a different nature.

According to them, the nature of the mind is 'essentially immaculate', but, being defiled and contaminated by the klesas and the 'adventitious dusts', the mind is said to be defiled and impure; when it is separated from the klesas, it turns pure again. Hence the pure dharmas are not born without cause.

We ask what is the meaning of this expression 'nature of the mind'?

(1) If it is a question of Sunyata (that is to say, the Bhutatathata), that is not the cause of the mind; being unconditioned (*asamskrta*) and immutable, Sunyata cannot be the Bija of pure dharmas, because there is no change in its substance either in the past or in the future; in other words, it will be the same in the future as it was in the past.

(2) Is it a question of the mind itself? This explanation presents many difficulties: a. it should be the same as the theory of the Samkhyas: that the mind is immutable and unique in its original nature in spite of the evolution and transformation of its characteristics; b. if the nature of the mind, the mind itself, is immaculate, the bad and the non-defined mind should be good; c. in consequence, it should be associated with faith and other virtues; d. if you do not admit this consequence, the mind in question has not the nature of a good mind; if one cannot say that its nature is good, how much less that its nature is pure (*anasrava*); e. as for the good-impure mind (*kusala-sasrava*), it is, as everybody knows, defiled (*samklesa*): like a bad mind, its nature is not

勿善惡等互爲因故。

若有漏心性是無漏，應無漏心性是有漏，差別因緣不可得故。

又異生心若是無漏，則異生位無漏現行，應名聖者。若異生心性雖無漏而相有染，不名無漏，無斯過者。則心種子亦非無漏。何故汝論說有異生唯得成就無漏種子？種子現行性相同故。

然契經說心性淨者，說心空理所顯眞如，眞如是心眞實性故。

或說心體非煩惱故名性本淨。

〔述記：或依他心體非煩惱名性本淨。……心性者眞如也。〕

非有漏心性是無漏故名本淨。

申其正義

由此應信有諸有情無始時來有無漏種，不由熏習法爾成就，後勝進位熏令增長，無漏法起以此爲因。無漏起時，復熏成種。有漏法種類此應知。

釋相違

a. 內種熏習

諸聖教中雖說內種定有熏習，而不定說一切種子皆熏故生，寧全撥無本有種子。

然本有種亦由熏習令其增盛，方能得果，故說內種定有熏習。

pure. Hence it could not be the cause of a pure dharma, unless you are disposed to admit that the good and the bad engender each other; f. if you say that the nature of the impure mind is pure, you should say also that the nature of a pure mind is impure; this is incorrect, for cause and effect (mind and nature) cannot be different in quality; g. if the mind of an ordinary sentient being (*Prthagjana*) is pure, then, at his present stage of evolution, pure dharmas should manifest themselves, and he should be called a sage. If you say that the mind of the Prthagjana presents defiled characteristics although its essential nature is pure, and that, for this reason, it is not regarded as 'pure', we reply that the Bijas of this mind must not be regarded as 'pure'; why, then, is it affirmed in your Treatise that 'there are Prthagjanas endowed exclusively with pure Bijas?' The nature and the character of the Bijas and those of the dharmas 'in action' are necessarily of the same order.

(3) What then is the meaning of the Sutras (Vimalakirti, Srimala) on the immaculate nature of the mind?

When they say that the nature of the mind is essentially immaculate, the Sutras are referring to the Bhutatathata which is revealed by the Sunyata of the mind, because the Bhutatathata is the real nature of the mind. Alternatively, that which the Sutras regard as the 'essentially immaculate nature' is the substance of the mind, i.e., the Bhutatathata, which is free from klesas. It does not mean that the nature of the impure mind (*sasrava*) is pure (*anasrava*) and is, for that reason, regarded as 'essentially immaculate'.

(4) Explanation of some Difficulties

Let us conclude that sentient beings have been endowed, since before the beginning of time, with pure Bijas which are not produced by perfuming but are in their essential nature inherent in them. In course of time, when the ascetic, in his advancement along the Path, arrives at the 'stage of excellence', perfuming causes the Bijas to increase and grow. The pure dharmas which are born when he has entered the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth have these Bijas as their cause. These pure dharmas perfume in turn and thus produce new pure Bijas.

It should be understood that the same process of mutual production applies to the Bijas of impure dharmas. Thus, some Bijas are innate and natural while others are engendered by perfuming.

[This means that the seeds (Bijas) contained in the Alayavijnana, being perfumed by the other seven consciousnesses, are thus caused to grow, resulting in the appearance of things or dharmas. The Alayavijnana (of which the seeds form a part) is what is perfumed; the other seven consciousness are the perfuming agents.]

a. Perfuming of Internal Bijas

The Samgraha teaches that all internal Bijas are definitely subject to perfuming; but it does not definitely teach that all these Bijas are born as a result of perfuming. One cannot take advantage of the authority of this text to deny the existence of inborn Bijas.

But these inborn Bijas, too, must first of all be made to increase and grow by

b. 聞熏習

其聞熏習非唯有漏。

聞正法時亦熏本有無漏種子令漸增盛，展轉乃至生出世心，故亦說此名聞熏習。

〔述記：解脱分善根以去聞正法時，由現行有漏及自因緣所熏有漏種爲增上緣，令其本有無漏種子亦得增長展轉增勝。〕

聞熏習中有漏性者是修所斷，感勝異熟爲出世法勝增上緣。

無漏性者非所斷攝，與出世法正爲因緣。

此正因緣微隱難了，有寄麤顯勝增上緣方便說爲出世心種。

c. 種姓與種子

依障建立種姓別者，意顯無漏種子有無。謂若全無無漏種者，彼二障種永不可害即立彼爲非涅槃法。若唯有二乘無漏種者，彼所知障種永不可害，一分立爲聲聞種姓，一分立爲獨覺種姓。

means of perfuming before they can bear fruit, that is to say, before they can create the actual dharmas. This is why the Samgraha says that all internal Bijas, inborn as well as newly created, are definitely subject to perfuming.

b. Srutavasana

The Samgraha says that the *vasana* produced by the hearing of the Good Law [by a Prthagjana] is a Bija of supramundane mind. We would have, therefore, a pure Bija which is born of impure *srutavasana.*

But it should be observed that the perfume born of hearing (*srutavasana*), is not exclusively impure. In fact, when the ascetic listens to the Good Law, the innate pure Bijas are perfumed in such a way that they increase and develop progressively until they engender a mind of supramundane order. Hence these pure Bijas are also called *srutavasana.*

That part of the *srutavasana* which is of an impure nature will be abandoned of destroyed by the Bhavanamarga (*bhavanaheya*), the Path of Meditation and Self-Cultivation. It creates an excellent *vipaka* and constitutes an excellent *adhipatipratyaya*, i.e., the necessary and efficacious 'condition quâ contributing agent', of supramundane dharmas.[1] [It does not serve as the *hetupratyaya*, that is, 'condition quâ cause'.]

That part of the *srutavasana* which is of pure nature is not to be abandoned or destroyed (*heya*). It serves as the right cause (*hetupratyaya*) of supramundane dharmas. Being subtle and hidden, this right condition quâ cause is difficult to comprehend. This is why certain texts, the Samgraha for example, are only concerned with the impure *srutavasana*, which is the crude and manifest *adhipatipratyaya*, and say, incorrectly, that it is the Bija of the supramundane mind.

c. The Gotras and the Bijas

According to the Yogasastra, 52, the Gotras (families) are established on the basis of the *avaranas*. But the idea of the author is that the Gotras have as their *raison d'être* the presence or the absence of pure Bijas.

In the case of a person who is absolutely devoid of pure Bijas, the Bijas inherent in him of the two kinds of *avarana* can never be destroyed. That person is regarded as *nirvanadharmaka*, which means that he is 'a person not destined to attain Nirvana'.

In the case of a person who possesses only the pure Bijas of the two Vehicles, the Bijas of *jneyavarana* (the barrier which impedes Mahabodhi) that are inherent in him can never be destroyed. That person belongs either to the Gotra of Sravaka or to the Gotra of Pratyekabuddha.

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[1] Hearing of the Good Law, i.e., the Buddhadharma, creates Bijas of which it is the right cause: it perfumes and creates Bijas of a natural order which are good without being pure; which must be abandoned and are abandoned by the Bhavanamarga (Path of Meditation and Self-Cultivation); which bear an excellent natural fruit which is its retribution (*vipaka*). As regards the Bijas of a supramundane order, which commence action on the Darsanamarga (Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth), impure hearing cannot be their cause proper. It is their "condition quâ contributory agent" (*adhipatipratyaya*), because, without it, the innate pure Bijas, which are the cause of the supramundane dharmas, cannot grow into manifestation which is necessary for the production of those dharmas. Hearing of the Good Law perfumes the innate pure Bijas and causes them to increase and grow, but does not create them.

若亦有佛無漏種者，彼二障種俱可永害即立彼爲如來種姓。

〔述記：依瑜伽第五十二卷說。〕

故由無漏種子有無，障有可斷不可斷義。

然無漏種微隱難知，故約彼障顯姓差別。

不爾，彼障有何別因，而有可害不可害者。

若謂法爾有此障別，無漏法種寧不許然？

若本全無無漏法種，則諸聖道永不得生。

誰當能害二障種子，而說依障立種姓別？

旣彼聖道必無生義，說當可生亦定非理。

然諸聖教處處說有本有種子，皆違彼義。

故唯始起理教相違。

由此應知諸法種子各有本有始起二類。

In the case of a person who possesses the pure Bijas of Mahabodhi or of the Vehicle of the Tathagatas, the Bijas of the two kinds of *avarana* are destructible. That person belongs to the Gotra of the Tathagatas.

It is clear from the above that the possibility or the impossibility of abandoning the *avaranas* depends on the presence or the absence of pure Bijas.

However, the pure Bijas being subtle, hidden, and almost incomprehensible, the Yogasastra establishes the distinction of the Gotras on the basis of the *avaranas*.

The truth of this doctrine is beyond all doubt. Apart from the pure Bijas, what can be the cause of the destructibility and the indestructibility of the *avaranas*? If you say that the difference in the nature of the *avaranas* exists by reason of the essential nature or the natural force of the *avaranas* themselves, and that their destructibility or indestructibility is due entirely to their own essential nature, our reply is: can you not admit just as well that the difference in the nature of the Bijas of the pure dharmas of the three Vehicles exists also by reason of their essential nature and natural force?

If Bijas of pure dharmas are originally and absolutely lacking, the Holy Path (*aryamarga*) can never come into existence. By whom and by what then will the Bijas of the two *avaranas* be destroyed, and how can they be destroyed in such a way that the distinction of the Gotras can be established on the basis of the *avaranas*? Since the Holy Path cannot come into existence, it is absurd to attribute to infernal beings the Bijas of pure dharmas (the three pure *indriyas*).

But, in fact, in numerous places, the sacred teachings say that there are innate Bijas. Hence to hold that all Bijas were originated at a point of time in the past is contradictory to logical reason and the Scriptures. It follows from this that there are two species of Bijas, the innate and the originated.

三·種子六義，生引二因，內種外種

一· 種子六義

然種子義略有六種。

(一) 刹那滅

一刹那滅， 謂體纔生無閒必滅， 有勝功力方成種子。
此遮常法，常無轉變不可說有能生用故。

(二) 果俱有

二果俱有， 謂與所生現行果， 法俱現和合方成種子。
此遮前後及定相離。

現種異類互不相違，一身俱時有能生用。

非如種子自類相生，前後相違，必不俱有。

雖因與果有俱不俱， 而現在時可有因用， 未生已滅無自體故。

依生現果立種子名， 不依引生自類名種， 故但應說與果俱有。

(三) 恒隨轉

三恒隨轉，謂要長時一類相續至究竟位方成種子。

此遮轉識轉易閒斷，與種子不相應故。

此顯種子自類相生。

(四) 性決定

四性決定，謂隨因力生善惡等功能決定方成種子。
此遮餘部執異性因生異性果有因緣義。
〔述記：遮薩婆多等善法等與惡無記等爲同類因有因緣義。〕

(五) 待衆緣

五待衆緣，謂此要待自衆緣合功能殊勝方成種子。

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF BIJAS

DOUBLE Causality – Internal and External Bijas

1. Six characteristics of the Bijas

The Bijas have approximately six characteristics:

(1) The Bijas are momentary, *ksanika*. – Only those dharmas can be Bijas which perish immediately they are born and which possess a superior power of activity. This excludes the eternal dharmas which, being changeless and immutable, are incapable of generative action.

(2) The Bijas are simultaneous with their fruit. – Only that dharma is a Bija which is simultaneously and actually connected with its fruit (that is, with the actual dharma which it engenders). This excludes those dharmas which are anterior to their fruits and those which are not related with their fruits.

The Bija and the actual dharma, being of different nature, can coexist without contradicting each other: in a certain person there coexist the actual dharma and the 'energy' which engenders it. On the contrary, Bijas of the same nature cannot coexist, because they contradict one another; these similar Bijas engender one another in a series.

When the Bija engenders the actual dharma, the cause is simultaneous with the fruit. When the Bija engenders a Bija which is similar to it, the cause is anteriror to the fruit. – But we attribute 'causal activity' only to present things, not to future things (not yet born) and past things (already destroyed) which have no specific nature (*svabhava*, reality). Hence the name of Bija is reserved for that Bija which engenders the actual dharma, not for that which leads to the production of a Bija similar to itself.

Hence the Bija is simultaneous to its fruit.

(3) The Bijas form a continuous series. – They must, for a long period of time, continue in a homogeneous and uninterrupted series until the final stage, i.e., until the moment when the Holy Path is attained which will counteract and thwart them.

This definition rules out the doctrine that the first seven consciousnesses (the *pravrttivijnanas*) are Bijas. They are not, because they are variable and discontinuous, and are not associated with Bijas.

This definition shows that similar Bijas engender one another in succession.

(4) The Bijas must belong to a definite moral species. – They must possess the capacity to engender actual dharmas, good, bad, non-defined: this capacity is determined by the cause of the Bijas, i.e., the actual dharmas, good, bad, non-defined, which have perfumed and created them.

This definition rules out the Sarvastivadin doctrine that a cause of a certain species (good etc.) can engender, quâ 'similar cause', a fruit of another species.

(5) The Bijas depend on a group of conditions. – To realize their capacity to produce an actual dharma, the Bijas require a concourse of conditions.

此遮外道執自然因不待衆緣恒頓生果。

〔述記：謂外道執別有一法名曰自然，不待衆緣恒頓生果。此方外道爲計亦然。大梵時方等計亦爾。〕

或遮餘部緣恒非無，顯所待緣非恒有性，故種於果非恒頓生。

〔述記：三世有執緣體一切時有，即恒非無。今言待緣種方生果，故遮彼執。若緣恒有，應恒生果。〕

（六）引自果

六引自果，謂於別別色心等果各各引生方成種子。

此遮外道執唯一因生一切果。

或遮餘部執色心等互爲因緣。

〔述記：若增上緣等，義則可爾。〕

唯本識中功能差別具斯六義成種非餘。

外穀麥等識所變故，假立種名非實種子。

二·生引二因

此種勢力生近正果名曰生因，引遠殘果令不頓絕即名引因。

三·內種外種

內種必由熏習生長，親能生果，是因緣性。

外種熏習或有或無，爲增上緣辦所生果。

必以內種爲彼因緣，是共相種所生果故。

〔述記義演：從內共相種子生起者，意說外麥等種子從內識中麥等共相種子生·即有情共緣麥等熏種，後種藉此爲緣復生，故外種子非無因緣生。〕

四·所熏能熏

This definition rules out the cause called 'spontaneity' admitted by certain Tirthikas, i.e., the cause which engenders its fruit spontaneously without depending on any conditions. [It also rules out the causes called Brahma etc.] It also condemns the advocates of the existence of a past and a future for which conditions are always present.

This definition shows that, since the conditions are not always present, the Bija does not produce its fruit at all times and all at once.

·(6) The Bijas 'lead' to their own fruit. – Each Bija leads to the production of its own fruit: a Bija of mind (*citta*) leads to the manifestation of mind, a Bija of Rupa, to the production of Rupa.

This definition rules out the theory held by the Tirthikas of a unique cause engendering all fruits. It rules out the theory of the Sarvastivadins etc., according to which Citta and Rupa are reciprocally 'condition quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*). [We admit that they are reciprocally 'condition quâ contributory agent', *adhipatipratyaya.*] (K'uei Chi).

These six characteristics belong only to the powers or potentialities of the Mulavijnana or the Alayavijnana. Only these potentialities are actual Bijas. As regards the external grains, grains of rice, wheat, etc., they are only the manifestation of consciousness by reason of the potentialities (or Bijas) of consciousness. They are only conventionally called Bijas: they are not real Bijas.

2. Double Causality

The Bija, external or internal, inasmuch as it engenders a proximate fruit, the principal fruit, is called 'the engendering or generative cause'; inasmuch as it leads to the production of a remote fruit, the decaying fruit, in such a way that the fruit does not perish immediately, it is called the 'leading or directing cause'.

3. Internal and External Bijas

Internal Bijas, which are either innate or created by perfuming, must necessarily be perfumed before they can engender fruit. As a result of this perfuming, new Bijas are born while the innate Bijas increase and grow. These Bijas are the 'condition quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*) of the fruit.

As regards external Bijas, they are sometimes perfumed and sometimes not. They are actual dharmas, not 'potentialities' or Bijas in the proper sense of the word. They are not the 'condition quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*) but the 'condition quâ contributory agent' (*adhipatipratyaya*) of the fruit which they produce. The condition quâ cause of this fruit is the internal Bija: the fruit of the grains, like the entire receptacle world, is, in reality, the fruit of the internal Bijas of the 'non-personal' category.

4. THE PERFUMABLE AND THE PERFUMER

[The perfumable is that consciousness in which Bijas can be created or nourished. The perfumer is that dharma which creates or nourishes Bijas.

依何等義立熏習名？

所熏能熏各具四義，令種生長故名熏習。

何等名爲所熏四義？

一堅住性。若法始終一類相續能持習氣，乃是所熏。

此遮轉識及聲風等，性不堅住，故非所熏。

〔述記：若許持種，初地見道無漏心時應失一切有漏種子。聲風等者，卽遮根塵法處色等。生無色界色卽無故，入滅定等心亦無故。〕

二無記性。若法平等無所違逆能容習氣，乃是所熏。

此遮善染勢力強盛無所容納，故非所熏。

由此如來第八淨識唯帶舊種，非新受熏。

三可熏性。若法自在性非堅密能受習氣，乃是所熏。

此遮心所及無爲法，依他堅密故非所熏。

四與能熏共和合性。若與能熏同時同處不即不離，乃是所熏。

此遮他身刹那前後無和合義，故非所熏。

唯異熟識具此四義可是所熏，非心所等。

何等名爲能熏四義？

一有生滅。若法非常能有作用生長習氣，乃是能熏。

Given the 'perfumable' and a 'perfumer', there is 'perfuming' (*vasana*), i.e., creation or nourishment of Bijas.]

What are the characteristics on the basis of which the name of *vasana* or perfuming is established?

The perfumable and the perfumer have each four characteristics which cause the birth and growth of Bijas. Hence the name *vasana* or 'perfuming'.

1. What are the four characteristics of the Perfumable?

(1) It is durable. That dharma is perfumable which, from beginning to end, is of one single species, continues in an uninterrupted series, and is capable of receiving and keeping the *vasana* or habit-energy. This definition rules out the first seven consciousnesses (*pravrttivijnanas*) and their mental attributes (*caittas*), sound, wind, etc., which are not of a durable and permanent nature.

[If the Pravrttivijnanas can be perfumed and harbour Bijas, these impure Bijas will be lost in the mindless meditation when these consciousnesses are not in action, and at the first stage of the Path when the pure mind manifests itself. If 'material form' (Rupa) is perfumable and can harbour Bijas, these Bijas will not be possessed by those sentient beings who are born in the 'formless world' (Arupyadhatu).]

(2) It is non-defined. That dharma is perfumable which is equal, which is not in contradiction (either with the good or with the bad), and which is capable of receiving the habit-energy. This definition rules out that which is good or bad: being too intense and strong in its own quality for impressing or perfuming, the good or the bad is not capable of receiving the habit-energy. It rules out also the eighth consciousness of the Tathagatha which is immaculate by reason of his possession of the Adarsajnana: this consciousness is capable of conserving the acquired Bijas, but incapable of being perfumed anew and receiving new Bijas.

(3) It is perfumable. That dharma is perfumable which is autonomous, which is not as hard as stone, and which is capable of receiving the habit-energy. This definition rules out the mental associates (*caittas*) which depend on the mind (*citta*); it also rules out the unconditioned dharmas (*asamskrtas*), (e.g., space), which, being unique and immutable, are not perfumable.

(4) It is in intimate and harmonious relation with that which perfumes. That dharma is perfumable which is simultaneous with, and in the same place as, the perfumer, and which is neither identical with nor separate from the perfumer. This definition rules out the physical bodies of other persons and the anterior and posterior moments. These physical bodies and the moments, not being harmoniously related with the perfumer, are not perfumable.

Only the eighth consciousness, when it is Vipaka (retribution), presents these four characteristics. It is this Vipakavijnana that is perfumable, not its five Caittas and the Pravrttivijnanas.

2. What are the four characteristics of the 'perfumer' or perfuming factor?

(1) The perfuming factor comes into existence and passes away (that is to say, it is born and perishes). That dharma perfumes which is not eternal,

此遮無爲，前後不變無生長用故非能熏。

二有勝用。若有生滅勢力增盛能引習氣，乃是能熏。

此遮異熟心心所等，勢力羸劣，故非能熏。

三有增減。若有勝用可增可減，攝植習氣，乃是能熏。
此遮佛果圓滿善法，無增無減故非能熏。
彼若能熏，便非圓滿，前後佛果應有勝劣。

四與所熏和合而轉。若與所熏同時同處不卽不離，乃是能熏。

此遮他身刹那前後無和合義，故非能熏。

唯七轉識及彼心所有勝勢用而增減者，具此四義可是能熏。

如是能熏與所熏識俱生俱滅，熏習義成。
令所熏中種子生長，如熏苣藤，故名熏習。

能熏識等從種生時，即能爲因復熏成種，三法展轉，因果同時。

如炷生燄燄生焦炷，亦如蘆束，更互相依。

因果俱時，理不傾動。

which is capable of activity, and which can create and nourish Bijas (i.e., habit-energy). This definition rules out those dharmas which are unconditioned, which are always identical, and which can neither create nor nourish.

(2) It is endowed with eminent activity. That dharma perfumes which is born and perishes, which possesses great creative power, and which is capable of producing the perfuming habit-energy (*vasana*). This definition rules out the eighth consciousness (the Vipaka-mind and its mental associates) and all other dharmas the force of which is weak and slight (that is to say, the image-aspect, *nimittabhaga*, of the consciousnesses).

(3) It is capable of increase and decrease. That dharma perfumes which is endowed with eminent activity, which is capable of increase and decrease, and capable of enveloping and planting the *vasana* (habit-energy). This definition rules out the perfect, good dharmas of the 'fruit of Buddha', because these dharmas, being free from increase and decrease, cannot perfume. If they could perfume and create or nourish Bijas, the four pure wisdoms of the Buddha would not be perfect, and the fruits of the Buddha would be of different grades, some superior and others inferior.

(4) It is in intimate and harmonious relation with that which is perfumed. That dharma perfumes which is simultaneous with, and in the same place as, the perfumed, and which is neither identical with nor apart from the perfumed. This definition rules out the physical bodies of other persons and the earlier and subsequent moments. These physical bodies and the moments, not being harmoniously related with the perfumed, are not the perfumer.

Only the seven Pravrttivijnanas, with their mental associates, possess eminent activity and are capable of increase and decrease. Possessing these four characteristics, they are the 'perfumers'.

Thus, there is perfuming when the consciousness that perfumes (i.e., the *darsanabhaga* of one of the seven consciousnesses) is born and perishes simultaneously with the consciousness that is perfumed (i.e., the *samvittibhaga* of the eighth consciousness). In fact, at that moment, the Bijas (*vasana*) are born or increase in the perfumed consciousness. This perfuming process is analogous to that of the odour of the sesame flower. The seven consciousnesses perfume the Alayavijnana just as the sesame flowers perfume the seeds when mixed together to be ground for oil. Hence the name *vasana* or 'perfuming'.

3. Bijas and Actual Dharmas

The consciousness that perfumes (*darsanabhaga* of a Pravrttivijnana) is born of Bijas: at the moment of its birth, it is a cause capable of increasing and creating Bijas. Hence three dharmas must be considered: the Bijas that engender the consciousness, the engendered consciousness that perfumes and creates Bijas, and the Bijas created or caused to grow by the perfuming influence of the engendered consciousness. These three revolve in a cycle reciprocally and simultaneously functioning as cause and effect, just as a candle-wick engenders the flame and the flame engenders the incandescence of the wick. Or again they are like bundles of reeds stacked side by side, each of which is supported by the other. It is in conformity with irrefutable logic to admit the simultaneity

能熏生種，種起現行，如俱有因得士用果。

種子前後自類相生，如同類因引等流果。

此二於果是因緣性。除此餘法皆非因緣。
設名因緣，應知假說。

是謂略說一切種相。

of the cause and the fruit (cause and effect).

The perfumer engenders the Bija; the Bija produces the actual dharma: these two reciprocal simultaneous causes, being similar to the 'co-existence cause' (*sahabhuhetu*) of the Lesser Vehicle, produce the 'fruit that is useful to man' (*purusakaraphala*).

The earlier Bija engenders a subsequent Bija of the same species: this is the 'similar cause' (*sabhagahetu*) which leads to the 'similar efflux fruit' (*nisyandaphala*).

These two types of generation (actual dharma engendering Bija and Bija engendering actual dharma; Bija engendering Bija) are the true 'causality' (*hetupratyaya*). Apart from these, all other dharmas, are not conditions quâ cause (*hetupratyaya*). If they are termed condition quâ cause it is metaphorically speaking.

This concludes the summary exposition of the Alayavijnana considered as *sarvabijaka*.

第三章・行相所緣分別

此識行相所緣云何？

謂不可知執受處了。

了謂了別，即是行相，識以了別爲行相故。

處謂處所，即器世間，是諸有情所依處故。

執受有二，謂諸種子及有根身。

諸種子者，謂諸相名分別習氣。
有根身者，謂諸色根及根依處。
此二皆是識所執受，攝爲自體同安危故。

執受及處，俱是所緣。

一・ 明四分義

阿賴耶識因緣力故，自體生時內變爲種及有根身外變爲器。

即以所變爲自所緣，行相仗之而得起故。

此中了者，謂異熟識於自所緣有了別用。
此了別用，見分所攝。

§ III. AKARA AND ALAMBANA

Mode of Activity and Object of Perception

WHAT is the 'mode of activity' (*akara*) of the Alayavijnana? And what is its 'object of perception' (*alambana*)?

Vasubandhu replies:

> It is impossible to comprehend completely what it 'holds and receives' (*upadi*), its 'place' or 'locality' (*sthana*), and its power of perception and discrimination (*vijnapti*).

The 'mode of activity' of consciousness is perception or discrimination (vijnapti), because it is in perception or discrimination that consciousness has its mode of activity (*akara*).

Perception is that which is called *darsanabhaga*, that aspect of consciousness which is vision or perception.

The object of perception (*alambana*) of the Alayavijnana is twofold: its 'place' (*sthana*) and 'what it holds and receives' (*upadi*).

By 'place' or 'locality' is meant the receptacle-world, because it is the place that supports all living beings.

The *upadi* is twofold: the Bijas and the 'body with its sense-organs'. Upadi means holding and receiving, that is to say, the Bijas and the physical body are held and received by the Alayavijnana.

By Bijas are meant three kinds of perfuming influence (*vasana*); image (*nimitta*), name (*nama*), and discriminating influence (*vikalpavasana*).

By the 'body with its sense-organs' are meant the five material organs and their support (i.e., their supporting physical body).

These two (Bijas and body) are held and received by the Alayavijnana, integrated in its being and sharing its good or bad destiny.

Both the *upadi* and the *sthana* are the objects of perception (*alambana*) of the Alayavijnana.

1. THEORY OF BHAGAS

The Alayavijnana, in its essential nature, (*svabhava*, 'self-nature'), is born by the force of causes and conditions. Being born, it has a twofold activity: it develops, internally (i.e., as internal object), into Bijas and a body possessed of sense-organs, and externally, into the receptacle-world. These various dharmas, developed from itself, are its 'image' aspect, *nimittabhaga*. In this image aspect, it finds its object (*alambana*), and it is in dependence upon this object that it has its mode of activity (*akara*).

The term *vijnapti* in the Stanza signifies that the Vipakavijnana (i.e., the Alayavijnana) has an activity of perception in relation to its object. This activity of perception is the 'vision' or 'perception' aspect, the *darsanabhaga*, of the Alayavijnana.

(一) 二分分別

然有漏識自體生時，皆似所緣能緣相現。
彼相應法應知亦爾。
似所緣相說明相分，似能緣相說明見分。
若心心所無所緣相，應不能緣自所緣境。
或應一一能緣一切。
自境如餘，餘如自故。

若心心所無能緣相，應不能緣，如虛空等。

或虛空等亦是能緣。

故心心所必有二相。

如契經說，一切唯有覺，所覺義皆無，能覺所覺分，各自然而轉。
〔述記：引厚嚴經。〕

(二) 三分分別

執有離識所緣境者，彼說外境是所緣，相分名行相，見分名事，是心心所自體相故。

心與心所同所依緣，行相相似。
〔述記：心心所同所依所緣，據依一根緣一境故。行相相似，俱有似境相。隨是青等行相各別，總相似故。〕

事雖數等而相各異，識受想等相各別故。
〔述記：識受等體各是一故而相狀別，識受想等體性相狀各各別故。〕

達無離識所緣境者，則說相分是所緣，見分名行相。

(1) Two Bhagas (Aspects)

An impure consciousness, from the moment of the birth of its essential nature, manifests itself in two seeming aspects (*laksanas*): as object of perception (*alambana*), and as subject of perception (*salambana*). This should likewise be understood of all 'associates' of consciousness (*samprayuktas* or *caittas*, associated mental activities). As a seeming object, it is called the perceived aspect or the 'image' aspect of consciousness or the *nimittabhaga*. As a seeming subject, it is called the perceiving or 'perception' aspect or the *darsanabhaga*.

If the mind and its associates (*citta* or consciousness and *caittas*) did not have in themselves the image of the perceived object, they would be incapable of perceiving their own object of perception, or else they would, as well as other Cittas-Caittas, be capable of perceiving indiscriminately all objects, perceiving their own object as they do others and perceiving other objects as they do their own.

If the mind and its associates did not have in themselves the character of the subject of perception, they would be incapable of perceiving anything; they would have no object of perception; like space, they would not be aware of anything at all. Or else we may say that space itself takes an object and is aware of it.

Hence the mind and its associates must of necessity have two aspects, the perceived aspect and the perceiving aspect (*nimittabhaga* and *darsanabhaga*). As the Ghanavyuha Sutra says, 'All is mere consciousness; a real object of consciousness does not exist. The subjective (perception) aspect and the objective (image) aspect of consciousness arise spontaneously by themselves.'

(2) Three Bhagas

1. When it is admitted, with the old schools of Buddhism, that consciousness has as the 'condition quâ object' (*alambanapratyaya*) a thing that is external to it, the following definitions would be established: (1) the external thing is the perceived object of consciousness (*alambana*); (2) the internal image (which is our *nimittabhaga*) is the activity or mode of being of consciousness; (3) the vision, that which perceives (our *darsanabhaga*), is consciousness itself, i.e., the 'thing' or substance (*dravya*), because vision is the true substance of the mind and its associates (*citta-caittas*).

In this system, the mind and its associates, i.e., consciousness and its associated activities (*samprayuktas*), have the same point of support (*asraya*) and the same object, because they have as point of support the same organ (*indriya*, organ of sight etc. and organ of Manas) and as perceived image the same external object (e.g., blue colour). Their activities (*akara*), too, appear to be similar. Although the associate dharmas are equal in number (one consciousness, one sensation, etc., at the same moment), yet their characters (*laksanas*) are different, because the operations of consciousness and its associates such as sensation and conception (*vedana* and *Samjna*) are distinct.

2. But those who understand that objects external to consciousness are

相見所依自體名事，即自證分。

此若無者，應不自憶心心所法，如不曾更境必不能憶故。

心與心所同所依根，所緣相似，行相各別，了別領納等作用各異故。事雖數等而相各異，識受等體有差別故。

然心心所一一生時，以理推徵各有三分。

所量能量量果別故，相見必有所依體故。

如集量論伽他中說，似境相所量，能取相，自證，即能量及果，此三體無別。

(三) 四分分別

又心心所若細分別應有四分，三分如前，復有第四證自證分。

此若無者，誰證第三？心分既同，應皆證故。

non-existent say that the object (*alambana*) of consciousness (i.e., the image) is the *nimittabhaga*, while the activity (*akara*) of consciousness (i.e., the act of consciousness that perceives the image) is the *darsanabhaga*.

But these two Bhagas must have a basis or support (*asraya*); in other words, there exists what is called the *dravya*, the 'thing', which is the infrastructure and the essential nature (*svabhava*, 'substance') of the first two Bhagas, and which is consciousness itself. This is called the 'self-corroboratory' aspect or the *svasamvittibhaga*. If this Bhaga which is aware of the *darsanabhaga* were lacking, there would be no memory or recollection of the mind and its activities (*citta-caittas*), just as there is no memory or recollection of images that have never been perceived. There should therefore be: (1) the image, *nimittabhaga*; (2) the perception of the image, *darsanabhaga*; (3) the knowledge or awareness that perception of the image has taken place, *svasamvittibhaga*.

The mind and its associates (i.e., consciousness and its associated activities) have the same supporting basis. The images they perceive bear a close resemblance to each other, but are not one and the same. Their activities are different, because, while the action of consciousness is to perceive, the action of sensation (*vedana*) is to feel, etc. The 'things' in question (consciousness and its associates) are equal in number (one consciousness, one sensation, etc.), but their characters are different, because the natures of consciousness, of sensation, etc., are different.

3. On examining rationally the mind and its associates and the mode of their manifestation, one sees that each of them has three aspects or Bhagas, The reasons for this are as follows:

(1) Three aspects must be distinguished: (a) 'that which is perceived', i.e., the *nimittabhaga*; (b) 'the act of perception', i.e., the *darsanabhaga*; (c) the 'fruit of the act of perception', which is the *samvittibhaga* or 'substantial' Bhaga.

(2) The *nimittabhaga* and the *darsanabhaga* must have their supporting basis in a thing that is their 'substance', *svabhava*.

As taught in a stanza of the *Pramanasamuccaya*: 'The *nimitta* or internal image, which resembles an external thing, is the object of the act of perception. What perceives this image and the consciousness behind the perception (*svasamvitti*) are respectively the act of perception and the fruit of that act. The substance of these three is not differentiated.'

(3) Four Bhagas

Finally, if the mind and its associates are minutely and subtly analysed, it can be seen that they should have four Bhagas: three as explained above and a fourth, the 'Bhaga which corroborates the self-corroboratory Bhaga' or the *svasamvitti-samvitti-bhaga*.

1. If a fourth Bhaga is lacking, by what will the *svasamvitti*, in its turn, be perceived and corroborated? The *svasamvitti*, being a Bhaga of the mind, must be corroborated, as the *darsana* is corroborated by the *svasamvitti*.

又自證分應無有果，諸能量者必有果故。
不應見分是第三果，見分或時非量攝故。
由此見分不證第三，證自體者必現量故。

此四分中前二是外，後二是內。

初唯所緣，後三通二。

謂第二分但緣第一，或量非量，或現或比。

第三能緣第二第四。證自證分唯緣第三，非第二者，以無用故。第三第四皆現量攝。

故心心所四分合成，具所能緣，無無窮過。非即非離，唯識理成。

是故契經伽他中說，衆生心二性，內外一切分，所取能取纏，見種種差別。
〔述記：卽厚嚴經。〕

此頌意說衆生心性二分合成，若內若外皆有所取能取纏縛，見有種種或量非量或現或比多分差別。
此中見者是見分故。

(四) 三分，二分，一分

如是四分或攝爲三，第四攝入自證分故。

2. If a fourth Bhaga is lacking, what will be the fruit of the *svasamvitti*? The *svasamvitti*, being the act of perception, must have a fruit. Can it be said that the *darsana* is its fruit? Impossible, because, if it were its fruit, it would always corroborate it by 'illogical inference', since 'illogical inference' is its nature. In other words, the *darsana* is not always characterized by 'direct or sense inference'. Hence it does not corroborate the *svasamvitti*. The corroborator of the *svasamvitti* must be a fourth Bhaga which is characterized by the quality of direct or sense inference.

Bhagavibhanga

Among the four Bhagas, the first two are 'external' while the last two are 'internal'.

The first Bhaga, i.e., the mental image, is only the object of perception (*alambana*); the three others are both subject and object of perception (*salambana* and *alambana*).

The second Bhaga, i.e., the mental vision, takes as its object the first Bhaga. It sometimes functions by correct inference and sometimes by 'erroneous' or illogical inference. In the case of the former, it is sometimes 'direct inference' and sometimes 'comparative' or logical inference.

The third Bhaga, i.e., the *svasamvittibhaga* can take as its objects both the second, *darsanabhaga*, and the fourth, *svasamvittisamvittibhaga*.

The fourth Bhaga, i.e., the *svasamvittisamvittibhaga*, takes only the third as its object; it does not take the second which is already taken as its object by the third. Both the third and the fourth Bhagas belong to the 'direct inference' category.

Thus, the mind and its associates are constituted by the amalgamation of four Bhagas, which are object and subject (*alambana* and *salambana*); which form a closed circuit without the defect of linking up a series of Bhagas *ad infinitum*; which are neither identical, considering the diversity of their action, nor separate, considering the unity of their substance (*svabhava*); and which consequently establish the doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata.

That is why it is said in a stanza in the Ghanavyuha Sutra: 'The mind of sentient beings is of two kinds, internal and external. Being internal and external, the Bhagas are entangled in "being apprehended" and "apprehending". The *darsana* is of different kinds.'

The meaning of the stanza is this: The nature of the mind of sentient beings is constituted by the amalgamation of two kinds of Bhagas. Being internal or external, these Bhagas are entangled in the object (which is apprehended) and the subject (which apprehends). The *darsana* functions in different ways: as 'correct inference' or 'erroneous inference'; as 'direct inference" or 'comparative inference'. By *darsana* is meant *darsanabhaga*.

(4) Three Bhagas, two Bhagas, one Bhaga

The four Bhagas may be comprised in three, because the fourth may be included in the third.

或攝爲二，後三俱是能緣性故，皆見分攝。此言見者，是能緣義。

或攝爲一，體無別故。如入楞伽伽他中說，由自心執著，心似外境轉，彼所見非有，是故說唯心。

如是處處說唯一心。

此一心言亦攝心所。

故識行相即是了別，了別即是識之見分。

二· 所緣義

(一) 外境

處器世間

所言處者，謂異熟識由共相種成熟力故變似色等器世閒相，即外大種及所造色。

雖諸有情所變各別，而相相似，處所無異，如衆燈明各徧似一。

〔述記：如山河等業衆人並相似，及心於上共用無礙，故不相障。〕

誰異熟識變爲此相？

有義一切，所以者何？如契經說一切有情業增上力共所起故。

〔述記：初同月藏。〕

有義若爾，諸佛菩薩應實變爲此雜穢土。

〔述記：護法菩薩假爲別義難破月藏，無別師說。〕

諸異生等應實變爲他方此界諸淨妙土。

又諸聖者厭離有色生無色界必不下生，變爲此土復何所用？

是故現居及當生者，彼異熟識變爲此界。

They may be comprised in two, because the last three Bhagas are, in their essential nature, all capable of perceiving objects, and, consequently, can be comprised in the 'perception' aspect (*darsanabhaga*) of consciousness.

Alternatively, they may be comprised in one, because their substance is not different. As noted in Book X of the Lankavatara Sutra, 'Being attached to itself, the mind manifests itself into what seems to be an external sphere of objects. What it perceives has no real existence. Hence it is affirmed that there is nothing but Mind.'

Hence, in all places, it is affirmed that there is only one Mind. In other words, there is nothing but Mind. The expression 'one mind' includes also the mental associates (*caittas*).

Thus, the mode of being (*akara*) of consciousness is perception or discrimination; perception or discrimination is the *darsanabhaga* of consciousness.

2. THEORY OF ALAMBANA (PERCEIVED OBJECTS)

1. The seeming external object, the term 'place' or 'locality' (*sthana*) in the Stanza: the receptacle-world:

As regards the term 'place' or 'locality' (*sthana*) in the Stanza, what is meant is that the maturing consciousness or Vipakavijnana, by the force of the 'maturing' of its common or universal Bijas, develops into what appears to be a receptacle-world, colour, etc., that is, the external major elements and derived matter.

Although the consciousness of each sentient being manifests itself in its own distinct manner, yet the result of this manifestation is 'common'; that is to say, it is the same for all. In other words, the phenomena of the manifested world are each like the other, so that there is no differentiation of the external localities. An analogy is that of many lamps being assembled, the illuminations of which, though separate for each, seem to combine to make a single illumination. [This signifies that such objects as mountains, rivers, etc., are evolved out of common or universal Bijas which belong to all Alayavijnanas in common. Thus, they are not simply the product of any single consciousness.]

By whose maturing consciousnesses (Vipakavijnanas) are these phenomena evolved?

(1) According to Candragarbha, they are evolved by the Vipakavijnanas of all sentient beings; because the Sutra says that 'the world is produced by the combined sovereign power of the acts of all sentient beings.'

(2) Dharmapala refutes this opinion, saying that, if this opinion were admitted, the consciousness of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas should really manifest itself as this dirty, squalid land here below, and, conversely, the consciousness of ordinary sentient beings (Prthagjanas) and inferior beings in general should manifest itself as the pure lands either of this universe or of other regions. Besides, the saints (Aryas) who, disgusted with the material world, have been reborn in the 'formless world' (Arupyadhatu), would continue, from on high, to manifest their Vipakavijnanas as this inferior world. What would be the point of their doing so? Hence the Vipakavijnanas that manifest themselves as this world are the Vipakavijnanas of those beings who are inhabiting this

經依少分說一切言，諸業同者皆共變故。

有義若爾，器將壞時旣無現居及當生者，誰異熟識變爲此界？

又諸異生厭離有色生無色界，現無色身，預變爲土，此復何用？

設有色身，與異地器麤細懸隔，不相依持，此變爲彼亦何所益？

〔述記：設縱汝宗如大衆部無色有色身，及身生有色上地，旣變無益，麤細懸隔不相依持。如梵王下別變爲地。此異地身不能受用，故變無用。〕

然所變土本爲色身依持受用，故若於身可有持用便變爲彼。

由是設生他方自地，彼識亦得變爲此土。

〔述記：欲界欲界同故。〕

故器世間將壞初成，雖無有情而亦現有。

此說一切共受用者。若別受用，準此應知，鬼人天等所見異故。

(二) 內境

(執受：種子及有根身)

諸種子者，謂異熟識所持一切有漏法種，此識性攝，故是所緣。

world or who will be reborn in it. It is true that the Sutra speaks of 'all sentient beings', but it is concerned only with the minority of them, because it envisages only those beings whose deeds (karma) are the same, and whose Vipakavijnanas manifest themselves in a way common to one another. But the following objections or difficulties present themselves.

a. When a receptacle-world is about to perish and disintegrate, there will no longer be any beings inhabiting it or about to be born in it. Whose Vipakavijnanas, then, will manifest themselves as that world?

b. In the case of those ordinary human beings (Prthagjanas) who are disgusted with the material world and who have been born in the immaterial Arupyadhatu, appearing only in their non-material spiritual bodies, what is the use of their manifesting their Vipakavijnanas, in advance, in the form of an inferior world under the pretext that they will one day fall from the Arupya and be reborn here below?

c. If, with the Mahasamghikas and other schools, we suppose that the spirits of the Arupyadhatu possess bodies, there is, between those bodies and the receptacle-world, a great difference in the density of matter, some of it being gross and some fine, so much so that the earth cannot serve as a support for those bodies. What is the point of their manifesting their Vipakavijnanas from on high as a receptacle-world down below?

(3) Correct Exposition

In reality, if a consciousness manifests itself as a region or land, it is because that region can serve as a support or be of some use to its material bodies. Hence the consciousness will manifest itself as a region as long as that region can support those bodies or be of some use to them.

It follows from this that the consciousness of a sentient being born in the 'desire world' (*bhumi*) of some other universe (Trisahasra) may manifest itself as the 'desire world' of this universe which corresponds to his own stage of evolution.

Hence the receptacle-world, whether at the moment of its approaching disintegration when it is no longer inhabited, or at the commencement of its appearance when it is not yet inhabited, is not without actual existence although there are no sentient beings inhabiting it at the time, being the manifestation of the consciousness of beings inhabiting other places.

What has been written above relates to the question of the universe considered as a habitat used and enjoyed in common by all sentient beings. But different kinds of beings – ghosts (*pretas*), human beings, spirits (devas) – do not perceive the same things. The problem regarding objects for their special use and enjoyment can be solved in accordance with the same principles.

2. The Internal Object, *upadi*, which is twofold, (1) Seeds (Bijas) and (2) Sense faculties and their supporting physical body (Sendriyakakaya):

(1) By Bijas are meant all the Bijas of impure dharmas (*sasrava*), good, bad, non-defined, which are carried by the Vipakavijnana. As these Bijas are comprised in the substance of the consciousness itself, they are its object of perception (*alambana*).

無漏法種雖依附此識，而非此性攝，故非所緣。

雖非所緣，而不相離，如眞如性，不違唯識。

有根身者，謂異熟識不共相種成熟力故，變似色根及根依處，即內大種及所造色。

有共相種成熟力故，於他身處亦變似彼，不爾應無受用他義。

此中有義，亦變似根。

辯中邊說，似自他身五根現故。

有義唯能變似依處，他根於己非所用故。

〔述記：此護法菩薩等解。〕

似自他身五根現者，說自他識各自變義。

〔記述：何以得知變他依處？〕

故生他地或般涅槃，彼餘尸骸猶見相續。

三· 總料簡

前來且說業力所變外器內身界地差別。

若定等力所變器身，界地自他則不決定。

〔述記：有漏通者，身在下界地起上天眼耳及大扶根塵時，第八識緣彼爲境，即自通力緣異地身。〕

As regards the Bijas of pure dharmas (*anasrava*), although they have their point of support in this consciousness, they are not comprised in its substance. Hence they are not its object. This does not mean that they are 'dissociated' from this consciousness, because, like the Butatathata, they are not separate from it. Therefore, in affirming their existence, we do not contradict the principle of Vijnaptimatra.

(2) As regards the sense faculties and their supporting physical body (Sendriyakakaya), what is meant is that the Vipakavijnana, by the force of the maturing of its 'non-common' or 'non-universal' (i.e., private and special) Bijas, evolves what seem to be the sense faculties and their bodily basis, that is, the major internal elements and derived matter.[1]

This Vipakavijnana, by the force of the maturing of its common Bijas, manifests itself also as the visible bodily basis (for the sense faculties) of other persons. For, if it were not so, one would be unable to 'enjoy' the physical sense-organs of those other persons. But at this point there are some who hold that the Vipakavijnana of one person also develops the sense faculties of others. This opinion is justified, they think, by a declaration of the Madhyantavibhaga of Aryasanga:

'The Alayavijnana produces manifestations which seem to be those of the five sense faculties that pertain to the bodies both of oneself and of others.'

But Dharmapala replies that it is only the seeming physical basis (for the sense faculties of other beings) which can be developed by our own Alayavijnana, whereas their actual sense faculties are useless to us (and hence not developed by our consciousness).

(In actual fact), what is said in that sastra is that the manifestations, seemingly those of the five sense faculties of oneself and of others, respectively develop out of the individual consciousnesses of oneself and of those others.

How can it be known that the Vipakavijnana of one person also manifests itself as the body of another person?

It can be known from the fact that, when someone is reborn in a new stage of existence (*bhumi*), or has entered Nirvana, the corpse which he leaves behind him continues to be visible to us. (This corpse is definitely not the manifestation of the consciousness of the departed being; it is a product of our own consciousness).

3. Various Problems

We have seen that consciousness does not manifest itself indifferently as different receptacle-worlds and bodies, Dhatus and Bhumis; it is a question of manifestation proceeding from the force of acts. But consciousness also manifests itself in the power of meditation (*samadhi*), of vows (*pranidhi*), etc: in this case, no fixed rule applies with reference to the receptacle-world, to the body, to Dhatu and Bhumi, to the body of oneself or to the bodies of others. [For example, the consciousness of the ascetic who possesses the

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[1] The sense faculties are those of seeing, hearing, etc. Their physical basis or infrastructure is the physical eye, ear, etc. which do the seeing and hearing.

所變身器多恒相續，變聲光等多分暫時，隨現緣力擊發起故。

略說此識所變境者，謂有漏種十有色處及墮法處所現實色。

〔述記：十色處中五塵通外內，五根唯內。〕

何故此識不能變似心心所等爲所緣耶？

〔述記：等卽等取不相應行及諸無爲無法爲問。〕

有漏識變略有二種，一隨因緣勢力故變。
二隨分別勢力故變。

初必有用，後但爲境。

異熟識變但隨因緣。所變色等必有實用。

若變心等便無實用，相分心等不能緣故。

〔述記：問，若爾，何故心心所法從第八生。既不能變，不須生故。〕

須彼實用，別從此生。

〔述記：須七識等受用於境從第八生。〕

變無爲等亦無實用。

故異熟識不緣心等。

至無漏位勝慧相應，雖無分別，而澄凈故，設無實用，亦現彼影。

'divine eye' (clairvoyance or second sight) and the 'divine ear' (clairaudience or second hearing) manifests itself as objects that are visible to that eye and audible to that ear, even as a Bhumi superior to that in which he is born . . . K'uei Chi.]

The bodies and receptacle-worlds in the form of which the consciousness manifests itself are, as a general rule, a perpetual series. Sound, light, colour and the smell of flowers, etc., in most cases last only for very short periods of time, because their manifestation depends on the force of actual conditions.

We have treated summarily of the different things in the form of which the eighth consciousness manifests itself: impure Bijas, ten *rupayatanas* (of which five are simultaneously 'internal' and 'external', and five, i.e., the five sense faculties, are 'internal'), and real Rupa which forms part of the *dharmayatana* (that is to say, Rupa which is perceived during meditation).

One asks why the eighth consciousness does not manifest itself as mind and its associates (*citta-caittas*), as non-associated dharmas (*viprayuktas*), unconditioned non-active dharmas (*asamskrtas*), as non-existent things (*abhavadharmas*), and does not take these divers categories as objects.

Two kinds of manifestation of consciousness

The impure consciousness, in general, is capable of two kinds of manifestation: 1. manifestation produced by causes and conditions, and 2. manifestation produced by an act of attention and ideation (*vikalpa* and *manaskera*).

The dharmas which result from the first manifestation necessarily possess reality and activity; those which result from the second are simply object of perception or awareness.

Now the maturing consciousness (Vipakavijnana) is capable only of the first manifestation, not the second. Therefore the dharmas, Rupas etc., which are evolved by this consciousness must have some activity.

It cannot be admitted that the eighth consciousness manifests itself as Citta and Caittas, because the Citta and the Caittas in the form of which it would manifest itself, being merely the *nimittabhaga* of the eighth, would not take an object and would therefore be without real activity.

Objection. – You say that Cittas and Caittas are born of the eighth consciousness. Why are they born of the eighth consciousness?

Reply. – It is indeed of the eighth consciousness that the real activities of the seven consciousnesses and their associates are born, because it is necessary that they should 'enjoy' and make use of its *nimittabhaga*, that is to say, the objects in the form of which it manifests itself.

The eighth consciousness does not manifest itself as Asamskrtas and Viprayuktas either, because they possess no real activity.

For this reason, the Vipakavijnana does not perceive the Citta and the Caittas as objects.

All the above refers to the impure eighth consciousness.

When the eighth consciousness reaches the stage of purity (*anasrava*, Buddhahood), it is associated with a superior wisdom. Although it is exempt from all intellectual operations whereby images are perceived (*avikalpaka*), it is pellucid and pure; it therefore manifests all these images of Asamskrtas,

不爾，諸佛應非徧智。

故有漏位此異熟識但緣器身及有漏種。

在欲色界具三所緣，無色界中緣有漏種。

厭離色故，無業果色有定果色，於理無違。彼識亦緣此色爲境。

不可知者，謂此行相極微細故，難可了知。
或此所緣內執受境亦微細故，外器世間量難測故，名不可知。

云何是識取所緣境行相難知？
〔述記：謂外問言，卽經部等薩婆多等。旣行難知，應非是識。〕

如滅定中不離身識。
應信爲有。

然必應許滅定有識，有情攝故，如有心時。
無想等位，當知亦爾。

of Cittas, etc., however devoid these dharmas may be of real activity. If this were not so, the Buddhas would not be omniscient.

But, as long as it is in the stage of impurity (*sasrava*), this Vipakavijnana takes as its object only the receptacle-world, the body and the impure Bijas. When it resides in the Kamadhatu or the Rupadhatu, it takes all these three objects. Residing in the Arupyadhatu, it takes as its object only the impure Bijas. The spirits of this Dhatu, being detached from Rupa, have nothing to do with the Rupa fruit of the acts; but they have the Rupa fruit of meditation (*samadhi*). This is not contradictory to reason, because their eighth consciousness takes as its object also the latter Rupa which is the fruit of meditation.

The term *asamvidita* (incomprehensible or imperceptible) in the Stanza means that the *akara* (that is, the *darsanabhaga* or act of perception) of the eighth consciousness is extremely subtle, and therefore difficult to perceive. Or else the Alaya is described as incomprehensible because its internal object (the Bijas and the sense-organs held by it) is extremely subtle while its external object (the receptacle-world) is immeasurable in its magnitude.

However, the Sautrantikas and the Sarvâstivadins ask: 'If the mode of activity (*akara*) of the eighth consciousness is incomprehensible (*asamvidita*), how is it that the eighth is a consciousness?'

We reply to the Sautrantikas who, like the Sthaviras, believe in a subtle Manovijnana: 'You admit correctly that, in the course of the Nirodhasamapatti (the meditation of annihilation), a certain consciousness does not leave the body, the *akara* of which is incomprehensible. You must therefore admit that the eighth consciousness is always this kind of consciousness.'

And, as to the Sarvastivadins who deny the existence of consciousness in the course of the Nirodhasamapatti, we say to them: 'Consciousness undoubtedly remains during the above-mentioned Samapatti (meditation), because the ascetic who has plunged into it is counted among sentient beings just as when he is, as you know, exercising his mental faculties.'

The same is true of the 'state of mind in which all thinking ceases', the state of coma, etc.

第四章・心所相應門

（一） 阿賴耶識之五心所

此識與幾心所相應？

常與觸作意受想思相應。

阿賴耶識無始時來乃至未轉，於一切位恒與此五心所相應。以是徧行心所攝故。

（一）觸心所

觸謂三和分別變異令心心所觸境爲性，受想思等所依爲業。

謂根境識更相隨順，故名三和。

觸依彼生，令彼和合，故說爲彼。

三和合位皆有順生心所功能，說名變異。
〔述記：謂此三法居種子時及未合前皆無順生心所作用，於三合位功能乃生，旣與前殊說名變異。〕

觸似彼起故名分別。
〔述記：謂觸之上有似前三順生心所變異功能說名分別。分別卽是領似異名，如子似父名分別父。〕
〔述記：此意總顯根等三法有能順起心所功能名爲變異，此觸亦有順生心所功能作用，領似彼三，是故名爲分別變異。〕

§ IV. SAMPRAYUKTAS

Associated Mental Activities

1. THE FIVE CAITTAS OF THE ALAYAVIJNANA

WITH how many Caittas, mental associates, is the Alayavijnana associated, (*samprayukta*)?

Vasubandhu says:

> This consciousness is at all times associated with mental contact (Sparsa), attention (Manaskara), sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna), and volition (Cetana).

The Alayavijnana, from before the beginning of time up to the moment of the realization of the *asrayaparavrtti* (inner 'revolution' or transformation leading to Vajropamasamadhi),[1] is, in all its states, associated with these five Caittas which in reality are 'universals'.

(1) SPARSA

Mental Contact

1. Mental Contact (Sparsa) is defined as 'the union of the three, which is analogous to the transformation of the three, and which causes contact between the mind and its associates (Cittacaittas) and the object.' Its activity is to serve as the basis and support for sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna), volition (Cetana), etc.

'Union of the three': The triad consists of the physical sense-organ, the object, and the consciousness (*indriya, visaya, vijnana*). Union can be effected when these three become suited to one another: eye, form/colour, and visual consciousness, i.e., not a union of ear, odour, and auditory consciousness.

These three pre-exist in a state of Bijas. Mental contact, which also pre-exists in a state of Bija, depends or is based on these three in order to be born. Being born, it causes these three to be united. It is therefore called 'union of the three'.

Prior to their union, the three have not the requisite power for the generation of the Cittacaittas. But, at the moment of their union, they acquire that power. This acquired activity is called 'transformation'.

Mental contact resembles this transformation. That is to say: it possesses, for the generation of Cittacaittas, a power similar to that possessed by the three transformed dharmas. It is therefore called the 'replica' of transformation, or the 'analogy' to it, in the sense that a son is the replica of his father. [That is to say, he resembles his father in many respects.]

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[1] This is the revolution or turning-over which takes place at the base of consciousness, whereby we are enabled to grasp the inmost truth of all existence, thus liberating us from the fetters of discrimination. All Buddhist discipline aims at this revolution without which there is no permanent conversion.

根變異力引觸起時勝彼識境，故集論等但說分別根之變異。

和合一切心及心所令同觸境，是觸自性。

既似順起心所功能，故以受等所依爲業。

起盡經說，受想行蘊一切皆以觸爲緣故。

由斯故說識觸受等因二三四和合而生。

〔述記：眼色爲緣能生眼識，說識依根境二法和合生……三和故觸，說觸依根境識三和合生……受等依根境識觸四法和合生。〕

瑜伽但說與受想思爲所依者。

思於行蘊爲主勝故，舉此攝餘。

〔述記：思能造諸業勝。舉思攝餘法，非但獨取思，故諸心所皆依觸生。〕

集論等說爲受依者，以觸生受近而勝故。

謂觸所取可意等相與受所取順益等相極相鄰近，引發勝故。

然觸自性是實非假。
六六法中心所性故。
是食攝故。
能爲緣故。
如受等性，非即三和。

（二）作意心所

作意謂能警心爲性，於所緣境引心爲業。

The three are all transformed at the moment of contact. However, it is the transformation of the sense-organ (*indriya*) which plays a preponderant part in the production of mental contact. This is why the Abhidharma-samuccaya defines Sparsa as 'the transformation of sense-organs'.

The essential nature of mental contact is to unite all the Cittacaittas in such a way that, aligned and non-dispersed, they 'touch' or come into contact with the object.

2. The activity or function of mental contact is to serve as the basis and support for the four other Caittas, namely, attention, sensation, conception, and volition, because it resembles the power required for the production of the Caittas, the power that belongs to the concourse of the three dharmas.

In reality, the 'Sutra of Production and Exhaustion' [so named because it explains birth and extinction] says that the Skandhas of sensation, conception, and volition (Samskaras) all depend on mental contact as their precondition for manifestation (*pratyaya*). This is why the Sutra says that sense consciousness is born of the union of two factors, the sense-organ and the object – e.g., eye and colour, etc.; that mental contact is born of the union of three factors, sense-organ, object, and consciousness – e.g., eye, colour, and visual consciousness; and that the other Caittas (sensation etc.) are born of the union of four factors, the same three plus mental contact.

3. If mental contact is the basis and support for all the Caittas, why does the Yogasastra say that it is the support for three Caittas only, namely, sensation, conception, and volition?

Because volition is the sovereign power of the 'aggregate of predisposition' (Samskaraskandha) in so far as it prepares and makes up all acts. To mention 'volition' is therefore to mention 'predisposition' and other Caittas as well.

4. The Abhidharmasamuccaya teaches that mental contact is the basis and support for sensation. This is because mental contact is the direct and predominant principle in the production of sensation. The characteristics of agreeableness etc. perceived by mental contact are very closely related to those of advantageousness etc. experienced by sensation. Mental contact is therefore more important than any other Caitta in the production of sensation.

5. The question arises: is mental contact merely a designation of the simple fact of the union of the three dharmas, as the Sautrantikas would have it, or is it a separate thing?

Mental contact is a separate thing, because it constitutes one of the six, hexads, because it is one of the four forms of 'food-appreciation', and because it is a 'condition' (*pratyaya*) like sensation and the other Caittas, none of which alone constitutes the union of the three dharmas in question.

(2) MANASKARA

Attention

The nature of attention (Manaskara) is to arouse the mind to action, and its function is to direct the mind towards the object (*alambana*).

謂此警覺應起心種引令趣境，故名作意。

雖此亦能引起心所，心是主故，但說引心。

有說令心廻趣異境。
或於一境持心令住故名作意。

彼俱非理，應非偏行，不異定故。
〔述記：應非偏行故破正理師，應不異定故破雜集論師。〕

(三) 受心所

受謂領納順違俱非境相爲性，起愛爲業。

能起合離非二欲故。

有作是說，受有二種，一境界受謂領所緣，二自性受謂領俱觸。
〔述記：正理論師有二種受。〕

唯自性受是受自相，以境界受共餘相故。
〔述記：境界受通餘心心所，以彼皆能領境界相故。〕

彼說非理，受定不緣俱生觸故。

若似觸生名領觸者。似因之果應皆受性。

又旣受因，應名因受，何名自性？

若謂如王食諸國邑，受能領觸所生受體名自性受。

理亦不然，違自所執不自證故。

若不捨自性名自性受。應一切法皆是受自性。

故彼所說但誘嬰兒。

然境界受非共餘相，領順等相定屬己者名境界受，不共餘故。

It is called attention because (first of all in the state of Bija, later 'in action') it excites the Bijas of the mind which is about to be born (the other conditions being given) and directs this mind once born in such a manner that it makes for the object.

It exercises the same function in regard to the mental associates (*caittas*), but the text speaks only of the directing of the mind, because the mind is the sovereign power.

According to Samghabhadra, attention causes the mind to turn towards another object; according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, it holds the mind fixed on an object.

Both explanations are contrary to reason, because, in accepting the first, attention would not be 'universal', and the second explanation confuses attention and Samadhi.

(3) VEDANA

Sensation

The nature of sensation (Vedana) is to 'feel or experience the characteristics of an object, whether agreeable or disagreeable or of a nature that is neither agreeable nor disagreeable.' Its activity or function is to produce a 'craving thirst', because it produces a desire for union or separation, or neither the one nor the other.

According to Samghabhadra, sensation is of two kinds: 1. 'object-sensation' (*visaya-vedina*), i.e., experiencing the perceived object; and 2. 'nature-sensation' (*svabhava-vedana*), i.e., experiencing simultaneous mental contact. Only the second kind truly constitutes sensation, because the first is not distinguished from Caittas in general, all of which 'experience the characteristics of objects.'

This opinion is not correct: 1. Sensation undoubtedly does not perceive as its object the concomitant mental contact; 2. one cannot, for the reason that it is 'born *like* mental contact', state that it 'experiences mental contact', because, on this basis, all fruit resembling its cause would be sensation in its essential nature; 3. if sensation experiences its cause, mental contact, it should be called 'sensation that experiences its cause' (*hetu-vedana*), and not 'nature-sensation' (*svabhava-vedana*); 4. if you say that, just as a king lives on the products of his kingdom, sensation can experience the nature of the sensation born from mental contact, and if you call that sensation nature-sensation (*svabhava-vedana*), that, too, will clash with reason, because that means the abandonment of your doctrine of 'non-sensation of itself' and consequently your failure to prove your argument. [Samghabhadra does not admit that mind and its associates can take themselves as their object]; 5. if finally you call it nature-sensation because it never abandons its essential nature (*svabhava*), then all dharmas could be called nature-sensations. Therefore the opinion of Samghabhadra can only deceive infants.

In fact, the object-sensation (*visayavedana*) is not confused with the other Caittas, because, if the other Caittas experience the object, Vedana alone experiences the object in its agreeable and disagreeable characteristics.

(四) 想心所

想謂於境取像爲性，施設種種名言爲業。
謂要安立境分齊相，方能隨起種種名言。

〔述記：謂此是青非非青等，作此分齊而取共相名爲安立。〕

(五) 思心所

思謂令心造作爲性，於善品等役心爲業。

謂能取境正因等相，驅役自心令造善等。

此五旣是徧行所攝，故於藏識決定相應。
其徧行相後當廣釋。

此觸等五與異熟識行相雖異，而時依同，
所緣事等，故名相應。

二· 唯捨受義

此識行相極不明了，不能分別違順境相，微細一類相續而轉，是故唯與捨受相應。

又此相應受唯是異熟，隨先引業轉，不待現緣，任善惡業勢力轉故，唯是捨受。
苦樂二受是異熟生，非眞異熟，待現緣故，非此相應。

(4) SAMJNA

Conception

The nature of conception (Samjna) is to perceive or apprehend the characteristics of an object, and its activity (when it is mental) is to devise and produce various names and concepts. When the characteristics of the object are established – 'This is green, not non-green' – then only can be produced the various expressions that correspond to the general characteristics.

(5) CETANA

Volition

The nature of volition (Cetana) is to cause the mind (Citta and Caittas) to create and work; its activity is to manoeuvre the mind towards the good etc. That is to say: volition seizes the object in its relations with the good etc.; seizing the characteristics of the object, it manoeuvres and compels the mind to labour in such a way that it produces good, evil, etc.

These five Caittas, being universals, are definitely associated with the Alayavijnana. Their universal characteristics will be explained in greater detail in a later section.

These five Caittas, mental contact etc., although they are different from the Vipakavijnana in regard to their mode of activity (*akara*), are similar to it in regard to the time of manifestation, the support, the object, etc. Hence they are called 'associates'.

2. SENSATION

Vedana of the Alayavijnana

Vasubandhu says,

> The Alayavijnana is associated only with the 'sensation of indifference (Upeksa).'

1. There is a repugnance between the Alayavijnana and the two other sensations (joy and suffering, agreeable and disagreeable):

(1) The mode of activity (*akara*) of this consciousness is extremely obscure and unvivid. (2) This consciousness does not discern the sympathetic or antipathetic characteristics of an object. (3) It is subtle. (4) It is of one single species. (5) It forms an uninterrupted series. Hence it is in harmony with the sensation of indifference.

2. The sensation associated with the Alayavijnana is pure retribution (*vipaka*), because it comes exclusively from the 'acts which have projected existence, without depending on actual prevailing conditions (*pratyaya*)'. It proceeds spontaneously as a result of good or bad acts. Therefore it cannot be anything but the sensation of indifference. The two other sensations of joy and suffering are not 'retribution', but 'born of retribution' (*vipakaja*), because

又由此識常無轉變，有情恒執爲自內我。
若與苦樂二受相應，便有轉變，寧執爲我？故此但與捨受相應。

若爾，如何此識亦是惡業異熟？

既許善業能招捨受，此亦應然。
捨受不違苦樂品故，如無記法善惡俱招。

三· 餘心所

如何此識非別境等心所相應？
互相違故。
謂欲希望所樂事轉，此識任運無所希望。

勝解印持決定事轉，此識瞢昧無所印持。

念唯明記曾習事轉，此識昧劣不能明記。

定能令心專注一境，此識任運剎那別緣。

慧唯簡擇德等事轉，此識微昧不能簡擇。
故此不與別境相應。

此識唯是異熟性故，善染汙等亦不相應。

惡作等四無記性者，有間斷故，定非異熟。[1]

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[1] 四不定心所：悔眠尋伺

they depend on actual prevailing conditions, i.e., sympathetic and antipathetic objects. They are therefore not associated with this consciousness.

3. Again, because the Alayavijnana is perpetual and homogeneous, sentient beings grasp it as their 'I' (Ego) or 'Inner Self'. If it were associated with agreeable and disagreeable sensations, it would be heterogeneous: how, then, can it be grasped as the 'I'? It follows from this that the Alayavijnana is associated only with the sensation of indifference.

If the Alayavijnana is associated only with the sensation of indifference, how can it be the retribution of bad acts?

Since you admit that good acts produce the sensation of indifference, you should admit that it is the same with bad acts. Just as the non-defined is not opposed to the good and the bad,[1] so the sensation of indifference is opposed neither to pleasure nor to pain.

3. The other Mental Associates (Caittas)

1. Why is it that the Alayavijnana is not associated with the five special Caittas (desire, resolve, memory, meditation and discernment)?

Because they and the Alayavijnana are opposed to each other.

(1) In reality, desire (Chanda) arises from aspiration for desirable or enjoyable objects. The Alayavijnana proceeds spontaneously as a result of acts and is free from aspirations.

(2) Resolve (Adhimoksa) arises from reasoning and judgment in relation to an object. The Alayavijnana is dull and obscure and has no trace of reasoning.

(3) Memory (Smrti) is the clear remembrance of things that have been practised or experienced. The Alayavijnana is obscure, feeble, and incapable of clear remembrance.

(4) Meditation (Samadhi) can cause the mind to be concentrated on one object. The Alayavijnana proceeds spontaneously and takes a different object from one moment to another.

(5) Discernment (Prajna) is discrimination between acquisition, loss, etc. The Alayavijnana is subtle, obscure and incapable of discrimination.

For all these reasons the Alayavijnana is not associated with the special Caittas.

2. Being pure retribution, the Alayavijnana is associated neither with good Caittas nor with defiled ones.

3. As regards the four non-defined dharmas called 'indeterminate mental associates' (*aniyatas*) [i.e., remorse (Kaukrtya) resulting from detestation of bad acts committed, drowsiness (Middha), reflection (Vitarka), and investigation (Vicara)], they, being discontinuous, are undoubtedly not retributive.

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[1] Good acts and bad acts produce non-defined dharmas.

第五章・何性俱門

一・ 無覆無記

法有四種，謂善，不善，有覆無記，無覆 無記， 阿賴耶識何法攝耶？

此識唯是無覆無記，異熟性故。

異熟若是善染汙者，流轉還滅應不得成。

又此識是善染依故。若善染者，互相違故， 應不與二俱作所依。

又此識是所熏性故。若善染者，如極香臭，應不受熏。

無熏習故，染淨因果俱不成立。
故此唯是無覆無記。

覆謂染法，障聖道故。
又能蔽心令不淨故。
此識非染，故名無覆。

記謂善惡，有愛非愛果及殊勝自體可記別故。
此非善惡，故名無記。

§ V. MORAL SPECIES OF THE EIGHTH CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS CAITTAS

1. Nature of the Eighth Consciousness

Vasubandhu says:

The Alayavijnana is non-defiled-non-defined.

From the 'moral' point of view, dharmas are of three kinds: good, bad, non-defined; but, to be more precise, they are of four kinds, because the non-defined is defiled or non-defiled. To which of these four kinds does the Alayavijnana belong?

The Alayavijnana is exclusively non-defiled-non-defined, because it is 'retribution' (*vipaka*) in its essential nature.

1. If it were good (*kusala*), existence or the cycle of life and death (i.e., suffering) would be impossible; if it were defiled (*akusala*, bad), return and disappearance (i.e., extinction and the way) would be impossible.

2. Again, this consciousness is the point of support or infrastructure for good and defiled dharmas. If it were good or defiled, it would not be capable of supporting good or defiled dharmas, because the consciousness itself and the supported dharmas would be opposed to each other.

3. Again, this consciousness is by nature a perfumable dharma. If it were good or defiled, then, like an object that has an extremely fragrant or offensive smell, it would not be perfumable. Now it is in the perfuming of the Alayavijnana and in the Bijas created by this perfuming that the cause and the fruit of defiled and pure dharmas are to be found. If there were no perfuming, the cause and the fruit of defiled and pure dharmas could not be ascertained. Hence the Alayavijnana is non-defiled-non-defined.

The term *nivrta* in the Stanza means a veil, an obstacle. The defiled dharma is described by this term because it represents an obstacle to the Holy Path of Attainment (*aryamarga*); because it veils the mind and thus prevents its purification. The Alayavijnana is not defiled; it is therefore *anivrta* 'non-veiled'.

The term *vyakrta* in the Stanza means 'defined'. The good or bad dharma is described by this term partly because it produces an agreeable or disagreeable fruit which can definitely be defined or recorded and partly because its species is more easily discernible than that of the non-defined dharma. It can therefore be 'defined'. The Alayavijnana, being neither good nor bad, is *avyakrta*, 'non-defined'.

二· 諸心所法例同於心

觸等亦如是者，謂如阿賴耶識唯是無覆無記性攝，觸作意受想思亦爾，諸相應法必同性故。

又觸等五如阿賴耶，亦是異熟，所緣行相俱不可知，緣三種境，五法相應，無覆無記，故說觸等亦如是言。

有義觸等如阿賴耶，亦是異熟及一切種，
廣說乃至無覆無記，亦如是言無簡別故。
〔述記：此難陀論師等多人爲此解。〕

彼說非理。所以者何？
〔述記義演：是護法假作別師叙成。〕
觸等依識不自在故。
如貪信等不能受熏，如何同識能持種子？

又若觸等亦能受熏，應一有情有六種體。
若爾，果起從何種生？

理不應言從六種起，未見多種生一芽故。

若說果生唯從一種，則餘五種便爲無用。
亦不可說次第生果，熏習同時勢力等故。
又不可說六果頓生。
勿一有情一刹那頃六眼識等俱時生故。

誰言觸等亦能受熏持諸種子？

不爾，如何觸等如識名一切種？

2. Characteristics of the Caittas

Vasubandhu says:

> The same with mental contact (Sparsa) etc.

What is the meaning of this summary definition?

1. What is meant is that the words 'the same' refer to that which has just been said. The definition means that just as the Alayavijnana is exclusively non-defiled-non-defined, so its five Caittas – mental contact (Sparsa), attention (Manaskara), sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna) and volition (Cetana) – are non-defiled-non-defined, because the Caittas, i.e., the associated dharmas, are always of the same nature – good, bad or non-defined – as the Citta (mind), which is 'king'.

2. Or else the words 'the same' refer to the five characteristics of the Alayavijnana. Like the Alaya itself, these five Caittas, mental contact etc., (1) are retribution, (2) are of incomprehensible *akara* (mode of activity) and *alambana* (perceived object), (3) have as their object of perception three kinds of things, (4) are associated with five dharmas, and (5) are non-defiled-non-defined.

3. But, according to Nanda, the applicability of the words 'the same' is not limited. Therefore the Caittas have, with the Alayavijnana, a sixth common characteristic, that of *sarvabijaka*, 'being possessed of all Bijas'.

Dharmapala attacks this opinion, saying that it is contrary to reason:

(1) It cannot be said that the Caittas carry along Bijas as the Alayavijnana does, because the Caittas, mental contact etc., are dependent upon consciousness, which is 'king', and are not autonomous. Further, the Caittas, like the bad dharmas (covetousness etc.) or the good dharmas (faith etc.), are not perfumable. How, then, can they carry along Bijas like the Alayavijnana?

(2) If the Caittas are also perfumable, each sentient being should be sextuple, having six repositories for Bijas: Alayavijnana, Vedana, etc. If that is the case, of which reservoir of Bijas among the six will the fruit, i.e., the actual dharmas, be born?

It is against reason to say that the fruit is born of six Bijas all at the same time, because it is unheard of that a single sprout grows from many seeds.

If it is affirmed that the fruit is born of only one of the six seeds, then the other five seeds are without activity. Nor can it be said that the six Bijas produce fruits successively, one after the other, because they were all simultaneously created by perfuming and are possessed of equal power. Nor can any one hold that six fruits are born at the same time, because there is no single sentient being who has six visual consciousnesses produced simultaneously.

Nanda replies: Who says that the Caittas are perfumable and that they hold the Bijas?

Dharmapala asks: In that case, how can the Caittas, mental contact etc., like the Alayavijnana, be called *sarvabijaka*, 'possessed of all Bijas'?

謂觸等五有似種相名一切種。
觸等與識所緣等故。

無色觸等有所緣故。

親所緣緣定應有故。

此似種相，不爲因緣生現識等。
如觸等上似眼根等，非識所依。
亦如似火，無能燒用。

彼救非理。觸等所緣似種等相，後執受處方應與識而相例故。

由此前說一切種言定目受熏能持種義，不爾，本頌有重言失。

又彼所說亦如是言無簡別故咸相例者，定不成證。
勿觸等五亦能了別。

觸等亦與觸等相應。
由此故知亦如是者，隨所應說，非謂一切。

Nanda replies: Because the five Caittas, mental contact etc., have seeming Bijas which are called *sarvabijaka*. In reality, (1) the Caittas, mental contact etc., have the same object (*alambana*) as the consciousness; (2) they must of necessity have an object; therefore, in an existence in the 'formless world' (Arupyadhatu), they take as their object the Bijas, since the body and the receptacle-world are lacking. Therefore the Caittas are closely related to the Bijas; in other words, they have as *nimittabhaga* the Bijas, – to be more exact, the seeming Bijas.

These seeming Bijas are not the condition quâ cause (*hetupratyaya*) which engenders the actual consciousnesses. Likewise, while consciousness manifests itself in the form of sense-organs (*indriyas*) which serve as the basis or infrastructure for visual consciousness etc., the Caittas manifest themselves parallel to them as seeming organs which do not serve as the basis of these consciousnesses. One analogy is the 'semblance of fire', which is not capable of burning.

Dharmapala does not accept this explanation. In reality, Vasubandhu attributes to the Alayavijnana, as the third characteristic, its being *sarvabijaka*, and, as the fourth characteristic, its having as object *upadi* (of which Bijas form a part) and *sthana*. Nanda cannot, without accusing Vasubandhu of pointless repetition, maintain that the Caittas can be called *sarvabijaka* because they have as objects seeming Bijas (which enter into the fourth characteristic). Therefore the expression *sarvabijaka* must have a different meaning from 'taking Bijas as their object' and can only signify 'receiving, perfuming, and carrying along the Bijas'.

Again, Nanda's argument – that the applicability of the words 'the same' is not limited – goes too far. It cannot be said that the five Caittas are, like consciousness, capable of discrimination, *vijnapti* (which belongs really to consciousness), and associated with the five Caittas. [Sparsa would be associated with Sparsa itself as consciousness is associated with Sparsa.] Therefore the expression 'the same' must be understood to mean 'as is suitable', and does not signify 'the same from all points of view'.

第六章・恒轉如暴流

一・ 緣起正義

阿賴耶識爲斷爲常？
非斷非常，以恒轉故。

恒謂此識無始時來一類相續常無間斷。
是界趣生施設本故。
性堅持種令不失故。

轉謂此識無始時來念念生滅前後變異。
因滅果生，非常一故。
可爲轉識熏成種故。

〔述記：常阿賴耶應不受熏，以是常故，如虛空等。若不受熏，即無生死涅槃差別。〕

恒言遮斷，轉表非常，猶如暴流，因果法爾。

如暴流水非斷非常，相續長時有所漂溺，此識亦爾，

從無始來生滅相續，非常非斷，漂溺有情令不出離。

〔述記：前能引後名曰非常，後水續前稱爲非斷。生人天喻漂，居惡趣如溺。本識能持業煩惱等，漂溺有情，以水爲喻。〕

又如暴流，雖風等擊起諸波浪而流不斷，此識亦爾，
雖遇衆緣起眼識等而恒相續。

§ VI. THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. EXACT DOCTRINE OF CONDITIONAL CAUSATION OR DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

Is the Alayavijnana permanent or impermanent?[1]

It is neither permanent nor impermanent, for, says Vasubandhu,

> It is in perpetual evolution like a violent torrent.

1. By 'perpetual' is meant that, since before the beginning of time, this consciousness has evolved in a homogeneous series without interruption, because it is the creative basis of manifestations of the transmigratory course through the three realms of existence (Dhatus), the five directions of reincarnation (Gatis), and the four forms of birth (Yonis), and also because in its essential nature it is firm enough to hold Bijas without allowing them to be lost.

2. By 'evolution' is meant that this consciousness, from before the beginning of time, is born and perishes from one moment to another, ever changing. As cause it perishes and as fruit it is then born. Thus, it never remains continuously a single entity. Through the evolutions of the other consciousnesses, it is perfumed and thus forms seeds.

If it were permanent, like space, it would not be perfumable; if it were not perfumable, the distinction between Samsara (birth and death) and Nirvana (true deliverance) would disappear.

The word 'perpetual' rules out the notion of impermanence or discontinuity; the word 'evolution' indicates that it is not permanent.

Vasubandhu gives an example.

'Like a violent torrent': it is the nature and being (*dharmata*) of 'causation' which is foreign to permanence and impermanence.

In its sequence of cause and effect, it is like a violent torrent which is never impermanent yet never permanent, and which ever flows onward in a continuous series, carrying with it what sometimes floats and sometimes sinks. So too is this Alayavijnana which, from before the beginning of time, is born and perishes, forming a series which is neither permanent nor impermanent, carrying along sentient beings, sometimes floating, sometimes sinking, without allowing them to attain liberation from the cycle of mundane existence.

Again it is like a violent torrent which, though beaten by the wind into waves, flows onward without interruption. So too is this Alayavijnana, which, though it encounters conditions producing the visual and other kinds of consciousness, perpetually maintains its onward flow.

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[1] That is, does it remain forever immutable or does it come to an end?

又如暴流，漂水下上魚草等物隨流不捨，此識亦爾，與內習氣外觸等法恒相隨轉。

如是法喻，意顯此識無始因果非斷常義。

謂此識性無始時來剎那剎那果生因滅。果生故非斷，因滅故非常，非斷非常是緣起理。故說此識恒轉如流。

二· 破斥諸部

(一) 有部與正量部

過去未來既非實有，非常可爾，非斷如何？

斷豈得成緣起正理？

過去未來若是實有，可許非斷，如何非常？

常亦不成緣起正理。

豈斥他過己義便成？

若不摧邪，難以顯正。

前因滅位，後果即生，如秤兩頭低昂時等。

如是因果相續如流，何假去來方成非斷？

因現有位後果未生，因是誰因？果現有時前因已滅，果是誰果？既無因果，誰離斷常？

若有因時已有後果，果既本有，何待前因？

因義既無，果義寧有？無因無果，豈離斷常？

Or yet again it is like a violent torrent, in whose waters fish are borne along below and leaves of grass above, pursuing its onward course without abandoning it. So too is this consciousness, which perpetually follows its onward evolution, carrying with it the perfumed internal Bijas and the external Caittas (Sparsa etc.).

These comparisons show that the Alayavijnana, from before the beginning of time, has been both cause and effect, and so is neither permanent nor impermanent. They mean that since before the beginning of time this consciousness has been one in which from moment to moment effects are born and causes perish. Because these effects are born, it is not impermanent; because these causes perish, it is not permanent. To be neither impermanent nor permanent: this is the 'principle of conditional causation or dependent origination' (Pratityasamutpada). That is why it is said that this consciousness is in perpetual evolution like a torrent.

2. INCORRECT DOCTRINES

1. Doctrine of the Sarvastivadins and the Sammitiyas

These schools do not accept our theory. They formulate objections which we shall answer.

Objection. – Since past and future, according to the Mahayana, are not real entities, it may be said in that system that they are not permanent; but how can it be said that they are not discontinuous? Since they are discontinuous, how can your principle of conditional causation be established in conformity with the scriptural definition of conditional causation?

Reply. – You admit the real existence of past and future. It may therefore be admitted that they are not discontinuous; but how can you admit that they are not permanent? Since they are permanent, your principle of conditional causation cannot be established either.

Objection. – How can you establish your thesis by simply blaming others for faults and errors?

Reply. – It is difficult to establish the true without first refuting the false. At the very moment when the earlier cause perishes (*nirodha*), the subsequent fruit is born, just as at the moment when one end of the horizontal bar of the balance descends, the other end rises. In this way causes-and-fruits form a series like a stream. Where is the necessity of positing the existence of past and future to establish the notion of non-discontinuity?

Objection. – When the cause is in the state of being present, the subsequent fruit is not yet born. One asks of what can the cause be the cause? When in its turn the fruit is in the state of being present, the earlier cause has already perished. One asks of what can the fruit be the fruit? Since cause and fruit are non-existent, what is it that transcends discontinuity and permanence?

Reply. – The same weakness in your doctrine. If, at the moment when the cause actually exists, the subsequent fruit already exists (in the state of futurity), wherefore does this fruit depend on the earlier cause, since it exists in advance and by itself? Since the notion of cause has disappeared, do you expect to

因果義成依法作用，故所詰難非預我宗。

體既本有，用亦應然，所待因緣亦本有故。
由斯汝義因果定無，應信大乘緣起正理。

謂此正理深玅離言，因果等言皆假施設。

觀現在法有引後用，假立當果對說現因。

觀現在法有酬前相，假立曾因對說現果。

假謂現識似彼相現。

如是因果理趣顯然，遠離二邊，契會中道，諸有智者應順修學。

(二) 有餘部

有餘部說，雖無去來，而有因果恒相續義。

謂現在法極迅速者，猶有初後生滅二時。
生時酬因，滅時引果，時雖有二，而體是一。

前因正滅，後果正生，體相雖殊，而俱是有。

如是因果非假施設，然離斷常，又無前難，誰有智者捨此信餘？

establish the notion of fruit? In the absence of cause and fruit, can you avoid the shortcomings of discontinuity and permanence?

Objection. – You know very well that our notions of cause and fruit are established on the basis of the activity of dharmas. Therefore my objection to your theory does not have unfavourable repercussions on our system.

Reply. – If the thing itself exists in advance, its activity necessarily exists likewise, since the causes-and-conditions on which this activity depends are also given in advance. Hence, in your system, cause and fruit are lacking. You should therefore admit the principle of conditional causation as taught in the Mahayana.

This principle is 'profound and mysterious'; it is beyond description and explanation. Such names as cause (*hetu*), fruit (*phala*), etc., are mere metaphorical designations.

Considering the present dharma (which alone exists) as having the power to engender the subsequent dharma (which is its fruit), one posits metaphorically a future fruit (whereas, in reality, there exists only the power to produce the fruit) and, in relation to that future fruit, one says that the present dharma is the cause.

Considering the present dharma as responding or making a suitable return to an anterior dharma, one posits metaphorically a past cause (whereas there exists only the correspondence of the present dharma with the past dharma) and, in relation to that past cause, one says that the present dharma is the fruit.

We say that one 'posits metaphorically' because it is the present consciousness itself which appears as the semblance of a future, of a past, of cause, of fruit.

In this way the rationale of the doctrine of cause-and-fruit becomes perfectly clear. This doctrine is very remote from the two extreme views of discontinuity and permance and conforms with the 'Middle Way'. Every wise man should practise and study it.

2. Doctrine of the Sthaviras

Although past and future do not exist, nevertheless causes and fruits form a perpetual series. What is in fact the nature of the dharmas?

However rapid the present dharma may be, – at least the mental dharma, Citta and Caittas, – it has two periods, namely, an earlier period and a subsequent period, birth and destruction. When it is born, it fulfils or atones for its cause; when it perishes, it leads to the production of its fruit. Although there are two periods (birth and destruction), this dharma is nevertheless 'one' in substance. At the very moment when the earlier cause is perishing, the subsequent fruit is being born: although these two dharmas, cause and fruit, are distinct in their being and in their character, they are nevertheless simultaneous, being both present at the same moment.

Therefore, cause and fruit are not mere 'metaphorical designations'. And yet there is no 'annihilation', as in the theory of the Mahayana; and there is no 'permanence', as in the theory of the Sarvastivadins. Furthermore, the difficulties which trouble the other systems are resolved: what wise man would reject our system to believe in another?

彼有虛言，都無實義，何容一念而有二時？
生滅相違，寧同現在？
滅若現在，生應未來。

有故名生，既是現在，無故名滅　寧非過去？
〔述記：彼若救言，誰言於滅，滅卽是無，同薩婆多滅體是有，今難之。〕

滅若非無，生應非有。
生既現有，滅應現無。
又二相違，如何體一?非苦樂等見有是事。生滅若一，時應無二。生滅若異，寧說體同？

故生滅時俱現在有同依一體，理必不成。

(三) 經部師

經部師等因果相續，理亦不成，彼不許有阿賴耶識能持種故。

由此應信大乘所說因果相續緣起正理。

Refutation

All this is mere empty talk, nothing but rambling nonsense: (1) what possibility is there that one *ksana*, one 'instant', should consist of two periods? [One dharma cannot belong to two periods]; (2) how can birth and destruction, which are contradictory, be present at the same time? [The two dharmas, birth and destruction, cannot belong to the same period]; (3) if destruction be present, birth will be future (as say the Sarvastivadins); (4) that which is called 'birth' is existence (*bhava*); that which is called 'destruction' is non-existence (*abhava*): since birth belongs to the present, destruction must belong to the past (as says the Mahayana). [But, replies the Sthavira, who says that destruction is non-existence? This is not the opinion of the Sarvastivadins for whom destruction is present.] If destruction were not non-existence, birth would not be existence; since birth is present and existent, destruction should be past and non-existent; (5) the Sthavira attributes to a single dharma birth and destruction: these two are contradictory, like pleasure and pain; they cannot, together, constitute one thing; (6) if birth and destruction are one, one cannot attribute two periods to a dharma; if they are different, why say that they refer to the same dharma?

Let us conclude that we cannot in reason establish the conception that the period of birth and the period of destruction are both present and simultaneous and that birth and destruction refer to the same dharma.

3. Doctrine of the Sautrantikas

They do not succeed in establishing the causal series, because they do not admit the existence of the Alayavijnana as being capable of conserving Bijas. Hence we must accept the causal series, that is, the principle of conditional causation in conformity with the right doctrine of the Mahayana.

第七章・伏斷位次

隨義立名

一・ 究竟捨位

此識無始恒轉如流，乃至何位當究竟捨？

阿羅漢位方究竟捨。

謂諸聖者斷煩惱障究竟盡時名阿羅漢。

〔述記：此中唯依斷煩惱障盡名阿羅漢，非據所知障。〕

爾時此識煩惱麤重永遠離故，說之爲捨。

〔述記：雖煩惱現行亦名麤重，無堪任之性亦名麤重。〕

〔述記：下正廣解。於中有二，初廣阿羅漢，後廣捨位。初有三師。第一師中有五，一釋頌文，二問，三答，四徵，五釋。〕

此中所說阿羅漢者　通攝三乘無學果位。

皆已永害煩惱賊故，應受世間妙供養故，永不復受分段生故。
云何知然？

決擇分說諸阿羅漢獨覺如來皆不成就阿賴耶故。
集論復說，若諸菩薩得菩提時頓斷煩惱及所知障成阿羅漢及如來故。

若爾，菩薩煩惱種子未永斷盡非阿羅漢，應皆成就阿賴耶識，何故即彼決擇分說不退菩薩亦不成就阿賴耶識？

§ VII. CESSATION OF THE ALAYAVIJNANA NAMES OF THE EIGHTH CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Cessation of the Alayavijnana

Since before the beginning of time the Alayavijnana has been flowing like a stream without interruption. At what moment, in what stage, is it definitely and finally arrested?

Vasubandhu replies:

> The Alayavijnana ends at the stage of Arhatship.

What do you mean by Arhat?

The Aryas or the saints of the three Vehicles are called Arhats from the moment (*vajropamasamadhi*) when they have completely cut off the obscuring 'barrier of vexing passions' (*klesavarana*). [The expression 'to cut off completely' signifies: (1) to destroy radically, to eliminate, (2) to subjugate, to put out of action. The saints of the two Vehicles put their vexing passions (*klesa*) beyond the possibility of rebirth, but they have not yet cleared away the 'barrier which impedes Buddha-enlightenment' (*jneyavarana*).] At that moment the coarse dross (i.e., the crude and heavy Bijas) of the vexing passions is dissociated completely and for ever, and it is then said that the Alayavijnana is arrested.

One may however ponder upon the meaning of the definitions given by the Sastras. There are three opinions.

1. According to the first masters, the term Arhat denotes only the saints of the three Vehicles who have attained the fruit of Asaiksa: (1) all of them have killed the enemies which are the klesas; (2) they all deserve the veneration and assistance of the world; (3) they are all liberated from 'existence in fragments'.

How do you know that this is so?

We know because these masters quote the Yogasastra: 'The Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas and Tathagatas no longer possess the Alayavijnana.'

But they quote this text incompletely! In the same place, the Yogasastra says that the Alayavijnana is lacking also in 'Bodhisattvas who do not fall back'.

These masters reply by quoting the Abhidharmasamuccaya which says that Boddhisattvas retain something of the klesa-avarana, the 'barrier consisting of klesas or vexing passions', right up to the end of their career as Bodhisattvas: 'At the moment when they attain Bodhi, the Bodhisattvas cut off instantaneously the *avaranas* of *klesa* and *jneya*; they become Arhats and Tathagatas'.

Objection. – This proves that Bodhisattvas who have not exhausted their klesabijas are not Arhats and must have Alayavijnana. Why, then, does the Yogasastra say that Bodhisattvas who do not fall back have no Alayavijnana either?

彼說二乘無學果位廻心趣向大菩提者，必不退起煩惱障故，趣菩提故，即復轉名不退菩薩。彼不成就阿賴耶識。

即攝在此阿羅漢中，故彼論文不違此義。
〔述記：下第二說。此卽護法菩薩亦假爲二義於理無違。〕

又不動地以上菩薩一切煩惱永不行故。

法駛流中任運轉故。
〔述記：第八地以上菩薩於無相海任運而轉。〕
能諸行中起諸行故。[1]
刹那刹那轉增進故。
此位方名不退菩薩。

然此菩薩雖未斷盡異熟識中煩惱種子，而緣此識我見愛等不復執藏爲自內我。

由斯永捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。

有義，初地以上菩薩已證二空所顯理故。
〔述記：卽難陀論師等作如是解。〕

已得二種殊勝智故。
已斷分別二重障故。
能一行中起諸行故。
雖爲利益起諸煩惱，而彼不作煩惱過失，故此亦名不退菩薩。

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[1] 述記：初地以前於六波羅蜜一行中修一行，初地以去於六波羅蜜一行中修一切行，八地以去一切行中修一切行。

Reply – The Yogasastra, when it says that Bodhisattvas who do not fall back have no Alayavijnana, does not contradict the Abhidharmasamuccaya. In fact, it refers to those Bodhisattvas who are simultaneously Arhats, or, to use a better expression, those Arhats who have become Bodhisattvas: the ascetics who, possessing the fruit of Asaiksa (Arhat), either by the Vehicle of Sravakas or by that of Pratyekabuddhas, 'turn their mind' and make their way towards Mahabodhi. They become Bodhisattvas since they devote themselves to the realization of Bodhi; being Arhats, they do not fall back to produce klesas; therefore they are 'Bodhisattvas who do not fall back'. They change their name of Sravaka, Pratyekabuddha, or Asaiksa, to that of '*bodhisattva* who does not fall back' (*avaivartika bodhisattva*). Being Arhats, they do not possess the Alaya.

2. According to Dharmapala (second masters), the Bodhisattvas from the eighth Land (Acala Bhumi) inclusive are named *avaivartikas* ('without falling back'). From that Land onwards they no longer possess Alayavijnana and are included among the Arhats referred to in Vasubandhu's stanza: 'The Alayavijnana ends at the stage of Arhatship'.

In fact: (1) for them all klesas absolutely cease to enter into operation, to manifest themselves in acts; (2) they are carried forward without effort in the rapid current of Dharma [i.e., they spontaneously advance to the 'formless Bhutatathata': ocean of Dasabhumika]; (3) they occupy themselves with all spiritual practices and practise all the virtues in each of them;[1] (4) from moment to moment, without interruption, their pure dharmas increase. Therefore the Bodhisattvas of the last three Lands are *avaivartika bodhisattvas.*

Without doubt these Bodhisattvas have not yet completely cut off the klesabijas which are in their Vipakavijnana; but, their series of actual thoughts being altogether pure, the klesas of Manas (*atmadrsti* etc.) no longer adhere to that Vipakavijnana as to an Inner Self. Therefore the Vipakavijnana of these Bodhisattvas can no longer be called Alaya. Therefore these Bodhisattvas are, in our text, included among the Arhats.

3. According to Nanda (third masters), the Bodhisattva is *avaivartika* right from the first Land for the following five reasons:

(1) He has already 'realized the Principle' (*li*, the Bhutatathata) revealed by the two Sunyatas (since he has practised the *darsanamarga*); (2) he has attained the two kinds of superior wisdom [i.e., the 'Fundamental Non-discriminating Wisdom' (*nirvikalpakajnana*) and the 'Subsequent Wisdom' (*prsthalabdhajnana*)]; (3) he has cut off the two heavy *avaranas* called *vikalpita* (discrimination); (4) he is capable of practising all the virtues of each of the six Paramitas; (5) although, with a view to benefiting others, he produces the klesas, these klesas do not constitute 'klesa transgressions' (*klesadosas*) on his part. For all these reasons he, too, is called an *avaivartika bodhisattva.*

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[1] Kwei Chi: Before the first Land (Bhumi), the Bodhisattva, practising one of the six Paramitas, practises only one virtue of that Paramita; in the first seven Lands, he practises all the virtues of that Paramita; from the eighth Land onwards, he practises all the virtues of all the Paramitas.

See Section on Mahabodhi in Book IX.

然此菩薩雖未斷盡俱生煩惱，而緣此識所有分別我見愛等不復執藏爲自內我，由斯亦捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。

故集論中作如是說，十地菩薩雖未永斷一切煩惱，然此煩惱猶如呪藥所伏諸毒，不起一切煩惱過失。一切地中如阿羅漢已斷煩惱，故亦說彼名阿羅漢。

彼說非理。七地以前猶有俱生我見愛等執藏此識爲自內我，如何已捨阿賴耶名？

〔述記：前第二師作如此難。〕

第三師答

若彼分別我見愛等不復執藏說名爲捨，
則預流等諸有學位亦應已捨阿賴耶名，許便違害諸論所說。

〔述記：徵難辭。〕

地上菩薩所起煩惱皆由正知，不爲過失。非預流等得有斯事，寧可以彼例此菩薩？

〔述記：第三師會。〕

彼六識中所起煩惱雖由正知不爲過失，而第七識有漏心位任運現行執藏此識，寧不與彼預流等同？

〔述記：論主難云………〕

由此故知彼說非理。

〔述記：第八地去諸菩薩等無漏相續，一切煩惱皆不現行，雖有種子，現行皆盡可得名捨。〕

然阿羅漢斷此識中煩惱麤重究竟盡故，不復執藏阿賴耶識爲自內我。

〔述記：結正義。〕

由斯永失阿賴耶名說之爲捨，

非捨一切第八識體。

勿阿羅漢無識持種，爾時便入無餘涅槃。

Doubtless he has as yet not completely cut off his 'inborn' klesas, but no *atmadrsti* etc. of the *vikalpita* class can adhere to his Vipakavijnana as to an Ego or Inner Self. Hence his Vipakavijnana can no longer be called Alaya. Therefore he has no Alaya and may be designated by the term 'Arhat'.

And we read in the Abhidharmasamuccaya: 'The Bodhisattvas of the ten Lands have not completely cut off all their klesas, but the klesas, like poisons that have been subdued by mantras and herbs, do not produce any klesa transgressions (klesadosas) (having been overcome by pure wisdom, *anasravajnana*). The Bodhisattvas in all Lands are therefore similar to Arhats who have cut off their klesas.

Hence Bodhisattvas of all Lands can be called Arhats.

4. The first and the second masters do not accept this thesis.

In the first seven Lands, Self-belief (*atmadrsti*), Self-love (*atmasneha*), etc., of the 'inborn' category (associated with Manas) continue to cling to the Vipakavijnana as to an Ego or Inner Self: hence the Vipakavijnana is always Alaya. How, then, can we cease to use the term Alaya?

Nanda replies: 'In view of the cessation of the *atmadrsti* called *vikalpita* (discrimination, associated with Manovijnana), it must be admitted that it is no longer Alaya.'

Then it is no longer Alaya for the Saiksas (Srotaapanna etc.), a thesis in contradiction with the Sastras.

Nanda replies: 'No, because the klesas produced by the Bodhisattvas of the Lands are not *klesadosa* by reason of their pure wisdom. Srotaapannas etc. cannot possibly produce such klesas. How, then, can you liken them to these Bodhisattvas?'

One must liken these Bodhisattvas to the Srotaapannas. Doubtless the klesas produced by their first six consciousnesses are not *klesadosa* by reason of their pure wisdom, but their seventh consciousness (Manas) is impure (*sasrava*), and, in its spontaneous manifestation, continues to cling to the Vipakavijnana as to an Ego or Inner Self. Therefore Nanda's opinion is contradictory to reason. [The Bodhisattvas, right from the eighth Land, are a pure series; klesas no longer enter into operation; although klesabijas remain, the actual klesas have disappeared. One can therefore say that the klesas have been abandoned. Before the eighth Land, the klesas are in actual manifestation. How, then, can it be said that the Alaya has been abandoned?]

5. [Let us conclude by agreeing with the first and the second masters.] The Arhats have cut off the coarse and heavy klesas of the Vipakavijnana; they have completely disappeared at the Vajropamasamadhi (definition of the first masters); they no longer cling or attach themselves to the Vipakavijnana as to an Ego or Inner Self (a definition which includes the Bodhisattvas of the eighth Land, as taught by the second masters.) One must therefore say that their Vipakavijnana loses for ever its name of Alaya, and that they have abandoned the Alayavijnana.

It is not true that, in abandoning the Alayavijnana, the Arhats abandon in

二· 隨義立名

然第八識雖諸有情皆悉成就，而隨義別立種種名。

謂或名心，由種種法熏習種子所積集故。

或名阿陀那，執持種子及諸色根令不壞故。

或名所知依，能與染凈所知諸法爲依止故。

或名種子識，能偏任持世出世間諸種子故。

此等諸名通一切位。

或名阿賴耶，攝藏一切雜染品法令不失故，我見愛等執藏以爲自內我故。

此名唯在異生有學，非無學位不退菩薩有雜染法執藏義故。

或名異熟識，能引生死善不善業異熟果故。

此名唯在異生二乘諸菩薩位，非如來地猶有異熟無記法故。

或名無垢識最極清凈，諸無漏法所依止故。

此名唯在如來地有，菩薩二乘及異生位持有漏種可受熏習，未得善凈第八識故。

如契經說，如來無垢識，是凈無漏界，解脫一切障，圓鏡智相應。

〔述記：此卽如來功德莊嚴經頌也。〕

its entirety the substance of the eighth consciousness, and that, at the moment of Vajropama-samadhi, through the lack of all consciousness bearing Bijas, they enter 'Nirvana-without-residue' or 'final Nirvana-without-vestiges-of-reincarnation' (*nirupadhisesanirvanadhatu*).

2. NAMES AND VARIETIES OF THE EIGHTH CONSCIOUSNESS

The eighth consciousness, although it is possessed by all sentient beings, receives different names according to the variety of view-points:

1. *Citta*, 'mind', of the root *ci*, to accumulate, because it is the 'accumulation of Bijas which are perfumed by various dharmas, i.e., the seven consciousnesses'.
2. *Adanavijnana*, 'consciousness that retains', that retains Bijas and material organs and prevents them from perishing.
3. *Jneyasraya*, 'basis and support for the knowable', because the eighth consciousness is the basis and support of dharmas, objects of knowledge (*jneya*), defiled or pure.
4. *Bijavijnana*, 'seed consciousness', because, universally, it carries within it all the mundane and supramundane Bijas.

All these names and others (Mulavijnana, Bhavangavijnana, etc.) are suitable for all states of the eighth consciousness. But it is also called by the following names:

1. *Alaya*, 'storehouse consciousness', because it includes all defiled dharmas (*samklesa*) and thus prevents them from disappearing; because Self-belief (*atmadrsti*), Self-love (*atmasneha*), etc., cling to it as to an Ego or Inner Self. The name of *alaya* is only suitable for the eighth consciousness of Prthagjanas and *Saiksas*, because defiled dharmas (*samklesa*) are non-existent in Arhats and Bodhisattvas 'who do not fall back'.

2. *Vipakavijnana*, the 'retribution consciousness', because it is the fruit of retribution of good and bad acts which project Samsara (birth and death). This name is suitable for the eighth consciousness of Prthagjanas, the saints of the two Vehicles, and all Bodhisattvas, because in all those beings there are non-defined dharmas that are retribution. But this name stops at the Land of Tathagatas, where there are no longer any non-defined dharmas that are retribution, where nothing remains but goodness.

3. *Vimalavijnana*, 'stainless or immaculate consciousness', the basis and support for all perfectly pure dharmas (*anasrava*). [Some scholars make this consciousness the ninth consciousness.] This name is only suitable for the eighth consciousness of the perfected beings of the Land of Tathagatas, because the eighth consciousness of other beings (e.g., Bodhisattvas, saints of the two Vehicles, and Prthagjanas) carries impure Bijas of the *sasrava* class, is susceptible to perfuming, and has not yet realized the state of a good and pure consciousness. As the Tathagatagunalamkarasutra says: 'The stainless consciousness of the Tathagatas is by nature pure and non-defiled (*anasrava*),

阿賴耶名過失重故，最初捨故，此中偏說。

異熟識體，菩薩將得菩提時捨，聲聞獨覺入無餘依涅槃時捨。

無垢識體無有捨時，利樂有情無盡時故。

心等通故，隨義應說。

然第八識總有二位。一有漏位，無記性攝，
唯與觸等五法相應，但緣前說執受處境。

二無漏位，唯善性攝。
與二十一心所相應，謂偏行別境各五，善十一。

與一切心恒相應故。

常樂證知所觀境故。

於所觀境恒印持故。

於曾受境恒明記故。

世尊無有不定心故。

於一切法常決擇故。

極凈信等常相應故。
無染汙故。
無散動故。
此亦唯與捨受相應，任運恒時平等轉故。
以一切法爲所緣境，鏡智偏緣一切法故。

liberated from all obscuring veils (*avaranas*) and hindrances, and associated with the 'Great Mirror Wisdom (*mahadarsajnana*).'

Vasubandhu, in the Stanza, lays special emphasis on the cessation aspect of the Alayavijnana, partly because its 'faults' (*dosa*) are serious and partly because it is the first of the two impure states that the saint abandons in the course of his spiritual advancement.

The Vipakavijnana, itself also impure, is abandoned by Bodhisattvas at the moment when they are about to obtain Bodhi, by the Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas at the moment when they enter 'Nirvana-without-residue' and cease in consequence to experience the fruit of their acts.

There will never be a time at which the Vimalavijnana (stainless consciousness) can be abandoned, because the period of meritorious service for sentient beings will never come to an end.

As regards the other names, *citta, adana*, etc., their appropriateness depends on the state of the consciousness. The time at which they are abandoned cannot be determined, because they are abandoned when the Alayavijnana or the Vipakavijnana is abandoned.

One must distinguish the eighth consciousness in its impure state from that in a pure state.

1. In its impure state, the eight consciousness, that is to say the Alaya or Vipaka, is, as we have described it, non-defined (*avyakrta*), associated with five Caittas, mental contact (*sparsa*) etc., having as its object the *upadis*, the *sthanas*, etc.

2. In its pure state, it is exclusively good (*kusala*). It is associated with twenty-one Caittas, namely, the five 'universals', the five 'specials', and the eleven good Caittas.

(1) It is associated with the five universals because these Caittas accompany all minds.

(2) It is associated with the special Caitta of desire (*chanda*), because it always has the desire to realize and to know the thing considered; with resolve (*adhimoksa*), because it always has decision and judgment in regard to all objects; with memory (*smrti*), because it always has a clear remembrance of things formerly experienced; with mental tranquillity (*samadhi*), because Bhagavat never has a non-tranquillized mind; and with discernment (*prajna*), because it always discerns and has a right discrimination of all dharmas.

(3) It is associated with the eleven good Caittas because it is always associated with perfectly pure faith (*sraddha*) etc.

It is associated with twenty-one Caittas only, because, not being defiled and not being distracted, it is not associated with bad and indeterminate dharmas. It is associated with the sensation of indifference (*upeksa*), because it always manifests itself in a spontaneous manner and in perfect equality. It has as its object all dharmas, because the 'Mirror Wisdom' discerns universally all dharmas.

第八章· 以五教十理證有本識

云何應知此第八識離眼等識有別自體？

聖教正理爲定量故。

一· 大乘教

謂有大乘阿毘達磨契經中說。

無始時來界，一切法等依，由此有諸趣及涅槃證得。

初 解

此第八識自性微細，故以作用而顯示之。

頌中初半顯第八識爲因緣用，後半顯與流轉還滅作依持用。

界是因義，即種子識無始時來展轉相續親生諸法，故名爲因。

依是緣義，即執持識無始時來與一切法等爲依止故名爲緣。

謂能執持諸種子故，與現行法爲所依故，即變爲彼及爲彼依。

變爲彼者，謂變爲器及有根身。

爲彼依者，謂與轉識作所依止。

以能執受五色根故，眼等五識依之而轉。

又與末那爲依止故，第六意識依之而轉。

末那意識轉識攝故，如眼等識依俱有根。

第八理應是識性故，亦以第七爲俱有依。

§ VIII. PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EIGHTH CONSCIOUSNESS

How can it be ascertained that, apart from the consciousnesses admitted by the Hinayana, there is an eighth consciousness?

We know this from the Scriptures (texts of the two Vehicles) and by logical reasoning.

1. Mahayana Sources

A Stanza from the Mahayanabhidharmasutra reads:

'There is a Dhatu (Ultimate Cause or World of Reality) which has existed since before the beginning of time.
It is the supporting basis for all dharmas.
From this have come into being different states of existence,
And because of this the attainment of Nirvana is possible.'

First Explanation

The eighth consciousness is subtle in its essential nature and only manifests itself through its activity and effects. The first half of the Stanza characterizes it in so far as it is cause (*hetu*) and condition (*pratyaya*). The last half defines it as supporting and carrying on the cyclic processes of birth and death and the abolition of existence (through the attainment of Nirvana).

1. 'Dhatu' signifies cause (*hetu*): it is a question of the eighth consciousness considered as Bija, the Bijavijnana, which, since before the beginning of time, has been developing itself in a continuous series, immediately engendering all dharmas.

2. The term 'supporting basis' (*samasraya*) signifies condition (*pratyaya*): it is a question of the eighth consciousness considered as the Adanavijnana which 'takes and holds' and which, since before the beginning of time, has been the supporting basis for all dharmas. By this is meant that the eighth consciousness takes and holds the Bijas and is the supporting basis for the actual dharmas. On the one hand, it develops itself as the receptacle-world and physical bodies with their sense-organs: it is the support of both. On the other hand, it is the supporting basis for the other consciousnesses: (1) it 'takes and holds' the five material sense-organs in dependence upon which the first five consciousnesses, the eye-consciousness etc., manifest themselves; (2) it is also the supporting basis for Manas which, in its turn, is the support of Manovijnana. It should be known that Manas and Manovijnana, being both 'evolving consciousnesses' (*pravrttivijnanas*), must, like the first five consciousnesses, support themselves on the sense faculties (*indriyas*) which are simultaneous

是謂此識爲因緣用。

由此有者，由有此識。

有諸趣者，有善惡趣。
謂由有此第八識故執持一切順流轉法，令諸有情流轉生死。
〔述記：現行染法名爲流轉，種子染法名順流轉。〕

雖惑業生皆是流轉，而趣是果勝故偏說。

或諸趣言通能所趣。

諸趣資具亦得趣名。

〔述記：謂器世間是趣所須，趣之資具相從所趣故亦名趣。或資具言釋惑業二名趣所由，唯說內故。〕

諸惑業生皆依此識，是與流轉作依持用。

及涅槃證得者，由有此識故有涅槃證得。

謂由有此第八識故執持一切順還滅法，令修行者證得涅槃。
〔述記：身中無漏種名順還滅法。〕

此中但說能證得道，涅槃不依此識有故。

〔述記：謂此但說能證得道執無漏種，非執涅槃，涅槃不親依此識故。〕

或此但說所證涅槃，是修行者正所求故。

或此雙說涅槃與道，俱是還滅品類攝故。

謂涅槃言顯所證滅，後證得言顯能得道。

由能斷道斷所斷惑，究竟盡位總得涅槃。

能所斷證皆依此識，是與還滅作依持用。

with them, and that the eighth, being a consciousness, must also have a supporting basis, which is Manas.

Such is the activity of the eighth consciousness as cause (*hetu*) and as condition (*pratyaya*).

3. The words 'from this' in the Stanza signify 'By reason of the existence of this consciousness'.

4. The clause 'have come into being different states of existence' means that there are good and bad destinies (*gatis*). It is by reason of the existence of this eighth consciousness that dharmas or Bijas favourable to 'samsaric existence' [birth and death (*pravrtti*)] are taken and held in such a manner that sentient beings continue to proceed in cycles of birth and death.

The text speaks only of Gati, destiny. Without doubt, passions (*klesa*), acts (*karman*) and modes of birth (*yoni*) also are *pravrtti*, i.e., factors in the cyclic process of birth and death, but Gati is the principal part of the fruit (*dukkhaphala*). Hence the text designates *pravrtti* by a single word Gati. Alternatively, the word Gati comprehends at the same time 'the region to which one journeys', that is to say, one's destiny, and 'that which causes one to go', i.e., passions, acts and modes of birth. The accompanying factors of Gati – on the one hand the receptacle-world and on the other the passions and acts – can also be designated by the term Gati. By this fact, passions, acts and modes of birth all depend on, and are supported by, the eighth consciousness which is the sustainer of *pravrtti* or destiny.

5. The phrase 'attainment of Nirvana' in the Stanza signifies that, by reason of the existence of this eighth consciousness, the realization and attainment of Nirvana can take place. In fact, it is this consciousness that takes and holds all the 'dharmas of abolition or annihilation': that is to say, the pure Bijas which cause the actual Path of Attainment to be born to enable the ascetic to arrive at Nirvana.

The text speaks only of access to Nirvana, that is to say, the path of Nirvana. In fact, Nirvana, being unconditioned (*asamskrta*), does not exist by reason of the eighth consciousness; nor is it supported by this consciousness. This consciousness does not take and hold Nirvana; it takes and holds the Bijas of Nirvana which are conditioned.

Or it may be said that the text speaks of the Nirvana to be attained, because it is to Nirvana that the ascetic aspires.

Alternatively, the expression *nirvanadhigama* in the original text of the Sutra may be understood to mean Nirvana and the Path to Nirvana, for both are of the 'Destruction-Cessation' (*nivrtti*) category. The term Nirvana means Destruction or Cessation (*nirodha* or *nivrtti*) which must be realized; the term *adhigama* means the path leading to the attainment of Destruction. By the Path which cuts, the ascetic cuts off the passions (*klesa*) which must be cut; at the moment when all passions are cut off, Nirvana is realized. That which cuts (the Path), that which must be cut (passions), that which leads to

二　解

又此頌中初句顯示此識自性無始恒有，後三顯與雜染清淨二法總別爲所依止。

〔述記：第一句顯此識體非今始有無始有故，出識自體即種子識。〕

雜染法者，謂苦集諦，即所能趣生及業惑。

清淨法者，謂滅道諦，即所能證涅槃及道。

彼二皆依此識而有，依轉識等理不成故。

三　解

或復初句顯此識體無始相續，後三顯與三種自性爲所依止。

謂依他起，徧計所執，圓成實性，如次應知。

今此頌中諸所說義，離第八識皆不得有。

即彼經中復作是說，由攝藏諸法，一切種子識，故名阿賴耶，勝者我開示。

〔述記：達磨經中第二頌也。〕

由此本識具諸種子故能攝藏諸雜染法。

依斯建立阿賴耶名。

非如勝性轉爲大等，種子與果體非一故。

能依所依俱生滅故。

〔述記：諸法及識能依所依俱生滅故，非如彼常，故與僧佉所計異也。〕

與雜染法互相攝藏，亦爲有情執藏爲我，故說此識名阿賴耶。

已入見道諸菩薩衆得眞現觀名爲勝者，彼能證解阿賴

realization (the Path), and that which must be realized (Nirvana), all these rest on the eighth consciousness which is therefore the sustainer of Destruction-Cessation (*nivrtti*).

Second Explanation

The first of the four 'padas' of this Stanza explains the essential nature (*svabhava*) of the eighth consciousness (*bijavijnana*), a perpetual procession of cause and effect which has no beginning in time. The last three padas indicate, at first in general (second pada), ultimately in detail (third and fourth padas), that this consciousness is the supporting basis for impure dharmas (*samklesa*) and pure dharmas (*vyavadana*). By impure dharmas are meant the truths of Suffering and the Cause of Suffering (*duhkhasatyr* and *samudayasatyr*): on the one hand, 'the place where one reincarnates'; on the other, 'that which causes one to reincarnate'; on the one hand, birth or existence; on the other, acts and passions. By pure dharmas are meant the truths of the Cessation of Suffering and the Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering (*nirodhasatyr* and *margasatyr*): on the one hand, 'that which is to be realized', i.e., Nirvana; on the other, 'that which renders possible the realization', i.e., the Path. Both categories of dharma exist by depending on the eighth consciousness, for it is impossible for them to support themselves on the other consciousnesses.

Third Explanation

The first pada explains the nature of the eighth consciousness, a continuous series without beginning. The three others indicate that it is the basis for the 'three natures' (*svabhava*), namely, *paratantra* ('nature of dependence on others', i.e., knowledge 'depending upon another'), *parikalpita* ('nature of mere-imagination', i.e., 'imagined' knowledge of things), and *parinispanna* ('nature of Ultimate Reality', i.e., 'perfected' knowledge issuing from Prajna or Aryajnana) respectively.

The notions expressed in this Stanza can only refer to the eighth consciousness.

In the Abhidharmasutra it is said: 'The consciousness which, being provided with all Bijas, comprises and stores up all dharmas is called Alaya. I have revealed it to Bodhisattvas of superior intelligence.'

Thus, the fundamental eighth consciousness, Mulavijnana, inasmuch as it is provided with all Bijas, is capable of enveloping and storing up all impure dharmas (*samklesa*). This is why it is given the name of Alaya.

It does not resemble the Pradhana of the Samkhyas which transforms itself into Mahat etc., because the Bijas are not the same thing as the fruit (that is to say, not the same thing as the actual Mulavijnana); because the actual dharmas which rest on the Mula and the Mula which supports them are born and perish at the same time.

The name of Alaya is given to this consciousness because impure dharmas (*samklesa*) envelope it as it envelopes them, and also because sentient beings cling to it as to their own 'Self'.

The Bodhisattvas who, having entered the 'Path of Insight into Transcen-

耶識，故我世尊正爲開示。

或諸菩薩皆名勝者，雖見道前未能證解阿賴耶識而能信解求彼轉依，故亦爲說。

〔述記：不問地上地前菩薩皆名勝者，佛皆爲說。地前雖猶未能證解，而能信解不生誹謗，希求此識轉依之果，故亦爲說。〕

非諸轉識有如是義。

解深密經亦作是說，阿陀那識甚深細，一切種子如暴流，我於凡愚不開演，恐彼分別執爲我。

以能執持諸法種子，及能執受色根依處，亦能執取結生相續，故說此識名阿陀那。

無姓有情不能窮底故說甚深，趣寂種姓不能通達故名甚細。

是一切法眞實種子。

緣擊便生轉識波浪，恒無間斷猶如暴流。

凡即無姓，愚即趣寂。

恐彼於此起分別執，墮諸惡趣，障生聖道，故我世尊，不爲開演。

唯第八識有如是相。

入楞伽經亦作是說，如海遇風緣，起種種波浪，現前作用轉，無有間斷時。藏識海亦然，境等風所擊，恒起諸識浪，現前作用轉。

眼等諸識無如大海恒相續轉起諸識浪，故知別有第八識性。

dent Truth', have obtained the 'actual discernment of Truth' (*tattva-abhisamaya*) are called 'Bodhisattvas of superior intelligence'. They are capable of realizing and comprehending the nature of the Alayavijnana. It is therefore fitting that Bhagavat (The World-honoured One) should reveal it to them.

Alternatively, all Bodhisattvas, even those who have not yet reached the first Bhumi and those who have not entered the 'Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth', are called 'Bodhisattvas of superior intelligence'. Although they are not capable of realizing and comprehending the Alayavijnana, they are capable of believing in it and will comprehend it. They will also cultivate themselves in order to obtain the 'inner transformation' (*paravrtti*) of the eighth consciousness. For this reason, Bhagavat preaches to them also the truth of the Alayavijnana.

The various Pravrttivijnanas – that is, all the consciousnesses apart from the Alayavijnana – do not correspond to the sense of that Stanza.

In the Samdhinirocana it is also said: 'The Adanavijnana, profound and subtle, proceeds with all the Bijas like a violent torrent. Fearing that they may believe it to be Atman or the Self, I have not revealed it to mediocre and ignorant people'.

This consciousness takes and holds the Bijas of all dharmas; it takes and receives the material sense-organs; it takes and seizes that which binds rebirth and the perpetual series. It is therefore termed 'adana'.

It is profound because sentient beings who are not possessed of Bijas of Bodhi (*agotrakas*) are not capable of scrutinizing its depths. It is subtle because saints who are possessed of Bodhibijas but whose destiny is peaceful rest (Sravakas and Pratyekas) are not capable of understanding it.

It is the real Bija of all dharmas.

Affected by occasional causes (*pratyaya*), it engenders temporary consciousnesses like waves; but it itself is always continuous like a torrent.

By 'mediocre people' are meant Prthagjanas who lack Bijas of Bodhi. By 'ignorant people' are meant adherents of the two Lesser Vehicles whose ultimate goal is peaceful rest. Bhagavat does not teach them 'the doctrine of the eighth consciousness as the generator of all dharmas' because he is afraid they may misunderstand the meaning of this doctrine and produce 'beliefs in Atman' (*atmagraha*) of the discrimination category (*vikalpita*), with the result that they will fall into bad destinies if they are Prthagjanas and represent an obstacle to the Holy Path if they are Aryas.

Only the eighth consciousness is possessed of such characteristics as are mentioned above.

In the Lankavatara Sutra it is also said: 'Just as the ocean, by reason of the wind which conditions its surface movements (*pratyaya*), produces many waves while its potentialities continue without interruption, so the ocean which is the Alayavijnana, battered by the wind of objects etc., always produces waves which are temporary consciousnesses while its potentialities continue without cessation.'

The eye-consciousness and those other sense-consciousnesses which are not Alayavijnana are not, like the ocean, perpetual series that can produce consciousness-waves. Therefore an eighth consciousness must exist.

此等無量大乘經中皆別說有此第八識。

諸大乘經皆順無我違數取趣，棄背流轉趣向還滅，讚佛法僧毀諸外道，表蘊等法遮勝性等，樂大乘者許能顯示無顚倒理契經攝故，如增壹等至教量攝。

又聖慈氏以七種因證大乘經眞是佛說。
〔述記：引莊嚴論爲證。〕

一先不記故。若大乘經佛滅度後有餘爲壞正法故說，何故世尊非如當起諸可怖事先預記別？

二本俱行故。大小乘教本來俱行，寧知大乘獨非佛說？

三非餘境故，大乘所說廣大甚深，非外道等思量境界，彼經論中曾所未說，設爲彼說亦不信受，故大乘經非非佛說。

四應極成故。若謂大乘是餘佛說非今佛語，則大乘教是佛所說其理極成。

五有無有故。若有大乘，即應信此諸大乘教是佛所說，離此大乘不可得故。

若無大乘，聲聞乘教亦應非有，以離大乘決定無有得

There are innumerable texts of the Greater Vehicle (Mahayana) in which the existence of this eighth consciousness is specially mentioned.

But the question arises whether these texts are authoritative. The answer is that they are, because (1) they are in conformity with 'the non-existence of the Atman or Ego' (*nairatmya*) and contradict the Atman, Pudgala; (2) they turn their back on Samsara (cyclic process of birth and death) and are turned towards Nirvana; (3) they praise the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha and deprecate the Tirthikas (unorthodox schools); (4) they teach Dharmas, Skandhas, etc., and reject Pradhanas etc.; (5) all adherents of Mahayana think that they (the Mahayana texts) are included in those sutras which are capable of revealing essential verities without false conceptions. Consequently Mahayana sutras, like the Ekottaragama and the other texts of the Lesser Vehicle, are part of the Agama.

Furthermore, Aryamaitreya demonstrates in the Sutralamkara Sastra, by means of seven arguments, that the sutras of the Greater Vehicle were really taught by the Buddha.

1. 'Because it had not been predicted in the beginning.' – If the sutras of the Greater Vehicle were preached after the Nirvana of Bhagavat by certain persons with a view to destroying the Good Law, why had Bhagavat not predicted this calamity as he had predicted other calamities to come?

2. 'Because, from the very beginning, the two Vehicles have co-existed.' – The teaching of the Greater Vehicle and that of the Lesser Vehicle have, from the very beginning, existed together. Why should the Greater Vehicle alone not be the word of the Buddha?

3. 'Because the Greater Vehicle is not the domain of the others, Tirthikas or adherents of the Lesser Vehicle.' – The teaching of the Greater Vehicle is vast and profound; it does not belong to the domain of speculation of the Tirthikas etc. who cannot attain to it; it is not promulgated in their sutras and sastras; and, even if it is promulgated, the disciples of the Lesser Vehicle do not believe and accept it. Therefore it is wrong to say that the Greater Vehicle is not the word of the Buddha.

4. 'Because the Greater Vehicle is generally recognized.' – When it is said that the Greater Vehicle was taught by other Buddhas (Kasyapa etc.), and not by the present Buddha (Sakyamuni), the thesis that the Greater Vehicle is the word of a Buddha is conclusively established.

5. 'Because if there is . . . and if there is not . . . ' – If there is a Greater Vehicle, one must admit that its teaching is the word of the Buddha, because, outside the teaching of the present Buddha, there does not exist another Greater Vehicle.

If there is no Greater Vehicle [that is, if the teaching of the present Buddha does not comprise the Greater Vehicle], then there will be no teaching of the

成佛義，誰出於世說聲聞乘？故聲聞乘是佛所說，非大乘教不應正理。

六能對治故。依大乘經勤修行者皆能引得無分別智，能正對治一切煩惱，故應信此是佛所說。

七義異文故，大乘所說意趣甚深，不可隨文而取其義便生誹謗謂非佛語。

是故大乘眞是佛說。

如莊嚴論頌此義言，先不記俱行，非餘所行境，極成有無有，對治異文故。

二· 小乘教

餘部經中亦密意說阿賴耶識有別自性。

謂大衆部阿笈摩中密意說此名根本識，是眼識等所依止故，譬如樹根是莖等本，非眼等識有如是義。

上座部經分別論者俱密意說此名有分識。有謂三有，分是因義，唯此恒徧爲三有因。

化地部說此名窮生死蘊。離第八識無別蘊法窮生死際無間斷時，謂無色界諸色間斷，無想天等餘心等滅，

Vehicle of Sravakas either, because, without the Greater Vehicle, nobody can become Buddha. Who, then, will appear in the world to teach the Vehicle of Sravakas? It is an absurdity to maintain that the Vehicle of Sravakas alone is the word of the Buddha.

6. 'Because it contradicts or opposes.' – All ascetics who industriously cultivate themselves in accordance with the Greater Vehicle are capable of attaining the transcendental wisdom called 'non-discriminating wisdom' (*avikalpakajnana*) which is directly opposed to all vexing passions (klesas). We should therefore believe that the Greater Vehicle is the word of the Buddha.

7. 'Because the meaning is different from the letter.' – The doctrines of the Greater Vehicle are very profound. It is not fitting that one should understand it literally and deny its authenticity by making slanderous remarks about it.

Therefore the Greater Vehicle is really the word of the Buddha.

The gist of the above seven arguments is contained in a stanza of the Sutralamkara Sastra and may be set forth under the following headings: (1) lack of prediction, (2) co-existence of the two Vehicles, (3) fact of not belonging to the domain of non-Buddhist and Hinayana Schools, (4) recognition, (5) existence and non-existence of the Greater Vehicle, (6) contradiction, and (7) difference between letter and underlying meaning.

2. Source of the Lesser Vehicle

The sutras of other Schools also, although in veiled language, say that there is an Alayavijnana of a special nature.

1. In the Agamas of the Mahasamghikanikaya, it is, in an 'esoteric' manner, designated by the term 'Mulavijnana', 'root consciousness'. In fact, it is the point of support for the consciousnesses of the eye etc., just as the root of a tree is the origin and support of its stem, branches, etc. The consciousnesses of the eye etc. cannot have the virtues of a root.

2. In the sutras of the Sthaviras and the Vibhajyavadins, it is, in an 'esoteric' manner, designated by the term 'Bhavangavijnana'. By *bhava* is meant the triple mode of existence (in the three Dhatus); by *anga* is meant cause (*hetu*). Only Alaya, being eternal and universal (existing in the three Dhatus in contradistinction to the eye-consciousness), can be 'the cause of the triple existence'.

3. The Mahisasakas call it the 'Skandha which lasts right up to the end of Samsara' (*samsarakotinisthaskandha*), [because the Alayavijnana lasts right up to Vajropama]. Apart from the eighth consciousness, there is no *skandhadharma* which lasts without discontinuity right up to the end of Samsara. For Rupa (form or matter) is interrupted in the Arupya dhatu (formless world); all

不相應行離色心等無別自體已極成故，唯此識名窮生死蘊。

說一切有部增壹經中亦密意說此名阿賴耶，謂愛阿賴耶，樂阿賴耶，欣阿賴耶，喜阿賴耶。

謂阿賴耶識是貪總別三世境故立此四名。

有情執爲眞自內我，乃至未斷恒生愛著，故阿賴耶識是眞愛著處。

不應執餘五取蘊等。

謂生一向苦受處者於餘五取蘊不生愛著彼恒厭逆餘五取蘊，念我何時當捨此命此衆同分此苦身心，令我自在受快樂故。

〔述記：此衆同分卽是行蘊。〕

五欲亦非眞愛著處，謂離欲者於五妙欲雖不貪著而愛我故。

樂受亦非眞愛著處，謂離第三靜慮染者雖厭樂受而愛我故。

身見亦非眞愛著處，謂非無學信無我者雖於身見不生貪著，而於內我猶生愛故。

轉識等亦非眞愛著處，謂非無學求滅心者雖厭轉識等而愛我故。

色身亦非眞愛著處，離色染者雖厭色身而愛我故。

mental activity that is not Alayavijnana has been annihilated by the Asamjnidevas (mindless deities) etc. in whom thinking (*samjna*) has entirely ceased; 'unassociated dharmas' (Viprayuktas) have no separate existence apart from *rupa* and *cittacaittas*: all these points have already been established. Therefore the Skandha which the Mahisasakas speak about can only be the Alayavijnana.

4. The Sarvastivadins, in their Ekottaragama, have a text which, in an esoteric manner, designates the eighth consciousness by the term 'Alaya'. The text says that sentient beings 'have deep affection for the Alaya, are very fond of the Alaya, take much delight in the Alaya, and rejoice greatly in the Alaya.'

These four expressions show that the Alaya, considered both in a general manner and as past-present-future, is the object of desire (*raga*) [of the seventh consciousness].

Sentient beings take the Alaya as their real Inner Self and, as long as the Alaya is not cut off by the Vajropamasamadhi, they maintain, without interruption, their loving attachment to it. Hence the Alaya is the real object of attachment.

(1) It is not to the other five *upadanaskandhas* (skandhas which give rise to grasping or desire) that sentient beings are attached as to their Inner Self.

Sentient beings born in places where their sensation is exclusively painful have no attachment to these five *upadanaskandhas*; they hate them without respite, cherishing such thoughts as these: 'When shall I give up this life, this "common lot of sentient beings" (*nikayasabhagata*, which is *samskaraskandha*), this body-and-mind that is so full of suffering, so that I may enjoy freedom and happiness?'

(2) The five objects of desire are not objects of attachment either, because ascetics 'detached from desire', i.e., Prthagjanas or Aryas, though no longer attached to these objects, continue to cherish deep affection for their Inner Self.

(3) Likewise, agreeable sensations are not objects of attachment; ascetics detached from the third Dhyana, though disgusted with agreeable sensations, continue to be emotionally attached to their Inner Self.

(4) Similarly the *satkayadrsti*[1] is not an object of attachment either, because ascetics who believe in the non-existence of the Atman (*nairatmya*), but who nevertheless are not yet Asaiksas (Arhats), although they do not produce any attachment to the *satkayadrsti*, continue to be emotionally attached to their Inner Self.

(5) Similarly the *pravrttivijnanas* (eye-consciousness etc.) are not objects of attachment either; ascetics who aspire to the 'cessation of mental activity', but who nevertheless are not yet Asaiksas, are disgusted with the *pravrttivijnanas*, but they continue to be emotionally attached to their Inner Self.

Similarly the physical body (*rupakaya*) is not an object of attachment either;

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[1] The erroneous doctrine that the Atman or Self, composed of the temporary five skandhas, is real and permanent.

不相應行離色心等無別自體，是故亦非眞愛著處。

異生有學起我愛時，雖於餘蘊有愛非愛，而於此識我愛定生，故唯此是眞愛著處。

由是彼說阿賴耶名定唯顯此阿賴耶識。

三· 正理

第一證：持種異熟心

已引聖教，當顯正理。
謂契經說，雜染清净諸法種子之所集起故名爲心。

若無此識，彼持種心不應有故。

(一) 經部師

〔述記：破五蘊受薰持種。〕

謂諸轉識在滅定等有間斷故。

根境作意善等類別，易脫起故。

如電光等，不堅住故。
非可熏習，不能持種，非染净種所集起心。

此識一類恒無間斷，如苣藤等堅住可熏，契當彼經所說心義。

若不許有能持種心，非但違經，亦違正理。

謂諸所起染净品法無所薰故不熏成種，則應所起唐捐其功。

ascetics who are detached from the tainting influence of Rupa, although disgusted with the *rupakaya*, continue to be emotionally attached to the Self.

As for 'unassociated activities' (*viprayuktasamskaras*), they have no separate being apart from Rupa, Citta, etc.: therefore they are not real objects of attachment.

Conclusions. – Prthagjanas and Saiksas are either emotionally or non-emotionally attached to the other *upadanaskandhas*. In all cases there is affection for the Self: this affection for the Self refers, in reality, to the Alayavijnana. The Alayavijnana is therefore the real object of attachment.

Therefore, when the Ekottaragama designates a consciousness by the name of Alaya, it indicates simply and solely this Alayavijnana.

3. Logical Arguments

(1) Citta as bearer of Bijas

Having quoted the Scriptures, we should proceed to logical arguments.

The Sutra says: 'It is named *citta* because it is there that the Bijas of defiled and pure dharmas are accumulated and produced.'

Apart from the eighth consciousness, there is no Citta which can hold the Bijas firmly. The various philosophers of the School of Sutras and the Mahasamghika, the Sthavira and the Sarvastivadin Schools have only unacceptable theories.

1. Sautrantikas. – Root thesis

Whatever the philosophers may think, Bijas are not held by the five Skandhas.

(1) The Pravrttivijnanas (the first seven consciousnesses to the exclusion of the Alaya) are not the Citta spoken of by the Sutra.

The Pravrttivijnanas are interrupted in the Nirodhasamapatti and in the four other states of mental inactivity: therefore they cannot hold the Bijas perpetually. They are born by means of the sense-organs, the objects perceived and attention (*manaskara*); they are occasionally of different natures, good, bad, etc.; they arise and disappear easily; therefore they cannot perfume one another. Like the flash of lightning, they are not firm and stable: therefore they are not perfumable. Nor are they capable of receiving and holding Bijas. They are not the Citta in which defiled and pure Bijas are accumulated and produced.

On the contrary, the Alayavijnana is of one single species, always uninterrupted, and firm and stable like a grain of sesame seed (which absorbs the odour of flowers) or a piece of hemp (which absorbs colour): therefore, susceptible to perfuming, it corresponds to the Citta spoken of by the Sutra. By denying the existence of a Citta that is capable of carrying Bijas, one contradicts not only the Scriptures but also pure reason.

On the one hand, the actual dharmas, that is, defiled or pure thoughts, in the absence of a perfumable Citta, will not create Bijas and cause an increase of pre-existing Bijas: therefore they will be absolutely useless. On

染凈起時既無因種，應同外道執自然生。

色不相應非心性故，如聲光等，理非染凈內法所熏，豈能持種？

又彼離識無實自性，寧可執爲內種依止？

轉識相應諸心所法如識間斷，易脫起故，不自在故，非心性故，不能持種，亦不受熏。

故持種心理應別有。

(二) 經部異師

有說六識無始時來依根境等前後分位事雖轉變，而類無別是所熏習能持種子。由斯染凈因果皆成，何要執有第八識性？

彼言無義。所以者何？
執類是實則同外道。
許類是假，便無勝用，應不能持內法實種。
又執識類何性所攝？
若是善惡，應不受熏，許有記故，猶如擇滅。

若是無記，善惡心時無無記心，此類應斷。
非事善惡類可無記，別類必同別事性故。

又無心位此類定無，既有間斷，性非堅住，如何可執持種受熏？
又阿羅漢或異生心，識類同故，應爲諸染無漏法熏。

the other hand, if the actual dharmas are not born of Bijas, how will they be born? Do you admit, with the Tirthikas, that they are born spontaneously and by themselves?

(2) Rupa and Viprayuktas are not perfumable; nor do they hold Bijas. They are not mental in their essential nature: like sound, light, etc., they cannot be perfumed by internal dharmas, defiled or pure. How, then, can they hold Bijas?

Furthermore, they have no real self-nature apart from consciousness. How can they be held to be the supporting basis for internal Bijas?

(3) The Caittas.

The Caittas associated with the Pravrttivijnanas are subject to interruption, being born in such and such a manner or not born at all. They are neither autonomous nor mental in their essential nature, being Caittas only. Therefore, they are not capable of holding Bijas; nor are they capable of being perfumed.

One is therefore obliged to recognize the existence of a Citta, distinct from the Pravrttivijnanas, which holds Bijas.

2. Sautrantikas. – Different Masters

According to certain Sautrantikas, the six Pravrttivijnanas have succeeded one another since before the beginning of time, being born and perishing in dependence on the sense-organs, the objects perceived, etc. The moments of Pravrttivijnana, in their 'individual reality', change, but all these moments are of the same species, being all of them consciousness. This species, that is, the consciousness species, does not change but abides. This species is perfumable and capable of holding Bijas. It is therefore unnecessary to imagine an eighth consciousness to explain the causal succession of dharmas, defiled or pure.

This theory is invalid for four reasons:

(1) If you hold your consciousness-species to be a real thing (*dravya*), you adopt the opinion of the Tirthikas (Vaisesikas). If its existence is fictitious, the species should be incapable of holding the real Bijas of internal dharmas simply because it is fictitious and because it is devoid of the special virtue needed to hold Bijas.

(2) Of what nature is your consciousness-species, good or bad?

If it is either good or bad, then, like Pratissamkhyanirodha (Nirvana as a result of discrimination), it should not be capable of receiving any perfuming influence since it is not non-defined.

If it is non-defined, then, when the mind is good or bad, there is no non-defined mind. Your consciousness-species should then be interrupted. In fact, if the thing or individual is good or bad, the species cannot be non-defined, because the particular species must be of the same moral nature as the particular thing or individual.

(3) Again, your consciousness-species, even if non-defined and stable, disappears during states of mental inactivity: being discontinuous, it is not firm and stable. How, then, can it hold Bijas and receive perfuming?

(4) Finally, since the mind of the Arhat and that of the Prthagjana have

許便有失。

又眼等根或所餘法與眼等識根法類同，應互相熏，然汝不許。故不應執識類受熏。

(三) 經部譬喻師

又六識身若事若類前後二念旣不俱有如隔念者非互相熏，能熏所熏必俱時故。

(四) 大衆部

執唯六識俱時轉者，由前理趣旣非所熏，故彼亦無能持種義。

(五) 上座部

有執色心自類無間前爲後種因果義立，故先所說爲證不成。

彼執非理，無熏習故。

謂彼自類旣無熏習，如何可執前爲後種？

又間斷者應不更生。
〔述記：攝論云，謂生無色，色久時斷，復生下界，色應不生。〕
二乘無學應無後蘊，死位色心爲後種故。

亦不應執色心展轉互爲種生，轉識色等非所熏習前已說故。

(六) 一切有部

有說三世諸法皆有，因果感赴無不皆成，何勞執有能

the same consciousness-species, there should be reciprocal perfuming by defiled and pure dharmas. Do you accept this absurd thesis? Similarly, the various sense-organs, having the same species (that is to say, 'organ species'), should perfume one another; the various other dharmas, faith etc., having the same species (that is to say, 'dharma species') should perfume one another. Since you reject this thesis, you cannot maintain that the consciousness-species receives perfuming.

3. Darstantikas

Whether one considers the individual or the species, any two successive moments of the Pravrttivijnanas are not simultaneous. Nor can two moments separated from each other give rise to mutual perfuming, because the perfuming agent and the perfumed object must be simultaneous.

4. Mahasamghikas

These doctors do not take consciousness-species into account. They believe that the Pravrttivijnanas can be simultaneous; but they do not accept the notion of perfuming. Hence, not being perfumable, the Pravrttivijnanas do not hold Bijas.

5. Sthaviras

They do not admit the existence of Bijas as entities in themselves. They hold that the earlier moment, whether Rupa or Citta, is, in accordance with its species, the Bija of the subsequent moment, whether Rupa or Citta. On the basis of this notion, the chain of cause and effect is established. Therefore, the arguments in favour of the eighth consciousness are invalid.

This doctrine is inadmissible, because there is no perfuming.

(1) Since there is no perfuming, the earlier moment does not perfume, that is to say, it does not create Bijas. How, then, can it be the Bija of the subsequent moment which is not simultaneous with it?

(2) Once interrupted, Rupa or Citta cannot be reborn. [The series of Rupa is interrupted when one is reborn in a superior Dhatu . . .]

(3) The Asaiksas of the two Vehicles will not have the final Skandha: the series of their Skandhas will not be capable of extending to Nirvana, because the Rupa and the Citta of the dying Asaiksa are Bijas of future Rupa and Citta.

If the Sthavira, replying to the second objection, says that Rupa and Citta are Bijas of each other (whence the reappearance of Rupa after an existence in a superior Dhatu), we say that neither Rupa nor the Pravrttivijnanas are perfumable, as has been mentioned above.

6. Sarvastivadins

The dharmas of the three periods (past, present, and future) exist. The

持種識？

然經說心爲種子者，起染淨法勢用強故。

彼說非理。過去未來非常非現，如空華等，非實有故。

又無作用，不可執爲因緣性故。若無能持染淨種識，一切因果皆不得成。

(七) 清辯無相大乘

有執大乘遣相空理爲究竟者，依似比量撥無此識及一切法。

彼特違害前所引經。

知斷證修染淨因果皆執非實，成大邪見。

外道毀謗染淨因果亦不謂全無，但執非實故。

〔述記：彼若救言，我依世諦不說爲無，但言非實，則同外道。〕

若一切法皆非實有，菩薩不應爲捨生死精勤修集菩提資糧，誰有智者爲除幻敵求石女兒用爲軍旅？

故應信有能持種心，依之建立染淨因果。彼心即是此第八識。

第二證：異熟心

又契經說有異熟心善惡業感，若無此識，彼異熟心不應有故。

謂眼等識有間斷故，非一切時是業果故，如電光等，

cause leads to the fruit being born, and that fruit in its turn is a cause. This action and reaction of cause and effect operates unfailingly in all cases. Why take the trouble to imagine the existence of a consciousness that is capable of holding Bijas? In fact, the reason why the Sutra says that Citta is a Bija is that it produces defiled and pure dharmas and has very great creative energy.

That theory is inadmissible, because past and future dharmas are neither eternal nor present. Like flowers in the sky, they are not realities. Furthermore, they have no activity of any kind and cannot be considered as a cause. Therefore, in the absence of an eighth consciousness that is capable of holding defiled and pure Bijas of actual dharmas, the law of cause and effort cannot be established.

7. Bhavaviveka

A certain master takes as ultimate and absolute the Mahayana teaching on the void or emptiness understood as the negation of *laksanas*. On the basis of faulty arguments, he denies the existence of the Alayavijnana and of all dharmas.

This system is in direct contradiction to the Sutra quoted above. To deny the real existence of the knowledge of suffering, of the abandonment of the cause of suffering, of the realization of the cessation of suffering, of the practice of the Way leading to the cessation of suffering, of the defiled (i.e., suffering and its cause), of the pure (i.e., cessation of suffering and the Way), of the cause (i.e., cause of suffering and the Way), of the fruit (i.e., suffering and its cessation): to deny the existence of all these dharmas is a 'grossly false view'.

But, the master will reply, 'I do not deny the existence of all dharmas; I deny only their reality.

'The non-Buddhist Tirthikas, too, although denying and slandering the cause and effect of defiled and pure dharmas, do not teach that those dharmas are absolutely non-existent; they maintain only that they are not real, and this is what is rejected as their false view.'

If all dharmas are unreal, why should the Bodhisattva, in order to reject Samsara (birth and death), make ceaseless efforts to accumulate the spiritual provisions of Bodhi? What reasonable man will go and take the 'sons of a woman of stone' (a barren woman) and employ them as an army to repulse chimerical enemies?

We should therefore believe that there is a Citta which is capable of holding Bijas, on the basis of which are established defiled and pure dharmas, causes and fruits. This Citta is the eighth consciousness.

(2) Vipakacitta

According to the Sutra, there is a Vipakacitta, 'a mind which is retribution', created by good or bad acts. If the eighth consciousness is lacking, this Vipakacitta should have no existence.

1. The six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness . . . Manovijnana) are subject

非異熟心。

異熟不應斷已更續，彼命根等無斯事故。

眼等六識業所感者猶如聲等，非恒續故，是異熟生，非眞異熟。

定應許有眞異熟心酬牽引業徧而無斷，變爲身器作有情依。

〔述記：酬牽引業非滿業者，有間斷者是滿業故。引果之識徧三界有。〕

身器離心理非有故。
不相應法無實體故。
諸轉識等非恒有故。
若無此心，誰變身器？復依何法恒立有情？

又在定中或不在定，有別思慮無思慮時，理有衆多身受生起。
此若無者，不應後時身有怡適或復勞損。若不恒有眞異熟心，彼位如何有此身受？

非佛起餘善心等位必應現起眞異熟心，如許起彼時，非佛有情故。

由是恒有眞異熟心，彼心即是此第八識。

第三證：五趣四生

又契經說有情流轉五趣四生，若無此識，彼趣生體不

to interruption; they are not always the fruit of acts. Like the flash of lightning, they are not Vipakacitta.

We know for a fact that dharmas which are Vipaka, once cut off, do not continue any more; for example, the 'root of life' (*jivitendriya*), once cut off, does not continue.

The six consciousnesses, when they are created by acts, are like sound, odour, etc., which do not form a perpetual series; therefore they are *vipakaja*, 'born of retribution', but not real Vipaka.

2. We must admit the existence of a real Vipakacitta which corresponds to acts that lead to the ripening of the fruit [and not to complementary acts], which may be found in all the three Dhatus, which is perpetual, which manifests itself as the receptacle-world and the physical body with its sense-organs, and which is the supporting basis for the living being.

In fact: (1) there is no receptacle-world or physical body apart from mind; (2) the Viprayuktas (especially the *jivitendriya*) have no real substance – [they are not things in themselves]; (3) the Pravrttivijnanas do not always exist. If there is no Alayavijnana, what is it that manifests itself as the receptacle-world and the physical body? Finally, where the mind exists, there is *sattva* (living being); where the mind does not exist, there is no *sattva*. If you do not admit the existence of the eighth consciousness, which dharmas – in the course of the five states of unconsciousness – will be the perpetual supporting basis for the living being (*sattva*)?

3. Furthermore, in the state of meditation as in the state of non-meditation, whether the meditation involves an intellectual operation (when the Manovijnana attaches itself to a thing or a truth) or does not include an operation of this kind (*nirodhasamapatti* etc.), there are always numerous bodily sensations. That is why, after emerging from the meditation, the ascetic feels a sense of physical well-being or physical exhaustion. Hence a real Vipakacitta continues throughout all the states of meditation. Otherwise, how can there be those bodily sensations in that state of meditation?

Let us consider those living beings who are not Buddhas. You admit that, at certain moments, their six consciousnesses are the fruit or result of their acts, and that they are non-defined and retributive. At the time when these beings have consciousnesses of another kind, (good, bad, etc.) as at the time when they have consciousnesses of this kind, they also have a real Vipakacitta, because they are not Buddhas but only *sattvas*, [in whom the continued presence of the Vipakacitta is presupposed.]

There exists therefore a real perpetual Vipakacitta, which is the eighth consciousness.

(3) Gatis and Yonis

The Sutra teaches that sentient beings transmigrate ceaselessly through the five states of existence or destinies (*gati*) [infernal beings, hungry ghosts,

應有故。

謂要實有，恒，徧，無雜，彼法可立正實趣生。

非異熟法趣生雜亂，住此起餘趣生法故。

諸異熟色及五識中業所感者不徧趣生，無色界中全無彼故。

諸生得善及意識中業所感者。雖徧趣生，起無雜亂而不恒有。

不相應行無實自體，皆不可立正實趣生。

唯異熟心及彼心所實恒徧無雜是正實趣生。

此心若無，生無色界起善等位應非趣生。

〔述記：設許別報心是趣生。〕

設許趣生攝諸有漏，生無色界起無漏心應非趣生，便違正理。

勿有前過及有此失，故唯異熟法是正實趣生。

由是如來非趣生攝，佛無異熟無記法故。

亦非異攝，非有漏故，世尊已捨苦集諦故，諸戲論種已永斷故。

animals, human beings, devas] and the four forms of birth (*yoni*) [(1) viviparous, as with mammals; (2) oviparous, as with birds; (3) moisture or water born, as with worms and fishes; (4) metamorphic, as with moths from the chrysalis, or with devas, or with infernal beings].

If they do not possess this eighth consciousness, one does not see what Gati and Yoni can consist of; that is to say, the Gati-yoni entity should not exist at all.

1. The Gati-yoni entity must be a real thing (and not an ideal dharma like the 'vital principle'), perpetual (i.e., non-interrupted), universal (that is to say, it can be found in all the three Dhatus), and non-mixed. Only a dharma with such attributes can be established as the real Gati-yoni entity.

If non-retributive dharmas, e.g., 'good dharmas proceeding from effort,' formed part of the gati-yoni entity, that entity would be mixed, because a Kamadhatu being who had produced a good thought in the realm of Dhyana (Rupadhatu) would belong at the same time to the human Gati and to the divine Gati.

The Rupa of retribution and the five consciousnesses caused by acts do not form part of the universal gati-yoni entity, for Rupa and the five consciousnesses are absent in the Arupyadhatu.

In all existences there are 'inborn good dharmas' and Manovijnana caused by acts: these dharmas present three of the essential characteristics (i.e., reality, universality, and homogeneity), but they lack the attribute of perpetuity.

Obviously Viprayuktas are out of the question here. They cannot be established as the real Gati-yoni entity, for they are not real things.

2. Only the Vipakacitta and its Caittas possess the four characteristics of reality, perpetuity, universality, and homogeneity, and constitute the real Gati and Yoni.

[It is said that the 'mind of particular retribution' distinct from Vipakacitta, that is to say, 'particular recompense', constitutes the Gati.]

But, in the absence of Vipakacitta, when a being born in the Arupyadhatu produces a good thought, he will lack the Gati, because this being is no longer anything but a good thought and the Gati is non-defined by definition.

If it is admitted that the Gati comprises everything that is impure, then we may say that the Gati is absent in the being of the Arupyadhatu who produces a good thought. This is contrary to reason.

One must not fall into this error and the preceding errors regarding the four characteristics. Hence only the Vipakadharma is the real Gati-yoni.

It follows from this that the Tathagata is not comprised in the Gati-yoni, because He has no dharma which is retributive or non-defined. Nor is He comprised in the dhatus because He has no impure dharmas; because Bhagavat has rejected the *duhkhasatya* and the *samudayasatyr* (suffering and the cause of suffering); because He has cut off for ever and ever all Bijas of frivolous speculation (*prapancabijas*).

正實趣生旣唯異熟心及心所，彼心心所離第八識理不得成，故知別有此第八識。

第四證：執受

又契經說有色根身是有執受，若無此識，彼能執受不應有故。

謂五色根及彼依處唯現在世是有執受，彼定由有能執受心。
〔述記：對法執受九處，除聲，聲非所執故。〕

唯異熟心先業所引，非善染等，一類能偏，相續執受有色根身，眼等轉識無如是義。

此言意顯眼等轉識皆無一類能偏相續執受自內有色根身，非顯能執受唯異熟心，勿諸佛色身無執受故。

然能執受有漏色身唯異熟心，故作是說。

謂諸轉識現緣起故，如聲風等。彼善染等非業引故，如非擇滅。

異熟生者非異熟故，非偏依故，不相續故，如電光等，不能執受有漏色身。

諸心識言亦攝心所，定相應故，如唯識言。

非諸色根不相應行可能執受有色根身，無所緣故，如虛空等。

The real Gati-Yoni can only be constituted by the Vipakacitta and its Caittas, a Citta which is really *vipaka* and not *vipakaja*. Such a Citta does not exist outside the eighth consciousness. Hence the existence of this eighth consciousness is certain.

(4) Theory of Upadana

According to the Sutra, the 'material body with its sense-organs' is appropriated (*upatta*), i.e., 'held and borne'. If there is no eighth consciousness, where is one to find the *upadatar* of this body, 'that which appropriates the body'?

If the five material organs (*rupindriya*), with the matter that serves as their support (altogether nine material *ayatanas* excluding sound) are appropriated, it is certainly by reason of a mind that appropriates them to it. To the exclusion of the six Pravrttivijnanas (visual consciousness – Manovijnana), this mind can only be the Vipakacitta. The latter, in fact, is projected by former acts; it is neither good nor defiled, but non-defined; it can be found throughout the three Dhatus; and it exists in a continuous series.

1. The meaning of the Sutra is that the Pravrttivijnanas, not being homogeneous (since they are good, bad, etc.), not existing throughout the three Dhatus, and not constituting a continuous series, are incapable of appropriating the body with its material organs. That is not to say that the Vipakacitta alone is capable of this action, because that would imply that the material body (*rupakaya*) of the Buddha is not appropriated by the mind of the Buddha, since there is no dharma in the Buddha that is Vipaka. Here it is merely a question of the impure body: the Vipakacitta alone appropriates this body.

2. The Pravrttivijanans, let us say, are out of the question, because, like sound, wind, etc., they are produced by actual causes (*pratyaya*), and because, when they are good or defiled, etc., they are, like the Apratisamkhyanirodha (Nirvana as a result of discrimination), not created by acts. When they are 'born of Vipaka' (*vipakaja*), they are not really Vipaka; they cannot be found throughout the three Dhatus; and they do not constitute a continuous series: like lightning etc., they cannot appropriate to themselves the impure material body.

3. When one speaks of the Citta or consciousness which appropriates, one also means the Caittas which are necessarily associated with it.
Similarly, the expression *vijnanamatra*, 'mere-consciousness', does not exclude the existence of the Caittas.

4. The material organs and the Viprayuktas, like space etc., have no object. How, then, can one suppose that they appropriate the physical body with its sense-organs?

故應別有能執受心，彼心即是此第八識。

第五證：壽煖識

又契經說壽煖識三更互依持得相續住。若無此識，能持壽煖令久住識不應有故。

謂諸轉識有間有轉，如聲風等，無恒持用，不可立爲持壽煖識。
唯異熟識無間無轉，猶如壽煖有恒持用，故可立爲持壽煖識。

經說三法更互依持，而壽與煖一類相續，唯識不然，豈符正理？

雖說三法更互依持，而許唯煖不徧三界，何不許識獨有間轉？

此於前理非爲過難，謂若是處具有三法無間轉者可恒相持，不爾便無恒相持用。

前以此理顯三法中所說識言非詮轉識，舉煖不徧豈壞前理？故前所說其理極成。

又三法中壽煖二種旣唯有漏，故知彼識如壽與煖定非無漏。

生無色界起無漏心，爾時何識能持彼壽？

由此故知有異熟識一類恒徧能持壽煖，彼識即是此第八識。

第六證：生死時心

又契經說諸有情類受生命終必住散心非無心定，若無

Hence there exists, separately, a Citta which appropriates; it is the eighth consciousness.

(5) Life, Heat, and Consciousness

According to the Sutra, life, heat, and consciousness last in a continuous series by supporting one another. We say that the eighth consciousness is the only consciousness capable of serving as a support for life and heat.

1. The Pravrttivijnanas are discontinuous and variable like sound, wind, etc.; they are incapable of constantly operating as a support. Therefore they are not the consciousness discussed by the Sutra. But the eighth consciousness, the Vipakavijnana, like life and heat, is not discontinuous or variable. Hence one may attribute to it this supporting operation; hence it is the consciousness that sustains life and heat.

2. The Sutra teaches that these three dharmas support one another, and you admit that life and heat are homogeneous and constitute a continuous series. Is it reasonable to think that the consciousness in question is the Pravrttivijnana which is neither homogeneous nor continuous?

Objection – Although the Sutra says that these three dharmas sustain one another, yet it says also that, in contradistinction to life and consciousness, heat is not found throughout the three Dhatus. One can therefore believe that, as distinct from life and heat, the consciousness is neither homogeneous nor continuous.

Answer – The fact that heat is not found throughout the three Dhatus does not invalidate our argument. Where the three dharmas are found together (i.e., in the two inferior Dhatus), they are continuous, and consequently can support one another: in fact, this constant operation of mutual support is impossible if they are not all continuous.

Hence the term consciousness, in the enumeration of these three dharmas, does not designate the Pravrttivijnanas: the absence of heat in the Arupyadhatu changes nothing in the matter.

3. Life and heat are certainly impure dharmas (*sasrava*): hence the consciousness which supports them is not pure (*anasrava*).

If you do not admit the existence of the eighth consciousness, say which consciousness will support the life of a being of the Arupyadhatu who produces pure Pravrttivijnanas.

Hence there exists a Vipakavijnana, homogeneous (always non-defined), continuous, being found throughout the three Dhatus, and capable of supporting life and heat: that is the eighth consciousness.

(6) The Mind at Conception and at Death

The Sutra says that, at conception and at death, sentient beings are undoubtedly in a state of mental confusion and distraction, not in mindless

此識生死時心不應有故。

謂生死時身心惛昧，如睡無夢極悶絶時，明了轉識必不現起。

又此位中六種轉識行相所緣不可知故，如無心位必不現行。

六種轉識，行相所緣有必可知，如餘時故。

眞異熟識極微細故，行相所緣俱不可了，是引業果一期相續恒無轉變，是散有心，名生死心不違正理。

有說五識此位定無，意識取境或因五識，或因他教，或定爲因，生位諸因既不可得，故受生位意識亦無。
〔述記：破大乘異說有六，一叙宗，二正破，三救義，四破救，五更救，六復難。〕

若爾，有情生無色界，後時意識應汞不生，定心必由散意識引，五識他教彼界必無，引定散心無由起故。

若謂彼定由串習力，後時率爾能現在前。

彼初生時，寧不現起？

又欲色界初受生時，串習意識亦應現起。

若由惛昧初未現前，此即前因，何勞別說？

有餘部執生死等位別有一類微細意識行相所緣俱不可

meditation (*nirodhasamapatti*). The mind at the moment of conception and at that of death can only be the eighth consciousness.

1. At these two moments, the mind and the body are stupefied as in dreamless sleep or extreme stupor. The quick and perceiving Pravrttivijnana (that is to say, the Manovijnana) cannot arise.

At these two moments, one cannot attribute to the six Pravrttivijnanas conscious acts of knowledge or the recognition or apprehension of objects: that is to say, these consciousnesses are not in operation just as they are not in operation in the mindless state. For, if the mind at conception or at death is, as you maintain, a Pravrttivijnana, its activity and object must, as at all other times, be perceived and known.

The case of the eighth consciousness is entirely different. As it is extremely subtle, it is not perceived in its activity or in its object. Being the result of acts which project or lead to the existence in question, it is truly retribution (*vipaka*): it constitutes, for a determined period of time (i.e., for the duration of the existence), a perpetual and homogeneous series. It is this consciousness that is designated by the name of 'mind at conception' and 'mind at death'. It is on its account that the sentient being, at these two moments, is in a state of 'mental confusion and distraction'.

2. Certain masters of the Mahayana School have other theories regarding mind at conception. [As far as death is concerned, they agree that the Pravrttivijnanas are lacking because the body and the mind are stupefied.]

Nanda says, 'At conception and at death, the five consciousnesses (visual consciousness etc.) are lacking. As regards the Manovijnana, it perceives its object either by reason of the five consciousnesses, or by reason of the teaching of another, or by the power of meditation (*samadhi*). Now, at conception, these three causes are lacking; therefore the Manovijnana is also lacking.'

Dharmapala says, 'If such is the case, the Manovijnana is always lacking in the beings of the Arupyadhatu, because the five consciousnesses and the teaching of others are lacking in this Dhatu, and because the mind withdrawn in meditation is brought about by the distracted Manovijnana and there is no reason for this Manovijnana to appear in this Dhatu.'

Nanda replies, 'The mind in meditation can manifest itself later, in the course of existence in the Arupya, suddenly, by the force of habit.'

Dharmapala replies, 'Why should it not manifest itself from the first moment of its existence in the Arupya? Why does the Manovijnana not manifest itself by the force of habit from the first moment of existence in the Kamadhatu and the Rupadhatu?'

Nanda will doubtless reply that the Manovijnana does not manifest itself at this first moment because of the stupefaction of body and mind: this is the very reason that Dharmapala has given. What is the use of taking the trouble to dwell on this?

3. According to the Sthaviras, at the moment of conception, death, etc.,

了。

〔述記：上座部師。〕

應知即是此第八識，極成意識不如是故。

又將死時由善惡業，下上身分冷觸漸起。

若無此識，彼事不成，轉識不能執受身故。

眼等五識各別依故，或不行故。

〔述記：五識依別，若能執受，無識之時身冷應起。若身識偏能執受者，或不行故。漸命終時亦有先捨五識身故。〕

第六意識不住身故，境不定故，偏寄身中恒相續故。

不應冷觸由彼漸生。

唯異熟心由先業力恒偏相續執受身分，捨執受處冷觸便生，壽煖識三不相離故。

冷觸起處即是非情，雖變亦緣而不執受。

故知定有此第八識。

第七證：識與名色

又契經說，識緣名色名色緣識，如是二法展轉相依，譬如蘆束俱時而轉。若無此識，彼識自體不應有故。

there exists a certain subtle Manovijnana, the activity and object of which are imperceptible and incomprehensible.

This subtle consciousness, we reply, can only be our eighth consciousness, because no Manovijnana presents this characteristic of non-perceptibility.

4. With the approach of death, sensations of cold arise gradually in the body, either from the feet or from the head, according to the nature of the acts (good or bad acts) which can bring about retribution in the coming existence.

This fact (that coldness arises gradually) is inexplicable if the eighth consciousness which appropriates the body to itself is lacking.

As regards the six Pravrttivijnanas, they cannot appropriate the body to themselves. [Hence one cannot explain the coldness of the body by the fact that they let go their hold on it.]

Each of the first five consciousnesses (visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc.) has a special supporting basis (eye, ear, etc.). Therefore they do not appropriate the entire body to themselves, and, if they appropriate their corresponding organs, coldness would be produced in those organs when they are no longer functioning. If one says that the fifth consciousness (tactile consciousness or *kayavijnana*) appropriates the totality of the body to itself, we shall answer that this consciousness may not be in manifestation. [Furthermore, when death is gradual, the five consciousnesses disappear without causing the disappearance of heat from the body.]

Coming to the sixth consciousness or Manovijnana, it is not always found in the body: [it is often interrupted, and one does not perceive that coldness is produced by its absence]. Its object is not fixed, whereas the eighth consciousness, at the end of life as at other times, always has the same object. The eighth consciousness permeates the entire physical body and exists permanently in a continuous series. [In this way it is capable of appropriating the body to itself.]

It should not be maintained that the coldness of the body at death is due to the gradual disappearance of this sixth consciousness.

Projected by the force of former acts, the eighth consciousness alone constitutes a continuous and universal series: it appropriates to itself all parts of the body. Coldness is produced in that part of the body which it abandons. For life, heat, and consciousness are not dissociated. That part where coldness is produced no longer belongs to a living being. It is, as we have seen, a manifestation of the eighth consciousness; but the eighth consciousness no longer appropriates it to itself.

The existence of the eighth consciousness is therefore proved.

(7) Consciousness and Namarupa

According to the Sutra, consciousness exists by reason of Namarupa and vice versa. These two dharmas support each other like two bundles of reeds, and function simultaneously.

Which consciousness are we dealing with here, if not the eighth consciousness?

謂彼經中自作是釋，名謂非色四蘊，色謂羯邏藍等。

此二與識相依而住，如二蘆束更互爲緣，恒俱時轉不相捨離。

眼等轉識攝在名中，此識若無，說誰爲識？

亦不可說名中識蘊謂五識身，識謂第六，羯邏藍時無五識故。

又諸轉識有間轉故，無力恒時執持名色寧說恒與名色爲緣？

故彼識言顯第八識

第八證：四食

又契經說一切有情皆依食住，若無此識，彼識食體不應有故。

謂契經說食四種。

一者段食，變壞爲相。

謂欲界繫香味觸三於變壞時能爲食事。

由此色處非段食攝，以變壞時色無用故。

二者觸食，觸境爲相。謂有漏觸纔取境時攝受喜等能爲食事。

此觸雖與諸識相應，屬六識者食義偏勝，觸麤顯境攝受喜樂及順益捨資養勝故。

三意思食，希望爲相。謂有漏思與欲俱轉希可愛境，能爲食事。

此思雖與諸識相應，屬意識者食義偏勝，意識於境希

The same Sutra explains the expression *namarupa*: 'By *naman*, we mean the four immaterial Skandhas (i.e., consciousness and the three Caittas, sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna), volition (Cetana): by *rupa* is meant the *kalala* (the first embryonic state).' This couple (*namarupa*) and consciousness remain together by supporting each other like two bundles of reeds; they are conditional causes of each other, exist simultaneously, and do not become separated from each other.

The first five Pravrttivijanas (visual consciousness etc.) are comprised in Naman. If there is no eighth consciousness, which consciousness is it that supports this *Naman*?

It cannot be said that the consciousness Skandha included in Naman consists of the first five consciousnesses and that the consciousness that supports Naman is the Manovijnana, because the *kalala* in its first embryonic state is not possessed of the first five consciousnesses.

In addition, the six Pravrttivijnanas are not continuous; they have not the potential capacity of appropriating Namarupa permanently to themselves. One cannot say that they are the constant conditional cause (*pratyaya*) of Namarupa.

Hence by consciousness the Sutra means the eighth consciousness.

(8) Theory of Food

According to the Sutra, 'all sentient beings remain alive by partaking of food.' If the eighth consciousness is lacking, the 'substance of consciousness-food' (i.e., food which consists of consciousness) is lacking.

The Sutra says that food is of four kinds:

1. 'Food in mouthfuls', the characteristic of which is transformation-deterioration. It is the smell-taste-contact of Kamadhatu, which can serve as food when the contacted object is transformed and has deteriorated. Colour is not food of this kind, for colour has no activity at the moment of its transformation-deterioration.

2. 'Food which consists of contact', the characteristic of which is 'contact' with objects. This is impure contact (Sparsa). That contact, at the very moment at which it is established with the object, gives delight, satisfaction, etc., and serves as nourishing food since it comforts the body.

We know that contact (Sparsa) is associated with all the eight consciousnesses; but it has special value as food when associated with the first six consciousnesses. The contact with gross and obvious objects, affording delight, joy and 'comforting indifference', is particularly nourishing.

3. 'Food which consists of mental activities', the characteristic of which is 'aspiration'. This is impure 'volition' (*cetana*) accompanied by the desire or wish (*chanda*), which aspires to an agreeable object and functions as food.

This volition is associated with all the eight consciousnesses, but it has

望勝故。

四者識食，執持爲相。謂有漏識由段觸思勢力增長能爲食事。

此識雖通諸識自體，而第八識食義偏勝，一類相續執持勝故。

由是集論說此四食，三蘊五處十一界攝。
〔述記：三蘊卽色行識，五處卽香味觸意法處，十一界卽七心香味觸法界。〕

釋食義

此四能持有情身命令不壞斷故名爲食。

辨界

段食唯於欲界有用，觸意思食雖偏三界而依識轉隨識有無。

總破諸部

眼等轉識有間有轉，非偏恒時能持身命。

謂無心定熟眠悶絶無想天中有間斷故。

設有心位，隨所依緣性界地等有轉易故，於持身命非偏非恒。

諸有執無第八識者，依何等食經作是言一切有情皆依食住？

破薩婆多

非無心位過去未來識等爲食，彼非現常，如空華等，無體用故。

設有體用，非現在攝，如虛空等，非食性故。

亦不可說入定心等與無心位有情爲食。

住無心時彼已滅故，過去非食已極成故。

又不可說無想定等不相應行即爲彼食。段等四食所不攝故。不相應法非實有故。

special value as food when associated with the Manovijnana, because, in relation to objects, it is the principal agent of aspiration.

4. 'Food which consists of consciousness', the characteristic of which is sustenance. It is impure consciousness. Strengthened by the first three foods (i.e., food by mouth, by contact, by volition), it nourishes the main elements of the organs.

This food-consciousness includes all the eight consciousnesses, but it is the eighth consciousness which has special value as food. Homogeneous (always non-defined), existing in a continuous series, it is the sustainer par excellence.

The Abhidharmasamuccaya can therefore say that the four foods are comprised in three Skandhas (material form, predisposition, consciousness), five Ayatanas (smell, taste, contact, *manas*, *dharmas*), and eleven Dhatus (the seven *cittas*, smell, taste, contact, *dharmas*).

Discussion

These four varieties receive the name of food or nourishment (*ahara*) because they can sustain or cause the growth of the body and life of sentient beings and prevent them from perishing and being destroyed.

Although food in mouthfuls is available in Kamadhatu alone, and although the second and third varieties, namely, food by contact and food through aspiration, are available throughout the three Dhatus, all of them are dependent on the fourth, i.e., consciousness-food, existing or not existing according as this fourth variety is present or absent.

The six Pravrittivijnanas (visual consciousness etc.) are discontinuous and variable and cannot everywhere and always sustain the body and life. They are interrupted in 'mindless meditation', during deep sleep and fainting fits, and in the two 'mindless heavens'. Even in states of full consciousness, their activities vary according to the sense-organ, the object perceived, the moral species (good, bad, etc.), the Dhatu, the Bhumi, etc. As a sustainer of body and life, they are neither universal nor perpetual. If you deny the existence of the eighth consciousness, say which food is the Sutra referring to when it says that all sentient beings are sustained by food?

1. Sarvastivadins

In the state of mindlessness (i.e., unconsciousness), past or future consciousnesses are not food, because they are not actual and eternal, and because, like flowers in the sky, they have neither substance nor activity. Even if they have substance and activity, they are, like space, not of the present time and therefore have not the nature of food. It cannot be said that the 'mind that has entered into meditation' is food for the ascetic who is in a state of mindlessness or unconsciousness, because, during the period of unconsciousness, this mind has disappeared, and we have established that the past is not food. Nor can it be said that unassociated dharmas (Viprayuktas) are food for the ascetic who is withdrawn in mindless meditation, because they are not counted

破上座

有執滅定等猶有第六識於彼有情能爲食事，彼執非理，後當廣破。

破經部

又彼應說生上二界無漏心時以何爲食？無漏識等破壞有故，於彼身命不可爲食。

亦不可執無漏識中有有漏種能爲彼食，無漏識等猶如涅槃不能執持有漏種故。

復不可說上界有情身命相持即互爲食，四食不攝彼身命故。

又無色無身，命無能持故，衆同分等無實體故。

結識食體

由此定知異諸轉識有異熟識一類恒徧，執持身命令不斷壞。

世尊依此故作是言，一切有情皆依食住。

唯依取蘊建立有情，佛無有漏，非有情攝。

說爲有情依食住者，當知皆依示現而說。

既異熟識是勝食性，彼識即是此第八識。

among the four varieties of food and, furthermore, Viprayuktas do not exist in themselves.

2. Sthaviras

We cannot admit, with these doctors, that the Manovijnana, in a subtle state, subsists in the Nirodhasamapatti (cessation meditation)[1] and serves as food for the ascetic. This theory of the Sthaviras is illogical and will be refuted in a later section.

3. Sautrantikas and Sarvastivadins

When a being born in one of the two superior Dhatus produces a pure mind, what is his food? It is the characteristic of pure consciousness to smash and destroy existence. This consciousness cannot serve as food to sustain the body and life of the ascetic.

4. Sautrantikas

The Sautrantikas admit that pure consciousness carries impure Bijas that can serve as food. This is inadmissible, because pure consciousness, like Nirvana, does not carry impure Bijas.

5. Sautrantikas and Sarvastivadins

Nor can it be said that, in the superior Dhatus, the body and the life of each sentient being feed each other because they maintain each other. This is inadmissible, because the body and the life are not counted among the four kinds of food. Furthermore, the body is lacking in Arupyadhatu, and your vital principle finds nothing there that can sustain it. Nor can similar beings (*nikayasabhagatas*) in that Dhatu sustain it because they are not real entities.

Conclusion

From the above it is definitely understood that, apart from the Pravrttivijnanas, there exists a consciousness which is retribution (Vipakavijnana), which manifests itself throughout all the three Dhatus, and which is homogeneous (always non-defined), continuous, and capable of sustaining body and life, preventing them from perishing and being interrupted. It is of this Mulavijnana that Bhagavat is speaking when he says that 'all sentient beings subsist through nourishment.'

'All sentient beings': the term 'sentient being' applies solely to the *upadanaskandhas* (impure Skandhas)[2]. As there is nothing impure about the Buddha, the Buddha is not counted among sentient beings. When a sastra says that a sentient being sustains himself through nourishment, it is to be understood as a semblance of being and a semblance of nourishment.

The Vipakavijnana is specifically of a nourishing or alimentary nature. This consciousness is the eighth consciousness.

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[1] A Samadhi in which there is complete extinction of sensation and thought.

[2] The Skandhas (aggregates) which give rise to grasping or desire.

第九證：滅盡定

又契經說，住滅定者身語心行無不皆滅而壽不滅，亦不離煖，根無變壞，識不離身。

若無此識，住滅定者不離身識不應有故。

謂眼等識行相麤動，於所緣境起必勞慮，厭患彼故暫求止息，漸次伏除至都盡位，依此位立住滅定者，故此定中彼識皆滅。

〔述記：暫求止息漸次伏除，從麤至細緣無相想至都盡位，一期分位無心，或但一日，或復七日，大乘一劫餘，依此位立住滅定者。〕

若不許有微細一類恒徧執持壽等識在，依何而說識不離身？

A. 破薩婆多部

若謂後時彼識還起，如隔日瘧名不離身。

是則不應說心行滅，識與想等起滅同故。

壽煖諸根應亦如識，便成大過。

故應許識如壽煖等實不離身。

又此位中若全無識，應如瓦礫非有情數，豈得說爲住滅定者？

又異熟識此位若無，誰能執持諸根壽煖？無執持故皆應壞滅，猶如死屍，便無壽等。

旣爾後識必不還生，說不離身彼何所屬。

(9) Nirodhasamapatti (Cessation Meditation)

According to the Sutra, 'Of him who dwells in the meditation of cessation' (*nirodhasamapatti*), the activities (*samskaras*) of body, of voice and of mind are all destroyed (*nirodha*); but his life is not destroyed; he is not bereft of his bodily heat; his sense-organs do not deteriorate; and his consciousness does not leave his body.

The only consciousness which does not leave the body in the course of the meditation of cessation is the eighth consciousness.

All the other consciousnesses (the visual consciousness etc.) are, in their act of perception and knowledge, coarse and inconsistent. He in whom these consciousnesses manifest themselves in the perception of objects necessarily becomes tired and upset; hence he becomes disgusted and seeks to stop them for a time. Gradually he subdues and expels them up to the moment when they cease entirely [for a day or for a week or, according to the Mahayana, for a kalpa or even longer]. The ascetic who attains this cessation is said to dwell in the meditation of cessation. Hence, in this Samadhi, all the other consciousnesses, i.e., the seven Pravrttivijnanas, are entirely inactive.

If we do not admit the existence of an actual consciousness that is subtle, homogeneous (always non-defined), eternal, universal (existent in all the three Dhatus), and capable of holding and sustaining life, the organs, etc., which consciousness is the Sutra referring to when it says that 'the consciousness does not leave the body'?

A. THEORY OF THE SARVASTIVADINS

According to these doctors, if the Sutra says that consciousness does not leave the body, it is because consciousness manifests itself again after the meditation, just as an intermittent malarial fever recurs after a period of inactivity.

If this theory is true, then it should not be said that all activities of mind (sensation, conception, etc.) are destroyed in Samadhi, because consciousness is born and perishes with those activities. Then, again, life, heat and the organs would have the same destiny as consciousness; they would leave the body in order to return to it. Such a conception is entirely erroneous. It should therefore be admitted that consciousness, like life, heat, etc., does not leave the body.

If consciousness leaves the body during the meditation, the body will, like tiles and stones, no longer belong to the living being. How, then, can it be said that a certain individual (Pungala) dwells in Nirodhasamapatti?

Furthermore, if there is no Vipakavijnana in this Samadhi, what is it that holds and sustains the organs, the life and the bodily heat of the Pungala? If not held and sustained, these dharmas will deteriorate and perish. The man entering into Nirodhasamapatti will, like a corpse, no longer have life, heat and organs.

This being the case, there will definitely be no return of consciousness to the lifeless body. Then to what does the Sutra refer when it affirms that

諸異熟識捨此身已，離託餘身無重生故。

B. 破經部本計

又若此位無持種識，後識無種如何得生？

過去未來不相應法非實有體，已極成故。
諸色等法離識皆無，受熏持種亦已遮故。
然滅定等無心位中如有心位定實有識具根壽煖，有情攝故。

由斯理趣，住滅定者決定有識實不離身。

C. 破經部末宗轉計

若謂此位有第六識名不離身。

亦不應理，此定亦名無心定故。

若無五識名無心者，應一切定皆名無心，
諸定皆無五識身故。

意識攝在六轉識中，如五識身，滅定非有。

或此位識行相所緣不可知故，如壽煖等，非第六識。

若此位有行相所緣可知識者，應如餘位，非此位攝。

本爲止息行相所緣可了知識入此定故。

'consciousness does not leave the body'? Hence, when the Vipakavijnana has left this body, it will no longer be reborn unless to take a new body in a new existence.

B. SAUTRANTIKAS – ROOT-THEORY

The Sautrantikas think that Rupa can carry Bijas of Mind

If, in this Samadhi, there exists no consciousness which carries Bijas, how can the six consciousnesses which return after meditation and which carry no Bijas be born? We have already shown and established that the past, the future, and the Viprayuktas are not real things, and that, on the other hand, Rupa, sound, etc. (objects of sense perception), which have no existence apart from consciousness, neither receive perfuming nor carry Bijas. Furthermore, on the basis of all evidence, consciousness persists in states of 'mindless' meditation (meditation in which there is no mental activity) just as it does in mentally-active ones, because these states include organs-life-heat, and because these states are states of a living being. From this line of reasoning it follows that there is a consciousness dwelling in Nirodhasamapatti which does not leave the body.

C. SAUTRANTIKAS – BRANCH-OPINION

These doctors think that the sixth consciousness, Manovijnana, dwells in Nirodhasamapatti and that it is for this reason that the Sutra says that consciousness does not leave the body.

1. This theory is contrary to reason. Four remarks:

(1) This Samapatti is said to be 'exempt from mental activity'.

Yes, reply the Sautrantikas, but this is because the first five consciousnesses, but not the sixth, are lacking. On this account, we reply, all Samapattis must be called 'exempt from mental activity', because in none of them are the five consciousnesses active.

(2) Manovijnana is a Pravrttivijnana, comprised in the six Pravrttivijnanas which cease to function; hence it is lacking in this Samapatti, like the first five Pravrttivijnanas.

(3) If the Sautrantikas say, 'The Manovijnana, during this Samapatti, is imperceptible and incomprehensible in its activity and its object,' we reply, 'Then the consciousness in it is not the sixth consciousness, just as the life, the heat, etc., are not the sixth consciousness.

(4) If the Sautrantikas say, 'The Manovijnana, during this Samapatti, remains perceptible in its activity and its object,' we reply, 'Your Nirodhasamapatti is not a Nirodhasamapatti any more than the other states of Samapatti in which activity of mind and the object of perception are perceptible; for, if the ascetic enters into this Nirodhasamapatti, it is precisely in order to stop all activities of mind, all perceptions of objects, and all states of consciousness.

又若此位有第六識彼心所法爲有爲無？

若有心所，經不應言住此定者心行皆滅。
又不應名滅受想定。

此定加行但厭受想，故此定中唯受想滅。
〔述記：經部救云……。〕

受想二法資助心強，諸心所中獨名心行，說心行滅何所相違？
〔論主答。〕

無想定中應唯想滅，但厭想故，然汝不許。
〔經部師救。〕

既唯受想資助心強，此二滅時心亦應滅。
〔論主答。〕

如身行滅而身猶在，寧要責心令同行滅？
〔述記：此經部救。〕

若爾，語行尋伺滅時語應不滅，而非所許。
〔論主答。〕

然行於法有徧非徧，徧行滅時法定隨滅，非徧行滅法或猶在。
〔述記：此論主釋。〕

非徧行者謂入出息，見息滅時身猶在故。
尋伺於語是徧行攝，彼若滅時語定無故。

受想於心亦徧行攝，許如思等大地法故。

受想滅時心定隨滅，如何可說彼滅心在？

2. If Manovijnana exists in this Samapatti, do its Caittas exist in it also?

(1) If Manovijnana exists in it, one must believe that its 'associates' (Caittas) exist in it also. If they exist, why does the Sutra say that all activities (Samskaras) of the mind [sensation (Vedana) and conception (Samjna)] are destroyed in it? Why is this meditation called 'Samapatti of the cessation or destruction of sensation and conception' (*samjnaveditanirodhasamapatti*)?

(2) The Sautrantikas' contention: In the preparatory stage of this Samapatti, the ascetic is disgusted with two mental associates only, sensation and conception (Vedana and Samjna): this is why, among the Caittas, only sensation and conception are destroyed in this Samapatti.

Our reply: These two dharmas, sensation and conception, alone among the mental associates, receive the name of 'activities (Samskaras) of the mind' because they are vivid and exert a strong influence on the mind. This being the case, why is it inconsistent to say that, in this Samapatti, the mental activities are destroyed?

(3) The Sautrantikas' contention: In the preparatory stage of the Asamjnisamapatti, the 'meditation in which all conception (Samjna) has been destroyed', the ascetic is disgusted with conception only; but you think that sensation (Vedana), too, is lacking in this Samapatti.

Our reply: Since sensation and conception exert a strong influence upon the mind, therefore, when these two associates cease to function, the mind, which must be based on them, should also cease to function.

(4) The Sautrantikas defend themselves: Inspiration and expiration, which are the activities of the body, disappear in the fourth Dhyana without the body disappearing for that reason. Why, then, do you argue that the mind perishes when its activities, sensation and conception, disappear?

Our reply: If what you think is true, then the voice should not disappear when its two activities, reflection (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicara*), disappear; but you admit that the use of the voice is impossible when its activities are lacking.

(5) Theory of Samskaras (activities)

The Samskaras are either universal or non-universal. Universal Samskaras are those which must be present when the dharma which they condition is to be present; in their absence, this dharma is impossible. It is thus that the use of the voice is impossible when its Samskaras, reflection and investigation, which are universal, are lacking. Non-universal Samskaras are those the presence of which is not indispensable; when they disappear, the dharma may still be present; it is thus that the body does not disappear when its Samskaras, inspiration and expiration, are stopped.

Now one must place sensation and conception in the category of universal Samskaras, because, according to the Sautrantikas, they form with volition part of the class of *mahabhumikas*, i.e., mental attributes necessarily associated with all minds. Therefore, if they are arrested in the Nirodhasamapatti, the mind must also cease. How could it subsist without their support?

(6) Another point: – The Sautrantika has no right to affirm the absence of Vedana and Samjna and the presence of the other Caittas.

又許思等是大地法，滅受想時彼亦應滅。
〔論主反難。〕

旣爾，信等此位亦無，非偏行滅餘可在故，如何可言有餘心所？

旣許思等此位非無，受想應然，大地法故。

又此定中若有思等，亦應有觸，餘心所法無不皆依觸力生故。

若許有觸，亦應有受，觸緣受故。

旣許有受，想亦應生，不相離故。

如受緣愛非一切受皆能起愛，故觸緣受非一切觸皆能生受，由斯所難其理不成。
〔述記：經部救言。〕

彼救不然，有差別故。
〔述記：此論主非。〕

謂佛自簡唯無明觸所生諸受爲緣生愛，曾無有處簡觸生受。

故若有觸必有受生，受與想俱其理決定。

或應如餘位受想亦不滅，執此位中有思等故。

許便違害心行滅言，亦不得成滅受想定。

D. 破無心所

〔述記：此即經部異師。〕

若無心所，識亦應無，不見餘心離心所故。
〔論主破。〕

餘偏行滅法隨滅故。

受等應非大地法故。

此識應非相應法故。

Volition (Cetana) is also *mahabhumika*. If sensation and conception are lacking, why should volition persist?

Faith (Sraddha) (which is a mode of volition) and all the Caittas which are not universal, and which cannot persist, will also be lacking if the universals are lacking. It is therefore wrong to say that the Caittas remain to the exclusion of sensation and conception. If the Sautrantikas insist in the presence of the other Caittas, they must admit the presence of sensation and conception which, according to them, are *mahabhumika*.

Again, if he admits the presence of volition in this Samapatti, he must also admit the presence of mental contact (Sparsa), because all the remaining Caittas are born by reason of mental contact. But, if mental contact is present, sensation will be present, for the Sutra says, 'sensation is born by reason of mental contact'. And if sensation is present, conception will also be present, because these two are never dissociated.

(7) The Sautrantikas' objection

Although the principle is that 'sensation is born by reason of mental contact,' it does not follow that all mental contacts produce sensation, for, despite the principle that 'craving-thirst (Trsna) is born by reason of sensation,' one knows that not all sensations can produce thirst. Hence mental contact and volition can be present without sensation being present.

(8) Reply: – The Sautrantikas' argument is not valid, because the two cases are not identical and because the Buddha himself has defined the meaning of the formula: 'Thirst is born of sensation'. He said, 'The sensation which produces thirst is the sensation that is born of mental contact accompanied by ignorance (Avidya),' that is to say, sensation produces thirst when it proceeds from mental contact accompanied by ignorance. Nowhere else has the Buddha denied that sensation is produced only by certain mental contacts. Hence mental contact being given, sensation necessarily follows. Furthermore, sensation and conception are concomitants of each other.

In other words, admitting that Nirodhasamapatti includes volition and the other Caittas, the Sautrantikas must admit that it also includes sensation and conception. In this case, it contradicts the Sutra which teaches that 'the Samskaras of the mind are arrested', and it attributes to this Samapatti a nature that is in contradiction to its name of 'Samapatti of the cessation of sensation and conception'.

Hence Caittas are lacking in this Samapatti.

D. Sautrantikas – Citta without Caittas

1. If the Caittas are lacking, consciousness or Citta is also lacking: (1) One is not aware of any other Citta (outside the Citta in question which the Sautrantikas claim is present in the Nirodhasamapatti) which is not accompanied by Caittas. (2) It is the rule that the dharma does not exist when its Samskaras are absent. (3) The Sautrantikas cannot say that sensation, conception and volition are *mahabhumika* if he admits the existence of a certain Citta not accompanied by sensation etc. (4) The consciousness which the

許則應無所依緣等，如色等法，亦非心故。

又契經說，意法爲緣生於意識，三和合觸，與觸俱起有受想思。

若此定中有意識者，三和合故必應有觸。
觸既定與受想思俱，如何有識而無心所？

若謂餘時三和有力成觸生觸能起受等，由此定前厭患心所，故在定位三事無能不成生觸亦無受等。

〔述記：經部之中有二師救。〕

若爾，應名滅心所定，如何但說滅受想耶？

〔述記：論主返難。〕

若謂厭時唯厭受想，此二滅故心所皆滅，依前所厭以立定名。

〔述記：經部救。〕

既爾，此中心亦應滅，所厭俱故，如餘心所。

〔述記：論主難。〕

不爾，如何名無心定？

又此定位意識是何？

〔述記：此總問也。〕

不應是染或無記性。
諸善定中無此事故。餘染無記心必有心所故。
不應厭善起染等故。非求寂靜翻起散故。

Sautrantikas say is present in the Nirodhasamapatti will be without 'associates' (*samprayuktas*), and it will also be without a supporting basis (asraya – indriya), without object, and without any act of knowledge: in a word, like Rupa, it will not be Citta.

When the Sautrantikas want the Manovijnana, not accompanied by Caittas, to subsist in the Nirodhasamapatti, we oppose him with the Sutra which says, 'By reason of Manas and dharmas, Manovijnana is born; the concourse of the three is mental contact; arising simultaneously with mental contact there are sensation, conception and volition.'

If Manovijnana is present in Nirodhasamapatti, mental contact, by reason of the concourse of the three, will also be present. Since sensation, conception and volition are invariably born with mental contact, how can it be admitted that Nirodhasamapatti includes a Manovijnana that is not accompanied by Caittas?

2. Reply by Sautrantikas

At other times the 'concourse of the three' has the power to constitute or engender mental contact, producing sensation etc.; but the ascetic, before entering into Nirodhasamapatti, has become disgusted with the Caittas. It follows from this that, during Nirodhasamapatti, the concourse of the three is incapable of constituting or producing mental contact. In consequence, the Caittas, sensation etc., are absent.

If Nirodhasamapatti is exempt from Caittas, one ought to call it Caittanirodhasamapatti, 'Samapatti of the cessation of mental associates', not Samjnaveditanirodhasamapatti, 'Samapatti of the cessation of sensation and conception'.

3. Reply by Sautrantikas

During the preparatory stage, the ascetic is disgusted with sensation and conception alone. These disappear when Samapatti is obtained and, simultaneously, all the Caittas will also disappear. But Samapatti takes its name from the method whereby it is produced.

This reasoning proves that the mind must also disappear in Nirodhasamapatti, for, like all Caittas, it is simultaneously associated with sensation and conception with which the ascetic has become disgusted. If it does not disappear, how will Nirodhasamapatti receive the name of 'mindless meditation' or 'Samapatti exempt from mind'?

4. What is the moral species of the Manovijnana which is supposed to exist in Nirodhasamapatti? Is it defiled or non-defined? Is it good?

It should not be defiled or non-defined: (1) There is nothing defiled or non-defined in good Samapattis; (2) all defiled or non-defined minds which one knows are accompanied by Caittas; (3) during the preparatory stage of this good Samapatti, the ascetic cannot have become disgusted with what is good and conceive something defiled etc. [What, then, if he is equally disgusted with good and evil?] He is disgusted with defiled dharmas by reason of his

若謂是善，相應善故，應無貪等善根相應。

此心不應是自性善，或勝義善，違自宗故，非善根等及涅槃故。

若謂此心是等起善，加行善根所引發故，理亦不然。

違自宗故，如餘善心，非等起故。

善心無間起三性心，如何善心由前等起？

故心是善由相應力。

旣爾，必與善根相應，寧說此心獨無心所？故無心所，心亦應無。

如是推徵，眼等轉識於滅定位非不離身，故契經言不離身者彼識即是此第八識。

入滅定時不爲止息此極寂靜執持識故。

無想等位類此應知。

第十證：染淨法

又契經說，心雜染故有情雜染，心清凈故有情清凈。

若無此識，彼染凈心不應有故。

謂染凈法以心爲本，因心而生依心住故，心受彼熏持彼種故。

然雜染法略有三種，煩惱，業，果，種類別故。

〔述記：三界見修所有煩惱名煩惱，一切有漏善不善業名業，此業所得總別異熟名果。〕

pursuit of mental silence and tranquillity. Seeking that silence and tranquillity, he cannot produce thoughts and emotions that trouble and disturb, i.e., thoughts and feelings that are defiled.

If Manovijnana in Nirodhasamapatti is described as morally good, it is because of its association with good Caittas, such as 'absence of covetousness' etc. It cannot be good by itself or absolutely, because, according to our system of teachings, it is neither the 'root of good' nor Nirvana.

The opinion that this Manovijnana is good by reason of the cause which gives it origin, being induced to become a manifestation by a 'root of good effort', is also illogical and contradicts our system, because, like all other good minds, the mind in Nirodhasamapatti is not good by reason of its originating cause. In fact, the manifestation of a good mind may be followed immediately by the arising of good, bad or non-defined thoughts. How, then, can it be said that good minds are born because they are preceded by good thoughts? Hence a mind is good because it is associated with the eleven good Caittas. Hence, like other good thoughts, Manovijnana, if existing in Nirodhasamapatti, must be good because it is associated with the roots of good. How can it be said that this consciousness is alone and without Caittas? In consequence, if Caittas are lacking in Nirodhasamapatti, consciousness will be lacking there too.

Conclusion: It follows from these logical inferences that the Pravrttivijnanas leave the physical body during Nirodhasamapatti. When the Sutra says, 'The consciousness does not leave the body', it is referring to the eighth consciousness. When the ascetic enters into Nirodhasamapatti, it is not to arrest this extremely calm and life-sustaining Adanavijnana.

As regards the Asamjnisamapatti (meditation exempt from conception) and the two 'mindless Samapattis', one may reason and conclude in a similar manner.

(10) Samklesa and Vyavadana
Pure and Impure Dharmas

The Sutra says, 'By the tarnishing (*samklesa*) of the mind, the sentient being is tarnished; by the purity (*vyavadana*) of the mind, the sentient being is purified.'

The only mind that corresponds to this definition is the eighth consciousness. If this consciousness were lacking, the tarnished or purified mind would be non-existent.

This signifies that pure and impure dharmas (dharmas of *samklesa* and *vyavadana*) have as their root or foundation the eighth consciousness; because, if they are born, it is with this mind as their cause; if they subsist, it is by the support of this mind. This mind is perfumed by them, and it holds their Bijas.

1. Samklesa (impure dharmas)

Dharmas of *samklesa* (impure dharmas) are of three kinds: (1) Klesas or 'vexing passions' of the three Dhatus and the two categories (those to be abandoned by insight into Transcendent Truth, and those to be abandoned

若無此識持煩惱種，界地往還，無染心後諸煩惱起，皆應無因。

餘法不能持彼種故。

過去未來非實有故。

若諸煩惱無因而生，則無三乘學無學果，諸已斷者皆應起故。

若無此識持業果種，界地往還異類法後諸業果起，亦應無因。

餘種餘因前已遮故。

若諸業果無因而生，入無餘依涅槃界已三界業果還復應生。

煩惱亦應無因生故。

又行緣識應不得成，轉識受熏前已遮故。

結生染識非行感故。

應說名色行爲緣故。

時分懸隔無緣義故。

此不成故，後亦不成。

諸清凈法亦有三種，世出世道斷果別故。

by meditation, *darsana* and *bhavanaheya*); (2) *Karmans* or acts, i.e., bad and impure-good acts; and (3) *phalas* or fruits: 'general recompense', i.e., fruits of acts that project the existence, and 'particular recompense', i.e., fruits of acts that complete that existence.

(1) In the absence of an eighth consciousness which holds the Bijas of klesa, the birth of klesas will take place without any cause (1) when one changes one's Dhatu or plane of existence, and (2) after a non-defiled mind has been produced.

In fact, dharmas which are not the eighth consciousness (Rupa etc.) are incapable of holding Klesabijas. Past and future dharmas do not exist and cannot be a cause.

The admission that klesas are born without any cause is a denial of the fruits of Saiksa and Asaiksa of the three Vehicles, because klesas can be reborn among the Saiksas and Asaiksas without any cause at all even though these saints have already cut them off.

(2) In the absence of an eighth consciousness which holds the Bijas of the acts and their fruits, the subsequent birth of the acts and their fruits will take place without cause when a change of Dhatu has been made and when a dharma of a contradictory nature has been produced.

We know in fact that Rupa and other dharmas do not hold Bijas; we also know for a fact that past dharmas are not causes of present or future dharmas.

But, if acts and their fruits are born without any cause, why are acts and fruits of the three Dhatus not produced for the saint who has entered final Nirvana-without-residue? And klesas would also be produced without cause.

(3) Furthermore, [the process of conditional causation whereby, according to the chain of existence called the Twelve Nidanas,] 'consciousness (*vijnana*) is born by reason of activities of all kinds (Samskaras)' cannot be established unless there exists a consciousness which is perfumed by the Samskaras. In other words, this causality is impossible unless there is an eighth consciousness. We have already refuted the thesis that the Pravrttivijnanas are perfumable.

The 'defiled consciousness at the moment of birth' is not produced by the Samskaras. If the consciousness produced by the Samskaras is the consciousness comprised in Namarupa, the Sutra should have said: 'Namarupa exists by reason of the Samskaras'.

A distant and separated dharma cannot be 'condition' (*pratyaya*).

Just as you have no right to say of this link in the chain of existence [the Twelve Nidanas] that 'consciousness (*vijnana*) is born by reason of the Samskaras', so you cannot say of the subsequent link in the chain that 'being or existence (*bhava*) is born by reason of grasping or seizing (*upadana*)'.

2. Vyavadana (pure dharmas)

Dharmas of *Vyavadana, purification*, are of three kinds: (1) The 'mundane' path, that is to say, the six spiritual practices; (2) the 'supramundane' path; and (3) 'the fruit of the elimination of barriers', that is to say, the unconditioned dharma (*asamskrta*) obtained as a result of the elimination of the klesas by these ways.

若無此識持世出世清凈道種，異類心後起彼凈法皆應無因。

所執餘因前已破故。

若二凈道無因而生，入無餘依涅槃界已彼二凈道還復應生。

所依亦應無因生故。

又出世道初不應生，無法持彼法爾種故。

有漏類別，非彼因故。

無因而生，非釋種故。

初不生故，後亦不生，是則應無三乘道果。

若無此識持煩惱種，轉依斷果亦不得成。

謂道起時現行煩惱及彼種子俱非有故。染凈二心不俱起故。道相應心不持彼種，自性相違，如涅槃故。

去來得等非實有故。餘法持種理不成故。既無所斷，能斷亦無，依誰由誰而立斷果？

若由道力後惑不生立斷果者，則初道起應成無學。
〔述記：此牒計非。經部救言，無斷果體，但由道力後惑不生卽立斷果，何須本識持煩惱種立實斷果，論主難云，則初道起應成無學。〕

後諸煩惱皆已無因永不生故。
〔述記：釋前所以。〕

許有此識，一切皆成，唯此能持染凈種故。

(1) In the absence of an eighth consciousness that holds the Bijas of the two pure paths, the subsequent treading of these two paths is impossible from the time when the present consciousness has been interrupted by a mind of a different nature (a mind of a lower Dhatu, a defiled mind). In fact, outside their own Bijas, these paths cannot have Pravrttivijnanas, Rupas, etc., as their cause.

Would you say that they are reborn without cause? – If they are reborn without cause, you ought to admit that they can be reborn when one has already entered final Nirvana-without-residue, and that the ascetic himself whose body is the supporting basis (*asraya*) for this ultimate realization can be reborn in Nirvana.

(2) One does not see how the 'first supramundane path' (first moment of *darsanamarga*) can be born, if there is not an eighth consciousness which holds, at all times, the innate Bijas of the supramundane path (*dharmatabijas*). In fact impure dharmas are of a different nature and cannot be the cause of this path.

To think that the first supramundane path can be born without cause is to give up calling oneself a Buddhist.

If the first supramundane path is not born, the subsequent path will not be born. In consequence, there will be no paths and fruits of the three Vehicles.

(3) In the absence of a consciousness that holds the Bijas of klesa, the 'transmutation of consciousness into transcendental wisdom' and the fruit of the 'elimination of klesas' are impossible.

Can it be supposed that the eighth consciousness does not exist and that the path of elimination of klesa comes into being without a cause?

This is impossible, because at the moment when this path comes into being, actual klesas do not exist, since the mind is pure; pure mind and defiled mind cannot go together. The Bijas of klesa do not exist either, because the mind associated with the path cannot hold similar Bijas. There is repugnance between these Bijas and these minds as between these Bijas and Nirvana. Hence the Sautrantikas, with their Bijas held by the actual consciousnesses, explain nothing.

As to the Sarvastivadins, past klesas, future klesas, and the Praptis do not exist. Rupa and the other dharmas do not hold Bijas.

Hence, in the absence of the eighth consciousness, that which must be eliminated will be lacking, and the path which eliminates will also be lacking.

Then, in relation to what and by the force of what can the fruit of the elimination be established?

Objection. – The fruit of the elimination consists in klesa not being reborn as a result of the path.

Reply. – This explanation is inadequate. In fact, if the eighth consciousness is lacking, the ascetic will be Asaiksa (i.e., Arhat) from the birth of the first path. Furthermore, in the absence of Bijas, all klesas will henceforth be without cause and will never be born.

But, as soon as one admits the existence of this eighth consciousness, everything is properly established, because only this consciousness can hold pure and impure Bijas (*samklesa* and *vyavadana*).

證此識有，理趣無邊，恐厭繁文，略示綱要。

別有此識，教理顯然，諸有智人應深信受。

There are innumerable logical arguments which demonstrate and prove the existence of the eighth consciousness. We have only given a summary exposition for fear of making the present treatise too long and elaborate.

From the sacred teachings and logical reasoning it is abundantly clear that this eighth consciousness exists. All persons of wisdom should believe deeply in and accept this truth.

BOOK III

THE MANAS CONSCIOUSNESS

末 那 識

末那識

如是己說初能變相，第二能變其相云何？

頌曰：

次第二能變，　是識名末那，
依彼轉緣彼，　思量爲性相。
四煩惱常俱，　謂我癡我見，
幷我慢我愛，　及餘觸等俱，
有覆無記攝，　隨所生所繫。
阿羅漢滅定，　出世道無有。

THE MANAS CONSCIOUSNESS

We have dealt with the first evolving consciousness and its characteristics. What are the characteristics of the second evolving consciousness?

The Stanzas say:

5

Next comes the second evolving consciousness.

This consciousness is called Manas.

It manifests itself with the Alayavijnana as its basis and support and takes that consciousness as its object.

It has the nature and character of cogitation or intellection.

6

It is always accompanied by four klesas or vexing passions (sources of affliction and delusion),

Namely, Self-delusion (*atmamoha*), Self-belief (*atmadrsti*)

Together with Self-conceit (*atmamana*) and Self-love (*atmasneha*).

It is also accompanied by the other mental associates (*caittas*), namely, mental contact (Sparsa) and so forth [attention, sensation, conception, and volition].

7

It belongs to the 'defiled-non-defined moral species' (neither good nor bad but defiled).

It is active in the dhatu or bhumi in which the sentient being is born and to which he is bound.

It ceases to exist at the stage of Arhatship, in the 'meditation of annihilation' (state of complete extinction of thought and other mental qualities),

And on the supramundanc path.

第一章·　釋能變名

論曰。次初異熟能變識後，應辨思量能變識相。
是識聖教別名末那，恒審思量勝餘識故。

此名何異第六意識？

此持業釋，如藏識名，識即意故。彼依主釋，如眼識等，識異意故。

然諸聖教恐此濫彼，故於第七但立意名。

又標意名爲簡心識，積集了別劣餘識故。

或欲顯此與彼意識爲近所依，故但名意。

§ I. NAME OF THE SEVENTH CONSCIOUSNESS

THE Treatise says:

Having first dealt with the evolving maturing consciousness (Vipakavijnana), we must now explain the evolving consciousness of cogitation. In the sacred teachings, this consciousness is given the special name of Manas, because in its perpetual practice of cogitation it surpasses the other consciousnesses.

In what way is this name different from the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana)?

The name Manas is formed in accordance with the rule of composition called 'Karmadharaya'; it means: 'consciousness that is Manas', just as the name Alayavijnana, the eighth consciousness, means: 'consciousness that is Alaya (storehouse)'. On the other hand, the name Manovijnana is formed by the rule of composition called 'Tatpurusa', which indicates the idea of lordship or possession. Accordingly, Manovijnana means 'consciousness of Manas', or 'consciousness of the mind', the sixth consciousness being different from Manas. Thus, the word *manovijnana* is of the same type as the word *caksurvijnana*, 'consciousness of the eye'.

Lest there should be confusion between the seventh consciousness and the sixth, the Holy Scriptures called the seventh consciousness by the shorter name of Manas.

There are other reasons for calling the seventh consciousness by this name: 1. it is desired to distinguish it from Citta (that is to say, from the eighth consciousness) and from the first six consciousnesses (Manovijnana, eye-consciousness, etc.), because it is inferior to Citta in power of accumulation (accumulation of Bijas etc.), and inferior to the first six consciousnesses in power of discriminative perception; 2. or it is desired to indicate that this consciousness is the immediate support (*asraya*) of Manovijnana.

第二章· 末那所依

依彼轉者，顯此所依。
彼謂即前初能變識，
聖說此識依藏識故。

有義此意以彼識種而爲所依，非彼現識，
此無間斷，不假現識爲俱有依方得生故。

〔述記：是第一義，難陀勝子皆作是說。〕

有義此意以彼識種及彼現識俱爲所依，雖無間斷而有轉易名轉識故，必假現識爲俱有依方得生故。

〔述記：護法等諸論師釋。〕

轉謂流轉，顯示此識恒依彼識，取所緣故。

〔述記：流是相續義，轉是起義。謂依第八或種或現相續起義。〕

釋所依體

諸心心所皆有所依，然彼所依總有三種。

一因緣依，謂自種子，諸有爲法皆托此依，離自因緣必不生故。

二增上緣依，謂內六處，諸心心所皆託此依，離俱有根必不轉故。

三等無開緣依，謂前滅意，諸心心所皆託此依，離開導根必不起故。

〔述記：此開導依若言開避，二義無別，開卽避故。今言開者，離其處所，卽開彼路。復言導者，引彼令生，引導招彼令生此處故。梵言羯爛多，此可言次第緣。」

§ II. THE BASIS AND SUPPORT (ASRAYA) FOR MANAS

THE phrase 'manifestation with that as basis and support' in the Stanza indicates the basis and support (asraya) for Manas. This basis is the first evolving consciousness, that is to say, the Alayavijnana, because it is said in the sacred teachings that the seventh consciousness, Manas, depends upon the Alayavijnana for support.

According to Nanda, Manas depends for support on the Bijas of the Alayavijnana, that is to say, on its own Bijas stored in the Alaya, not on the actual Alayavijnana itself. The reason is that Manas is a consciousness that functions without interruption or discontinuity, and, as such, it does not require for its birth an actual consciousness to serve as its basis.

According to Dharmapala, Manas depends for support both on the actual eighth consciousness and on its Bijas. Although it is not discontinuous, yet it is, as its name *pravrttivijnana* implies, susceptible to transformation. Its birth, therefore, must necessarily depend on the actual eighth consciousness for simultaneous support.

The word *pravartate* (in the original Sanskrit stanza) means continuous manifestation, indicating that Manas perpetually depends on the eighth consciousness and its Bijas for support and takes it as its object.

General theory of Asraya

All Cittas and Caittas – mind and mental properties – have 'supports' or *Asrayas*. There are three kinds of support.

1. *Hetupratyaya-asraya*, the support which constitutes the 'condition quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*). This condition is the Bija. All conditioned dharmas (*samskrta*) come into being by virtue of this kind of support, because they cannot be born without these Bijas which are their 'causal condition', their *conditio sine qua non*.

2. *Adhipatipratyaya-asraya*, the support which constitutes the 'condition quâ agent or contributory factor'. Here it is a question of the six internal *ayatanas* or bases (sense-organs). All Cittas and Caittas manifest themselves by virtue of this support which is called 'simultaneous support' (*sahabhu-asraya*) or 'simultaneous organ' (*sahabhu indriya*); they cannot manifest themselves without it.

3. *Samanantarapratyaya-asraya*, the support which constitutes the 'condition quâ similar and immediate antecedent'. Here it is a question of 'Manas that has perished' – this term Manas comprises all the eight consciousnesses. The other name for this is *kranta pratyaya* or *krantaindriya*, the *pratyaya* or *indriya* of succession, i.e., one concept making room or opening the way for the succeeding concept. If this *krantaindriya* is lacking, no *Citta* or *Caitta* can arise. In other words, all Cittas and Caittas are born by reason of the *krantaindriyas*.

唯心心所具三所依名有所依，非所餘法。

一· 因緣依

初種子依，有作是說，

要種滅已現果方生。
〔述記：因果異時，經部等義。〕
無種已生，集論說故。
〔述記：謂無學最後蘊，此時種入過去，過去是無當果不生，現種已滅，唯有現行蘊在，名無種已生。〕
種與芽等不俱有故。
有義彼說爲證不成，彼依引生後種說故。
〔述記：護法等釋彼集論中據不能生後種說故。謂此時緣闕，現在種子不能更引生後念種，非謂此念現行無種，種在過去名爲無種。〕

種生芽等非勝義故。
種滅芽生非極成故。
燄炷同時互爲因故。

然種自類因果不俱，種現相生決定俱有。

故瑜伽說，無常法與他性爲因，亦與後念自性爲因，是因緣義。

自性言顯種子自類前爲後因，他性言顯種與現行互爲因義。

攝大乘論亦作是說，藏識染法互爲因緣，
猶如束蘆俱時而有。
又說種子與果必俱。
故種子依定非前後。

設有處說種果前後，應知皆是隨轉理門。

如是八識及諸心所定各別有種子所依。

Only Cittas and Caittas have this triple support; they are therefore described as 'having a support' in contradistinction to other dharmas.

1. HETUPRATYAYA-ASRAYA

The first Asraya is the support which consists in the 'condition quâ cause'. This is also called Bijasraya, the support of Bijas.

According to Nanda and Jinapura, the Bija must perish in order that the actual fruit may be born.

[The Sautrantikas affirm that the cause and the fruit are not simultaneous.]

Their arguments are: 1. the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya* distinguishes, from among the twenty-four species of 'already born', that which is called the 'without-*bijas* already born'. [This refers to the last Skandhas of the Arhat: at this moment, the Bijas have entered into the past, and the past is non-existent; the future fruit has not yet been born, but the present Bijas have been destroyed. The Arhat has only those Skandhas which have no Bijas, 'without Bijas', and which have been born]; 2. The seed (*bija*) and the sprout etc. are not contemporaneous.

But Dharmapala thinks that these arguments cannot be established as proofs: 1. The meaning of the Abhidharma is that, at the last moment of the Arhat, his Bijas are not capable of engendering new Bijas of their species; the Arhat is therefore 'without Bijas', but there exist in him Bijas which produce an actual fruit that is simultaneous with them, hence 'already born'; 2. That the seed engenders the sprout is a causality in a worldly sense, not in real truth. Besides, it is not a demonstrated and established truth that the sprout is born after the destruction of the seed; we do not admit this thesis. And it is proved that the flame and the candle are simultaneous and reciprocal causes.

In fact, in the causation of Bijas producing Bijas, the cause and the fruit are not simultaneous; the Bija and the actual dharma engender each other and are simultaneous. This is why the Yogasastra defines *hetupratyaya*: 'Impermanent dharmas (Bijas and actual dharmas) are causes of things of another sort and are causes of a subsequent moment of their sort.' The phrase 'of their sort' signifies that the earlier Bija is the cause of the subsequent Bija; the phrase 'of another sort' signifies that the Bija and the actual dharma are reciprocal causes of each other.

Likewise, the Mahayanasamgraha says: 'The Alayavijnana and the defiled (actual) dharmas are reciprocally *hetupratyaya*, like a bunch of reeds tied together, and exist simultaneously.' The same treatise again says: 'The Bija and its fruit are simultaneous.'

Let us conclude, therefore, that *Bijasraya* – 'Bijas as support of actual dharmas' – definitely does not admit of succession.

There may be certain texts (cited by the Sautrantikas) which teach that there is succession between the Bija and its fruit, but these texts are not authorities.

Thus, all the eight consciousnesses and their Caittas – pure or impure – have their own particular Bijas to serve as their support.

二· 增上緣依

(一) 難陀義

次俱有依，有作是說，眼等五識意爲依，此現起時必有彼故。

無別眼等爲俱有依，眼等五根即種子故。

二十唯識伽他中言，識從自種生，似境相而轉，爲成內外處，佛說彼爲十。

彼頌意說，世尊爲成十二處故，說五識種爲眼等根，五識相分爲色等境，故眼等根即五識種。

觀所緣論亦作是說，識上色功能名五根應理，功能與境色，無始互爲因。

彼頌意說，異熟識上能生眼等色識種子名色功能，說爲五根，無別眼等。

種與色識常互爲因，能熏與種遞爲因故。

第七八識無別此依，恒相續轉自力勝故。

第六意識別有此依，要託末那而得起故。

(二) 安慧義

有義，彼說理教相違。若五色根即五識種，十八界種應成雜亂。

2. ADHIPATIPRATYAYA-ASRAYA OR SAHABHU-ASRAYA

Here we study the views of four Masters, Nanda, Sthiramati, Suddacandra, and Dharmapala, on the 'simultaneous support' (*sahabhuasraya*) of the five consciousnesses, the sixth, the seventh and the eighth consciousnesses.

1. Opinion of Nanda

(1) The five consciousnesses (visual consciousness etc.) have only one simultaneous support, namely, the Manovijnana, because this consciousness must exist whenever the five consciousnesses are present.

What are called the *indriyas*, 'organs', the eye etc., do not constitute distinct simultaneous supports for the five consciousnesses, because the five organs are only Bijas. A stanza of the Vimsatikakarika says:

'Consciousness is born of its own Bijas and develops into what seems to be an external sphere of objects. To establish the distinction between internal and external bases of cognition, the Buddha says there are ten such bases.'

The purpose of this stanza is to show that, with a view to establishing the twelve bases of cognition, the Buddha has designated the Bijas of the five consciousnesses by the name of indriyas, eye etc., and the 'perceived aspect' (*nimittabhaga*) of the five consciousnesses by the name of objects (*visaya*), colour etc. Hence the *indriyas*, eye etc., are the Bijas of the five consciousnesses, and nothing more.

Likewise, Dignaga in his treatise *the Alambanapariksa* says:

'The potentialities (*bijas*) of *rupa* which reside in the consciousness (the eighth consciousness) are given the name of "the five *indriyas*". These potentialities and the "rupa object" (*visayarupa*) have, since before the beginning of time, been reciprocal causes, producing each other.'

The meaning of this stanza is as follows:

In the Vipakavijnana are found Bijas or potentialities which engender the 'rupa-consciousness' of the eye etc.: that is to say, which engender an actual consciousness which develops itself into colour, sound, etc. Hence this consciousness is called 'rupa-consciousness'; it is called 'consciousness of the eye' when it manifests itself in colour, 'of the ear' when it manifests itself in sound and so forth. The potentialities in question, or Bijas, receive the name of *indriyas*, organs. There is no eye, no ear, etc. other than these Bijas. These Bijas (*darsanabhagabijas*) and the rupa-consciousness (actual *darsanabhaga*, the perceiving aspect) always exist as reciprocal causes, because the actual *darsanabhaga*, itself the fruit of the Bijas, perfumes the eighth consciousness and is the cause of the Bijas.

(2) The seventh and eighth consciousnesses have no simultaneous support (*sahabhu-asraya*), because, by virtue of their own great strength, they manifest themselves in a continuous series.

(3) The Manovijnana is produced only by reason of Manas which is its simultaneous support.

2. Opinion of Sthiramati

The foregoing system is inadmissible, being at variance with reason and the sacred teachings.

然十八界各別有種，諸聖教中處處說故。

又五識種各有能生相見分異，爲執何等名眼等根？

若見分種，應識蘊攝。若相分種，應外處攝。

便違聖教眼等五根皆是色蘊內處所攝。

又若五根卽五識種，五根應是五識因緣，不應說爲增上緣攝。

〔述記：如瑜伽第三，第五十四，對法第五等說。〕

又鼻舌根即二識種，則應鼻舌唯欲界繫，

或應二識通色界繫，許便俱與聖教相違。

眼耳身根即三識種，二地五地爲難亦然。

又五識種既通善惡，應五色根非唯無記。

〔述記：對法第四等云八界八處全餘一分是無記。〕

又五識種無執受攝，五根亦應非有執受。

〔述記：瑜伽論五十六說，幾執受非執受？答五是執受。〕

又五色根若五色種，應意識種即是末那，彼以五根爲同法故。

又瑜伽論說眼等識皆具三依，若五色根即五識種，依但應二。

又諸聖教說眼等根皆通現種，執唯是種，便與一切聖教相違。

(1) Concerning the Five Consciousnesses

A. If the five material organs (*rupindriya*) are the Bijas of the five consciousnesses, there will be confusion of the Bijas of the eighteen *dhatus*. But the sacred texts say in several places that the eighteen *dhatus* each have their own Bijas.

B. The Bijas of the five consciousnesses are of two different kinds, some of them producing the *darsanabhaga* (perceiving aspect), the others producing the *nimittabhaga* (aspect perceived). Now which of these Bijas do you say are the material organs? If you say that it is the *darsanabhaga-bijas*, then the five organs should be included in the Vijnanaskandhas (consciousness Skandha). If you say it is the *nimittabhaga-bijas*, then the organs should be included in the external bases (*ayatanas*). But either of these conclusions is at variance with the sacred texts which teach that the five organs are Rupaskandhas included in the internal bases (*ayatanas*).

C. If the five organs are the Bijas of the five consciousnesses, they should be the 'condition quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*) of the five consciousnesses. Then we should not say that they are the 'condition quâ agent' (*adhipatipratyaya*) [as taught in the Yogasastra, 3 and 54, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 5].

D. If the organs of the nose and the tongue are the Bijas of the consciousnesses of smell and taste, the nose and the tongue will exist only in the Kamadhatu: or else the consciousnesses of smell and taste will exist in the Rupadhatu also. Both these two hypotheses are contradicted by the sacred texts.

The same difficulties will confront us if we affirm that the organs of eye-ear-body are the Bijas of the consciousnesses of sight-hearing-touch, because these three consciousnesses exist in two spheres (Kamadhatu and the first Dhyana), while the three organs exist in five spheres (Kamadhatu and four Dhyanas).

E. Inasmuch as the Bijas of the five consciousnesses can be good or bad. the five organs [if they are the Bijas of the five consciousnesses] should not be exclusively non-defined as the texts say (Abhidharmasamuccaya, 4).

F. The Bijas of the five consciousnesses are not 'appropriated' (held and borne by the Alayavijnana); the five organs, if they are these Bijas, should not be appropriated either. According to Book 56 of the Yogasastra, the five organs are appropriated.[1]

G. If the five organs are the Bijas of the five consciousnesses, we must conclude that Manas (organ of Manovijnana) is the Bija of Manovijnana, because Manas is to Manovijnana what the five organs are to the five consciousnesses.

H. The Yogasastra (83) attributes three 'supports' (*asraya*) to the visual consciousness etc. – If the five organs are the Bijas of the five consciousnesses, the latter will each have only two supports.

I. All Scriptures (the Abhidharmasamuccaya, for instance) say that the five organs are actual dharmas as well as Bijas. If we hold that they are Bijas only, then our theory is at variance with all Scriptures.

However, one may discard the foregoing objections of Sthiramati and adhere to the thesis that the *indriyas* are the Bijas, affirming that they are not

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[1] See 'Theory of Upadana' in the preceding section on Alayavijnana.

有避如前所說過難，朋附彼執復轉救言，異熟識中能感五識增上業種名五色根，非作因緣生五識種，玅符二頌，善順瑜伽。

彼有虛言，都無實義，
應五色根非無記故。

又彼應非唯有執受，唯色蘊攝，唯內處故。

鼻舌唯應欲界繫故，三根不應五地繫故。

感意識業應末那故，眼等不應通現種故，又應眼等非色根故。

又若五識皆業所感，則應一向無記性攝。善等五識既非業感，應無眼等爲俱有依。故彼所言非爲善救。

又諸聖教處處皆說阿賴耶識變似色根及根依處器世間等，如何汝等撥無色根？

許眼等識變似色等，不許眼等藏識所變，如斯迷謬深違教理。

然伽他說種子功能名五根者，爲破離識實有色根，於識所變似眼根等以有發生五識用故假名種子及色功能，非謂色根即識業種。

又緣五境明了意識應以五識爲俱有依，以彼必與五識俱故。

若彼不依眼等識者，彼應不與五識爲依，彼此相依勢力等故。

Bijas quâ cause, *hetupratyaya*, which immediately engenders the five consciousnesses, but *karmabijas* in the Alayavijnana which are 'condition quâ agent' (*adhipatipratyaya*), and which bring about as fruit of retribution the ethically non-defined five consciousnesses. This theory is in agreement with the two stanzas (Vimsatika and Alambanapariksa) and with the Yogasastra. It is, moreover, not subject to the preceding criticisms.

According to Sthiramati, this reply is sheer drivel and does not contain any real truth. And this for ten reasons: (1) If the five *indriyas* are *Karmabijas*, they should not be non-defined; (2) they should not be exclusively 'appropriated' (by the Alayavijnana); (3) they should not be exclusively included in *rupaskandha*; (4) they should not be exclusively 'internal bases'; (5) the nose and the tongue should belong to Kamadhatu only; the eye, the ear and the body should not belong to the first five 'lands' (*bhumis*); (6) the Karman which creates the Manovijnana should be Manas (because, according to the analogy of the five organs, just as the five organs are *karmabijas*, so Manas, support of Manovijnana, will be Karman; (7) the five sense-organs should not be actual dharmas and Bijas; (8) the five organs should not be 'material organs' (*rupindriya*); (9) the five consciousnesses, being created by Karman, should be exclusively non-defined, but we know it for a fact that they are also good etc.; and (10) the five consciousnesses, being good etc., should not be created by Karman, in which case they should not have the five organs as their simultaneous support. It follows from this that the theory that the *indriyas* are *Karmabijas* is not a good defence.

Besides, continues Sthiramati, the sacred texts repeatedly teach that 'the Alayavijnana develops itself into what appear to be material organs, supporting bases for the organs, receptacle worlds, etc.' How can you deny the existence of material organs? To deny that the eye, the ear, etc., are a development of the Alayavijnana while affirming that the eye-consciousness itself develops into what appears to be colour etc. is to misunderstand the Alaya and its Bijas; it is to contradict the texts and logical reason.

It is indeed true that the stanzas of the Vimsatika and the Alambanapariksa say that the Bijas or 'potentialities' receive the name of *indriya*; but they express themselves in this way to refute the doctrine (Sautrantika etc.) which admits the existence of material organs apart from consciousness. These stanzas do not teach that material organs are *karmabijas* of consciousness; they designate metaphorically, by the names of 'Bija' and 'rupa-potentiality', that which, in fact, is the manifestation of the Alaya, i.e., what appear to be an eye organ, an ear organ, etc., the function of which is to engender the five consciousnesses.

(2) Concerning the Manovijnana

The clear Manovijnana, which perceives and conceives the five objects, must have the five consciousnesses as its simultaneous support (*sahabhuasraya*), because it must be simultaneous with them. If Manovijnana has not the Five as its point of support, it will not be the support of the Five, because the Five and Manovijnana have equal strength and support and assist each other mutually.

又第七識雖無間斷，而見道等旣有轉易，應如六識有俱有依。

不爾彼應非轉識攝，便違聖教轉識有七。

〔述記：則違聖教六十三云轉識有七。〕

故應許彼有俱有依，此即現行第八識攝。

如瑜伽說，有藏識故得有末那，末那爲依意識得轉。

〔述記：五十一說，顯揚十七皆亦同之。〕

彼論意言現行藏識爲依止故得有末那，非由彼種。

不爾，應說有藏識故意識得轉。由此彼說理教相違。

是故應言前五轉識一一定有二俱有依，謂五色根同時意識。

第六轉識決定恒有一俱有依，謂第七識。

若與五識俱時起者，亦以五識爲俱有依。

第七轉識決定唯有一俱有依，謂第八識。

唯第八識恒無轉變，自能立故，無俱有依。

(三) 淨月義

有義，此說猶未盡理。

第八類餘旣同識性，如何不許有俱有依？

第七八識旣恒俱轉，更互爲依斯有何失？

許現起識以種爲依，識種亦應許依現識。

能熏異熟爲生長住依。

識種離彼，不生長住故。

(3) Concerning the Seventh Vijnana

Although it is never interrupted, the seventh consciousness is susceptible to transformation on the 'Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth' etc.; so, like the first six consciousnesses, it must have a simultaneous support. If this were not so, it would, like the eighth consciousness, not be included among the *pravrttivijnanas*, and this would be at variance with the teaching of the sacred texts (the Yogasastra, 63 etc.) that the *pravrttivijnanas* are seven in number. Let us therefore conclude that the seventh consciousness has a simultaneous support, namely, the actual Alayavijnana.

According to the Yogasastra, 51, (and Vikhyapana, 17), 'Inasmuch as Alayavijnana exists, Manas exists; it is with Manas as support that Manovijnana manifests itself.' The meaning of this sentence is that 'Manas exists by taking the actual Alayavijnana as its support, not by reason of the Bijas of Alayavijnana.' If it were not so, the Sastra would say, 'Manovijnana exists because Alayavijnana exists.' [The Alayavijnana contains the Bijas of Manas and of Manovijnana: if Manas is derived from its Bijas contained in the Alayavijnana without relying on the actual consciousness for support, we must admit, on parallel lines, that Manovijnana is derived from its Bijas and does not depend on Manas for support. – Hence Nanda, the first master, contradicts reason and the sacred texts.

To sum up: (1) The first five consciousnesses always have each two simultaneous supports, that is, the five material organs and, at the same time, Manovijnana; (2) the sixth *pravrttivijnana*, Manovijnana, always has a simultaneous support, namely, the seventh consciousness or Manas; when it arises simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, it has also the five consciousnesses for support; (3) the seventh *pravrttivijnana*, Manas, has only one simultaneous support, namely, the eighth consciousness; (4) the eighth consciousness is not subject to modification; it stands by itself; hence it has no simultaneous support.

3. Opinion of Suddhacandra

According to Suddhacandra, the foregoing explanation is not entirely satisfactory.

(1) Since the Alaya (the eighth in the series) is, like the other seven, a consciousness, why is it not admitted that it, too, should, like the others, have a simultaneous support? Since the seventh and the eighth consciousnesses coexist at all times, what is there wrong in thinking that they are the support of each other?

(2) The Bijavijnana and the actual consciousness: – If it is admitted that the actual consciousness has as its support the Bijas, it must also be admitted that the Bijas have as their support the actual consciousness. The consciousnesses that perfume (that is to say, the first seven actual consciousnesses) are the basis and support for the birth of new Bijas and for the growth of old Bijas, while the Vipakavijnana (eighth consciousness) is the supporting basis for the duration of Bijas. Without these supports, the Bijas can neither be born nor grow nor last.

又異熟識有色界中能執持身，依色根轉。

如契經說，阿賴耶識業風所飄，偏依諸根恒相續轉。

瑜伽亦說眼等六識各別依故，不能執受有色根身。

若異熟識不偏依止有色諸根，應如六識非能執受。
或所立因有不定失。

是故藏識若現起者定有一依謂第七識，在有色界亦依色根。

若識種子定有一依謂異熟識，初熏習位亦依能熏。

餘如前說。

（四） 護法義

有義前說皆不應理，未了所依與依別故。

依，謂一切有生滅法仗因託緣而得生住。
〔述記：諸法新起名爲得生，本來無故，如新熏種等，若法本有名爲得住，非新生故，如本有種等。〕
諸所仗託皆說爲依，如王與臣互相依等。

若法決定，有境，爲主，令心心所取自所緣，乃是所依即內六處。

餘非有境，定，爲主故。

此但如王，非如臣等。

故諸聖教唯心心所名有所依，非色等法，無所緣故。

但說心所心爲所依，不說心所爲心所依，彼非主故。

(3) The eighth consciousness and the sense-organs: – When it is born in the material Dhatu (Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu), the Vipakavijnana 'holds and sustains' the body and its functions by taking the five material organs as its support. As the Lankavatara says: 'The Alayavijnana, beaten upon by the wind of acts, depends universally on all the organs for support and continues in a perpetual series,' and the Yogasastra, 51, says: 'The six consciousnesses, having a special support, are not capable of appropriating (i.e., holding and sustaining) the body and the material organs.' If the Vipakavijnana does not depend universally on all the material organs for support, it will, like the six consciousnesses, be incapable of appropriating them, or else the argument of the Yogasastra ('having a special support') presents the defect of deciding nothing.

Conclusion

Let us conclude that the Alayavijnana, considered as an actual consciousness, must necessarily have a simultaneous support, namely, the seventh consciousness. When it is born in the material Dhatu, it has a second support in the material organs, the eye etc. As for the Bijas, they, too, must have a support, namely, the Vipakavijnana. At the moment when they are first perfumed in this consciousness, they have also as their support the consciousness that perfumes them.

The rest is in accordance with Sthiramati's theory.

4. Opinion of Dharmapala

According to Dharmapala, the foregoing explanation is incorrect, because it does not take into account the distinction between 'that which serves as support' and 'that which is supported or leans for support'.

By 'leaning for support' is meant that all dharmas that are born and perish must necessarily depend on causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*) for their birth and their duration. For example, the birth of new Bijas and the duration of innate Bijas depend on causes and conditions.

All causes and conditions by which and by reason of which dharms exist are spoken of as the 'support' of the dharmas, just as a ruler and his ministers are the support of each other.

Those dharmas support which are indispensable, which take objects, which function like a ruler, and which enable the Citta and Caittas to take their own respective objects: the dharmas which correspond to this definition are the 'six internal *ayatanas*', that is, the five material sense-organs (*rupindriya*) and the mental organ (*mana-indriya, mana-ayatana*).

The other dharmas cannot 'support' because they do not take objects, are not indispensable, and do not function like a ruler. On the other hand, the six internal *ayatanas* are regarded as a 'support', because they function like a ruler who supports his ministers, and not like ministers who depend on their ruler for support. This is why in the sacred texts (Yogasastra, 55) only Citta-caittas are said to have support, because they are enabled by the six internal *ayatanas* to perceive objects, whereas Rupa, sound, etc., are not so regarded, because they do not perceive any objects. However, in regard to

然有處說依爲所依，或所依爲依，皆隨宜假說。

由此五識俱有所依定有四種，謂五色根六七八識。

隨闕一種必不轉故。同境，分別，染淨，根本，所依別故。

〔述記：此四何別。五根與五識爲同境依，共取現境故。……第六意識與前五識爲分別依，與依同緣分別境故。五雖無分別，意是分別，爲無分別依，如五十五說有分別心無分別心當言同緣現在境。……第七與五識爲染淨依，五識由此根本染故成有漏，根本淨故成無漏。……其第八識與前五識爲根本依，如前說故。〕

聖教唯說依五根者，以不共故，又必同境，近，相順故。

第六意識俱有所依唯有二種，謂七八識，隨闕一種必不轉故。

雖五識俱取境明了，而不定有，故非所依。

聖教唯說依第七者，染淨依故，同轉識攝，近，相順故。

第七意識俱有所依但有一種，謂第八識。藏識若無定不轉故。

the Citta and the Caittas, we can only say that the Citta is the support of the Caittas, not that the Caittas are the support of the Citta, because the Caittas do not function like a ruler.

Nevertheless, in several texts, there is some confusion between 'support' and 'what takes support'. They say of that which takes support that it is support, and of that which is support that it takes support. All these are incorrect expressions which are employed for the sake of convenience.

On the basis of the preceding considerations, we arrive at the following conclusions:

(1) Concerning the five consciousnesses

The five consciousnesses have a fourfold simultaneous support: the five organs and the sixth, seventh and eighth consciousnesses. The five consciousnesses would be missing if any one of these four supports were missing.

These four supports present some particular characteristics: a. the five sense-organs are the 'selfsame-object-support' (*samavisaya-asraya*) of the five consciousnesses, because they take with them the same present object; b. the Manovijnana is the 'discriminating support' (*vikalpa-asraya*) of the five consciousnesses, because it takes as its 'object of discrimination' (*vikalpa*) the object of the five consciousnesses which are non-discriminating (*avikalpaka*). The Manovijnana is 'discriminating' (*savikalpaka*) and is the support of the five 'non-discriminating (*avikalpaka*) consciousnesses'. As the Yogasastra, 55, says, 'The discriminating mind and the non-discriminating mind together perceive the same present object'; c. Manas is the 'pure-impure-support' (*samklesa-vyavadana-asraya*) of the five consciousnesses, because it is on Manas that their purity or impurity depends; d. the eighth consciousness is the 'root-support' (*mula-asraya*) i.e., the fundamental support of the five consciousnesses.

Some sacred texts say that the five consciousnesses have as their support the five organs only. This is because a. the five organs are the special or 'non-common' support for the five consciousnesses; b. they have the same object of perception as the five consciousnesses; c. they are closely related to them; and d. they are in solidarity with them.

(2) Concerning the Manovijnana

The Manovijnana has only two simultaneous supports, namely, the seventh and the eighth consciousnesses. There would be no Manovijnana if either of these two supports were missing. When it arises simultaneously with the first five consciousnesses, it perceives objects more clearly and with better comprehension; but the Five are not essential for its existence – [they may be dormant when Manovijnana functions, e.g., in a dream]; hence they are not regarded as its support.

Certain texts say that Manovijnana depends only on the seventh consciousness for support and make no mention of the eighth. This is because: a. the seventh is the 'pure-impure-support' (*samklesa-vyavadana-asraya*) of the sixth; b. it is comprised, like the sixth, among the *pravrttivijnanas*; c. it is nearest to the sixth; d. it is in solidarity with the sixth.

(3) Concerning Manas

The seventh consciousness, Manas, has only one simultaneous support,

如伽他說，阿賴耶爲依，故有末那轉，依止心及意，餘轉識得生。

〔述記：即楞伽經第九卷總品中頌。〕

阿賴耶識俱有所依亦但一種，謂第七識，彼識若無定不轉故。

論說藏識恒與末那俱時轉故，又說藏識恒依染汙，此即末那。

而說三位無末那者依有覆說。如言四位無阿賴耶非無第八。此亦應爾。

雖有色界亦依五根，而不定有，非所依攝。

識種不能現取自境，可有依義，而無所依。

心所所依隨識應說，復各加自相應之心。若作是說，妙符理教。

三・　等無間緣依及開導依

(一)　難陀義

後開導依。有義五識自他前後不相續故。

必第六識所引生故，唯第六識爲開導依。

第六意識自相續故，亦由五識所引生故，以前六識爲開導依。

第七八識自相續故，不假他識所引生故，但以自類爲開導依。

namely, the eighth consciousness or Alayavijnana. It would not exist if the Alayavijnana were missing. As the Lankavatara Sutra says: 'Having the Alaya as its support, Manas manifests itself; depending on Citta (i.e., the Alaya) and Manas for support, the other *pravrttivijnanas* are born.'

(4) Concerning the eighth consciousness

The Alayavijnana has only one simultaneous support, namely, the seventh consciousness; it does not exist without this support. As the Yogasastra, 63, says: 'The Alaya is always in manifestation simultaneously with Manas.' Another treatise says: 'The Alayavijnana always depends on the defiled consciousness for support.' By the 'defiled consciousness' is meant Manas.

The Sastra teaches, it is true, that Manas is missing in three cases [in the case of the Arhat; during the Nirodhasamapatti (the meditation of cessation); and in the course of the Supramundane Path];[1] but we must understand that, in these three cases, it is the defiled Manas that is missing, not the seventh consciousness in its pure state. In the same sense, it is said that the Alayavijnana disappears in four states of consciousness (the Sravaka, the Pratyekabuddha, the Bodhisattva who does not retreat from his Path, and the Tathagata): but this does not mean that the eighth consciousness does not exist at all. It is the same in this case of Manas.

When the eighth consciousness is born in a material Dhatu (Kamadhatu or Rupadhatu), it takes as its support also the five material organs; but as these organs do not invariably function in conjunction with the Alaya, they are not included in the category of 'simultaneous support' of the Alayavijnana.

As regards the Bijas of the Alayavijnana, they do not take an object and do not cause the Citta and the Caittas to take an object. Hence they do not answer to the definition of 'that which is taken as support'; they belong to the category of 'that which takes support'.

(5) Concerning the associated dharmas (samprayuktas)

Each associated dharma or Caitta has as its support the consciousness with which it is associated plus the support or supports of that consciousness.

These definitions are in conformity with the texts and with logical reason.

3. SAMANANTARAPRATYAYA-ASRAYA AND KRANTA-ASRAYA

1. Opinion of Nanda

(1) The five consciousnesses do not form, either each in its kind or among themselves, a series of successive moments, because they must be roused to activity by Manovijnana. So Manovijnana is for them the only 'support that opens the way and guides', *kranta-asraya.*

(2) Manovijnana forms a continuous series by itself. Besides, it can be brought into activity by the five consciousnesses. Hence it has for *kranta-asraya* the first six consciousnesses.

(3) The seventh and the eighth consciousnesses form series by themselves; they are not brought into activity by the other consciousnesses. So they have for *kranta-asraya* the seventh and the eighth respectively.

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[1] See following section on the cessation of Manas.

(二) 安慧義

有義前說未有究理。

且前五識未自在位遇非勝境，可如所說。

〔述記：五識有三位……一未自在位，二率爾遇境位，三遇非勝境位。〕

若自在位如諸佛等，於境自在諸根互用任運決定不假尋求，彼五識身寧不相續？

等流五識旣爲決定染淨作意勢力引生，專注所緣未能捨頃，如何不許多念相續？

〔述記：如觀佛像專注一緣未休觀來名未捨頃，意眼二識俱並未捨，如何不許多念相續。〕

〔五心：率爾心，尋求心，決定心，染淨心，等流心。〕

故瑜伽說，決定心後方有染淨，此後乃有等流眼識善不善轉，而彼不由自分別力乃至此意不趣餘境，經爾所時眼意二識或善或染相續而轉，如眼識生，乃至身識應知亦爾。

彼意定顯經爾所時眼意二識俱相續轉。

旣眼識時非無意識，故非二識互相續生。

2. Opinion of Sthiramati

(1) Concerning the five consciousnesses

The opinion of Nanda is correct only when the five consciousnesses are being considered: a. in those stages of the Path prior to that of Masterhood, b. in the case of a sudden meeting with an object, c. in the case of a meeting with a mediocre or insignificant object. But it is necessary to examine: a. the stage of Masterhood, b. the five 'outflowing' consciousnesses (*nisyanda*), which are distinguished from the five 'sudden' consciousnesses, c. powerful objects.

A. In the state of Masterhood – for instance, in the case of those Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the last three *bhumis* who have attained perfect mastery over all objects – the activity of the sense-organs (*indriyas*) is interchangeable; they spontaneously determine the nature and qualities of objects without resorting to the faculty of investigation and research. Can it be said that the five consciousnesses, in these conditions, do not form a continuous series?

B. In contradistinction to the five consciousnesses stimulated by the sudden perception of objects, the five 'efflux consciousnesses' are brought into activity by the force of the act of decision, the act of Manovijnana: these five consciousnesses together with Manovijnana apply themselves to an object, concentrating themselves with full attention on it, incapable of pausing for a single moment. [For instance, when a devotee contemplates an image of the Buddha, his Manovijnana and visual consciousness continuously have that image as their object.] How can we not admit that in this case there is a continuous series of numerous moments of visual consciousness?

[In the perception and contemplation of an object the mind functions in five stages: a. when the mind suddenly comes in contact (through the eyes) with an unfamiliar object; b. when it inquires to find out what that object is; c. when the mind determines its nature, functions, etc; d. when the mind forms different ideas about itself, good or bad, pure or impure; e. when there is an outflow of thoughts of a similar nature, conditioned by the third and fourth stages.]

The Yogasastra sets forth the details of this process: [The 'sudden' mind that is visual consciousness; the investigating mind that is Manovijnana; the deciding mind, non-defined, that is Manovijnana.] It is after the arising of the deciding mind that we have the defiled or pure mind; and it is after the arising of this defiled or pure mind that a visual consciousness of efflux comes into activity (*nisyanda*, that is to say, an outflow of visual consciousness of the same moral species), good or bad. But this outflow is spontaneous, not engendered by its own power of discrimination (*vikalpa*), because it is brought into activity by the Manovijnana. As long as the Manovijnana does not turn towards another object, i.e., during the prolonged period when it is concentrated on the same object, the two consciousnesses, the mental and the visual, form continuous series, either good or defiled. As with the visual consciousness, so with the auditory and so forth up to the tactile consciousness.

This text indicates clearly that for a prolonged period of time both the visual consciousness and the Manovijnana manifest themselves in separate continuous series. Since Manovijnana is not missing during the period of

若增盛境相續現前，逼奪身心不能暫捨，
時五識身理必相續，如熱地獄戲忘天等。

故瑜伽說若此六識爲彼六識等無閒緣，即施設此名爲意根。

若五識前後定唯有意識，彼論應言若此一識爲彼六識等無閒緣，或彼應言若此六識爲彼一識等無閒緣。

既不如是，故知五識有相續義。

五識起時必有意識能引後念意識令起，何假五識爲開導依？

無心睡眠悶絶等位意識斷已後復起時，藏識末那既恒相續，亦應與彼爲開導依。

若彼用前自類開導，五識自類何不許然？
此既不然，彼云何爾？

平等性智相應末那初起必由第六意識，亦應用彼爲開導依。

圓鏡智俱第八淨識，初必六七方便引生。

又異熟心依染汙意，或依悲願相應善心。

〔述記：攝論第三說異熟心依染汙意，無性染意卽是第六，世親染意或第七心，故知第八亦依六七。〕

manifestation of the visual consciousness, one cannot say that the two consciousnesses together form series engendering each other in turn.

C. The continued presence of a powerful object crushes or ravishes the body and the mind, which become incapable of escaping even for one moment. During this period the five consciousnesses must necessarily form a continuous series. This is what happens in the hot infernal regions (*narakas*) and in the pleasurable Kridapradusikas heavens.

Hence the Yogasastra says: 'When these six consciousnesses *here* are the "condition quâ antecedent" (*samanantarapratyaya*) of those six consciousnesses *there*, they are given the name of mental organ (mana-indriya).'

Nanda thinks that the five consciousnesses are intercepted by Manovijnana, that Manovijnana arises between all the moments of the five consciousnesses. If this is the case, the Sastra ought to say either that this unique Manovijnana is the *samanantarapratyaya* of those six consciousnesses or that these six consciousnesses are the *samanantarapraytyaya* of that unique Manovijnana. The wording adopted by the Sastra shows that the five consciousnesses form continuous series by themselves, (that is to say, one moment of visual consciousness is the *samanantarapratyaya* of the next moment of visual consciousness.)

(2) Concerning the Manovijnana

A. When the five consciousnesses are born, there must necessarily be present a moment of Manovijnana which brings about its subsequent moment and causes it to be born. It is not the Five that serve as the *kranta-asraya* (i.e., the support that opens the way and guides) of the subsequent moment.

B. In the state of mindlessness, deep sleep, or a fainting fit, Manovijnana is interrupted. When it is reborn later, it should have as its *kranta-asraya* the Alayavijnana and Manas, which form continuous series.

Nanda thinks that, after a mindless state, Manovijnana has as its *kranta-asraya* its own past moment previous to the mindless state. If this is the case, why has Nanda not the same theory for the Five which are reborn after having been intercepted? If this theory is not true for the Five, why is it true for Manovijnana?

(3) Concerning the seventh and eighth consciousnesses

A. When Manas, associated with the 'Universal Equality Transcendental Wisdom' (*samatajnana*), is born for the first time, it must necessarily be by reason of Manovijnana. It should therefore have Manovijnana as its *kranta-asraya.*

B. Likewise, it is with the sixth and seventh consciousnesses as *kranta-asraya* that the pure eighth consciousness, associated with the "Transcendental Mirror Wisdom" (*mahadarsajnana*), is first brought into manifestation.

Again, the Samgraha (Chapter III) teaches that the Vipakacitta, [in the case of Prthagjanas etc.], depends for support on defiled Manas (that is to say, the seventh consciousness according to Vasubandhu, the sixth according to Asvabhava); that, [in the case of Bodhisattvas in certain conditions], it depends for support on a good mind associated with compassion and great vows (*karunapranidhi*). Hence the eighth consciousness, in certain cases, has as its *kranta-asraya* the sixth and seventh consciousnesses.

旣爾，必應許第八識亦以六七爲開導依，由此彼言都未盡理。

應說五識前六識內隨用何識爲開導依。

〔述記：五識以前六識皆得爲依，自相續故，他引生故，得次無間生。〕

第六意識用前自類或第七八爲開導依。

第七末那用前自類或第六識爲開導依。

阿陀那識用前自類及第六七爲開導依。
皆不違理，由前說故。

(三)　護法義

有義此說亦不應理。

開導依者，謂有緣法，爲主，能作等無閒緣。

此於後生心心所法開避引導，名開導依。此但屬心，非心所等。

若此與彼無俱起義，說此於彼有開導力。

一身八識旣容俱起，如何異類爲開導依？

若許爲依應不俱起，便同異部心不竝生。

又一身中諸識俱起，多少不定，若容互作等無閒緣，色等應爾。

便違聖說等無閒緣唯心心所。

〔述記：如菩薩地第三十八十因中云唯心心所是等無閒緣。〕

We conclude from this that the system of the first master is inadmissible.

(1) The five consciousnesses have as their *kranta-asraya* any one of the six consciousnesses, no matter which: [that is to say, either they form a series of the same kind, or else they are brought into manifestation by a consciousness of another kind.]

(2) Manovijnana employs as *kranta-asraya* either the Manovijnana that precedes it, or, after the state of mindlessness, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses.

(3) The seventh consciousness, Manas, employs as *kranta-asraya* either the seventh consciousness that precedes it or the sixth consciousness.

(4) The eighth consciousness (Adanavijnana) employs as *kranta-asraya* the eighth consciousness that precedes it and the sixth and seventh consciousnesses.

3. Opinion of Dharmapala

The system of Sthiramati is not logical either.

What dharmas, in fact, can be *kranta-asraya*, 'support that opens the way and guides?' – The dharmas which 'take an object' (*salambana*) (so neither Rupa nor the Viprayuktas nor the Asamskrtas can be *kranta-asraya*); which function as ruler (so the Caittas must be excluded); which can serve as *samanantarapratyaya*, 'condition quâ similar and immediate antecedent' (so dissimilar dharmas must be excluded). The dharmas which present these characteristics – that is, the previous moments of the Citta-king – in regard to those Cittas and Caittas that immediately succeed them, are entitled *kranta-asraya*, because they open the way for them, and guide them in such a way that they are born. Here it is a question of Cittas only and not of Caittas, Rupa, etc.

If *this* (i.e., the previous moment of Citta-king) is not simultaneous with *that* (i.e., the subsequent moment of Citta or Caitta); then it can be said that, in regard to *that*, *this* has the power of a way-opener and conductor.

Since in one and the same person the eight different consciousnesses can arise together simultaneously [without impeding one another and without the necessity of opening the way for one another], how can a different consciousness be the *kranta-asraya* of a different consciousness? [The idea is that, when the similar earlier consciousness serves as *kranta-asraya*, it must perish in order that the subsequent consciousness may be born; in other words, it must vanish in order that the next similar consciousness may appear.]

If one maintains that a different consciousness can be *kranta-asraya*, then the conclusion is that different consciousnesses are not born together, which is a doctrine of the Lesser Vehicle (Sarvastivadin).[1]

Again, in one and the same person different consciousnesses are born together, in large or small numbers, without anything being fixed in this regard. If one holds that they are, among themselves, *samanantarapratyaya*, Rupa will also be *samanantarapratyaya* of Rupa. This would be contradictory to the sacred texts (Bodhisattva-bhumi) which teach that only Citta-Caittas are *samanantarapratyaya*.

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[1] K'uei Chi: The Sarvastivadins say that the six consciousnesses cannot be born at the same time.

然攝大乘說色亦容有等無閒緣者，是縱奪言，謂假縱小乘色心前後有等無閒緣，奪因緣故。不爾，等言應成無用。

若謂等言非遮多少但表同類，便違汝執異類識作等無閒緣。

是故八識各唯自類爲開導依，深契教理，自類必無俱起義故。

心所此依，應隨識說。

雖心心所異類竝生而互相應，和合似一，定俱生滅，事業必同，一開導時餘亦開導，故展轉作等無閒緣。諸識不然，不應爲例。

然諸心所非開導依，於所引生無主義故。

若心心所等無閒緣各唯自類，第七八識初轉依時相應信等此緣便闕。

則違聖說諸心心所皆四緣生。

無心睡眠悶絶等位意識雖斷，而後起時彼開導依即前自類。

閒斷五識應知亦然。無自類心於中爲隔，名無閒故。

It is true that the Samgraha says that Rupa may also be *samanantarapratyaya*; but this declaration is 'a concession' granted in order to reject a false thesis: the Samgraha, conceding a point to the Lesser Vehicle, admits that the earlier Rupa is the *samanantarapratyaya* of the subsequent Citta in order to reject that School's graver error that the earlier Rupa is the *hetupratyaya* of the subsequent Citta. If this is not the case, if the Samgraha is taken literally, the prefix *sam* (of *samanantara*, which signifies *sama*, equal and similar) would have no *raison d'être*.

If the first master says that the prefix *sam* does not indicate quantitative equality, but only qualitative equality, then that remark contradicts his thesis that different consciousnesses are *samanantarapratyayas* of one another.

Let us conclude that each of the eight consciousnesses is *kranta-asraya* of the dharmas of its own species. This thesis is in agreement with the texts and logical reason, because dharmas of the same species are never born together at the same moment.

It is the same for Caittas as for consciousnesses.

Five Difficulties

(1) One Citta and some Caittas of different kinds (*vedana, samjna*, etc.) are born together: However, the 'Citta-king' (i.e., the consciousness) is the *samanantarapratyaya* (condition quâ immediate antecedent) of the Caittas, and vice versa. – How is that? – The Citta and the Caittas of different kinds that are born together are in fact mutually associated (*samprayukta*); they are synthesized in a sort of unity; they are born and perish at the same time; they are of the same nature (good, bad, non-defined); when the Citta 'opens the way and guides', the Caittas also do likewise. They are therefore the *samanantarapratyaya* of each other. Such are not the relations of Cittas or consciousness that are different from one another. Hence the fact that Caittas of different kinds are *samanantarapratyaya* among themselves does not prove that it is the same with Cittas or consciousnesses.

(2) However, the Caittas are not *kranta-asraya*, because they are not the 'ruler' in regard to the dharmas to be born. [In fact, only the support, *asraya*, can function as ruler.]

(3) [Why do we not admit that different Caittas, *vedana* etc., are a support in regard to the dharmas of their kind? Why do we regard consciousness only as the support of Caittas]? If the Citta-Caittas are each *samanantarapratyaya* of its own kind (Citta of Citta, Vedana of Vedana, etc.), then, at the moment of the 'revolution' or 'inner transformation' (*paravrtti*) of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, this kind of Pratyaya will be lacking for the Faith Caitta and other good Caittas. This would be contradictory to the sacred texts which teach that all Cittas and Caittas are born of four Pratyayas.

(4) The Manovijnana is cut off in the mindless states of stupor and unconsciousness; when it resumes its activity, it has as its *kranta-asraya* the previous moment of its kind, that is to say, the last preceding moment of Manovijnana. The same applies to the five consciousnesses that have been interrupted: what is called *samanantarapratyaya*, 'similar and immediate anteced-

彼先滅時已於今識爲開導故。何煩異類爲開導依？

然聖教中說前六識互相引起，或第七八依六七生。

皆依殊勝增上緣說，非等無閒，故不相違。

瑜伽論說，若此識無閒諸識決定生，說此爲彼等無閒緣。又此六識爲彼六識等無閒緣，即施設此名意根者。

〔述記：八十五卷有四緣廣分別義正與此同。〕

言總意別，亦不相違。

故自類依，深契教理。

傍論已了應辨正論。

此能變識雖具三所依，而依彼轉言但顯前二。

爲顯此識依緣同故。

又前二依有勝用故。

或開導依易了知故。

ent', is not the moment preceding immediately and of a different kind; it is the last preceding moment of the same kind: the moment which is not separated by another moment of the same kind.

[But at what time does this previous moment fulfil its role as support? In fact, the past does not exist.] – At the time when this previous moment was present and was going to vanish, it became the *kranta-asraya* of the present consciousness. Why should so much trouble be taken to regard a different consciousness as *kranta-asraya?*

(5) The texts say, it is true, that the six consciousnesses produce one another and that the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are born with the support of the sixth and the seventh. But here it is a question of a 'special' *adhipatipratyaya*, and not of the true *samanantarapratyaya.* Hence there is no contradiction.

The Yogasastra [in Book 85, which explains the four Pratyayas] says: 'When immediately after this consciousness there are necessarily born those consciousnesses, this consciousness is said to be their *samanantarapratyaya,*' and elsewhere: 'These six consciousnesses, which are the *samanantarapratyaya* of those six consciousnesses, receive the name of mental organ (*mana-indriya*).' – These texts do not present any difficulty, because, while their expression is general, their intention is to distinguish. [It is necessary to add that each consciousness follows a *samanantarapratyaya* of its own kind.]

Consequently, it is in agreement with the sacred texts and logical reason to admit that a consciousness of the same kind is the sole support of a certain consciousness.

Having completed our study of this subsidiary problem, let us come back to the main Treatise.

Although Manas has three supports, nevertheless the Stanza says: 'Manas functions with the Alayavijnana, depending on it for support.' This means that the Stanza treats only of the first two kinds of support (*asraya*) (the *hetupratyaya-asraya* and the *sahabhu-asraya*). The reason for this is that it wishes to teach that the support (*asraya*) of Manas is also its object (*alambana*). In other words, its support and object are identical. It is also because the first two supports are more important. Or else it is because the third support, i.e., the *kranta-asraya*, is obvious and therefore easy to understand.

第三章· 末那所緣

如是已說此識所依。所緣云何？
謂即緣彼。

彼謂卽前此所依識。
聖說此識緣藏識故。

一· 難陀義

有義，此意緣彼識體及相應法。論說末那我我所執恒相應故。

謂緣彼體及相應法，如次執爲我及所我。

然諸心所不離識故，如唯識言無違教失。

二· 火辨義

有義，彼說理不應然，曾無處言緣觸等故。應言此意但緣彼識見及相分，如次執爲我及我所，相見俱以識爲體故，不違聖說。

三· 安慧義

有義，此說亦不應理，五色根境非識蘊故。

應同五識亦緣外故。

應如意識緣共境故。

應生無色者不執我所故。

§ III. THE ALAMBANA OF MANAS

Now that we have explained the Asraya of Manas, the question arises: What is the object of Manas?

Vasubandhu answers:

> Manas takes that as its object.

By 'that' is meant the consciousness that is its support (*asraya*), because the sacred texts teach that the seventh consciousness takes the Alayavijnana as its object.

1. 'Non-revolutionized' Manas

(1) Opinion of Nanda

Manas takes as its object the substance (*svabhava*) of the Alayavijnana – i.e., neither the *nimittabhaga* ('image' aspect) nor the Bijas of the Alayavijnana – and the dharmas associated with the Alayavijnana (that is to say, its Caittas).

In fact, according to the Yogasastra, Manas is always accompanied by the concept of 'I' (*atmagraha*) and the concept of 'mine' (*atmiyagraha*): it conceives the substance of the Alayavijnana as 'I', Atman, and the dharmas associated with it as 'mine', *atmiya*. As these associate dharmas have no existence apart from the Alayavijnana, being the Caittas of this consciousness, this explanation does not contradict the texts that teach that the object of Manas is the Alayavijnana only. Likewise, in the formula *vijnaptimatra* (Mere-Consciousness), the term *vijnapti* is understood as the Citta and its Caittas, i.e., consciousness and its associates.

(2) Opinion of Citrabhanu

The opinion of Nanda is inadmissible, because nowhere in the texts has it been said that Manas has as its object the Caittas, mental contact (*sparsa*) etc. It should be explained that Manas has as its object the *darsanabhaga* ('perception' aspect) and the *nimittabhaga* ('image' aspect) of the Alayavijnana and, in their respective order, conceives these two Bhagas as 'I' and as 'mine'. Since these two Bhagas have their substance (*svabhava*) in the Alayavijnana itself (in its *svasamvittibhaga*) this explanation does not contradict the texts which define the object of Manas by the Alayavijnana only.

(3) Opinion of Sthiramati

The opinion of Citrabhanu is inadmissible also. In fact, [if Manas perceives the *nimittabhaga* of the Alayavijnana, it should also perceive the objects (*visaya*) of the five material sense-organs, but] these objects are not comprised in the Vijnanaskandha. [Now the texts specify that Manas perceives the Alayavijnana only, i.e., the Vijnanaskandha.] Like the five consciousnesses [of which it is said that they perceive 'external' things], Manas should perceive external things. [Now the texts say that its activity is internal.] Like Manovijnana, Manas should have a common object with the five consciousnesses. [Now the texts assign to it a special object.] Let us add that the Manas of sentient beings

厭色生彼不變色故。

應說此意但緣藏識及彼種子，如次執爲我及我所。
以種即是彼識功能，非實有物，不違聖教。

四・　護法義

有義前說皆不應理，色等種子非識蘊故。

論說種子是實有故。

假應如無，非因緣故。

又此識俱薩迦耶見任運一類恒相續生，何容別執有我我所？

無一心中有斷常等二境別執俱轉義故。

亦不應說二執前後，此無始來一味轉故。

應知此意，但緣藏識見分，非餘，彼無始來一類相續似常一故。
恒與諸法爲所依故。
此唯執彼爲自內我，
乘語勢故說我所言。

或此執彼是我之我，故於一見義說二言。

若作是說，善順教理，多處唯言有我見故。我我所執不俱起故。

未轉依位唯緣藏識，既轉依已亦緣眞如及餘諸法，平等性智證得十種平等性故，知諸有情勝解差別示現種種佛影像故。

〔述記：佛地經說證得十種平等性故。〕

born in the Arupyadhatu should have no *atmiyagraha*, concept of 'mine', because in this Dhatu are born only those persons who are disgusted with Rupa and of whom, in consequence, the Alayavijnana does not manifest itself in the form of Rupa.

Sthiramati concludes that Manas perceives the Alayavijnana itself and its Bijas, that it conceives the former as Atman and the latter as *atmiya*. Since the Bijas are not real entities but only the potentialities of the Alaya, this explanation does not contradict the texts which assign to Manas, as sole object, the Alayavijnana.

(4) Opinion of Dharmapala

None of the fore-going three interpretations accords with reason. On the one hand, the Bijas of Rupa (colour, form, etc.) are not *vijnanaskandha*; as mentioned in the Yogasastra, Bijas are real entities, because, were they not real, they would be non-existent and would not be causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*).

On the other hand, Manas, always accompanied by *satkayadrsti* (the inborn concept of 'I'), continues spontaneously in a perpetual and homogeneous series. This being the case, how can Manas conceive separately the Atman and the *atmiya*, the 'I' and the 'mine'? We cannot see how one single mind can have two objects, eternity-annihilation etc., and two 'graspings' or 'conceptions', (*graha*). Nor can we say that Manas, which has functioned in one self-same manner since before the beginning of time, can have these two graspings successively.

Dharmapala concludes that Manas has as its object only the *darsanabhaga*, the 'perception' aspect, of the Alayavijnana, and not the other Bhagas of the consciousness, because, since before the beginning of time, this Bhaga has been manifesting itself in a perpetual and homogeneous series, appearing as eternal and one in essence, and because it is the constant support of all dharmas (in contradistinction to the Caittas: hence it is fit to be conceived as Atman). It is this Bhaga that Manas conceives as the Inner Self.

However, the texts say that Manas has the *atmiyagraha*, grasping of *Atmiya*, 'mine'; why this contradiction? Let us say that the texts express themselves in this way by reason of the force of their literary style. Or it may be because Manas conceives the Alayavijnana as the 'Self of itself', and the two expressions Atman and *atmiya* are employed as referring to *dassanabhaga* only.

This explanation is in conformity with the texts and pure reason, because many texts attribute to Manas only *atmadrsti*, (not *atmiyadrsti*), and because *atmagraha* and *atmiyagraha* cannot arise together simultaneously.

2. The 'revolutionized' Manas.

Manas, when it has not been 'revolutionized' (*aparavrtti*), has as its object the Alayavijnana only. When revolution or inner transformation (*asraya-paravrtti*) has been achieved (first stage on the Path), it has as its object, besides the eighth consciousness, also the Bhutatathata and the other dharmas. The reason is that the 'Universal Equality Transcendental Wisdom' (Samatajnana) has realized ten species of equality (Buddhabhumi Sutra) and that, knowing

此中且說未轉依時，故但說此緣彼藏識，

悟迷通局理應爾故，無我我境徧不徧故。

如何此識緣自所依？
如有後識即緣前意，彼旣極成，此亦何咎？

the different dispositions of all sentient beings (i.e., Bodhisattvas of the ten Lands), the Samatajnana manifests itself in all varieties of images of the Buddha.

The present treatise considers only the 'non-revolutionized' Manas, the Manas prior to its entrance into the Lands. This is why it simply says that Manas has as its object the Alayavijnana only.

The differentiation between non-revolutionized Manas and revolutionized Manas is justified: the deluded is limited, the enlightened is free from limitation; *Nairatmya* (Egolessness) is universal; Atman, non-universal.

3. How can Manas take as its object its own support, the eighth consciousness?

In the same way as Manovijnana can take as its object its *samanantarapratyaya*, i.e., the previous consciousness that has just passed away, (*manodhatu* or mana-indriya). Since that is admitted in the two Vehicles, what is wrong in this?

第四章·　末那性相

頌言思量爲性相者，雙顯此識自性行相。

意以思量爲自性故，即復用彼爲行相故。
由斯兼釋所立別名，能審思量名末那故。

未轉依位恒審思量所執我相，已轉依位亦審思量無我相故。

§ IV. SVABHAVA AND AKARA OF MANAS

Essential nature and Mode of Activity

The Stanza teaches that

> Manas has the nature and character of cogitation or intellection.

This expression shows that Manas is cogitation or intellection both in regard to its essential nature (*svabhava*) and to its mode of activity (*akara*). In fact, the essential nature of Manas (i.e., its *samvittibhaga*) consists in cogitation or intellection, and it is in cogitation or intellection that Manas has its mode of activity (i.e., its *darsanabhaga*). The special name of Manas – which is also entitled Citta and consciousness – is justified from the point of view of its essential nature and mode of activity; it is named Manas because it is capable of cogitating and reflecting upon its object.

When it has not yet been revolutionized (*aparavrtta*), it constantly meditates and cogitates upon the supposed Atman; after the revolution (*paravrtta*), it meditates and cogitates also upon Nairatmya, i.e., Egolessness.

第五章・　相應心所

一・　四種煩惱

此意相應有幾心所？
且與四種煩惱常俱。

此中俱言顯相應義。

謂從無始至未轉依，此意任運恒緣藏識，與四根本煩惱相應。

其四者何？

謂我癡我見，幷我慢我愛，是名四種。

我癡者謂無明，愚於我相，迷無我理，故名我癡。

我見者謂我執，於非我法妄計爲我，故名我見。

我慢者謂倨傲，恃所執我令心高舉，故名我慢。

我愛者謂我貪，於所執我深生耽著，故名我愛。

幷表慢愛有見慢俱，遮餘部執無相應義。

〔述記義演：幷表慢愛等者，幷表之言而有两義，一表慢愛二法與有見俱起，二者表愛與慢俱起。〕

此四常起，擾濁內心，令外轉識恒成雜染。

有情由此生死淪迴，不能出離，故名煩惱。

彼有十種，此何唯四？

§ V. SAMPRAYOGA OF MANAS

1. The Four Klesas

With how many mental activities (Caittas) is Manas associated?

Vasubandhu replies:

> It is always accompanied by four klesas or vexing passions
> (sources of affliction and delusion).

The word *sahita* [in the Sanskrit Stanza] is synonymous with *samprayukta*, 'accompanied' or 'associated'.

1. At all times from before the beginning of time till the stage of development prior to its 'revolution' or inner transformation, Manas spontaneously and perpetually takes as its object the Alayavijnana and has a reciprocal relationship with the four fundamental klesas or vexing passions (i.e., sources of affliction and delusion).

What are these four klesas?

> They are Self-delusion or atman-ignorance (*atmamoha*) and
> Self-belief (*atmadrsti*), together with Self-conceit (*atmanana*)
> and Self-love (*atmasneha*).

(1) Self-delusion means lack of understanding. It is ignorance of the true character of the Atman, and delusion as to the principle that there is no Atman (Nairatmya, egolessness). Therefore it is called Self-delusion.

(2) Self-belief means adhering to the view that Atman exists, erroneously imagining certain dharmas to be the self when they are not so. Hence it is called Self-belief.

(3) Self-conceit means pride. Basing itself on the belief in an Atman, it causes the mind to feel superior and lofty. It is therefore called Self-conceit.

(4) Self-love means a greedy desire for the self. Because of its belief in the Atman it develops deep attachments to it. It is therefore called Self-love.

The words 'together with' indicate that Self-conceit and Self-love accompany Self-belief and that Self-love accompanies Self-conceit: an association which is not admitted by the Sarvastivadins.

These four klesas, by their constant manifestation, disturb and pollute the innermost mind (Alayavijnana) and cause the outer (i.e., the remaining seven) transforming consciousnesses to be perpetually defiled. Because of this, sentient beings are bound to the cycle of birth and death (transmigration) without being able to liberate themselves from it. Hence they are called vexing passions or klesas.

2. The fundamental klesas (mulaklesas) are ten in number. Why is Manas associated with only four?

有我見故，餘見不生，無一心中有二慧故。

如何此識要有我見？
二取邪見但分別生，唯見所斷，此俱煩惱唯是俱生，修所斷故。

我所邊見依我見生，此相應見不依彼起。
恒內執有我故，要有我見。

由見審決，疑無容起。

愛著我故，瞋不得生。故此識俱煩惱唯四。

見慢愛三如何俱起？
行相無違，俱起何失？

瑜伽論說，貪令心下，慢令心舉，寧不相違？

分別俱生，外境內境，所陵所恃，
麤細有殊，故彼此文義無乖返。

[According to the Abhidharma, there are six fundamental klesas, namely, covetousness (Raga), anger (Pratigha), ignorance (Avidya), conceit (Mana), doubt (Vimati), and erroneous views (Drsti).

There are five *drstis* (erroneous views), namely, (1) Satkayadrsti, the view that the five *upadana-skandhas* are the 'I and mine'; (2) Antagrahadrsti, the one-sided extreme view that Atman is eternal or indestructible; (3) Mithyadrsti, the false view that other false views are excellent and capable of producing purity; (4) Drstiparamarsa, the perverted view that regards inferior things as superior or counts the worse as the better; and (5) Silavrataparamarsa, the view that certain religious practices or abstinences are excellent and capable or producing purity.

By replacing the *drsti* in the list of six klesas with this series of five *drstis*, we have ten klesas or Anushayas.

Satkayadrsti is twofold, *Atmagraha*, clinging to the 'I', and *Atmiyagraha*, clinging to the 'mine']

(1) The presence of Self-belief (Atmadrsti) prevents the other beliefs from arising, because two discernments (Prajnas) – all *drsti* is discernment (Prajna), discernment of dharmas – cannot exist together in one mind.

Why is it that the *drsti* of Manas must necessarily be Atmadrsti?

Because the two Paramarsas (Drstiparamarsa and Silavrataparamarsa) and Mithyadrsti are exclusively the result of the discrimination and differentiation of phenomena (*vikalpa*) to be cut off and destroyed on the Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth only (*darsanaheya*), while the klesas of Manas are 'inborn' (*sahaja*) to be cut off and destroyed only on the Path of Meditation and Self-Cultivation (*bhavanaheya*). Another reason is that Atmiyadrsti and Antagrahadrsti are both born in dependence upon Atmadrsti, whereas the *drsti* associated with Manas does not depend on Atmadrsti; at all times it takes as its object the Alayavijnana and conceives the idea of Atman in its place. This *drsti* is therefore Atmadrsti.

(2) Doubt (Vimati) cannot manifest itself, because the characteristics of Atmadrsti are certainty and decisiveness.

(3) Anger (Pratigha) has no place either, being given the presence of Self-love (Atmasneha). Hence this consciousness, Manas, is associated with four klesas only.

(4) How can belief (*drsti*), conceit (*mana*), and love (*sneha*) be simultaneous? – Their modes of activity (*akara*) are not contradictory. There is nothing wrong with their simultaneous manifestation.

Does not the Yogasastra say that covetousness (Raga) humbles the mind and that conceit (Mana) exalts it? Are these two klesas not mutually contradictory?

Undoubtedly, but the Yogasastra, in this context, occupies itself with klesas of discrimination and differentiation (*vikalpita*), external objects, a contemptuous attitude towards other people, and something gross, whereas here it is a question of 'inborn' klesas (*sahaja*), internal objects, exaltation of self, and something subtle. There is therefore no contradiction in the meanings of the texts.

二· 餘所相應門

此意心所唯有四耶？
不爾，及餘觸等俱故。

有義此意心所唯九，前四及餘觸等五法，即觸作意受想與思，意與徧行定相應故。

前說觸等異熟識俱，恐謂同前亦是無覆，顯此異彼，故置餘言。

及是集義，前四後五合與末那恒相應故。
此意何故無餘心所？
〔述記：初答別境，次答善所，次答隨惑，後答不定。〕

謂欲希望未遂合事，此識任運緣遂合境，無所希望，故無有欲。

勝解印持曾未定境，此識無始恒緣定事經所印持，故無勝解。

念唯記憶曾所習事，此識恒緣現所受境，無所記憶，故無有念。

定唯繫心專注一境，此識任運刹那別緣，旣不專一，故無有定。

慧即我見，故不別說。

善是淨故，非此識俱。
隨煩惱生必依煩惱前後分位差別建立，此識恒與四煩惱俱，後一類分位無別，故此識俱無隨煩惱。

2. OTHER CAITTAS (MENTAL ASSOCIATES) OF MANAS

Is Manas associated with only four Caittas, *i.e.*, the four klesas? No, the Stanza says that

> It is accompanied also by other mental associates (caittas), namely, mental contact (Sparsa) and so forth.

1. According to one opinion, the Caittas associated with Manas are only nine in number: the four klesas and the five 'universals', mental contact (Sparsa), attention (Manaskara), sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna), and volition (Cetana). The reason is that Manas is invariably accompanied by the 'universal' Caittas.

The present Trimsika has said, in a preceding section, that the Alayavijnana is accompanied by the universals. For fear that these universals of Manas may, like those of the Alayavijnana, be regarded as of the non-defiled-non-defined moral species, and in order to indicate that these are different from those, the Stanza employs the word 'other'. As regards the word 'and', it signifies addition or totality; it means that the four klesas *and* the five universals are always associated with Manas.

Why is it that Manas has no other Caittas than these nine?

Because it is not associated with the five special Caittas (*viniyatas*), the eleven good Caittas (*kusalas*), the derived or secondary klesas (*upaklesas*), and the four indeterminate Caittas (*aniyatas*).

(1) Special Caittas: Desire (Chanda) is the strong longing for things not yet attained. Now Manas perceives spontaneously; it takes as its object a thing that has already been attained, and it does not desire anything. Hence it is not associated with desire.

Resolve (Adhimoksa) is 'determination' in regard to a thing not yet precisely specified. Now Manas, at all times since before the beginning of time, perpetually takes as its object a specified thing that has already been determined (a thing which it holds only as the Atman and not as anything else). Hence it is not associated with resolve.

Memory (Smrti) is the remembrance or recollection of a thing experienced in the past. Manas perceives and perpetually takes as its object a thing actually felt and experienced at the present moment, which is not a thing to be remembered. It has nothing to remember. Hence it has no memory.

Meditation (Samadhi) attaches the mind to, and with some efforts concentrates it on, one thing. Now Manas spontaneously and effortlessly perceives its object from moment to moment without having to concentrate. Hence it has no Samadhi.

Discernment (Prajna) is the same thing as Atmadrsti. Hence it is not separately mentioned here, under its name, as an associate of Manas.

(2) The good dharmas, being pure, do not accompany Manas.

(3) As regards the secondary klesas (*upaklesas*), they are only born in dependence upon the different successive states of the fundamental klesas, and they are not born simultaneously with them. Manas is always associated

惡作追悔先所造業，此識任運恒緣現境非悔先業，故無惡作。

睡眠必依身心重昧外衆緣力有時暫起，此識無始一類內執不假外緣，故彼非有。

尋伺俱依外門而轉，淺深推度，麤細發言，此識唯依內門而轉一類執我，故非彼俱。

有義彼釋餘義非理，頌別說此有覆攝故，又闕意俱隨煩惱故，煩惱必與隨煩惱俱，故此餘言顯隨煩惱。

此中有義，五隨煩惱徧與一切染心相應。

如集論說，惛沈掉舉不信懈怠放逸於一切染汙品中恒共相應。

若離無堪任性等染汙性成無是處故。

煩惱起時心既染汙，故染心位必有彼五。

煩惱若起，必由無堪任囂動，不信，懈怠，放逸故。

掉舉雖徧一切染心，而貪位增，但說貪分。

with the four klesas which, before and after, remain in the same state without difference. It cannot therefore be associated with the secondary klesas.

(4) Indeterminate Caittas: Regret (Kaukrtya) is repentance for actions done in the past. Manas spontaneously and perpetually perceives an actual object that is present at all times. It does not regret past actions. Hence it has no regret.

Drowsiness (Middha) arises by reason of the heaviness and dullness of body·and mind and in consequence of external conditions (illness, fever, a cold, etc.) Arising sometimes for a limited period of time, it is not a permanent state. Manas, at all times homogeneous, with its strong hold on the inner consciousness, does not depend on external conditions. Hence it is not associated with drowsiness.

Reflection and investigation (Vitarka and Vicara) are both turned towards the outside. Being respectively superficial and profound speculations and rough and subtle examinations, they express themselves in speech. Manas is turned only inwards; uniform and homogeneous, it clings to the Atman. Hence it is not associated with reflection and investigation.

2. According to another opinion, the explanation by the first master of the meaning of the word 'others' does not accord with reason, because a later Stanza separately affirms that Manas belongs to the defiled-non-defined category', [and it is not necessary for the author to use the word 'others' here to express this truth]. His interpretation is faulty also because it does not specify the fact that Manas is accompanied by upaklesas. The truth is that klesas must necessarily be accompanied by upaklesas. Hence the word 'others' in the Stanza denotes upaklesas. Hence the translation should be: 'Manas is accompanied by the four klesas, the *others* [that is to say, the upaklesas], and the five universals, mental contact etc.'

There are four masters[1] who accept this opinion:

(1) Five upaklesas are associated with all defiled minds, as mentioned in the Abhidharma: 'Torpid-mindedness (Styana), agitation (Auddhatya), unbelief (Asraddhya), indolence (Kausidya), and thoughtlessness (Pramada) are always associated with all defiled minds.' In fact, apart from incompetence or incapacity (*akarmanyata*) etc., there would not be any defiled nature of the mind. [Incompetence is a genus of which torpid-mindedness is a species.] When klesa is produced, the mind is said to be defiled; hence, when that is so, there must necessarily be those five upaklesas, because the manifestation of klesas is certainly due to incompetence (i.e., torpid-mindedness, agitation, unbelief, indolence, and thoughtlessness).

Although agitation is found in all defiled minds, yet it is defined as 'a part of covetousness', because it increases in the state of covetousness. Likewise,

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[1] First master. - Five upaklesas in all defiled minds: torpid-mindedness, agitation, unbelief, indolence, and thoughtlessness.

Second master. - Six: Unbelief, indolence, thoughtlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, non-discernment.

Third master. - Ten: Thoughtlessness, agitation, torpid-mindedness, unbelief, indolence, perverse desire, perverted decision, perverted memory, distraction, non-discernment.

Fourth master. - Eight: Torpid-mindedness, agitation, unbelief, indolence, thoughtlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, non-discernment.

如眠與悔雖徧三性心，而癡位增但說爲癡分。

雖餘處說有隨煩惱或六或十徧諸染心，而彼俱依別義說徧，非彼實徧一切染心。

謂依二十隨煩惱中解通麤細，無記不善，通障定慧相顯，說六。

依二十二隨煩惱中解通麤細二性說十，故此彼說非互相違。

然此意俱心所十五，謂前九法五隨煩惱幷別境慧。

我見雖是別境慧攝，而五十一心所法中義有差別，故開爲二。

何緣此意無餘心所？
謂忿等十行相麤動，此識審細，故非彼俱。
無慚無愧唯是不善，此無記故，非彼相應。
散亂令心馳流外境，此恒內執一類境生不外馳流，故彼非有。
不正知者謂起外門身語意行違越軌則，此唯內執，故非彼俱。

drowsiness (Middha) and regret (Kaukrtya), although they are associated with good, bad, and non-defined minds, are defined as 'a part of delusion' (Moha), because they are augmented in the state of delusion.

We are aware that some other texts say that the universal upaklesas (which are found in all defiled minds) are six or ten in number. But, in fact, it is not so at all. These texts regard them as universal, not because they are really associated with all defiled minds, but because they (the texts) express themselves from a particular point of view. In the enumeration of twenty upaklesas, we recognize six universals [unbelief, indolence, idleness, forgetfulness (Musitasmrtita), distraction (Viksepa), and non-discernment (Asamprajanya)] by taking: a. those which are at the same time gross and subtle [thus discarding 'fury (Krodha) and the nine others' which are exclusively gross]; b. those which are at the same time non-defined and bad [thus discarding shamelessness (Ahri) and 'absence of the sense of integrity' (Atrapa), which are gross and subtle, but exclusively bad]; and c. those which obstruct at the same time meditation (Samadhi) and discernment (Prajna) [thus discarding torpid-mindedness which does not obstruct Samadhi, and agitation which does not obstruct Prajna.] In the enumeration of twenty-two upaklesas,[1] one recognizes ten universals [by adding torpid-mindedness, agitation, perverse desire (Mithyachanda), and perverted decision (Mithyadhimoksa)], that is, by taking those which are gross and subtle and those which can be non-defined. Hence the texts in question do not contradict our doctrine.

Let us conclude that Manas is associated with fifteen Caittas; that is, the nine on which there is perfect agreement (mental contact etc., Self-delusion etc.) plus five upaklesas, plus, among the five 'specials', Prajna. Without any doubt Self-belief (Atmadrsti) (clinging to the concept of the reality of Atman) is comprised in this Prajna, but, in the list of fifty-one caittas, the two are distinguished (Prajna is a genus; Atmadrsti, a species. Prajna may be good, bad, or non-defined, whereas Atmadrsti is exclusively defiled).

Why is it that this consciousness, Manas, does not possess the remaining (thirty-six) Caittas?

Manas is not associated: a. with 'fury (Krodha) and the nine others', because these ten Caittas are gross and disturbing, while Manas is subtle 'cogitation'; b. with shamelessness and absence of integrity, which are exclusively bad, while Manas is non-defined; c. with distraction, because this Caitta causes the mind to disperse itself among external objects, while Manas perpetually and internally clings to one sole object and does not disperse itself

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[1] The twenty-two upaklesas (derived vexing passions or mental qualities) are as follows:

1. Krodha, fury
2. Upanaha, enmity
3. Mraksa, dissimulation
4. Pradasa, vexation
5. Irsya, envy
6. Matsarya, parsimony
7. Sathya, deception
8. Maya, fraudulence
9. Vihimsa harmfulness
10. Mada, pride
11. Ahrikya, shamelessness
12. Atrapya, absence of a sense of integrity
13. Auddhatya, agitation
14. Styana, torpid-mindedness
15. Asraddhya, unbelief
16. Kausidya, indolence
17. Pramada, thoughtlessness
18. Musitasmrtita, forgetfulness
19. Viksepa, distraction
20. Asamprajanya, non-discernment
21. Mithyachanda, perverse desire
22. Mithyadhimoksa, perverted decision.

無餘心所，義如前說。

有義應說六隨煩惱徧與一切染心相應。

瑜伽論說，不信懈怠放逸忘念散亂惡慧一切染心皆相應故。

忘念散亂惡慧若無，心必不能起諸煩惱。

要緣曾受境界種類發起忘念及邪簡擇，方起貪等諸煩惱故。

煩惱起時心必流蕩，皆由於境起散亂故。

惛沈掉舉行相互違，非諸染心皆能徧起。

論說五法徧染心者，解通麤細，違唯善法，純隨煩惱，通二性故。

〔述記：一者麤細，簡忿等十唯麤事故。二者爲善法，卽明不信翻信，懈怠翻精進，惛沈翻輕安，掉舉返捨，放逸翻不放逸來。〕

說十徧言，義如前說。

然此意俱心所十九，謂前九法六隨煩惱幷念定慧及加惛沈。

此別說念，準前慧釋。

幷有定者，專注一類，所執我境曾不捨故。

加惛沈者，謂此識俱無明尤重，心惛沈故。

無掉舉者，此相違故。

無餘心所，如上應知。

有義復說十隨煩惱徧與一切染心相應。

outwardly; d. with non-discernment, because this Caitta produces externally activities of the body, of the voice, and of the mind, contradicting and transgressing rules and regulations, while Manas clings to only one internal object.

As regards the remaining missing Caittas, their absence has been explained by the first master in the preceding section.

(2) According to another opinion, six upaklesas are associated with all defiled minds, as taught by the Yogasastra, that is, unbelief, indolence, thoughtlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and non-discernment.

If the last three, i.e., forgetfulness, distraction, and non-discernment, are lacking, the mind cannot produce the various klesas, because, in order that the various klesas, covetousness etc., can be produced, there must first arise defects of memory or forgetfulness and erroneous judgment (Mithyapravicaya, i.e., Asamprajanya, non-discernment) in regard to subjects relating to things or situations that have been experienced personally or known by hearsay in the past, and also in regard to subjects relating to the genus and species of those things. When klesa arises, the mind necessarily rushes and wanders. All this is due to distraction caused by the object perceived by that mind.

As regards torpid-mindedness and agitation, their modes of activity are contradictory; they cannot arise together in all defiled minds.

The Sastra (Abhidharma) says that five dharmas are 'universals', torpid-mindedness, agitation, etc., because it takes, among defiled dharmas: a. those that are altogether gross and subtle [discarding anger etc.]; b. those that contradict only good dharmas [unbelief contradicts belief (Shraddha); indolence, zeal (Virya); torpid-mindedness, composure (Prasrabdhi); agitation, equanimity (Upeksa); idleness, vigilance; while the other upaklesas contradict also the five 'Special Caittas']; c. those that are exclusively upaklesas (in contradistinction to the *mulaklesas* and the 'four indeterminates'); d. those which are non-defined and bad [as opposed to shamelessness and absence of integrity which are exclusively bad].

As regards the doctrine of ten universal upaklesas, they have been explained by the first master in the preceding section.

Manas is therefore associated with nineteen Caittas: 1–5. mental contact etc.; 6–9. Self-delusion etc.; 10–15. six upaklesas which have just been explained; and also, 16–18. memory, meditation, and discernment; and 19. torpid-mindedness. The special mention of memory is explained for the same reason as that of discernment was explained above. Samadhi or meditation is mentioned because Manas attaches itself to one sole object, that is, the Atman, and never abandons it. Torpid-mindedness is added because Manas is specially heavy with ignorance, always clinging falsely to the internal, never turning itself towards the external, thus producing a torpidity of mind.

Agitation is lacking because it is in contradiction to torpid-mindedness and the other Caittas, as has been explained by the second master.

As regards the remaining missing Caittas, their absence has been explained in the preceding section.

(3) According to a third opinion, ten upaklesas are associated with all defiled minds.

瑜伽論說，放逸掉舉惛沈不信懈怠邪欲邪勝解邪念散亂不正知，此十，一切染汙心起，通一切處，三界繫故。

若無邪欲邪勝解時，心必不能起諸煩惱。於所受境要樂合離印持事相，方起貪等諸煩惱故。

諸疑理者於色等事必無猶豫，故疑相應亦有勝解。

〔述記義演：且如於苦諦理雖生猶預，於苦界色身必定勝解，知人天等決差別故。〕

於所緣事亦猶豫者，非煩惱疑，如疑人杌。

餘處不說此二徧者，緣非愛事疑相應心邪欲勝解非麤顯故。

〔述記：由此二體雖徧染心，若緣非愛事情則不欲此事，疑於理時不印於理。〕

餘互有無，義如前說。

此意心所有二十四，謂前九法，十隨煩惱，加別境五，準前理釋。

無餘心所，如上應知。

有義前說皆未盡理。

且疑他世爲有爲無，於彼有何欲勝解相？

煩惱起位若無惛沈，應不定有無堪任性。
掉舉若無，應無囂動，便如善等非染污位。

若染心中無散亂者，應非流蕩，非染汙心。

若無失念不正知者，如何能起煩惱現前？

故染汙心決定皆與八隨煩惱相應而生，謂惛沈，掉舉，不信，懈怠，放逸，忘念，散亂，不正知。

According to the Yogasastra, 58: 'thoughtlessness, agitation, torpid-mindedness, unbelief, indolence, perverse desire (Mithyachanda), perverted decision (Mithyadhimoksa), perverted memory (Mithyasmrti), distraction, and non-discernment: these ten are associated with all defiled minds, because they penetrate all places of the three Dhatus.'

If perverse desires and perverted decisions are lacking, the mind cannot produce the various klesas, because covetousness and the other klesas are only produced if there is a desire for union or for separation in regard to the objects experienced, and if there is determination of the characteristics of those objects.

[Question: If there is doubt (*Vicikitsa*) in regard to the Four Noble Truths and other philosophical verities, how can there be determination of their characteristics?]

Answer: A person may doubt certain philosophical truths, but he certainly has no doubt in regard to things etc. [For instance, he may doubt the truth that 'existence is suffering', but he can certainly understand that a human being on the physical plane suffers more than a celestial being in Devachan (the Land of the Gods)]. Hence resolve (*Adhimoksa*) can be associated with doubt.

Doubt may also concern things perceived by the senses, but this kind of doubt cannot be regarded as a klesa. It is certainly not klesa when one doubts whether he is seeing a man or a post.

Elsewhere perverse desire and perverted decision are not classed as universals, because they are not manifest when the mind has as object something disagreeable, when it is associated with doubt (which affects the power of determination) [and hatred (which overcomes desire)]. Nevertheless, they are found in all defiled minds.

As regards the other Caittas associated or not associated with Manas, they have been dealt with in preceding sections.

This consciousness, Manas, is therefore accompanied by twenty-four Caittas: mental contact and the four others, Self-delusion and the three others, ten upaklesas, and five 'Special Caittas'.

As regards the remaining missing Caittas, their absence has been explained in preceding sections.

(4) According to Dharmapala:

None of the three preceding theories is in perfect accord with logical reason.

What desires and resolve can there be to be associated with doubts regarding the existence or non-existence of other worlds?

When klesas are born, if there is no torpid-mindedness, there will be no incompetence or incapacity; if there is no agitation, there will be no turbulence: just as when the mind is good, it is not a defiled state.

If there is no distraction in a defiled mind, there will be no rushing and wandering: it will not be a defiled mind.

If forgetfulness and non-discernment are lacking, how can klesas manifest themselves?

Hence all defiled minds are associated with eight upaklesas: torpid-mindedness, agitation, unbelief, indolence, thoughtlessness, forgetfulness, distraction, and non-discernment.

忘念不正知念慧爲性者，不徧染心，非諸染心皆緣會受有簡擇故。若以無明爲自性者，徧染心起，由前說故。

然此意俱心所十八，謂前九法，八隨煩惱，幷別境慧。
〔述記：以別境慧卽我見故。〕

無餘心所，及論三文準前應釋，若作是說，不違教理。

三· 解五受俱

此染汙意何受相應？

有義此俱唯有喜受，恒內執我生喜愛故。

有義不然，應許喜受乃至有頂違聖言故。
〔述記：違聖言故者，違瑜伽第十二說，初定出憂，第二定出苦，第三定出喜，第四定出樂，於無想中出捨根，乃至廣說。〕

應說此意四受相應。
謂生惡趣憂受相應，緣不善業所引果故。

生人欲天初二靜慮，喜受相應，緣有喜地善業果故。

第三靜慮樂受相應，緣有樂地善業果故。
第四靜慮乃至有頂捨受相應，緣唯捨地善業果故。

有義彼說亦不應理，此無始來任運一類緣內執我恒無轉易，與變異受不相應故。

As regards the theories of the second masters, if forgetfulness and non-discernment are of the nature of memory and discernment, they are not found in all defiled minds, because not all defiled minds perceive objects that have been experienced in the past; nor do they all discriminate. But, if they are of the nature of ignorance, then they arise together with all defiled minds, as has already been explained.

Manas is therefore accompanied by eighteen Caittas: mental contact etc., Self-delusion etc., eight upaklesas, and one Special Caitta, namely, discernment (i.e., Self-belief, clinging to the concept of the Atman).

As regards the remaining Caittas not associated with Manas, the texts which deal with them (Abhidharma and Yogasastra, 55 and 58) have already been explained.

This system is therefore in conformity with the texts and logical reason.

3. Vedana of Manas

With what sensations (Vedanas) is defiled Manas associated?

1. *First opinion.* – It is associated with only one sensation, that of delight (Saumanasya), because it always clings to the Alayavijnana, conceives it as Atman, and engenders delight and affection.

2. *Second opinion.* – In the above hypothesis, the delight would exist in all spheres of existence up to the highest sphere of the Arupyadhatu, the Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana (Bhavagra), the land of knowledge where there is neither consciousness nor unconsciousness, i.e., above either, which is in contradiction to the sacred teachings (Yogasastra and Abhidharmakosa).

It should be said that Manas is associated with four sensations.

In regard to the existences in the realm of bad destinies, Manas is associated with grief (Daurmanasya), because, although it perceives the eighth consciousness, it is perceiving, in fact, the fruit produced by past bad deeds.

In regard to the destinies of man, of the spirits of Kamadhatu, and of the spirits of the first two Dhyanas, Manas is associated with delight, because the eighth consciousness, which it perceives, is the fruit of good deeds 'of the lands of delight'.

In regard to the destinies of the spirits of the third Dhyana, Manas is associated with the sensation of joy (Sukhavedana), because the eighth consciousness which it perceives is the fruit of good deeds 'of the lands of joy'.

Above the third Dhyana (fourth Dhyana up to Bhavagra), Manas is associated with the sensation of indifference (Upeksavedana), because the eighth consciousness which it perceives is the fruit of good deeds 'of the lands of indifference'.

3. Third opinion. – The preceding theory is also illogical. Manas, since before the beginning of time, is homogeneous and proceeds spontaneously, perceiving the inner consciousness and clinging to it as the Atman without any modification: hence it is not associated with sensations that are subject to change and modification.

又此末那與前藏識義有異者，皆別說之，若四受俱亦應別說，旣不別說，定與彼同，故此相應唯有捨受。

未轉依位，與前所說心所相應。已轉依位，唯二十一心所俱起謂偏行別境各五善十一，如第八識已轉依位唯捨受俱，任運轉故，恒於所緣平等轉故。

四· 釋性俱

末那心所何性所攝？

有覆無記所攝，非餘。

此意相應四煩惱等是染法故，障礙聖道隱蔽自心說名有覆，非善不善故名無記。

如上二界諸煩惱等，定力攝藏是無記攝，此俱染法所依細故，任運轉故，亦無記攝。

若已轉依，唯是善性。

五· 繫界別門

末那心所何地繫耶？

隨彼所生，彼地所繫。

謂生欲界，現行末那相應心所即欲界繫，乃至有頂應知亦然。

任運恒緣自地藏識執爲內我，非他地故。

若起彼地異熟藏識現在前者名生彼地，染汙末那緣彼執我即繫屬彼名彼所繫。

Furthermore, if Manas differs in any respect from the Alayavijnana, the Trimsika would point out expressly the differences: it would specify its different supports, its different objects, etc. If Manas, in contradistinction to the Alayavijnana, were associated with four sensations, the Stanzas would have specially mentioned it. Since no special mention has been made, it must, so far as sensation is concerned, be the same as the Alaya. It follows from this that it is associated with only one sensation, that of indifference.

As long as it is not revolutionized, Manas is associated with the Caittas mentioned above. Once it has been revolutionized, it becomes associated with twenty-one Caittas, namely, the five 'Universals', the five 'Special Caittas', and the eleven good ones. And, like the Alayavijnana, it is associated with only one sensation, that of indifference, because it proceeds spontaneously and is associated with Samatajnana, Universal Equality Wisdom.

4. The 'Moral' Species of Manas

To which 'moral' species do the Caittas of Manas belong? They are exclusively defiled-non-defined.

The four klesas associated with Manas, being defiled dharmas, are an obstacle to the Holy Path (*aryamarga*); they impede and obscure the mind (i.e., Manas which is their lord); they are therefore defiled. On the other hand, they are neither good nor bad; they are consequently non-defined.

Just as the klesas in the two superior Dhatus, being enveloped and held under control by the force of inner tranquillity, are comprised in the 'non-defined' category, so the klesas associated with Manas, their supporting basis being subtle, and their manifestation being spontaneous, are comprised in the 'non-defined' category.

But, once revolutionized, Manas is exclusively good.

5. Bhumi ('Land' or Realm) of Manas

To what Dhatu or Bhumi (Land) are the Caittas of Manas bound and confined?

The Stanza says:

> Manas is active in the dhatu or bhumi (land) in which the
> sentient being is born and to which he is bound.

When the eighth consciousness is born in Kamadhatu, the Caittas (e.g., Self-belief) associated with Manas are confined to Kamadhatu. This is true for all Bhumis up to Bhavagra, for they are spontaneous, taking always as their object the Alayavijnana of their particular Bhumi and considering it as the Atman; they never take as their object the dharmas of other Bhumis.

The Alayavijnana contains Bijas of all Bhumis; but it is said to be 'born in a certain Bhumi' when it is actually the retribution (*vipaka*) of the deeds of that Bhumi and is in actual manifestation at the time. Defiled Manas takes

或爲彼地諸煩惱等之所繫縛名彼所繫。

若已轉依即非所繫。

the Alayavijnana as its Atman and is attached to it. It is then said to be 'tied to the Alayavijnana'.

Alternatively, Manas is tied by the klesas of that Bhumi in which the Alayavijnana is born; it is then said to be 'tied to the Bhumi by the klesas of that Bhumi'.

Once revolutionized, Manas is dissociated from all Bhumis.

第六章· 末那起滅分位

一· 末那伏斷位

此染汙意無始相續，何位永斷或暫斷耶？

阿羅漢滅定，出世道無有。

阿羅漢者，總顯三乘無學果位，此位染意種及現行俱永斷滅故說無有。

學位滅定出世道中俱暫伏滅，故說無有。

謂染汙意無始時來微細一類任運而轉，諸有漏道不能伏滅，三乘聖道有伏滅義，眞無我解違我執故。

後得無漏現在前時，是彼等流，亦違此意。

眞無我解及後所得俱無漏故，名出世道。

滅定旣是聖道等流，極寂靜故，此亦非有。

由未永斷此種子故，從滅盡定聖道起已此復現行，乃至未滅。

然此染意相應煩惱是俱生故，非見所斷，是染汙故，非非所斷。

§ VI. CESSATION OF MANAS

1. ABANDONMENT OF MANAS

SINCE before the beginning of time this defiled Manas has continued in a perpetual series. In what state is it absolutely or temporarily cut off?

Vasubandhu replies to this question:

> Manas ceases to exist at the stage of Arhatship, in the meditation of annihilation (state of complete extinction of thought and other mental qualities), and on the Supramundane Path.

Arhats are the Asaiksas of the three Vehicles. In the state of Arhatship, defiled Manas, both actual and in Bija-form, has been entirely annihilated. Hence one says that it does not exist.

As regards the Saiksas, in the state of 'meditation of annihilation' (Nirodhasamapatti) and while they are treading the Supramundane Path, defiled Manas is provisionally 'subdued' (i.e., incapable of actualizing itself). Hence one says that it does not exist.

1. Defiled Manas, since before the beginning of time, has been subtle and homogeneous, manifesting itself spontaneously. The various impure mundane exercises are incapable of subduing it. But the Holy Path of the three Vehicles subdues it, being pure mind. For Atmagraha (Atman-adhesion) is contradicted by the true intelligence of Nairatmya (Egolessness) [which is the 'Fundamental Non-discriminating Wisdom']. Defiled Manas is also impossible when there is in actual manifestation the 'Subsequent Pure Wisdom', which is the efflux (*nisyanda*) of the 'Fundamental Non-discriminating Wisdom'.[1]

As both these wisdoms are pure, they receive the name of 'Supramundane Path' (*lokottaramarga*).

2. The Nirodhasamapatti (meditation of annihilation) is the efflux of the Holy Path; it is perfectly calm and, in reality, resembles Nirvana. Defiled Manas is incompatible with it.

However, the Bijas of this Manas have as yet not been cut off and annihilated. Therefore, when the ascetic emerges from the Nirodhasamapatti and the Holy Path, Manas becomes active again, and this goes on and on as long as the Bijas have not been annihilated.

3. Concerning the Arhat

The klesas associated with Manas are of the 'inborn' (*sahaja*) category; hence they are not abandoned or cut off (in their Bijas) by the Path of Insight

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[1] See Section on The Path.

極微細故，所有種子與有頂地下下煩惱一時頓斷，勢力等故。金剛喻定現在前時頓斷此種成阿羅漢，故無學位永不復起。

二乘無學迴趣大乘，從初發心至未成佛，雖實是菩薩亦名阿羅漢，應義等故不別說之。

二· 無染末那

此中有義末那唯有煩惱障俱，聖教皆言三位無故。

〔述記：安慧等云，三位體無，此識俱時唯有人執無有法執，對法等說三位無故。若此俱有法執，應言三位有。〕

又說四惑恒相應故。

〔述記：顯揚第一說四惑俱故無法執。〕

又說爲識雜染依故。

〔述記：攝論第一論本不言爲淨依，故無淨第七。〕

有義彼說教理相違。

出世末那經說有故。

無染意識，如有染時，定有俱生不共依故。

論說藏識決定恒與一識俱轉所謂末那，意識起時則二俱轉所謂意識及與末那，若五識中隨起一識則三俱轉，乃至或時頓起五識則七俱轉。

〔述記：第五十一及解深密經當七十六。〕

若住滅定無第七識，爾時藏識應無識俱，便非恒定一識俱轉。

住聖道時若無第七，爾時藏識應一識俱，如何可言若起意識爾時藏識定二俱轉？

顯揚論說末那恒與四煩惱相應，或翻彼相應恃舉爲行

into Transcendent Truth (*darsanamarga*); but, since they are defiled, it is not impossible to abandon and cut them off (in other words, they are not unabandonable).

All the Bijas of these klesas, being extremely subtle, are cut off simultaneously with the most tenuous klesas (those of the lowest grade) of Bhavagra; this is achieved all at once and by one blow, as it were, because the klesas are all of equal force. That is what happens when the Vajropamasamadhi (Diamond Samadhi) is attained. All the Bijas being cut off instantaneously, the ascetic becomes an Arhat or Asaiksa, and his defiled Manas disappears never to arise again.

The Asaiksas or Arhats of the two Vehicles who turn round and devote themselves to the Greater Vehicle (Mahayana) are in truth Bodhisattvas from the moment of their conversion (the first awakening of their Bodhi-Heart) to that state immediately prior to the attainment of Buddhahood. But the Stanzas designate them by the term 'Arhat', because Arhats are, like Bodhisattvas, exempt from Atmagraha.

2. NON-DEFILED MANAS

1. According to Sthiramati, Manas or the seventh consciousness is always 'defiled' and always arises with the klesas; there will be no more Manas when the *klesavarana* is lacking. For the texts say: (1) Manas is missing in the three states which we have just studied; (2) Manas is always associated with four klesas (Vikhyapana); (3) Manas is the point of support for the corruption of consciousness (Samgraha).

2. But Dharmapala says that Manas, ceasing to be defiled, remains in its pure nature (seventh consciousness). – The thesis of Sthiramati is in contradiction to the sacred teachings and logical reason.

(1) A sutra says that there is a Manas *lokottara*, i.e., a supramundane Manas.

(2) Manovijnana, when it is non-defiled, must, as when it is defiled, necessarily have a support (*asraya*) which is 'born with it' and which is special. [This special support is the pure Manas.]

(3) The Yogasastra, 51, teaches that the Alayavijnana always functions with a consciousness, which is Manas; that it functions with two when Manovijnana manifests itself; with three, when one of the five consciousnesses manifests itself; and so on: with seven when all the first Five manifest themselves instantaneously. If, as Sthiramati understands it, Manas disappears at the time of the *nirodhasamapatti*, then the Alayavijnana would have no consciousness to associate with it; this would be contradictory to the teaching of the Yogasastra that the Alayavijnana always functions with a consciousness. If the seventh consciousness disappears at the time of treading the Holy Path (which resorts to Manovijnana), the Alayavijnana should have only one consciousness to associate with it. How, then, can the Yogasastra say that, when Manovijnana arises, the Alayavijnana functions with two consciousness?

(4) The *Aryadesanavikhyapanasastra* says that 'Manas, born of the Bijas

或平等行，故知此意通染不染。

若由論說阿羅漢位無染意故便無第七，應由論說阿羅漢位捨賴耶故便無第八。

〔述記：大論六十三。〕

彼旣不爾，此云何然？

又諸論言轉第七識得平等智，彼如餘智定有所依相應淨識。此識無者，彼智應無，非離所依有能依故。

〔述記：莊嚴論攝論。〕

不可說彼依六轉識，許佛恒行如鏡智故。

〔述記：佛地經中說此智品佛位恒行，即汝共許許佛恒無轉易行如鏡智故。非六識智，六識智有轉易不恒故。〕

又無學位若無第七識，彼第八識應無俱有依，然必有此依，如餘識性故。

又如未證補特伽羅無我者彼我執恒行，亦應未證法無我者法我執恒行。此識若無，彼依何識？

非依第八，彼無慧故。

由此應信二乘聖道滅定無學此識恒行，彼未證得法無我故。

又諸論中以五同法證有第七爲第六依。

〔述記：瑜伽第五十一，攝論第一，證七識中以五識爲同法，證有第七爲第六依。〕

聖道起時及無學位若無第七爲第六依，所立宗因便俱有失。

of the Alayavijnana, takes this consciousness as its object and is always associated with four klesas (Self-delusion, Self-belief, Self-conceit, Self-love)'; but it adds: 'or else associated with contrary Caittas; always, either with the attitude of superciliousness or in the spirit of equality, it functions with this consciousness.' From this text we conclude that Manas can be defiled or non-defiled.

(5) The Yogasastra says that 'defiled Manas' ceases to exist in the state of Arhatship. If you conclude from this that the seventh consciousness no longer exists in that state, then, from the saying in the same Sastra that 'the Alayavijnana is abandoned in the state or Arhatship', you have to draw the same conclusion that, in that state, the Alayavijnana no longer exists. You believe, however, that the eighth consciousness remains in Arhats. If it is so in the latter case, why is it otherwise in the former?

(6) The Alamkara and the Samgraha say: 'By the transmutation of the seventh consciousness there is acquired the Universal-Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana)'. This wisdom, like the other wisdoms, must rely for support on a pure consciousness with which it is associated. Without a supporting basis (i.e., without a supporting consciousness), there would be no depending Caittas. Hence, for want of a pure seventh consciousness, the Samatajnana (Universal-Equality Wisdom) would be lacking. It cannot be said that this wisdom depends on the first six consciousnesses, because, as one of the attributes of a Buddha, it is perpetual like the Adarsajnana (the all-reflecting Mirror Wisdom), whereas the wisdom associated with the first six consciousnesses is changeable and transient. (Buddhabhumisastra).

(7) Again, if the seventh consciousness is lacking in the state of Asaiksa, the eighth consciousness, in that state, would have no simultaneous support. Now, being a consciousness, it must, like all other consciousnesses, have this support.

(8) Furthermore, it is admitted that, inasmuch as Atmagraha is associated with the seventh consciousness, Atmagraha constantly exists in the person who has not yet realized *pudgalasunyata* (*pudgalanairatmya*, voidness of Atman). Likewise, Dharmagraha also exists constantly in the person who has not yet realized *dharmasunyata* (*dharmanairatmya*, voidness of all dharmas). On which consciousness will this Dharmagraha depend if the seventh consciousness disappears (with Atmagraha and the klesavarana)? – On the eighth consciousness? Impossible, because the eighth consciousness is devoid of discernment (Prajna). [The Alayavijnana is associated only with the five universal Caittas and not with the five special Caittas.]

Let us conclude that, in the Sages of the two Vehicles, i.e., in the Asaiksas, the ascetics on the Holy Path and those devoted to Nirodhasamapatti, Manas remains in constant activity, endowed with Dhamagraha, because the Sages in question have not yet realized *dharmasunyata*.

(9) Again, the Yogasastra, 51, and the Samgraha establish the necessity of the existence of a seventh consciousness as the support of the sixth; because the sixth must have a support of the same nature as the first five consciousnesses. If, at the time of the revelation of the Holy Path or in the state of Asaiksa, the seventh consciousness is not present as the support of the sixth, the reasoning

〔述記義演：意云瑜伽論攝論二本論文以五同法說第七爲第六依，
若如安慧師無〇世末那，則瑜伽攝論立比量所有宗因
俱便有失。〕

或應五識亦有無依，五恒有依，六亦應爾。

是故定有無染汙意於上三位恒起現前。

言彼無有者，依染意說。如說四位無阿賴耶，非無第八。此亦應爾。

三· 分位行相差別

此義差別略有三種。

一補特加羅我見相應。

二法我見相應。

三平等性智相應。

初通一切異生相續，二乘有學，七地以前一類菩薩有漏心位。

〔述記：一類之言謂卽簡取頓悟菩薩。〕

彼緣阿賴耶識起補特伽羅我見。

次通一切異生聲聞獨覺相續，一切菩薩法空智果不現前位。

彼緣異熟識起法我見。

後通一切如來相續，菩薩見道及修道中法空智果現在前位。

彼緣無垢異熟識等起平等性智。

〔述記：此第三智緣何法境？於佛地時緣無垢識等，卽緣無垢第八
淨識一切有爲及眞如故言等，菩薩見修道位緣異熟識及眞
如故。〕

of the Yogasastra and the Samgraha would present a double defect regarding the 'proposition' and the 'reason' for it.

If the sixth consciousness has no support, the first five consciousnesses, too, should have no support. But the five consciousnesses always have a support; it should therefore be the same with the sixth.

Hence, in the above-mentioned three states, there must always remain present a non-defiled Manas. The texts which say that Manas is non-existent in those states consider only the defiled Manas. In the same way we have seen that the Alayavijnana is lacking in four states (Asaiksas of the three Vehicles and Avaivartikabodhisattvas); but the pure eighth consciousness is not lacking. The same is true of the seventh consciousness.

3. THREE VISESAS OF MANAS
Modes of Manifestation

The seventh consciousness, Manas, manifests itself in three different modes corresponding to three different grades of human beings:

1. It is associated with the view of substantial existence of Pudgalas (sentient beings).

2. It is associated with the view of substantial existence of dharmas.

3. It is associated with Samatajnana (Universal-Equality Transcendental Wisdom).

1. This represents the Manas: a. of Prthagjanas at all times, the Manas as it is when their mind is impure [that is to say, when they are not treading the Path], b. of the Saiksas of the two Vehicles, and c. of one category of Bodhisattvas (to the exclusion of those Arhats who have become Bodhisattvas through 'sudden awakening') of the seven Lands before the eighth Land. This Manas takes the Alayavijnana as its object and produces the Pudgaladrsti: [it considers the Alayavijnana as an Atman a Pudgala].

2. This is the Manas: a. of Prthagjanas, Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas (Asaiksas and Saiksas) at all times, and b. of all those Bodhisattvas in whom the 'Wisdom of the Voidness of Dharmas' (*dharmasunyatajnana*) has not yet manifested itself, and who have not yet acquired the fruits of this wisdom ('Subsequent Transcendental Wisdom' and the Meditation of Annihilation). This Manas takes as object the Vipakavijnana and produces the Dharmadrsti: [it considers the Vipakavijnana as a dharma].

3. This is the Manas of Tathagatas at all times and those Bodhisattvas who are treading the Darsana Path (on which they have gained an insight into transcendent Truth) and the Bhavana Path (on which they are perfecting their realization of Truth), and by whom the Wisdom of the Voidness of Dharmas and its fruits have been attained and are in course of manifestation. This Manas has as its object the eighth absolutely pure consciousness (in the case of the Buddha), the Vipakavijnana (in the case of the Bodhisattvas), and also the *såmskrtas* and the Bhutatathata. It produces the Samatajnana.

補特伽羅我見起位彼法我見亦必現前，我執必依法執而起，如夜迷杌等方謂人等故。

我法二見用雖有別而不相違同依一慧，如眼識等體雖是一而有了別青等多用不相違故，此亦應然。

二乘有學聖道滅定現在前時，

頓悟菩薩於修道位

有學漸悟生空智果現在前時，皆唯起法執，我執已伏故。

二乘無學及此漸悟法空智果不現前時，亦唯起法執，我執已斷故。

八地以上一切菩薩所有我執皆永不行，或已永斷或永伏故，法空智果不現前時猶起法執，不相違故。

〔述記：不相違故，細執不障麤觀起故。〕

如契經說，八地已上一切煩惱不復現行，唯有所依所知障在。

〔述記義演：第六識八地以上……取第七識中法執所知障爲所依也。〕

此所知障是現非種，不爾煩惱亦應在故。

〔述記：八地以去所有法執是現行非種子，此非第六識中法執現種。〕

法執俱意於二乘等雖名不染，於諸菩薩亦名爲染，障

When there is *pudgaladrsti*, there is certainly *dharmadrsti*, because Atmagraha depends on Dharmagraha: to mistake a post for a man in the darkness of night, one must first of all be under a delusion about the post. These two *drstis* possess different functions; however, they do not contradict each other, and, together, they depend on one unique Prajna, just as the visual consciousness (*caksurvijnana*) is unique, but possesses many different functions, perception of blue etc., because these functions are not in contradiction with one another.

1. The following Saiksas have only Dharmagraha (associated with the seventh consciousness), because they have already 'subdued' Atmagraha:

(1) Saiksas of the two Vehicles who are treading the Holy Path (the Marga: *Darsanamarga* and *Bhavanamarga*), and those have withdrawn themselves in the Meditation of Annihilation, the *Nirodhasamapatti*: [at other times, they have also Atmagraha].

(2) Bodhisattvas of 'sudden realization' who, on the Bhavanamarga, are practising the Wisdom of the Voidness of Pungalas (*Pudgalasunyatajnana*) and enjoying its fruits (Subsequent Transcendental Wisdom and *Nirodhasamapatti*).

(3) Bodhisattvas of 'progressive realization' who, on the Holy Path, are practising the *Pudgalasunyatajnana* and enjoying its fruits.

2. In the case of the Asaiksas of the two Vehicles and those Bodhisattvas of 'progressive realization', when they have emerged from their Samadhi so that *Dharmasunyatajnana* and its fruits are no longer in active manifestation, they have only Dharmagraha, because they have already cut off Atmagraha. [This means that at the time of their Samadhi, when they are practising *darsanamarga* and *bhavanamarga*, their *Dharmasunyatajnana* is in manifestation and Dharmagraha is non-existent.]

However, in the eighth Land and above, Atmagraha ceases absolutely to be in activity in all Bodhisattvas, whatever their category may be. This is either because it is absolutely cut off or because it is absolutely subdued. But, except at those times of their meditation when they are manifesting the *dharmasunyatajnana* and enjoying its fruits, they still produce Dharmagraha. There is no contradiction between this Dharmagraha (which is subtle) and the *Pudgalasunyatajnana* (which is gross). [This means that, when they have emerged from their Samadhi, they manifest only *Pudgalasunyatajnana*, not *Dharmasunyatajnana*.] As the Samdhinirmocanasutra says: 'In the eighth Land and above, the klesas are all annihilated, never to be active again. There remains only the *jneyavarana* (the barrier that obstructs Absolute Knowledge) which is the point of support of the sixth consciousness.' [That is to say, there remains only the Dharmagraha (i.e., *jneyavarana*) of the seventh consciousness which is here the support of the sixth.] This *jneyavarana* is in actual manifestation, not latent as potential Bijas (that is to say, it is not the Atmagraha-Bija of the sixth consciousness). If it exists merely as Bijas, the klesas would exist also.

3. As regards the two Vehicles, Manas, with which Dharmagraha is associated, is said to be 'non-defiled'. But, in regard to Bodhisattvas, it is said

彼智故，由此亦名有覆無記。於二乘等說名無覆，不障彼智故。

是異熟生攝，從異熟識恒時生故名異熟生，非異熟果，此名通故。

〔述記：有四無記，此何無記攝？是異熟生攝。從異熟識性恒時生故名異熟生，非是從善惡異熟業所生名異熟生。〕

如增上緣，餘不攝者皆入比攝。

to be 'defiled', because it is an obstacle to the manifestation of the wisdom (*jnana*) which is proper to them. Hence it is called defiled-non-defined, whereas, in regard to the two Vehicles, it is called 'non-defiled', because it presents no obstacle to the wisdom proper to them.

4. Manas is non-defined and, among the four kinds of non-defined dharmas, it belongs to the *vipakaja* category, 'born of retribution'. The reason is that it is born perpetually of the eighth consciousness which is the Vipakavijnana; it is not *vipakaphala*, 'fruit of retribution'. [Thus, if it is called *vipakaja*, it is because it is born of Vipakavijnana, not because it is born as the retribution of good and bad deeds.] The term *vipaka*, in fact, is extensive and comprehends all non-defined dharmas, just as all *pratyayas* (conditions) that are not *hetu* (cause), *alambana* (object) and *samanântara* (immediate precedent) are classified as *adhipatipratyaya* (condition quâ contributing agent).

第七章· 引教及理證有此識

云何應知此第七識離眼等識有別自體 ？ 聖教正理爲定量故。

一· 依顯經以教證有

謂薄伽梵處處經中說心意識三種別義。

集起名心，思量名意，了別名識，是三別義。

如是三義雖通八識，而隨勝顯第八名心，集諸法種起諸法故。第七名意，緣藏識等恒審思量爲我等故。餘六名識，於六別境麤動閒斷了別轉故。

如入楞伽伽他中說，藏識說名心，思量性名意，能了諸境相是說名爲識。

又大乘經處處別說有第七識，故此別有。
諸大乘經是至教量，前已廣說，故不重成。

解脫經中亦別說有此第七識。如彼頌言，

染汙意恒時諸惑俱生滅，若解脫諸惑 非曾，非當有。

彼經自釋此頌義言 ， 有染汙意從無始來與四煩惱恒俱

生滅，謂我見我愛及我慢我癡。
對治道生斷煩惱已，此意從彼便得解脫。

§ VII. PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF MANAS

How do we know that Manas, the seventh consciousness, is a consciousness apart from the first six consciousnesses? We acquire this knowledge from the sacred teachings and by the exercise of logical reason.

1. ARGUMENTS DRAWN FROM SACRED TEACHINGS

1. The World-Honoured One (Bhagavat, the Buddha), in many passages of His Sutras, teaches that Citta (mind), Manas (intellection), and Vijnana (consciousness) have three different meanings: that which accumulates and produces (all things) is called Citta (mind), that which reasons or cogitates is called Manas (intellection), and that which discriminates is called Vijnana (consciousness).

These three terms apply to all the eight consciousnesses; but, in accordance with the characteristics of each of them, they apply with particular appropriateness to the three following categories respectively: The eighth is called *citta*, because in it the Bijas of all dharmas are accumulated and from it all things arise. The seventh is called *manas*, because it takes as its object the Alayavijnana and, through its perpetual intellection, regards it as Atman etc. The remaining six are called consciousness, because their functions are those of perceiving and discriminating – even though crudely, unstably, and with interruptions – the six special spheres of sense-objects.

One of the Gathas of the Lankavatara Sutra says:

> The Alayavijnana is called *citta* (mind);
> The cogitating principle is called *manas*;
> Those that can discriminate various sense-objects
> Are called *vijnanas* (consciousnesses).

Furthermore, it is said in many other Mahayana Sutras that there is a seventh consciousness. Hence this consciousness must exist, because we have proved that the Mahayana Sutras are the highest authorities.

2. Besides, a *muktakasutra*, recognized by the Lesser Vehicle, also affirms the existence of the seventh consciousness. In this Sutra, the following stanza is found:

'The defiled Manas always comes into being and perishes with the klesas; when it is emancipated from the klesas, it will not only cease to exist but will have neither a past nor a future.'

The Sutra itself gives the following commentary on this stanza:

'There is a defiled Manas, which, since before the beginning of time, has come into being and perished at the same time as the four klesas, that is, Self-belief (*atmadrsti*), Self-love (*atmasneha*), Self-conceit (*atmamana*), and Self-delusion (*atmamoha*). When the way of counteracting these klesas has been found and when these klesas have been subdued and cut off by the treading

爾時此意相應煩惱非唯現無，亦無過未，過去未來無自性故。

如是等教諸部皆有，恐厭廣文故不繁述。

二· 依隱經以理證

不共無明

已引聖教，當顯正理。

謂契經說不共無明微細恒行覆蔽眞實。
〔述記：緣起經。〕

若無此識，彼應非有。

謂諸異生，於一切分恒起迷理不共無明，覆眞實義，障聖慧眼。

如伽他說，眞義心當生，常能爲障礙，俱行一切分，謂不共無明。
〔述記：攝論。〕

是故契經說異生類，恒處長夜無明所盲，惛醉纏心曾無醒覺。

若異生位有暫不起此無明時，便違經義。

俱異生位，迷理無明有行不行，不應理故。

此依六識皆不得成，應此閒斷，彼恒染故。

許有末那，便無此失。

染意恒與四惑相應，此俱無明何名不共。

of that Way, Manas will, from that moment, attain deliverance. The klesas associated with Manas will then not only cease to exist in the present, but will have neither past nor future, because past and future have no self-nature of their own.'

We will not hold up the discussion by pointing out analogous texts from all schools.

2. AVENIKI AVIDYA

Unique or Non-common Ignorance

Now that the Scriptures have been quoted, let us apply fundamental principles and deal with the subject from the logical point of view.

The Pratityasamutpada Sutra teaches:

'The Avidya (ignorance) called *aveniki* (non-common), subtle, always active, obscures Ultimate Reality' and prevents it from being known.

If there were not this seventh consciousness, Manas, such Avidya would not exist.

1. Explanation of Sutra

The Prthagjanas as distinguished from Aryas or sages, whether their mind is good, bad or non-defined, always produce an Avidya called *aveniki*, which causes errors in the understanding of right principles, obscures Reality or Bhutatathata, and obstructs the eye of Transcendental Wisdom or Prajna.

Thus, one Gatha from the Mahayana-samparigrahasastra says:

'When the Mind of Reality is about to be born, it is always obscured and obstructed by something which actively operates at all times; it is the *aveniki* Avidya.' Thus, the Sutra says: 'The Prthagjanas always live and move in a long night, blinded by Avidya, their minds being stupefied and intoxicated and never showing any signs of awakening or sobriety.'

If it is supposed that, in the state of Prthagjana, the manifestation of this Avidya can cease for a moment, it is contradictory to the truth taught in the Sutra. It is also contradictory to suppose that the Avidya which causes errors in the perception of Transcendent Truth and which is the essence of the state of Prthagjana, can exist or cease to exist in the Prthagjana according as his thoughts are good or bad. Nor can it be established that this Avidya is dependent upon or finds support in the six consciousnesses, because, if this were the case, it would follow that, on the one hand, this Avidya would be subject to interruption (which is contrary to the Sutra and to the stanza) since the six consciousnesses are not perpetual, and, on the other hand, the six consciousnesses would at all times be defiled, which is not true.

If we admit the existence of Manas, always accompanied by *aveniki* Avidya, [and that it will be aeons before an ascetic abandons the state of Prthagjana,] all these fallacies and difficulties will disappear.

2. Explanation of the term *aveniki*

Defiled Manas is, as we have seen (in the preceding chapter on Samprayoga of Manas), at all times associated with four klesas (Self-belief, Self-delusion,

有義此俱我見慢愛非根本煩惱，名不共何失？

有義彼說理教相違，純隨煩惱中不說此三故。
此三，六十煩惱攝故。
〔述記：依瑜伽等說六根本煩惱，對法等論說十根本煩惱。〕
處處皆說染汙末那與四煩惱恒相應故。

應說四中無明是主，雖三俱起亦名不共，從無始際恒內惛迷曾不省察，癡增上故。

此俱見等應名相應，若爲主時應名不共。

如無明故，許亦無失。

有義，此癡名不共者，如不共佛法，唯此識有故。

若爾，餘識相應煩惱此識中無，應名不共。

依殊勝義立不共名，非互所無皆名不共。

謂第七識相應無明無始恒行障眞義智，如是勝用餘識所無，唯此識有，故名不共。

旣爾，此俱三亦應名不共。

無明是主，獨得此名。
或許餘三亦名不共。對餘癡故，且說無明。

Self-conceit, Self-love). The question arises: why is it that of these four klesas Self-delusion or Atman-ignorance, i.e., Avidya, is the only one that is called *aveniki* (unique or non-common)?[1]

(1) According to one opinion, Self-belief, Self-conceit and Self-love, which accompany Manas, are not primary *mulaklesas*, but secondary klesas (upaklesas). Self-delusion, i.e., Avidya, is the only klesa that is primary and fundamental. Where is the fallacy for calling it '*aveniki*?'

(2) But, according to another opinion, this explanation is contradictory to reason and the Scriptures, because these three klesas are not mentioned among the 'pure' secondary klesas (upaklesas) at all. They are included among the six or ten primary klesas (six or ten according to the Yogacharyabhumi-sastra or the Abhidharma). Furthermore, everywhere in the Scriptures it is expressly stated that defiled Manas is always associated with the four primary klesas, no mention being made anywhere that it is associated with secondary klesas.

Nevertheless, among the four klesas, Avidya, being the cause and support of the other three, is the ruler or controlling power and, as such, it is most potent and predominant. Although it is accompanied by three klesas, yet it is the only klesa that may properly be called *aveniki*; because, since before the beginning of time, this Avidya has always been stupefying and bewildering the mind, resulting in its failure to realize Ultimate Reality. This failure is entirely due to the powerful nature of Self-delusion.

The idea is suggested that belief-conceit-love (*drsti-mana-sneha*) should be called 'associates' (*samprayuktas*) when Self-delusion is the 'ruler' but that they should be called *aveniki* when they are rulers.

The answer to this suggestion is that, if it is supposed that they are rulers like Avidya, it is not wrong to call them *aveniki*.

(3) According to a third opinion, this Avidya is called *aveniki* because it is possessed by Manas only, just as the *avenikadharmas* of Buddha are so called because they belong to Buddha only.

If this is the case, says the opponent, then the *drstiparamarsas* or such other klesas belonging exclusively to a certain consciousness (Manovijnana) and lacking in the seventh (Manas), should also be called *aveniki*.

The answer is No. A dharma is called *aveniki* by reason of its singular and outstanding character and not because of its absence in certain beings or certain things. The Avidya associated with Manas has been in action at all times since before the beginning of time, impeding the manifestation of the supreme intelligence of *Bhutatathata* (Reality). Such an important function is lacking in the Avidya of the other consciousnesses. This Avidya that belongs exclusively to the seventh consciousness (Manas) is called *aveniki*.

But, then, all the three other klesas of Manas should also be called *aveniki*?

No. Because this Avidya alone is the controlling power. Even if the three other klesas also deserve this name, still it is this Avidya alone that is called *aveniki* by contrast with the *moha* (ignorance) of the sixth consciousness.

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[1] In the sense that it belongs to Manas only, not to any other consciousness.

不共無明總有二種，

一 恒行不共，餘識所無。

二 獨行不共，此識非有。

故瑜伽說無明有二，若貪等俱者名相應無明，非貪等俱者名獨行無明。

〔述記：此引教，五十八言無明有二等。〕

是主獨行唯見所斷。如契經說，諸聖有學不共無明已永斷故不造新業。

〔述記：緣起初勝法門經。〕

非主獨行亦修所斷，忿等皆通見所斷故。

恒行不共餘部所無，獨行不共此彼俱有。

三· 意識二緣

又契經說眼色爲緣生於眼識廣說乃至意法爲緣生於意識。若無此識，彼意非有。

〔述記：謂如眼識以本識及眼爲二乃至意識應有二緣。若無第七，六識爲一。〕

謂如五識，必有眼等增上不共俱有所依。

意識旣是六識中攝，理應許有如是所依。

此識若無，彼依寧有？

不可說色爲彼所依，意非色故，意識應無隨念計度二分別故。

In fact, *aveniki* Avidya is of two kinds:

(1) *Nityacarini* Avidya, perpetual, belonging to Manas only, not to any other consciousness;

(2) *Kevalacarini* Avidya, isolated, solitary, not associated with *mulaklesas*, associated only with the ten upaklesas, anger (*krodha*) etc., which are not possessed by Manas, because the Avidya of Manas is always accompanied by Self-belief etc. – This is why the Yogasastra, 58, says that there are two Avidyas. The Avidya accompanying the *mulaklesas*, covetousness etc. (of the sixth consciousness) is entitled 'associated Avidya'. That which does not accompany covetousness etc. is entitled 'solitary Avidya'.

'Solitary Avidya' is sub-divided into two kinds: a. controlling; b. non-controlling.

The controlling solitary Avidya is abandoned only by insight into transcendent Truth (*darsanaheya*). It is this kind of Avidya that is referred to in the Pratityasamutpadasutra: 'The Arya Saiksas (saints who have practised the *darsanamarga*) have absolutely cut off the *aveniki* Avidya (that is to say, the controlling solitary Avidya), and they are no longer creating new Karma.'

The non-controlling solitary Avidya (being associated with the ten upaklesas) is also of a category that is abandoned by meditation (*bhavanaheya*), because anger (*krodha*) and the other upaklesas are abandoned by meditation as well as by insight into transcendent Truth.

'Solitary' Avidya is admitted by both the Vehicles, Mahayana and Hinayana, while ('perpetual' Avidya is admitted by the Greater Vehicle (Mahayana) only.

3. THE TWO PRATYAYAS OF MANOVIJNANA

The Sutra says: 'By reason of the eyes and the colours there is born the eye-consciousness . . . ; by reason of Manas and the dharmas there is born Manovijnana.' What is this Manas, causal condition (*pratyaya*) of Manovijnana, but the seventh consciousness?

1. In reality the five consciousnesses must of necessity have an organ (*indriya*) as *pratyaya*, an organ that is the 'condition quâ agent' (*adhipatipratyaya*) which is special for each consciousness (eye for visual consciousness, and so forth) which is simultaneous with consciousness, not immediately anterior to it. Manovijnana, being comprised in the first six consciousnesses, must have a supporting basis (*asraya*) of this type. If there is no seventh consciousness, Manas, there will be no such basis.

2. [The Sthaviras say that there is within the bosom of every sentient being a Rupa, a *rupadravya*, something substantial, analogous to the eye etc., which serves as the *indriya* of Manovijnana.] It cannot be said that Manovijnana has as its support material dharmas (*rupa*), because Manas is not Rupa and also because Manovijnana, if it has Rupa as its support, would, like the first five consciousnesses, be deprived of the two *vikalpas* of memory and speculation.

[The Sautrantikas think that the five consciousnesses have no simultaneous support (*sahabhu*). They believe that it is the antecedent moment of the *indriya*

亦不可說五識無有俱有所依，彼與五根俱時而轉，如芽影故。

又識與根旣必同境，如心心所決定俱時。

總破前後

由此理趣，極成意識，如眼等識，必有不共顯自名處等無間不攝增上生所依，極成六識隨一攝故。

四· 意名

又契經說思量名意，若無此識，彼應非有。

謂若意識現在前時，等無間意已滅非有。

〔述記：第二破薩婆多等。〕

過去未來理非有故，彼思量用定不得成。
旣爾，如何說名爲意？

若謂假說，理亦不然，無正思量，假依何立？

〔述記：經部宗言過去無體假說用者。〕

若謂現在曾有思量，爾時名識，寧說爲意？

〔述記：彼經部救。或薩婆多云彼過去意於現在時曾有思量故過去名意者。〕

總結

故知別有第七末那，恒審思量正名爲意，已滅依此假立意名。

〔述記：意有二義，一思量義，二依止義。第七通有二名，過去但唯依止。體雖現無，與現依止思量之意相似，故但名意不名爲識。〕

which engenders the subsequent consciousness and that it is the same with Manovijnana. This is not correct.] It cannot be said that the five consciousnesses have no simultaneous support at all. They must have such a support, because, like the bamboo-shoot and its shadow, they exist simultaneously with the five indriyas; they take the same object as the five *indriyas* and must be simultaneous with them, like the mind and its associates (Citta and Caittas).

Conclusion

On the basis of these logical inferences, we may conclude that the perfectly-established Manovijnana, being one of the six perfectly-established consciousnesses, must, like any one of these six, have a particular support (distinct from the eighth consciousness), a support which serves as a base (*ayatana*) for its name (*mana-ayatana*), which is not comprised in the *samanantarapratyaya* ('condition quâ immediate antecedent'), but is *adhipatipratyaya* ('condition quâ agent').

This support or *asraya* is our seventh consciousness.

4. The Name of Manas

The Sutra says: 'The faculty of cogitation is called Manas', attributing to Manas a present action. What is this Manas that thinks, but the seventh consciousness?

1. [The Sarvastivadins say that the past mind is called Manas] – We say: At the moment at which Manovijnana exists, that is, at the present moment, the antecedent Manas has perished and no longer exists, because the past and the future are not real. That past Manas can no longer have any thinking activity. How can that past mind be called Manas?

2. [The Sautrantikas say: The past Manas does not exist, but one may attribute to it metaphorically some thinking activity.] – Impossible. Since this activity is not existent, how can you say metaphorically that something is being exercised?

3. [The Sautrantikas and the Sarvastivadins say: The past Manas, when it was present, had exercised this activity; then, although past, it can be called Manas.] – We say: when it was present, this so-called Manas was called consciousness (*manovijnana*, *caksurvijnana*, etc.) How can you maintain that, once past and no longer having any activity, it can be called Manas?

Conclusion

Hence there is a seventh consciousness, distinct from the six, which is perpetually 'thinking' or 'cogitating', and which, without metaphor, is called Manas. Nevertheless, one can metaphorically give the name of Manas, in imitation of the true and actual Manas, to the 'antecedent' mind [without inquiring about which of the six consciousnesses it is].

[*Manas* has two meanings: that which 'thinks' and that which 'supports'. Our Manas has both these qualifications; but the 'immediately antecedent' mind which passes away and perishes opens the way to subsequent consciousness,

五· 無想定滅盡定

又契經說，無想滅定。染意若無，彼應無別。

謂彼二定俱滅六識及彼心所體數無異。

若無染意於二定中一有一無，彼二何別？

〔述記：體數無別者，謂二定所滅者各二十二心心所法。〕

若謂加行界地依等有差別者，理亦不然，彼差別因由此有故。

此若無者，彼因亦無。
是故定應別有此意。

六· 無想有情

又契經說無想有情一期生中心心所滅，若無此識，彼應無染。

謂彼長時無六轉識，若無此意，我執便無。

非於餘處有具縛者一期生中都無我執。彼無我執應如涅槃，便非聖賢同所訶厭。

初後有故，無如是失。

〔述記：第二薩婆多等小乘救言。〕

中間長時無故，有過。

去來有故，無如是失。

which leans or depends on it for manifestation. It resembles, then, the cogitating Manas which serves as its support. In this sense, it can be called Manas.]

5. THE TWO SAMAPATTIS

The Sutra distinguishes two meditations (*samapattis*), the Asamjnisamapatti and the Nirodhasamapatt. 'Defiled Manas' does not cease in Asamjnisamapatti but ceases entirely in Nirodhasamapatti. If a defiled Manas does not exist, there should be no difference between these two *samapattis*. The idea is that in both these meditations there is cessation (*nirodha*) of the first six consciousnesses and their Caittas; the twenty-two kinds of mental properties and their nature are the same in both cases. If there is no 'defiled Manas', how can we distinguish the one *samapatti*, in which there remains the defiled Manas, from the other, in which there is no defiled Manas but only a purified Manas?

The Sarvastivadins will say that the difference between the two *samapattis* lies in the difference in the preparatory exercises (*prayoga*), in the sphere (*dhatu*) and 'land' (*bhumi*) where they are practised, and in the persons who practise them. But this explanation is inadmissible, because the cause of all these differences lies in the presence or the absence of Manas. If Manas does not exist, the cause of these differences will, likewise, not exist.

Hence, positively, this Manas must exist.

6. THE ASAMJNISATTVAS

Sentient Beings devoid of Mental Activities

The Sutra says that, for Asamjnisattvas, the mind and mental properties cease entirely throughout the period of one particular life. If there is no Manas, these beings should not be 'defiled'. The idea is that, during this long period, the first six consciousness (*pravrttivijnanas*) are lacking. If there is no Manas, Atmagraha (concept of Atman, belief in the reality of Atman) will be lacking too. We cannot say that there is some other place in which sentient beings, tied by bonds of all kinds, are, for one particular existence, entirely free from Atmagraha. [That is to say, Asamjnisattvas must have *Atmagraha*, because they are Prthagjanas like other Prthagjanas.] If they are free from Atmagraha, they should rest in a state of being similar to Nirvana and their species of existence will not be one which sages and honourable men unanimously consider with disgust.

1. The Sarvastivadins say that Samjnisattvas have mental consciousness and Atmagraha at the commencement and at the end of their life in the Asamjnisattvaloka.[1] Thus the objection will not hold water.

Let us say that it does, since Atmagraha is lacking during the very long intermediate period. Their argument is therefore fallacious.

2. The Sarvastivadins say that past and future dharmas exist; that Asamjnisattvas are defiled by their past and future klesas (vexing passions).

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[1] Asamjnisathvaloka: the fourth of the fourth Dhyana, where thinking, or the necessity for thought, has entirely ceased.

彼非現常，無故，有過。
所得無故，能得亦無。

不相應行前已遮破。
〔述記：次大衆部。〕
〔述記：經部救言。〕

藏識無故，熏習亦無。
餘法受熏，已辯非理。

故應別有染汙末那，於無想天恒起我執，由斯賢聖同訶厭彼。

（七） 我執不有失

又契經說異生善染無記心時恒帶我執。
若此無識，彼不應有。

謂異生類三性心時，雖外起諸業，而內恒執我。
由執我故，令六識中所起施等不能亡相。

故瑜伽說，染汙末那爲識依止，彼未滅時相了別縛不得解脫，末那滅已相縛解脫。
〔述記：瑜伽五十一。〕

言相縛者，謂於境相不能了達如幻事等，由斯見分相分所拘不得自在故名相縛。

In reply to this let us say that past and future dharmas are neither present nor eternal. There is the absence of Atmagraha just the same. There cannot be any 'acquisition' since the thing to be acquired does not exist. Hence the fallacy remains.

3. [The Mahasamghikas explain the defilement of the Asamjnisattvas by the presence of certain unassociated activities (*viprayukta samskaras*), the Anusayas.] We have proved that *viprayuktas* do not exist.

4. [The Sautrantikas say: 'Though there is no actual Atmagraha in the Asamjnisattvas, yet the Bijas of Atmagraha exist in a state of unconsciousness; this state admits of Atmagraha]. We have established that no dharma except Alayavijnana can receive Bijas (*vasana*). Hence, since you do not recognize the existence of Alayavijnana, you cannot affirm the existence of Bijas of Atmagraha. We have already proved that the contention that other dharmas can receive perfuming and store up Bijas is contrary to reason.

We should therefore conclude that the state of the Asamjnisattva is defiled by the action of Manas, which, in the Asamjnisattvaloka, produces Atmagraha without cessation. It is for this reason that sages and honourable men unanimously regard this state with disgust.

7. ABSENCE OF ATMAGRAHA

The Sutra teaches that a Prthagjana, no matter whether his thoughts are good, bad, or non-defined, still embraces Atmagraha. That presupposes the existence of Manas. If Manas is non-existent, such Atmagraha will, likewise be non-existent.

1. Prthagjanas have thoughts of three natures (good, bad, and non-defined). While externally producing, by the power of the first six consciousnesses, various acts of a corresponding nature, they produce, internally and in a continuous manner, through the influence of Manas, Atmagraha, adhering to their Atman. Because of this Atmagraha, all their actions through the six consciousnesses, such as their practice of the Six Paramitas, – Dana Paramita, i.e., charity, Dhyana Paramita, i.e., meditation and contemplation, etc. – are not free from *nimitta*, i.e., attachment to the image-aspect of the mind.

This is why the Yogasastra, 51, explains that defiled Manas is the supporting basis for the first six consciousnesses. As long as it is not destroyed, there is the 'binding or entrammelling of the perception-aspect (*darsanabhaga*) of the mind by the image-aspect (*nimittabhaga*)', with the result that deliverance or emancipation cannot be attained. As soon as defiled Manas is destroyed, liberation from the fetters of the image-aspect (*nimitta-bandhana*) is achieved.

In what does this enchainment of the mind consist? It consists in our inability to understand the true nature and character of external objects as having the same mode of existence as illusions and mirages. In consequence of this, the perception-aspect of the mind is fettered by the image-aspect. Being fettered, it cannot attain freedom or self-mastery.

依如是義有伽他言，如是染汙意，是識之所依，此意未滅時，識縛終不脫。

又善無覆無記心時若無我執應非有漏，

自相續中六識煩惱與彼善等不俱起故。去來緣縛理非有故。

非由他惑成有漏故。
勿由他解成無漏故。

又不可說別有隨眠是不相應現相續起由斯善等成有漏法。彼非實有，已極成故。

亦不可說從有漏種生彼善等故成有漏，彼種先無因可成有漏故。

〔述記：第三經部師等言，如無學身諸有漏識法雖不由他惑緣及過去緣縛是煩惱引，然自身中有有漏種在生此有漏法，故此善等例亦然者，不然。論主難云，彼善等種成有漏者，先無因可成有漏故。謂此善種能熏熏時，無始已來先皆不與煩惱俱有，有何所以得成有漏？〕

非由漏種彼成有漏，勿學無漏心亦成有漏故。

雖由煩惱引施等業而不俱起，故非有漏正因，以有漏言表漏俱故。

又無記業非煩惱引，彼復如何得成有漏？

然諸有漏由與自身現行煩惱俱生俱滅，互相增益，方成有漏。

由此熏成有漏法種，後時現起有漏義成。

異生既然，有學亦爾。

〔述記：異生三種既然，有學亦爾，第七未滅，有煩惱俱故。〕

It is in this sense that a stanza (gatha) reads:
'Defiled Manas is the supporting basis for consciousness. As long as it is not destroyed, the bondage of consciousness can never be broken.'

2. If we refuse to admit the perpetual existence of an Atmagraha inherent in Manas, we have to consider as non-impure or perfectly pure all thoughts that are good or non-defiled-non-defined for the following reasons:

(1) The klesas which infect the six consciousnesses of a certain series (i.e., of a certain person) cannot coexist with the good thoughts of this same series or person; these good thoughts cannot be affected by past or future klesas that do not exist.

(2) Good thoughts cannot become impure as a result of the klesas of another person, just as they cannot become pure as a result of the deliverance of another person.

(3) It cannot be said that good thoughts have become impure on account of the existence and continuous manifestation of some other Anusayas (drowsiness etc.) which are *viprayaktas*, because it has been proved that such Anusayas do not exist.

(4) Nor can it be said that good thoughts are born of impure Bijas and have therefore become impure. [The Sautrantikas, like ourselves, deny that good thoughts can be impure through the influence of past klesas, or the thoughts of others, or Anusayas considered as Viprayuktas. But they think that good thoughts are impure because they are engendered by impure Bijas.] There is no reason why Bjas of good thoughts, which have been planted by good acts, should have become impure at a moment when there were no klesas at all.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that impure Bijas are found in company with the Bijas of good thoughts, and that the good mind has consequently become impure.

There are impure Bijas in the mental series of Saints who are not yet Arhats: Does this mean that the pure thoughts of these Saints are impure? The truth is that, although thoughts of charity, of almsgiving, and other good thoughts are brought about by klesas, these klesas are not simultaneous with the thoughts; therefore they are not the direct cause of the impurity of the thoughts. The term "impure" indicates that something must be simultaneous with impurity.

(5) Furthermore, non-defined acts are not brought about by klesas. How, then, can they become impure?

3. Dharmas are rendered impure by klesas of the individual himself (not by those of other persons); by klesas in activity (not by those in the form of germs or seeds, Bijas); by those klesas which are born and perish at the same time with those dharmas and which, consequently, are in reciprocal causality with them (not by past or future klesas). Thus, by actual impure dharmas there are created (perfumed) Bijas of impure dharmas. Later on, the good dharmas, when they are born, will be impure.

As with Prthagjanas, so will it be with Saiksas (ascetics who have not yet attained Arhatship); their thoughts, even those that are good, are impure

無學有漏雖非漏俱，而從先時有漏種起故成有漏，於理無違。

由有末那恒起我執，令善等法有漏義成，此意若無，彼定非有，故知別有此第七識。

證此識有理趣甚多，隨攝大乘略述六種，諸有智者應隨信學。

然有經中說六識者，應知彼是隨轉理門。

或隨所依六根說六，而識類別實有八種。

because their Manas or seventh consciousness is defiled or tainted by Atmagraha.

The impure dharmas of Asaiksas (Arhats), although not accompanied by impurities, proceed from past impure Bijas and are, for this reason, impure. There is no contradiction here as there is in the case of the Lesser Vehicle, [in which there is no affirmation of the pre-existence of impure Bijas.]

Conclusion

Good dharmas etc. are rendered impure by a Manas which, without cessation, produces Atmagraha. If this Manas is non-existent, the good dharmas cannot be impure. Hence this seventh consciousness must exist separately.

There are numerous arguments in favour of the existence of Manas. We have set forth six of them according to the Mahayanasamgrahasastra. The wise should believe them. However, some Sutras say that there are six consciousnesses only. It should be understood that this is only an expedient way of expounding the truth to less qualified persons. Alternatively, the texts in question take into account only the six special *indriyas* or sense-organs upon which the six consciousnesses depend. In fact there are eight consciousnesses.

This ends the explanation of Manas.

BOOK IV

THE FIRST SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

前 六 識

前六識

如是已說第二能變，第三能變其相云何？

頌曰：

次第三能變，　差別有六種，
了境爲性相，　善不善俱非。

論曰：

次中思量能變識後，應辨了境能變識相。

THE SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

We have dealt with the second evolving consciousness. What are the characteristics of the third evolving consciousness?

The Stanza says:

8

Next comes the third evolving consciousness

Which is divided into six categories of discrimination.

Their nature and character consist of the perception and discrimination of spheres of objects.

They are good, bad, and neither good nor bad.

The Treatise says:

Having next dealt with the evolving consciousness of intellection, we should explain the characteristics of the evolving consciousness which perceives and distinguishes (seemingly external) objects.

第一章· 六識立名

此識差別總有六種。

隨六根境種類異故。

謂名眼識乃至意識。

隨根立名具五義故。

五謂依，發，屬，助，如根。

〔述記：謂依於根，根之所發，屬於彼根，助於彼根，如於根故。〕

雖六識身皆依意轉，然隨不共立意識名，如五識身無相濫過。

或唯依意故名意識。

辨識得名，心意非例。

或名色識乃至法識。
隨境立名順識義故，謂於六境了別名識。

色等五識唯了色等，法識通能了一切法。

§ I. NAMES OF THE SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

THESE six categories of consciousness are classified in accordance with the six sense-organs (*indriyas*) and their respective spheres of objects (*visaya*). They are known as the visual consciousness (*caksurvijnana*) and so on down to the sense-centre consciousness (*manovijnana*). [Thus the consciousnesses which distinguish by the senses the objects of the external world are of six varieties: the five senses (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch), plus a sixth faculty, the sense-centre consciousness, which unifies and coordinates the percepts derived from the five senses.]

The name of each of these consciousnesses is established by reason of the organ to which it is related, not by reason of the particular object perceived by it. This is because each organ has five values: 1. The consciousness depends on the organ for support (*asraya*); 2. the consciousness is conditioned by the condition of the organ; 3. the Bijas of the consciousness depend on the organ; 4. the consciousness assists the organ; and 5. the consciousness bears a resemblance to the organ.

Although all the six consciousnesses express themselves on the basis of Manas, yet only the sixth consciousness receives the name of Manovijnana. This is because it is named in accordance with its special point of support which is the seventh consciousness or Manas, the nature of which is not shared by the first Five. In the same way, the first Five, although all relying on Manas for support, are named in accordance with their special 'points of support', namely, the eye, the ear, etc. The characters of the consciousnesses are thus distinct, and the term 'Manovijnana' does not lend itself to confusion.

We may also say that Manovijnana is so called because it depends solely on Manas for support, whereas the first Five depend for support not only on Manas but also on the material sense-organs, the eye, the ear, etc.

The six consciousnesses are therefore named in a certain manner by reason of their points of support, i.e., by their relations with them: consciousness of the eye and so on down to the consciousness of Manas. This is not the case with the seventh and eighth consciousnesses which receive names that correspond to their particular nature: Manas by reason of its power of 'cogitation', Citta by reason of its capacity for 'accumulation'. This is why the eighth consciousness, although depending on the seventh for support, is not named Manovijnana; this is why the seventh, although depending on the eighth, Citta, for support, is not named Cittavijnana.

The six consciousnesses are also named in accordance with the objects perceived by them: consciousness of *rupas* (*rupavijnana*) and so on down to the consciousness of dharmas (*dharmavijnana*). This definition conforms to the meaning of the word consciousness or *vijnana*, that is, the perception of the six objects. The first Five – *rupa*-consciousness, sound-consciousness, etc. – perceive respectively *rupas* (colours and forms), sound, etc. The sixth, dharma-consciousness, perceives all dharmas (*rupas* etc.); or else it perceives that which,

或能了別法獨得法識名。
故六識名無相濫失。

此後隨境立六識名，依五色根未自在說，若得自在諸根互用，一根發識緣一切境，但可隨根無相濫失。

莊嚴論說，如來五根一一皆於五境轉者，且依麤顯同類境說。

〔述記：彼第二卷中菩薩品說。〕

佛地經說成所作智決擇有情心行差別起三業化作四記等，若不徧緣無此能故。

〔述記：佛地論第六廣解此義。〕
〔述記：決擇心行卽八萬四千法門。〕

然六轉識所依所緣麤顯極成故此不說。
前隨義便已說所依。此所緣境義便當說。

in a special sense, is dharmas, that is, the *dharmayatana*. This is why it receives the name of dharma-consciousness (*dharmavijnana*). The names given to the six consciousnesses are therefore suitable and proper, there being no 'spilling over' into or encroachment upon one another.

The designation of the six consciousnesses in accordance with the objects perceived by them holds good as long as we are considering the state in which mastery of the five material sense-organs has not yet been perfected. When mastery has been achieved (after the first stage of Self-realization, according to some Schools; or in the state of Buddhahood, according to others) the activity of the sense-organs is interchangeable. In other words, the sense-organs can exchange their functions: the consciousness produced by one organ, no matter which, can reach and perceive all objects of the senses. In this case, we can no longer designate the consciousnesses in accordance with the objects perceived by them; in order to avoid confusion, we can only name them in accordance with the organs through which they manifest themselves.

The Sutralamkara, Book II, says that each and every one of the five sense-organs of the Tathagatha is active in relation to the five objects (colour, sound, smell, taste, and touch). If the text expresses itself in this way, using the phrase 'in relation to the five objects', it is because it throws all the emphasis on 'gross-manifest' objects, i.e., objects of the same species as those which the material organs perceive. But the *Buddha-bhumisutra*, Book VI, treating of the 'Perfect Achievement Wisdom' (*krtyanusthanajana*), i.e., the 'transcendental wisdom attained by the transmutation of the first five consciousnesses', says that this wisdom (*jnana*) knows the eighty-four thousand different mental states of sentient beings, produces three kinds of occult powers of thought, word, and deed, and makes four kinds of declarations. If its activity were not universal (i.e., extending throughout the world of sense and the world of thought), it would not be capable of these feats.

THE supporting bases (*asraya*) and the objects (*alambana*) of the six evolving consciousnesses (Pravrttivijnanas), being gross and manifest, are well understood and recognized by both Mahayana and Hinayana Schools. This is why this section of the Treatise does not specify them. We have had occasion to speak of their *asraya*; we shall have occasion to speak of their *alambana*.

第二章· 六識性相

次言了境爲性相者，雙顯六識自性行相，識以了境爲自性故，即復用彼爲行相故。

由斯兼釋所立別名，能了別境名爲識故。

如契經說，眼識云何？謂依眼根了別諸色，廣說乃至意識云何？謂依意根了別諸法。

彼經且說不共所依，未轉依位，見分所了。

餘所依了如前已說。

§ II. 'ESSENTIAL NATURE' AND 'MODE OF ACTIVITY'

The next sentence in the Stanza reads:

> The nature and character (of the first six consciousnesses) consist of the perception and discrimination of spheres of objects.

In expressing himself in this way, the author indicates, in a twofold manner, both the essential nature (*svabhava*) and the characteristics (*akara*) of the six consciousnesses. He means to say that all these six consciousnesses have the perception and discrimination of objects as their essential nature, and they make use of this same perception and discrimination as their main characteristic. This enables us to understand why these special names are established and given to the first six consciousnesses in contradistinction to the seventh and the eighth. They are called consciousnesses because they perceive or distinguish the six spheres of objects.

As the Sutra says: 'What is visual consciousness? – It is that consciousness which, depending on the visual organ for support, perceives and distinguishes various colours and forms (rupas) . . . What is Manovijnana? – It is that consciousness which, depending on the Manas-organ for support, perceives and distinguishes all dharmas.'

This Sutra indicates only the special 'points of support' of the five consciousnesses prior to their transmutation. Further, it indicates only that which is perceived by the *darsanabhaga* (the perception aspect) of each consciousness. As regards the other points of support and the other objects of perception (the *svasamvittibhaga* and the *darsanabhaga* of the Five), they have already been explained in previous sections.

第三章· 三性門

此六轉識何性攝耶？
謂善不善俱非性攝。
俱非者謂無記，非善不善故名俱非。
能爲此世他世順益故名爲善，人天樂果雖於此世能爲順益非於他世故不名善。
能爲此世他世違損故名不善，惡趣苦果雖於此世能爲違損非於他世故非不善。

於善不善益損義中不可記別故名無記。

此六轉識若與信等十一相應，是善性攝。
與無慚等十法相應，不善性攝。
俱不相應無記性攝。

有義六識三性不俱，同外門轉互相違故。
五識必由意識導引俱生同境成善染故。
若許五識三性俱行，意識爾時應通三性，便違正理，故定不俱。

瑜伽等說藏識一時與轉識相應三性俱起者，彼依多念，如說一心非一生滅，無相違過。
〔述記：等取顯揚等。〕

有義六識三性容俱，率爾等流眼等五識或多或少容俱起故。

§ III. MORAL SPECIES OF THE SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

To which moral species do the six consciousnesses belong?

As is taught in the Stanza, the six consciousnesses are good, bad, and neither the one nor the other. The expression 'neither the one nor the other' means 'non-defined', i.e., neither good nor bad.

We call 'good' (*kusala*) that which is profitable and beneficial to the present life and to future lives. The 'joyful fruit', i.e., human and celestial pleasure, although profitable to the present life, is not profitable to lives to come. [It may cause decay or disaster in future lives.] Hence we do not call it good.

We call 'bad' (*akusala*) that which is detrimental and disadvantageous to the present life and to future lives. The 'sorrowful fruit', i.e., physical and mental suffering due to 'bad destinies', although harmful to the present life, is not harmful to future lives. Hence we do not call it bad.

We call 'non-defined' (*avyakrta*) that which cannot be defined as good or bad, profitable or disadvantageous.

The six consciousnesses, when they are associated with the eleven good Caittas (*sraddha*, i.e., faith etc.) are comprised in the 'good' species; they are comprised in the 'bad' species when they are associated with the ten Caittas of which shamelessness (*ahrikya*) is the first; dissociated from both of these species, they are comprised in the 'non-defined' species.

1. Can the six consciousness, at a given moment, be of three natures, – good, bad, and non-defined?

According to one opinion, that is impossible. For, when the Six arise together and simultaneously at the perception of external objects, the three natures, if they manifest themselves all at the same time, will be in contradiction to one another. Another reason is that the five consciousnesses are led by Manovijnana, are born with it, have the same object as it has, and are, in consequence, good or defiled by virtue of it. If we admit that the Five can simultaneously be of different natures, we have to admit that Manovijnana is of three different natures at one given moment, which is absurd. Hence the six consciousnesses cannot be of three natures at one given moment.

It is true that, according to the Yogasastra and the Vikhyapana, 'the Alayavijnana manifests itself at one single moment with the three natures (good, bad, etc.) in association with the Pravrttivijnanas (i.e., the first seven consciousnesses'. But this text must be understood as signifying numerous moments of the Alayavijnana, just as, when the Yogasastra mentions 'one thought', it means, not one single production and destruction, but numerous productions and destructions. [What is involved are numerous homogeneous moments constituting one thought.] There is therefore no contradiction between the Yogasastra and the above-explained theory.

2. According to another opinion, the six consciousnesses of three different

五識與意雖定俱生，而善性等不必同故，前所設難於此唐捐。

故瑜伽說若遇聲緣從定起者，與定相應意識俱轉餘耳識生。

非唯彼定相應意識能取此聲。

若不爾者，於此音聲不領受故，不應出定。

非取聲時即便出定，領受聲已若有希望後時方出。

在定耳識率爾聞聲理應非善，未轉依者率爾墮心定無記故。

由此誠證，五俱意識非定與五善等性同。
〔述記：若爾，何故解深密經及七十六說五識同時意識同緣？〕

諸處但言五俱意亦識緣五境，不說同性。
〔述記：何故雜集論第七說三摩呬多位餘識無耶？〕

雜集論說等引位中五識無者，依多分說。
〔述記：問，五爲所引意是能引，所引三性旣俱，能引意識應通三性。〕

natures can coexist. For the first Five of different natures can be born at the same time, either simultaneously or in a continuous series, either in larger numbers or in smaller numbers.

Although the Five must necessarily be born with Manovijnana, yet it does not follow that they must be all of the same nature, good, bad, etc., as Manovijnana. Since Manovijnana need not be of the same ethical nature as the five consciousnesses, the preceding argument that it must be of different natures to correspond to the different natures of the Five is sheer waste of effort and energy.

This is why the Yogasastra, 63, expresses itself as follows:

'In the case of the ascetic who, on hearing a noise, gets up from his meditation, there is born another consciousness, the auditory or ear-consciousness, which is simultaneous with the good-natured Manovijnana associated with the meditation. It is not this Manovijnana itself which apprehends the noise; it is the auditory consciousness that apprehends it. If an auditory consciousness does not manifest itself in the course of the meditation, no noise will be heard and the ascetic will not emerge from his meditation. It is not at the moment when the noise is heard that the ascetic rises from his meditation; it is after the noise has been heard and when curiosity or the hope of fulfilling a certain purpose has arisen that he comes out of his meditation.'

The auditory consciousness (*srotravijnana*) which, in the course of the meditation, 'suddenly' hears the noise cannot be good, because, as long as the 'revolution' or 'inner transmutation' of the ascetic has not taken place, all 'sudden' percepts, concepts or thoughts are necessarily non-defined.

This argument proves that Manovijnana associated with the five consciousnesses is not necessarily of the same nature (good, bad, etc.) as the Five. [In the course of meditation Manovijnana is good; the auditory consciousness is non-defined. It may be concluded that, in the state of non-meditation, the same disharmony between Manovijnana and the five consciousnesses may present itself.]

[If this is the case, why is it that the Sandhinirmocanasutra and the Yogasastra, 76, say that the five consciousnesses and Manovijnana perceive the same object at the same time?]

The texts only say that Manovijnana, simultaneously with the Five, perceives the same object as the Five. They do not say that it is of the same nature as the Five.

[If this is the case, why is it that the Tsa-tsi Sastra says that, in the state of Samahita, the five consciousnesses are entirely lacking?]

It is true that the Tsa-tsi Sastra affirms that the five consciousnesses are entirely lacking during meditation. This declaration applies to a large number of cases, but not to all.

[But, one may argue, the five consciousnesses are led by Manovijnana; Manovijnana attracts them. If the Five are of three different natures, Manovijnana that leads them should at the same time be of three different natures.]

If the five consciousnesses that arise with Manovijnana are of three different natures (some good, some bad, some non-defined), Manovijnana will be of the

若五識中三性俱轉，意隨偏注與彼性同，無偏注者便無記性，故六轉識三性容俱。

得自在位唯善性攝，佛色心等道諦攝故，已永滅除戲論種故。

same nature as that consciousness whose object it perceives with special attention. If it does not pay special attention to any one of the objects, [that is to say, if it perceives simultaneously all objects or *ayatanas*, *rupas* etc.], it will be non-defined. [The non-defined nature is in contradiction neither with the good nor with the bad: in other words, the non-defined Manovijnana can be associated with good or bad visual consciousness.]

Hence the six consciousnesses can, at the same time, present all these three natures.

They are exclusively good after the 'revolution', when 'Masterhood' is attained, because the Rupindriyas and the Citta of the Buddha are included in the *margasatva*. That is to say, they are integrated in the Path; because the Buddha has eliminated for ever all Bijas of frivolous discourses and speculations (*prapancabijas*).

第四章· 相應心所

六識與幾心所相應？

頌曰：

此心所徧行， 別境善煩惱，
隨煩惱不定， 皆三受相應。

論曰：

此六轉識總與六位心所相應，謂徧行等。

一· 心所總名

恒依心起，與心相應，繫屬於心，故名心所。

如屬我物立我所名。

心於所緣唯取總相，心所於彼亦取別相。

助成心事得心所名，如畫師資作模填彩。

故瑜伽說識能了別事之總相，作意了此所未了相，即諸心所所取別相。

〔述記：彼第三說識能了別事之總相不言取別，以是主故。〕

§ IV. SAMPRAYUKTAS

Associated Mental Activities

WITH how many Caittas (mental properties) are the six consciousnesses associated?

The Stanza says:

9

They are associated with the universal caittas,

The special caittas, the good caittas, the klesas (vexing
passions or mental qualities),

The upaklesas (secondary vexing passions or mental qualities),
and the Aniyatas (indeterminate mental associates).

They are all associated with the three sensations (Vedanas)
[joy, sorrow, and indifference].

The Sastra says:
These six Pravrttivijnanas, with regard to all possibilities, are associated with Caittas of six classes, the Universals, etc.

1. CAITTAS (MENTAL ASSOCIATES) IN GENERAL

The mental associates (Caittas) are so called because they always arise in dependence upon the mind (Citta), are associated w th the mind, and are subordinate to and affiliated with the mind. Just as one uses the word 'mine' (*atmiya*) to denote that which belongs to the 'I' (Atman), so one gives the name of 'mental associates' (Caittas) to those mental properties which belong to the mind (Citta).

In perceiving an object (*alambana*), the Citta perceives only its 'general' character; the Caittas perceive also its special characteristics. [The consciousness perceives the object as a whole; each Caitta perceives what the consciousness perceives, plus the special characteristics of the object.]

The Caittas collaborate with the Citta and accomplish its purpose; hence they receive the name of Caittas. This is analogous to the case in which the master-painter traces the outline while his pupil fills in the colours.

This is why the Yogasastra, 3, says: 'Consciousness perceives the general character of the object. Attention (Manaskara) perceives the general character as well as those characteristics which have not yet been perceived by the consciousness, that is to say, the special characteristics which can only be perceived by the Caittas.

觸能了此可意等相，受能了此攝受等相。
想能了此言說因相，思能了此正因等相，故作意等名心所法。

此表心所亦緣總相。

餘處復說欲亦能了可樂事相，勝解亦了決定事相，念亦能了串習事相，定慧亦了德失等相。

由此於境起善染等。

諸心所法皆於所緣兼取別相。

心所種類差別

雖諸心所名義無異，而有六位種類差別。
謂徧行有五，別境亦五，善有十一，煩惱有六，隨煩惱有二十，不定有四。
如是六位合五十一。

一切心中定可得故。

緣別別境而得生故。

唯善心中可得生故。

性是根本煩惱攝故。

唯是煩惱等流性故。

於善染等皆不定故。

然瑜伽論合六爲五，煩惱隨煩惱俱是染故。

〔述記：彼論第三合六爲五，根本及隨俱是染故合爲一也。〕

'Mental contact (Sparsa) perceives the agreeable characteristics etc. of an object. Sensation (Vedana) perceives the exhilarating characteristics etc. Conception or ideation (Samjna) perceives or apprehends those characteristics which are the cause of speech. Voliton (Cetana) perceives those characteristics which are the cause of right action etc. This is why attention, mental contact, etc., receive the name of Caittadharmas.'

This shows that the Caittas, besides apprehending the special characteristics of an object, also perceive its general character.

Elsewhere (in the Madhyantavibhaga) it is said: 'Desire (Chanda) also perceives the desirable characteristics of an object; resolve (Adhimoksa), those characteristics of a thing that are definitely determined; memory (Smrta), those characteristics of a thing that have been experienced and become familiar; meditation (Samadhi) and discernment (Prajna), those characteristics that are virtues or defects.'

By reason of these functions, the above-mentioned ten dharmas (five universal and five special Caittas), in relation to an object, produce ten good Caittas, thirty-two defiled ones, and four indeterminate ones.

All these Caittadharmas, in perceiving objects, perceive not only their general character but also their special characteristics.

Six Classes of Caittas

Although all the Caittas are similarly designated, all of them being called 'Caittas', and although they all mean the same thing, namely, mental properties, yet they are divided into six different classes: there are five universal Caittas, five special ones, eleven good ones, six klesas, twenty upaklesas, and four indeterminate Caittas, thus making a total of fifty-one.

1. Universal Caittas, which are definitely found with all the eight consciousnesses.

2. Special Caittas, which are born when perceiving certain special characteristics of an object.

3. Good Caittas, which are born only with a good Citta.

4. Klesas, which, by their very nature, are comprised in the *mulaklesas*, i.e., fundamental klesas.

5. Upaklesas, which, while being of the same nature as the klesas, are the efflux of those klesas.

6. Indeterminate Caittas, which can be found with a good Citta, a defiled one, etc., but which cannot be determined as belonging either to the one or to the other.

The Yogasastra, 3, combines the six categories to form five, because the klesas and upaklesas are all defiled dharmas. Besides, it explains the differences among these five categories of Caittas in accordance with the four 'alls': that

復以四一切辯五差別，謂一切性及地時俱。

五中徧行具四一切，別境唯有初二一切。

〔述記：徧行具四，無處無故。別境有初二，不緣一切境，亦非相續，非心有時有故無時也。又此未必竝生，無俱。〕

善唯有一，謂一切地。染四皆無。
不定唯一，謂一切性。

由此五位種類差別。

二． 三受相應

此六轉識易脫不定，故皆容與三受相應，皆領順違非二相故。

領順境相適悅身心說名樂受，領違境相逼迫身心說名苦受，領中容境相於身於心非逼非悅名不苦樂受。

如是三受或各分二，五識相應說名身受別依身故。
意識相應說名心受唯依心故。

又三皆通有漏無漏，苦受亦由無漏起故。

或各分三，謂見所斷修所斷非所斷故。

is, associated with consciousnesses of *all* natures; existing in *all* bhumis; existing at *all* times; and arising *all* together whenever any one of them arises.

Universal Caittas possess all the four 'alls': (they are associated with good, bad, and non-defined consciousnesses; they exist in all bhumis (the nine bhumis, kamadhatu etc.); they exist at all times (existing whenever there is mind in manifestation; being continuous since before the beginning of time; perceiving all objects); and they are all present whenever one of them is present.

Special Caittas possess only the first two 'alls': (they do not perceive all objects; they are not continuous; they do not necessarily arise when there is mind in manifestation; they do not arise all together).

Good Caittas possess only one 'all': (they are found in *all* bhumis).

Defiled Caittas possess none of the four 'alls'.

Indeterminate Caittas possess only one (the first) of the four 'alls'; it is found with consciousnesses of *all* natures, good, bad, and non-defined.

In this way the five categories of Caittas are differentiated from one another.

2. THE THREE SENSATIONS (VEDANAS)

The six Pravrttivijnanas, being subject to interruption and transformation and being undetermined (that is to say, the aspects of pleasure, displeasure, and indifference are easily transformed from one to the other), can be associated with the three 'sensations' or Vedanas, because they all receive and experience the agreeable, the disagreeable, and the neutral (i.e., neither the one nor the other) characteristics of objects.

The experience of the agreeable characteristics of an object, comforting the body and gladdening the heart, is called 'joyful sensation' (*sukha vedana*). The experience of the disagreeable characteristics of an object, disconcerting and molesting the body and the mind, is called 'sorrowful sensation' (*duhkha vendana*). The experience of the neutral characteristics, producing neither comfort nor discomfort to the body and the mind, is called 'sensation that is neither joyful nor sorrowful' (*aduhkhasukha vedana*).

1. Each of these three sensations is of two kinds: (1) associated with the five consciousnesses, it is called 'corporeal' sensation, because it depends for support not only on the mind but also on that part of the body (the five sense-organs) which is its special support; (2) associated with Manovijnana, it is called 'mental' sensation, because it depends for support solely on the mind.

2. All the three sensations can be 'impure' or 'pure', because sorrowful sensations can also be born by reason of pure dharmas.

3. Or else each of them can be divided into three kinds, namely, (1) sensation that is cut off by 'insight into Transcendent Truth' (*darsanaheya*); (2) sensation that is cut off by 'meditation and self-cultivation' (*bhavanaheya*); and (3) sensation that is neither the one nor the other.

又學無學非二爲三。

或總分四，謂善不善有覆無覆二無記受。

有義三受容各分四，五識俱起任運貪癡，
純苦趣中任運煩惱，不發業者是無記故。

彼皆容與苦根相應。

瑜伽論說，若任運生一切煩惱皆於三受現行可得，若通一切識身者偏與一切根相應，不通一切識身者意地一切根相應。

〔述記：五十九說。〕

雜集論說，若欲界繫任運煩惱發惡行者亦是不善，所餘皆是有覆無記，故知三受各容分四。

(一)　五受相應

或總分五，謂苦樂憂喜捨。
三中苦樂各分二者，逼悅身心相各異故。

〔述記：謂在五識即楚利逼切明利適悅名苦樂，在意稍降逼切如可適悅名憂喜，受身心異相也。〕

由無分別有分別故，尤重輕微有差別故。

〔述記：又在五識逼迫適悅俱無分別名爲苦樂，意有分別逼迫適悅故是憂喜。又在五識逼迫適悅二俱麤重故名苦樂。在意輕微故名憂喜。〕

不苦不樂不分二者，非逼非悅相無異故，無分別故，平等轉故。

4. Again, they can be *saiksa* (i.e., sensations of ascetics who are still acquiring knowledge), *asaiksa* (i.e., sensations of those who, having already cast off illusion, are no longer under the necessity of learning), and *naivasaiksanasaiksa* (i.e., sensations of those who are neither *saiksas* nor *asaiksas*).

5. Or else they can be divided into four classes: good sensations, bad sensations, defiled-non-defined sensations, and non-defiled-non-defined sensations.

According to one opinion, the three sensations can present all the above-mentioned four natures. Let us consider here the defiled non-defined sorrowful sensations.

The spontaneous greed (*raga*) and the spontaneous ignorance (*moha*) associated with the five consciousnesses [excluding anger (*dvesa*) which is always bad] and, in the destinies of exclusive suffering, the spontaneous klesas (associated with Manovijnana): all these, not producing any action, are non-defined; all these can be associated with sorrowful sensation (*duhkhendriya*).

The Yogasastra, 59, says: 'All klesas, when they are spontaneous, manifest themselves in association with the three sensations [sorrowful (*duhkha*), joyful (*sukha*), and indifferent (*upeksa*)]. Those klesas which extend to all consciousnesses can be associated with all Indriyas (i.e., sensations); those which do not extend to all consciousnesses (e.g. 'I and mine' views and klesas proper to Manas) can be associated with all the Indriyas (sensations) of the domain of Manas.'

The Tsa-tsi Sastra says: 'The spontaneous klesas of Kamadhatu, which produce evil actions, are also evil (i.e., not good). All the others are defiled-non-defined.'

Thus, the three sensations can be of four natures.

(1) The Five Sensations

Sensations are also divided into five categories: sorrow (*duhkha*), joy (*sukha*), grief (*daurmanasya*), delight (*saumanasya*), and indifference (*upeksa*). This means that sensations of sorrow and joy are sub-divided into two categories. Sorrow is divided into sorrow and grief; and joy, into joy and delight according as they affect the body or the mind (those affecting the body are sorrow and joy; those affecting the mind are grief and delight); according as they are accompanied or not by mental discrimination, *vikalpa*, (those accompanied by mental discrimination are grief and delight; those not so accompanied are sorrow and joy); and according as they are heavy or light, (heavy sensations are sorrow and joy; light sensations are grief and delight). [Therefore agreeable sensations are joy and delight while disagreeable sensations are sorrow and grief.]

As regards the sensation of indifference which is neither agreeable nor disagreeable, it is of only one species, because there is no difference in the action which it exercises (neither comforting nor disconcerting); because this sensation is always free from mental discrimination; because it always arises on an equal basis (neither heavy nor light).

諸適悅受五識相應恒名爲樂。

意識相應，若在欲界初二靜慮近分名喜，但悅心故。

若在初二靜慮根本名樂名喜，悅身心故。

若在第三靜慮近分根本名樂，安靜尤重無分別故。

諸逼迫受五識相應恒名爲苦。

意識俱者，有義唯憂逼迫心故，諸聖教說意地慽受名憂根故。

瑜伽論說，生地獄中諸有情類異熟無間有異熟生苦憂相續。

〔述記：六十六等論有此文。〕

又說地獄尋伺憂俱，一分鬼趣傍生亦爾。

〔述記：瑜伽第五五趣分別尋伺，說地獄中尋伺憂俱。〕

故知意地尤重慽受尚名爲憂，況餘輕者。

〔述記：下護法等第二師說，文中有五。〕

標宗

有義通二，人天中者恒名爲憂，非尤重故，傍生鬼界名憂名苦，雜受純受有輕重故。

捺落迦中唯名爲苦，純受尤重無分別故。

瑜伽論說，若任運生一切煩惱皆於三受現行可得，廣說如前。

〔述記：此五十九文。〕

引證

又說俱生薩迦耶見唯無記性，彼邊執見應知亦爾。

〔述記：五十八云俱生我見唯無記性，彼文雖無邊見，例必應爾。〕

此俱苦受非憂根攝，論說憂根非無記故。

又瑜伽說，地獄諸根餘三現行定不成就，純苦鬼界傍生亦爾。

〔述記：五十七說。〕

1. The sensation which comforts and gladdens, associated with the five consciousnesses always receives the name of joy.

If the sensation is associated with Manovijnana and manifests itself in Kamadhatu and in the preparatory meditations of the first two Dhyanas, it is called delight because it gladdens the mind only.

Associated with Manovijnana and manifesting itself in the fundamental and more advanced meditations of the two Dhyanas, it is called joy and delight because it comforts and gladdens both the body and the mind.

Associated with Manovijnana and manifested both in the preparatory and in the more advanced meditations of the third Dhyana, it is called joy because it is tranquil, heavy, and free from discrimination.

2. The sensation that disconcerts and oppresses, associated with the five consciousnesses, is always called sorrow or distress.

Associated with Manovijnana, according to one opinion, it is exclusively grief, because it perturbs the mind, and because the sacred texts say that the misery in the realm of Manas is called 'sensation of grief'.

The Yogasastra, 66, says: 'In the case of those sentient beings born in Hell, as soon as the *vipaka* (that is to say, the eighth consciousness, which is solely 'retributive') has begun to manifest itself in uninterrupted continuity, there commences, produced by this *vipaka*, a continuous series of sorrow and grief (sorrow of the first five consciousnesses and grief of Manovijnana).'

The same treatise, 55, says that 'infernal beings are endowed with "reflection-investigation-grief": it is the same with some ghosts and animals.'

We know therefore that the oppressive miserable sensations of the realm of Manas receive the name of grief; how much more should the light miserable sensations be so called!

According to another opinion (Dharmapala), the miserable sensations of the realm of Manas fall into two categories, sorrow and grief. In the case of heavenly spirits and human beings, they are called grief, because they are not oppressive. In the case of animals and ghosts, they are called sorrow-grief. The sensation of exclusive suffering is sorrow; that of mingled suffering is grief. The former state is oppressive; the latter, light. In the *Narakas* (hells), it is called sorrow, because in this realm of exclusive suffering, it is oppressive and free from discrimination.

In reality, the Yogasastra, 59, says: 'The three sensations can be in activity with all spontaneous klesas'. Details of this idea have been explained in a preceding section.

Again it says (Book 58): 'The inborn "I and mine" view (*satkayadrsti*) is non-defined; so are also all inborn "one-sided extreme views" (*antagrahadrsti*). The sorrowful sensation accompanying these false views cannot be comprised in the category of grief, because, according to the treatise, grief is never non-defined.'

Again, in Book 57, it says: 'In the case of infernal beings, the three other sensations (*indriyas*) are definitely not in action. This is likewise true of ghosts and animals of exclusive suffering.' – What are these three other sensations?

立理

餘三定是樂喜憂根，以彼必成現行捨故。

〔述記：餘三定是樂憂喜等，所以者何，以彼定有七八二識相續不斷定成現捨受。〕

豈不客捨，彼定不成？

〔述記：反詰。此前師問,此辨六識故無客捨,不約八識作法爲論。〕

寧知彼文唯說客受？

〔述記：後師返問。〕

應不說彼定成意根，彼六客識有時無故。

不應彼論唯說客受，通說意根，無異因故。

又若彼論依客受說，如何說彼定成八根？

若謂五識不相續故，定說憂根爲第八者，死生悶絶寧有憂根？

有執苦根爲第八者，亦同此破。

設執一形爲第八者，理亦不然，形不定故，彼惡業招容無形故。

彼由惡業令五根門恒受苦故定成眼等，必有一形於彼何用？

二十二根：1.眼根；2.耳根；3.鼻根；4.舌根；5.身根；6.意根；7.女根；8.男根；9.命根；10.苦根；11.樂根；12.憂根；13.喜根；14.捨根；15.信根；16.精進根；17.念根；18.定根；19.慧根；20.未知當知根；21.已知根；22.具知根。

They are joy, pleasure, and grief. [Indifference cannot be one of them], because those beings are definitely endowed with that sensation in action.[1]

Objection: – Is it not true that in those beings the adventitious indifference that is associated with the six consciousnesses is not in activity?

Answer: – How do you know that the passage in the Sastra in question treats solely of this adventitious indifference? It cannot be a question of this indifference. You must recognize the presence of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses also and interpret the sensation of indifference in question as the sensation of these two consciousnesses. If you do not recognize their existence in those infernal beings, then you cannot say that those beings are definitely endowed with the *indriya* of Manas, because the six adventitious consciousnesses of those beings are sometimes lacking. One cannot admit that the Treatise, attributing the *indriya* of Manas to the beings in question, treats only of the adventitious sensation of the six consciousnesses, while treating at the same time of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. There is no special reason at all why it should treat the subject in that way. It must therefore be understood that both the seventh and the eighth consciousnesses are active in infernal beings and that the sensation of indifference of these two consciousnesses is one of the active indriyas.

And then again, if the Treatise has in view only an adventitious sensation, how can we say that infernal beings must necessarily have eight *indriyas* (the five sense-organs, Manas, the life principle, and indifference)?

If one replies that the eighth *indriya* is grief, because the five consciousnesses do not form continuous series, we will ask how there can be grief at death, at birth, in a swoon, and at moments of unconsciousness when Manovijnana itself, associated with grief, has ceased to function?

We shall ask the same question if one says that the eighth *indriya* is sorrow because the body-consciousness forms a continuous series.

The opinion held by someone that the eighth indriya is one of the sexual organs is just as illogical, because infernal beings do not necessarily possess this kind of organ. In consequence of past evil actions, they can be sexless. By reason of these actions, they must at all times suffer agonies by the five sense-organs: that is why they are endowed with the organs of vision, of audition, of smell, of taste, and of contact. In such circumstances what is the

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[1] In order to understand these few paragraphs of the Text aright, it is necessary to set forth the names of the twenty-two *indriyas* (roots, organs, or powers) and say a few words about them. They are: 1. eye-root, *caksurindriya*; 2. ear-root, *srotrendriya*; 3. nose-root, *ghranendriya*; 4. tongue-root, *jihvendriya*; 5. body-root, *kayendriya*; 6. manas-root, *manas*, manaindriya (the above are the six *indriyas*); 7. female organ, *strindriya*; 8. male organ, *purusendriya*; 9. life, *jivitendriya*; 10, suffering (or pain or sorrow), *duhkendriya*; 11. joy, *sukhendriya*; 12. grief, *daurmanasyendriya*; 13. delight, *saumanasyendriya*; 14. indifference, *upeksendriya* (from 10 to 14 they are the five vedanas); 15. belief, *sraddhendriya*; 16. zeal, *viryendriya*; 17. memory, *smrtindriya*; 18. meditation, or trance, *samadhindriya*; 19. discernment, *prajnendriya*; 20. the power for learning (the Four Noble Truths) *anajnatamajnasyamindriya*; 21. the power of having learned (them), *ajnendriya*; 22. the power of perfect knowledge (of them), *ajnatavindriya* (these three are called the pure *indriyas*).

According to Dharmapala, eight of these *indriyas* are definitely active and three of them definitely non-active in sentient beings that are suffering in Naraka (Hell). The eight active *indriyas* are the first six (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and Manas), the 9th (life), and the 14th (indifference); the three non-active *indriyas* are the 11th, 12th, and 13th (joy, grief, and delight).

According to another opinion, the eighth active *indriya* is not indifference but sorrow. Hence the arguments set forth in the Text.

非於無閒大地獄中可有希求婬欲事故。

由斯第八定是捨根，第七八識捨相應故。

如極樂地意悅名樂無有喜根，故極苦處意迫名苦無有憂根。

故餘三言定憂喜樂。

會違

餘處說彼有等流樂。應知彼依隨轉理說，或彼通說餘雜受處，無異熟樂名純苦故。

〔述記：此會攝論，應知彼論隨小乘中薩婆多等說。若依大乘解彼文云，或彼通說餘二趣雜受處有等流樂，非極苦地獄中有等流樂，彼無異熟樂名純苦處故。〕

然諸聖教意地慼受名憂根者，依多分說，或隨轉門，無相違過。

〔述記：又對法第七等說。〕

瑜伽論說生地獄中諸有情類異熟無間有異熟生苦憂相續。又說地獄尋伺憂俱一分鬼趣傍生亦爾者，亦依隨轉門。

〔述記：第一解亦隨轉，謂大衆部……… 或依上座部……… 或依經部………或依彌沙塞部。〕

又彼苦根意識俱者，是餘憂類假說爲憂。

〔述記：彼地獄等苦根意識俱者，與餘雜受處及人天中憂根相似，亦在意識逼迫受故，說彼苦根爲憂，實非憂受。〕

或彼苦根損身心故，雖苦根攝而亦名憂。
如近分喜益身心故，雖是喜根而亦名樂。顯揚論等具顯此義。

〔述記：五十七對法第七皆與彼同。〕

use of possessing a sexual organ? In the great Avichi Hell, where pain and distress, birth and death, continue without intermission, there cannot be any desire for sexual intercourse.

Hence the eighth *indriya* which functions actively in infernal beings is definitely the *indriya* of indifference, because the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are associated with indifference.

Likewise, in the land of extreme joy – i.e., in the third Dhyana – the sensation which exhilarates Manas is called joy, there being no indriya of delight (associated with Manovijnana). Likewise, in the realm of extreme suffering, the sensation which agonizes Manas is called sorrow, there being no indriya of grief (associated with Manovijnana).

In consequence, the three non-active *indriyas* mentioned in the above text are grief, delight and joy.

It is true that certain texts (the Samgraha) say that infernal beings experience a 'joy of efflux'. This declaration is either a 'concession' made in conformity with the Sarvastivadin theory or (if it conforms to the Greater Vehicle) a reference to the two realms of mingled sensations (animals and ghosts). In these realms suffering is mingled with 'efflux-joy'. They are, in fact, not realms of exclusive suffering. The reason why they are so called is that the sentient beings there experience no 'retribution-joy' at all.

It is also true that, according to the Abhidharma, the miserable sensation of the realm of Manas receives the name of grief: this denomination applies to the majority of cases. (It is entirely correct in so far as it concerns human beings and heavenly spirits, and partially correct in so far as it concerns ghosts and animals). On the other hand, it may be a concession in conformity with the Sarvastivadin theory.

Likewise, the affirmations, quoted in preceding paragraphs, of the Yogasastra, namely, 'In the case of those sentient beings born in Hell, as soon as the *vipaka* (that is to say, the eighth consciousness, which is solely 'retributive') has begun to manifest itself in uninterrupted continuity, there commences, produced by this *vipaka*, a continuous series of sorrow (of the first five consciousnesses), and grief (of Manovijnana)', and 'Infernal beings are endowed with reflection-investigation-sorrow; it is the same with some ghosts and animals', are concessions [in conformity with the theories of the Mahasamghikas, the Sthaviras, the Sautrantikas, and the Mahisasakas].

Furthermore, it may be observed that the sensation of sorrow of infernal beings, associated with Manovijnana, is of the same kind as the grief due to other 'destinies' (heavenly spirits, human beings, and ghosts-animals of mingled sensations); one can therefore, incorrectly, call it grief.

Again, in the case of infernal beings, the indriya of sorrow injures the mind (associated with grief) as well as the body (associated with sorrow): hence, although comprised in the indriya of sorrow, it is called, incorrectly, grief. Likewise, the delight of the two preliminary Dhyanas, inasmuch as it benefits the body as well as the mind, is called joy although it is delight. Such is the doctrine of the Vikhyapana and the Yogasastra, 57.

Why is it wrong to say that the first two preliminary Dhyanas possess joy?

然未至地定無樂根，說彼唯有十一根故。

〔述記：地法無故。五十七說彼唯有十一根，彼自言有喜無樂故。十一根者，謂信等五三無漏意喜捨。〕

總結

由此應知意地慼受，純受苦處亦苦根攝。
此等聖教差別多門，恐文增廣故不繁述。

〔述記：此中聖教差別多門者，卽明三五受多門，謂有報無報界地繫何地斷等名曰多門。〕

（二） 三受俱不俱門

有義六識三受不俱，皆外門轉，互相違故。
五俱意識同五所緣，五三受俱，意亦應爾，

便違正理，故必不俱。

瑜伽等說藏識一時與轉識相應三受俱起者，彼依多念，如說一心非一生滅，無相違過。

有義六識三受容俱，順違中境容俱受故，意不定與五受同故。

〔述記：義演：問如何苦樂捨三受得俱耶？答，如在定中意雖樂不妨身有勞損，耳識率爾聞聲不妨與捨俱。〕

於偏注境起一受故，無偏注者便起捨故，由斯六識三受容俱。

得自在位唯樂喜捨，諸佛已斷憂苦事故。

It is certain that the Anagamya-bhumi (which precedes the first Dhyana) does not possess joy, because it admits of only eleven *indriyas* (Yogasastra, 57), that is to say, the five *indriyas* of which the first is faith (*sraddha*), the three pure *indriyas,* Manas, delight, and indifference.

It is therefore established that the painful sensation of the realm of Manas in the realm of exclusive suffering is comprised in the indriya of sorrow.

In the sacred texts the subject of sensations is dealt with under many different heads [such as the Dhatu, the Bhumi, and the abandonment of the *indriyas*]; but, in order to avoid undue elaboration of the thesis, we will not dwell upon it in detail.

(2) Simultaneity of the Sensations

We have examined in a preceding section whether the first six consciousnesses can, at the same time, be good, bad, and non-defined. We will now examine an analogous problem, whether they can, at the same time, be associated with all the three sensations.

1. According to one opinion, it is impossible: (1) because there will be a contradiction if all the three sensations manifest themselves at the same time; (2) because Manovijnana which accompanies the five consciousnesses and which has the same object as the Five, will, inasmuch as the Five are associated with the three sensations, also be associated with them, which is absurd. Hence the six consciousnesses are not associated with the three sensations at the same time.

The Yogasastra says, it is true, that the Alayavijnana of one period of time is born with the three sensations in association with the six Pravrttivijnanas: but this Sastra, in fact, has in view a multiplicity of moments of the Alayavijnana, just as the expression 'one mind' means not one birth and one destruction but a series of many births and destructions of consciousness. Hence the declaration of the Yogasastra presents no difficulty.

2. According to another opinion (Dharmapala), the three sensations of the six consciousnesses can be simultaneous; (1) because it is possible for the consciousnesses to perceive at the same time favourable, unfavourable, and neutral objects; (2) because Manovijnana is not necessarily bound to manifest the same sensations as the five consciousnesses. [For instance, Manovijnana in meditation is associated with joy, but the body may be unduly strained, giving rise to a sensation of discomfort or suffering. On the other hand, the mind may be indifferent when a pleasing sound is suddenly perceived by the auditory consciousness.] If it is applied specially to the object perceived by one of the five consciousnesses, it possesses the sensation of that consciousness; if not, it is associated with indifference. In consequence, the three sensations can be simultaneous.

When the state of Masterhood is attained, the six consciousnesses are associated only with joy, delight, and indifference, because Buddhas have already cut off all that causes sorrow and grief.

(三) 徧行與別境心所

前所略標六位心所，今應廣顯彼差別相。
且初二位其相云何？

頌曰：

初徧行觸等，　次別境謂欲，
勝解念定慧，　所緣事不同。

徧行心所

論曰：
六位中初徧行心所即觸等五，如前廣說。
此徧行相云何應知？
由教及理爲定量故。

此中教者，如契經言，眼色爲緣生於眼識三和合觸，與觸俱生有受想思乃至廣說，由斯觸等四是徧行。
〔述記：即阿含經……起盡經也〕

又契經說，若根不壞境界現前作意正起方能生識。
〔述記：即象跡喻經。〕

餘經復言，若復於此作意即於此了別。若於此了別即於此作意。是故此二恒共和合乃至廣說。由此作意亦是徧行。
〔述記：起盡經也。〕

此等聖教誠證非一。

3. UNIVERSAL AND SPECIAL CAITTAS

WE have summarily explained the six categories of Caittas (mental associates); we should now expound in detail their particular characteristics. What are the first two categories and what are their characteristics?

The Stanza says:

> 10
>
> First, universal caittas, mental contact and so forth (attention, sensation, conception, volition).
>
> Next, special caittas, that is, desire (Chanda).
>
> Resolve (Adhimoksa), memory (Smrti), meditation (Samadhi), and discernment (Prajna).
>
> The objects perceived by the special caittas are particular and varied.

Universal Caittas

The Treatise says:

The five universal Caittas, mental contact (Sparsa) etc., which constitute the first of the six categories, have already been dealt with in a previous section.

How shall we know the characteristics of these Universals? The Scriptures and logical reason are the criteria of our knowledge.

1. Concerning the Scriptures

(1) The Sutra (the Ch'i-tsin-ching in the Agama) says: 'Mental contact (Sparsa) is born through the union of three dharmas, namely, the eye-consciousness, the eye, and Rupa (colour and form, i.e., the object), the first relying on the other two as conditions of manifestation. Arising simultaneously with mental contact (Sparsa) are sensation (Vedana), conception (Samjna), and volition (Cetana) . . . ' This proves that the four Caittas of which mental contact is the first are universals.

(2) Again, the Sutra (Hastipadopama) says: 'If the *indriyas* (i.e., the sense-organs) have not deteriorated, and if objects appear in front of one, then, as soon as attention (Manaskara) arises, consciousness is born.'

(3) The other Sutra (Ch'i-tsin-ching) again says: 'If attention (Maṇaskara) arises in regard to a particular object, perception (i.e., consciousness) will spontaneously arise in regard to it. Conversely, if perception arises in regard to a particular object, attention will spontaneously arise in regard to it. Thus, these two dharmas, attention and perception, are always united . . . ' Hence attention, too, is universal.

To prove the truth of the above theory, one can quote numerous passages from the holy Scriptures.

理謂識起必有三和，彼定生觸，必由觸有。
若無觸者，心心所法應不和合觸一境故。

作意引心令趣自境，此若無者心應無故。

受能領納順違中境令心等起歡慼捨相，無心起時無隨一故。

想能安立自境分齊，若心起時無此想者，應不能取境分齊相。

思令心取正因等相造作善等，無心起位無此隨一故必有思。

由此證知觸等五法心起必有故是徧行，餘非徧行義至當說。

別境心所

次別境者，謂欲至慧。

所緣境事多分不同，於六位中次初說故。

欲

云何爲欲？
於所樂境希望爲性，勤依爲業。

有義所樂謂可欣境，於可欣事欲見聞等有希望故。
於可厭事希彼不合望彼別離，豈非有欲？

2. Concerning logical reason

(1) For the birth of a consciousness, the 'union of the three' (consciousness, sense-organ, and object) is necessary. This union necessarily engenders mental contact. Conversely, for the 'union of the three' mental contact is necessary, because if this contact is lacking, mind and its associated activities (Citta and Caittadharmas) will not unite to establish contact with an object.

(2) Attention (Manaskara) leads the mind and makes it turn towards its object. If attention is lacking, mind will not exist.

(3) Sensation (Vedana) can accept an object or situation either agreeable or disagreeable or neutral, and cause the mind to produce sensations of pleasure, pain, or indifference. There is no mind that can manifest itself without one of these three sensations being present.

(4) Conception or ideation (Samjna) is the comprehension and determination of certain particulars of an object (e.g., its quality and quantity, its size and colour, a part or the totality, etc.) If conception is lacking, when the mind manifests itself, the mind cannot comprehend the 'part-totality-*nimitta*' (the characteristics and the quantity) of the object.

(5) Volition (Cetana) enables the mind to comprehend the right causes and motives of actions etc., leading to the production of good actions etc. There is no manifestation of mind in which there is not present one of the three *nimittas* (causes, right, wrong, and neutral). Hence volition is necessary.

Thus, we have proved that the five dharmas, mental contact, attention, etc., must necessarily exist when the mind manifests itself. They are therefore universals. All other Caittas are not universals, as will be explained in due course.

Special Caittas

The special Caittas are: Desire (Chanda), resolve (Adhimoksa), memory (Smrti), meditation (Samadhi), and discernment (Prajna). These are Caittas the objects of which are, in the majority of cases, specified and different. As the word 'next' in the Stanza indicates, among the six categories of Caittas this category comes next to the first in the order of consideration.

DESIRE
Chanda

What is desire?

The nature of desire is to wish or long for an object that is ardently desired. Its special activity consists in serving as the supporting basis for ceaseless efforts to acquire that object.

What is meant by the 'object ardently desired'?

1. According to one opinion, it is the enjoyable thing, because, in regard to that thing, there is an aspiration to see, to hear, etc.; in other words, there is a desire for it.

此但求彼不合離時可欣自體，非可厭事。

故於可厭及中容境一向無欲，緣可欣事若不希望亦無欲起。

有義所樂謂所求境，於可欣厭求合離等有希望故。
於中容境一向無欲，緣欣厭事若不希求亦無欲起。

有義所樂謂欲觀境，於一切事欲觀察者有希望故，若不欲觀隨因境勢任運緣者即全無欲。

此由理趣欲非徧行。

有說要由希望境力諸心心所方取所緣，故經說欲爲諸法本。

〔述記：薩婆多說。〕

彼說不然。心等取境由作意故，諸聖教說作意現前能生識故，曾無處說由欲能生心心所故。

如說諸法愛爲根本，豈心心所皆由愛生？

故說欲爲諸法本者，說欲所起一切事業，或說善欲能發正勤，由彼助成一切善事，故論說此勤依爲業。

勝解

云何勝解？於決定境印持爲性，不可引轉爲業。

謂邪正等教理證力於所取境審決印持，由此異緣不能引轉。

But, one may ask, is there no desire when, in regard to something detestable, we hope that it will not be united with us, that it will be separated from us? Is there no aspiration in relation to that thing?

Answer: – Here we are aspiring to the time when that detestable object is not united with us, that is, when it is separated from us. That which is aimed at and regarded as enjoyable is not something that is detestable. Hence a detestable thing or one that is neither detestable nor agreeable is never of the domain of desire. Besides, if there is no aspiration for the enjoyable thing, there is no desire either.

2. According to another opinion, the enjoyable signifies something that is demanded and sought after. There is desire when one requests and seeks union with an enjoyable thing and separation from a detestable thing. There is absolutely no desire so far as a neutral object is concerned. Nor will desire manifest itself when there is no request in regard to the object, no matter whether it is enjoyable or detestable.

3. According to a third opinion, the enjoyable signifies something in regard to which there is an aspiration to see and examine. For there is always a desire for such a thing. If the aspiration to see and examine is lacking, if, owing to the feebleness of the cause (Bija) or of the object, one simply perceives spontaneously and as a matter of course, then there is absolutely no desire.

4. From this trend of reasoning we conclude that desire is not universal.

The Sarvastivadins think that desire is universal. They say that 'it is by the force of desire that the Citta-Caittas take an object, because the Sutra says that desire is the root of all dharmas.'

Their opinion is incorrect, because it is by the force of attention that the Citta takes an object. The sacred texts say that attention in activity engenders consciousness; there is no passage in any of the texts which says that desire possesses the power to produce Citta and its Caittas. If the Sutra says that love is the root of all dharmas, do you maintain that Citta-Caittas are born by the force of love?

Therefore, the formula that 'desire is the root of all dharmas' signifies that all tasks and enterprises, good, bad, etc., are produced by desire. It may also signify that good desire produces right efforts and helps accomplish all good tasks. This is why the present treatise says that the activity of desire consists in serving as the supporting basis for great efforts.

RESOLVE OR MENTAL RESOLUTION
Adhimoksa

What is resolve?

It is defined as the decision and judgment in regard to an object upheld with certainty. It signifies that, by the force of true or false teaching, of reasoning, of realization by meditation or an evidence, one arrives at a decision and

故猶預境勝解全無，非審決心亦無勝解，由斯勝解非偏行攝。

有說心等取自境時無拘礙故，皆有勝解。

〔述記：順正理云有餘師言，今此中解卽薩婆多異師諸對法異計說心取境時無拘礙故皆有勝解。〕

彼說非理。所以者何？能不礙者即諸法故，所不礙者即心等故。

勝發起者根作意故。

若由此故彼勝發起，此應復待餘，便有無窮失。

念

云何爲念？於曾習境令心明記不忘爲性，定依爲業。
謂數憶持曾所受境令不忘失，能引定故。

於曾未受體類境中全不起念。
設曾所受不能明記，念亦不生，故念必非偏行所攝。
有說心起必與念俱，能爲後時憶念因故。
〔述記：薩婆多師正理論第十文。〕

彼說非理，勿於後時有癡信等前亦有故。
前心心所或想勢力足爲後時憶念因故。

judgment in regard to a thing. By reason of this decision, one is not misled or influenced by other conditions or reasons.

Hence there is no resolve in regard to a thing which is not certain, or which is doubtful. Also there is no resolve if the mind is not decided in regard to that thing. Hence resolve is not universal.

Samghabhadra expresses the opinion of different Sarvastivadins: 'When the Citta-Caittas take their object, all are accompanied by resolve, because there is no obstacle.'

This thesis is illogical.

If you define resolve as that which does not constitute an obstacle to the Citta-Caittas, we say that no dharmas, except Citta-Caittas, constitute obstacles inasmuch as they can serve as 'condition quâ agent' (*adhipatipratyaya*). If what is involved is something to which it does not constitute an obstacle, then the Citta-Caittas, to which dharmas are no obstacle, would be resolve itself.

[If you reply that it is by the superior force of resolve that the production of Citta-caittas is not impeded], we say: 'The superior cause of the production of Citta-caittas is the sense-organ (*indriya*) and attention. What has it to do with resolve?'

If you reply that it is by reason of resolve that the sense-organ and attention have this superior force, not by themselves, we say: 'Your resolve, which is a Caitta, should, like attention and other Caittas, depend on another dharma, and so on in an infinite series, which is a grave error.''

MEMORY
Smrti

What is memory?

It is the dharma which makes the mind remember clearly and not forget a thing, an event, or a situation that has been experienced. Its special activity consists in serving as the supporting basis for meditation (*samadhi*), because it incessantly recalls and retains the thing experienced in such a way that there is no failure of recollection, and thereby, it induces *samadhi*.

There cannot be any memory of what has never been experienced; nor can there be any memory of the thing experienced if there is no clear recollection of it. Hence memory is not a universal Caitta.

According to the Sarvastivadins (Samghabhadra), all manifestations of mind must be accompanied by memory, because memory can be the cause of recollection in the future.

This thesis is illogical, because one cannot say that ignorance or faith or some other Caitta which will come into being in future has existed in the past. In fact, future recollection is sufficiently explained by the force of the past Citta-caittas or by the force of ideation (Samjna). [When Citta-caittas perceive an object, they imprint on the Mulavijnana the potentialities which will be the cause of recollection. There is no reason to presuppose a memory contemporaneous with the experience as the cause of future recollection.]

定

云何爲定？

於所觀境令心專注不散爲性，智依爲業。
謂觀德失俱非境中由定令心專注不散，依斯便有決擇智生。

心專注言顯所欲住即便能住，非唯一境。
不爾，見道歷觀諸諦前後境別，應無等持。

若不繫心專注境位，便無定起，故非徧行。

有說爾時亦有定起，但相微隱。應說誠言。
〔述記：正理師等亂心等時亦有定起。〕

若定能令心等和合同趣一境故是徧行，理亦不然，是觸用故。

若謂此定令刹那頃心不易緣故徧行攝，亦不應理，一刹那心自於所緣無易義故。

若言由定心取所緣故徧行攝，彼亦非理，作意令心取所緣故。

有說此定體即是心，經說爲心學，心一境性故。
〔述記：此經部以經三學中說爲心學，靜慮支中說爲心一境性，故離心無。〕

彼非誠證，依定攝心令心一境說彼言故。
根力覺支道支等攝，如念慧等非即心故。

MEDITATION
Samadhi

What is Samadhi or meditation?

The nature of Samadhi is to cause the mind to apply itself with full concentration to the object of meditation and not to stray. Its special activity consists in serving as the supporting basis for transcendental wisdom (*jnana*). It signifies that, in the qualitative examination of an object (of its virtues, defects, and qualities that are neither the one nor the other), Samadhi causes the mind to concentrate itself without straying in different directions. With this Samadhi as support, there will be born pure transcendental wisdom, the sure knowledge which apprehends the qualities etc. of the object.

The expression 'concentration of the mind' indicates that the mind is fixed where it wishes to be fixed, not that it is fixed on only one object. Otherwise, there would be no Samadhi on the 'Path of Insight into Transcendent Truth' where the ascetic discerns and contemplates successively the eternal verities and where, in consequence, the object changes from moment to moment.

Samadhi is not universal, because the mind is lacking in the state of meditation when it is not concentrated on the object.

1. However, according to Samghabhadra, even in the state of distraction, Samadhi manifests itself; only, in that case, it is subtle and hidden.

Samghabhadra should explain himself truthfully and without ambiguity. If he understands by Samadhi that which causes the Citta and its Caittas to unite and direct themselves to one single object, and claims that, in consequence, Samadhi is universal, the answer is that his definition is inadmissible, because what he explains is the action of mental contact. If he thinks that Samadhi causes the mind to concentrate during the space of one moment without changing the object of its perception and is, in consequence, universal, the answer is also no, because, in its essential nature, the mind does not change its object in the space of one moment. If he thinks that Samadhi causes the mind to apprehend the object of its perception and is, in consequence, universal, the answer is also no, because it is attention that causes the mind to apprehend the object.

2. On the other hand, the Sautrantikas think that Samadhi, in its essential nature, is simply the mind, because the Sutra says that, among the three Siksas (branches of knowledge), the science of mind defines it as 'the mind fixed on one single object'.

This text is not a sound testimony to the true nature of Samadhi. The Sutra means to say that Samadhi concentrates the mind in such a way that it is fixed on one single object. Samadhi, which is comprised among the five spiritual faculties (*indriyas*), the five powers (*balas*), the seven degrees of enlightenment (*bodhyangas*), and the eightfold noble path (*margangas*), is not the mind, just as memory, discernment, etc., are not the mind.

慧

云何爲慧？於所觀境簡擇爲性，斷疑爲業。

謂觀德失俱非境中由慧推求得決定故。

於非觀境愚昧心中無簡擇故，非徧行攝。

〔述記：正理師云。〕

有說爾時亦有慧起，但相微隱。天愛寧知？

〔述記：今應問彼，天愛寧知？〕

對法說爲大地法故。

諸部對法展轉相違，汝等如何執爲定量？

唯觸等五經說徧行，說十非經，不應固執。

然欲等五非觸等故，定非徧行，如信貪等。

（一） 別境心所五獨或並生

有義此五定互相資，隨一起時必有餘四。

〔述記：此安慧義。〕

有義不定，瑜伽說此四一切中無後二故。

又說此五緣四境生，所緣能緣非定俱故。

〔述記：五十五說此欲等五緣四境生。〕

應說此五或時起一，

謂於所樂唯起希望，

或於決定唯起印解，

或於曾習唯起憶念。

或於所觀唯起專注，

謂愚昧類爲止散心，雖專注所緣而不能簡擇，世共知彼有定無慧。

DISCERNMENT
Prajna

What is discernment?

Discernment is the discrimination of an object that is under examination; its special activity consists in the elimination of doubt. It signifies that, in the qualitative examination of an object (of its virtues, defects, and qualities that are neither the one nor the other), by means of the investigating power of discernment, one attains certitude and assurance.

Discernment does not belong to the 'universal' category of Caittas, because there is no discrimination when the object is not under examination and when the mind is ignorant and obtuse.

Samghabhadra holds that, even then, there is discernment; only its mode of activity is subtle and hidden.

How do you know, you child of ignorance ('beloved of the gods'!)?

By the testimony of the Abhidharma, which says that discernment is a universal dharma.

But the Abhidharmas of various schools contradict one another. How can you regard them as the highest authorities? The Sutra says that only five Caittas, mental contact etc., are Universals. The doctrine that there are ten Universals is not in conformity with the Sutras. You should not be so opinionated as to adhere to such a doctrine. In fact, the five Caittas beginning with desire, not being the five beginning with mental contact, are not Universals, just as belief, covetousness, etc., are not Universals.

(1) Relations of the five Special Caittas

According to Sthiramati, these five special Caittas condition one another. When one of them arises, the other four must necessarily arise with it. When one of them is lacking, all the others are lacking.

According to another opinion, they do not necessarily arise together, because the Yogasastra says that, among the four 'alls', they have not the last two (that is to say, they do not arise together at all times and simultaneously), and because the Yogasastra, 55, says that the five are born through the perception of four kinds of objects: the four objects and the five Caittas are not necessarily simultaneous.

1. It follows from the above that, of the five special Caittas, only one may manifest itself:

Desire only in regard to a desirable object;

Resolve only in regard to an object that is determined;

Memory only in regard to an object or situation that has been experienced;

Samadhi only in regard to an object under examination.

In the case of those ignorant and obtuse persons who, in order to fix their dispersed or straying mind, concentrate their attention on an object, although they may fix their mind on the object, they are not capable of discrimination or judgment on the underlying principles of dharmas. The whole world knows that they possess Samadhi but no discernment (Prajna).

彼加行位少有聞思，故說等持緣所觀境。

或依多分故說是言，如戲忘天專注一境起貪瞋等有定無慧，諸如是等其類實繁。

或於所觀唯起簡擇，

謂不專注馳散推求。

或時起二，謂於所樂決定境中起欲勝解，或於所樂曾習境中起欲及念，如是乃至於所觀境起定及慧合有十二。

或時起三，謂於所樂決定曾習起欲解念，如是乃至於曾所觀起念定慧，合有十三。

或時起四，謂於所樂決定曾習所觀境中起前四種，如是乃至於定曾習所觀境中起後四種，合有五四。

或時起五，謂於所樂決定曾習所觀境中具起五種。

如是於四起欲等五，總別合有三十一句。

[The question arises: in this case, since there is no discernment how can the object, on which their mind is fixed, be regarded as being 'under examination'?]

The reply is that those persons, in the preparatory stage of their Samadhi, have received some instruction from their teachers and are capable of some philosophical reflection. This is why it is said that Samadhi pertains to an object under examination.

This definition may, perhaps, apply to the generality of cases. For example, the *Kridapradusikas*, who apply themselves with concentration to an object, manifest covetousness, anger, etc.: there is in them Samadhi, not discernment. There are numerous similar cases.

As regards discernment, this, too, is the only Caitta that manifests itself in regard to an object under examination.

This signifies that, when concentration is lacking in regard to the object, when only discrimination arises, when the mind strays at random in its investigations, there will be only discernment and no Samadhi.

2. If follows from the above that, of the five special Caittas, two may manifest themselves at the same time:

Desire and resolve in regard to an object that is both desirable and determined;

Desire and memory in regard to a desirable object or situation that has been experienced in the past;

And so on till we have Samadhi and discernment in regard to an object under examination: altogether ten couples.

3. Of the five, three may manifest themselves at the same time:

Desire, resolve and memory in regard to a desirable object that is determined and has been experienced in the past.

And so on till we have memory, Samadhi and discernment in regard to an object under examination which has been experienced in the past. In this case there are ten triads in all.

4. Of the five, four may manifest themselves at the same time:

The first four special Caittas (desire, resolve, memory, and Samadhi) in regard to a desirable object under examination that is determined and has been experienced in the past.

And so on till we have the last four special Caittas (resolve, memory, Samadhi, and discernment) in regard to a determined object that is under examination and has been experienced in the past. In this case there are altogether five groups of four.

5. All the five may manifest themselves at the same time in regard to a desirable and determined object that is under examination and has been experienced in the past.

Thus, the five special Caittas may arise, either individually or collectively or in groups, in regard to the four characteristics of an object, making a total of thirty-one cases.

But there are also states of mind in which all the five are lacking; as, for

或有心位五皆不起，如非四境，率爾墮心及藏識俱，此類非一。

第七八識此別境五隨位有無，如前已說。

第六意識諸位容俱，依轉未轉皆不遮故。

有義五識此五皆無，緣已得境無希望故，不能審決無印持故，恒取新境無追憶故，自性散動無專注故，不能推度無簡擇故。

有義五識容有此五，

雖無於境增上希望，而有微劣樂境義故，

於境雖無增上審決而有微劣印境義故，

雖無明記曾習境體而有微劣念境類故。

雖不作意繫念一境而有微劣專注義故，遮等引故說性散動，非遮等持，故容有定。

雖於所緣不能推度，而有微劣簡擇義故，由此聖教說眼耳通是眼耳識相應智性，餘三準此，有慧無失。

〔述記：大論六十九說眼耳二通是二識相應智。〕

instance, when the object presents none of the four characteristics, when the mind (one of the six consciousnesses) is of the 'sudden' category, and when it is a question of the Alayavijnana. This enumeration is not complete: numerous are the mental states which are not associated with the five special Caittas.

The seventh and eighth consciousnesses are or are not associated with these five special Caittas according as they are in the state of cause (non-Buddhas) or of fruit (Buddhas). This has been explained in the Section on Alayavijnana.

The sixth consciousness can be associated with these five Caittas whether it has been 'revolutionized' or not.

Concerning the first five consciousnesses

According to Sthiramati, they are never accompanied by desire etc. Desire is lacking because, perceiving an object that has already been obtained (that is, present), they are not accompanied by desire; resolve is lacking because, perceiving the object spontaneously and being incapable of decision, they are not accompanied by judgment; memory is lacking because they always take a new object without recollecting past objects; Samadhi is lacking because, being by their very nature distracted and mobile, they do not apply themselves to concentration on an object; discernment is lacking because they are incapable of speculation and investigation.

According to Dharmapala, the first five consciousnesses can be accompanied by all these five special Caittas.

1. Although they have no strong craving and yearning in regard to the object (as is the case for the sixth consciousness) yet, being led by the sixth consciousness, they can have a weak desire for it.

2. Although they have no strong judgment and decision, yet they can have some vague impressions (in regard to the object).

3. Although they have not a clear recollection of the substance of the object previously experienced, yet they have a faint recollection of the species of that object.

4. Although they have not the close attention that attaches and binds the mind to an object, yet they are capable of a small measure of concentration. They are said to be distracted and changeable, which refutes the idea that they are always in meditation without distraction; but this does not refute the idea that they may be in meditation and yet distracted. Hence they can be associated with Samadhi.

5. Although they are incapable of considering and speculating on an object, yet they are capable of weak discrimination. This is why the sacred texts (Yogasastra, 69) say that the two supernatural powers of vision and audition (clairvoyance and clairaudience) are the pure wisdom (*jnana*) associated with the consciousnesses of sight and hearing. This applies likewise to the three other consciousnesses of smell, taste, and touch. Hence it is right that discernment should be attributed to the five consciousnesses.

In all the stages of evolution preceding the attainment of Masterhood

未自在位此五或無，得自在時此五定有。

樂觀諸境欲無減故，印境勝解常無減故，憶習曾受念無減故，又佛五識緣三世故，如來無有不定心故，五識皆有作事智故。

（二） 別境心所與五受相應

此別境五何受相應？

有意欲三除憂苦受，以彼二境非所樂故。

餘四通四，唯除苦受，以審決等五識無故。

有義一切五受相應，論說憂根於無上法思慕愁慼求欲證故。

〔述記：瑜伽五十七，對法第十說，憂根於無上法思慕欲證愁慼所攝，卽善法欲與憂俱也。〕

純受苦處希求解脫，意有苦根前已說故。

論說貪愛憂苦相應，此貪愛俱必有欲故。

〔述記：瑜伽五十九說。〕

苦根旣有意識相應，審決等四苦俱何咎？

又五識俱亦有微細印境等四，義如前說。

由斯欲等五受相應。

此五復依性界學等諸門分別，如理應思。

(non-Buddhas), it may be that the five consciousnesses are not accompanied by these five special Caittas; but, when Masterhood is attained (Buddhas), they are always accompanied by them. The reasons for this are: (1) Desire, that is, the desire of the Masters to contemplate the various fields of representation, does not decrease; (2) resolve, which judges the object, does not decrease; (3) memory of all objects which are familiar and which have been previously experienced does not decrease; besides, the five consciousnesses of a Buddha apprehend all the three epochs – past, present, and future; (4) a Tathagata is never possessed of a mind that is not in constant meditation; and (5) all the five consciousnesses of a Buddha have the 'pure wisdom for executing tasks' (Kriyanusthanajnana).

(2) Vedana of the five Special Caittas

With which Vedana are the five Special Caittas associated?

1. According to one opinion, desire is associated with three sensations, excluding grief and sorrow, because the object which causes these two sensations is always undesirable.

The four other Special Caittas, resolve etc., are associated with four sensations, excluding sorrow, because the five consciousnesses are devoid of judgment and decision etc. [Since these four other Special Caittas are not associated with the five consciousnesses, they cannot be associated with sorrow, which is exclusively a 'corporeal sensation', connected with the five consciousnesses. In consequence, they are associated with the remaining four sensations which belong to the sixth consciousness, Manovijnana.]

2. According to another opinion, all the five Specials are associated with the five sensations.

(1) Concerning desire (Chanda)

The Yogasastra, 57, says: 'Grief is associated with desire, because the yogin cherishes a high aspiration for the supreme dharmas, (*anuttaradharmas*), has an ardent desire for their realization, and grieves at his incapacity to attain them.'

In the region of exclusive suffering (all the pretas and some of the animals), there is a desire for deliverance from suffering. Manas, as we have seen, is associated with sorrow. The Yogasastra, 59, says that covetousness (*lobha*) and 'craving thirst for possession' (*trsna*) are associated with grief and sorrow, and that in covetousness and thirst there must of necessity be desire. Hence desire is accompanied by sorrow.

(2) Concerning the four other Special Caittas

Since, as we have seen, sorrow is associated with Manovijnana, how can it be erroneous to conclude that it accompanies the four Special Caittas, resolve (judgment and decision) etc.? Besides, as we have seen, the five consciousnesses are associated with subtle judgment etc.

Hence the five Special Caittas can be associated with the five sensations. These Five should be examined further from other points of view; their

四· 善心所

已說徧行別境二位，善位心所其相云何？

頌曰：

善謂信慚愧， 無貪等三根，
勤安不放逸， 行捨及不害。

論曰：

唯善心俱名善心所，謂信慚等定有十一。

出諸善體

云何爲信？於實德能深忍樂欲心淨爲性。
對治不信樂善爲業。

然信差別略有三種。
一信實有，謂於諸法實事理中深信忍故。
二信有德，謂於三寶眞淨德中深信樂故。

三信有能，謂於一切世出世善深信有力能得能成起希望故。

由斯對治不信，彼心愛樂證修世出世善。

nature (good, bad, etc.), their Dhatu (Kamadhatu etc.) their quality of *saiksa*, their abandonment, their retribution, etc.

4. THE GOOD CAITTAS

We have explained the Universals and the Specials. What are the good Caittas (mental qualities)?

The Stanza says:

11

> The good caittas refer to belief (Sraddha), sense of shame (Hri), sense of integrity (Apatrapa),
>
> The three roots of non-covetousness (Alobha) and so forth [non-anger (Advesa) and non-delusion (Amoha)],
>
> Zeal or diligence (Virya), composure of mind (Prasrabdhi), vigilance (Apramada),
>
> Equanimity (Upeksa), and harmlessness or non-injury (Avihimsa).

The Treatise says:

Those Caittas are entitled 'good Caittas' which are associated with a good mind only. They are faith (Sraddha), sense of shame (Hri), etc. They are eleven in number.

DEFINITIONS

1. What is belief (Sraddha)?

It is the deep understanding of, and the ardent desire for, realities, qualities, and capacities. It has as its essential nature the purification of the mind. Its special activity consists in counteracting unbelief (Asraddha) and loving that which is good.

The varieties of belief are three in number:

(1) Belief in realities. This signifies the profound faith in, and understanding of, dharmas really existing, things or principles (verities).

(2) Belief in qualities. This signifies the profound faith in, and intense fondness for, all the pure qualities of the Three Precious Ones (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha).

(3) Belief in capacities. This signifies the profound faith in one's power to attain and realize all good mundane and supramundane dharmas, and produce the desire and aspiration for them.

It follows from this that belief counteracts unbelief on these three points and produces the ardent desire to enter into possession of supramundane dharmas and cultivate mundane dharmas.

忍謂勝解此即信因，樂欲謂欲即是信果。

確陳此信自相是何？

豈不適言心淨爲性？

此猶未了彼心淨言。若淨即心應非心所，若令心淨慚等何別？心俱淨法爲難亦然。

此性澄清能淨心等，以心勝故立心淨名。

如水清珠能清濁水。

慚等雖善非淨爲相，此淨爲相無濫彼失。

又諸染法各別有相。唯有不信自相渾濁，復能渾濁餘心心所，如極穢物自穢穢他。信正翻彼故淨爲相。

有說信者，愛樂爲相。

〔述記：上座部義，或大乘異師。〕

應通三性，體應即欲，又應苦集非信所緣。

有執信者，隨順爲相。

〔述記：或大乘異師，或是大衆部。〕

應通三性，即勝解欲。

若印順者即勝解故。若樂順者即是欲故。離彼二體無順相故。由此應知心淨是信。

云何爲慚？

依自法力崇重賢善爲性。對治無慚止息惡行爲業。

Understanding refers to resolve, that is, 'determination and certitude with regard to an object'. This is the cause of belief. Fondness and aspiration constitute desire. This is the fruit or effect of belief.

Questions: Will you explain definitely the essential nature of this belief?

Answer: Have we not said just now that it is, by its very nature, purification of the mind?

Question: Undoubtedly, but you have not explained the meaning of that expression. If 'purification' signifies 'a mind that is pure', then belief is mind, Citta, and not a Caitta or associate of the mind. If it signifies 'that which makes the mind pure', then what is the difference between belief and the sense of shame and other good Caittas? The same difficulty arises if it is said that belief is a pure dharma or a pure associate of the mind.

Answer: It is the nature of belief to clarify and purify. This means that it has the capacity to purify the mind and its associated activities. Considering the paramount importance of the mind, one defines it as 'purification of mind' without referring to the associated mental activities. It is analogous to the 'water-purifying pearl' which clarifies and purifies dirty water. The sense of shame and other good dharmas, although good, do not have that capacity. Hence belief has as its main characteristic the purification of the mind and its activities, and is not confounded with other good dharmas.

Likewise, each of the defiled dharmas possesses its own particular characteristics: only Ásraddhya, incredulity, is defiled and defiles the mind and its associated activities, just as a very dirty thing is dirty itself and soils other things. Sraddha, belief, is just the contrary: hence it has clarification-purification as its main characteristic.

According to certain scholars (Sthaviras or the different masters of the Greater Vehicle), belief has ardent desire as its main characteristic. On this hypothesis, it should be of three moral species: good, bad, and non-defined [because one can desire bad and indifferent things as well], and not always good as faith should be. Then belief should be the same as desire. In that case, suffering (*duhkha*) and the cause of suffering (*samudaya*), [which are undesirable], should not be the object of belief.

According to other scholars (different masters of the Greater Vehicle or the Mahasamghikas), belief has adaptability as its main characteristic. On this hypothesis, it should be of three moral species (good, bad, and non-defined) according to the species of the object to which one adapts oneself. Then belief should be the same as resolve (Adhimoksa) or desire. If it is adaptation of aspiration, it is desire. Apart from resolve and desire, there is no adaptation. It follows from this that belief is purification of mind.

2. What is the sense of shame (Hri)?

It is the nature of the sense of shame to revere and respect good dharmas, these sentiments being cherished by the yogin both by reason of his own power and by reason of the power of the Dharma. Its special activity consists in counteracting and thwarting shamelessness (Ahrikya) and arresting all evil acts of body-voice-mind.

謂依自法尊貴增上，崇重賢善羞耻過惡，對治無慚息諸惡行。

云何爲愧？
依世間力輕拒暴惡爲性。對治無愧止息惡行爲業。

謂依世間訶厭增上，輕拒暴惡羞耻過罪，對治無愧息諸惡業。

羞耻過惡是二通相，故諸聖教假說爲體。

〔述記：諸對法顯揚等依此通相假說爲二別體〕

〔述記：彼雖言他自增上等，然是起緣非是別相。〕

若執羞耻爲二別相，應慚與愧體無差別，則此二法定不相應，非受想等有此義故。

若待自他立二別者，應非實有，便違聖教。

〔述記：謂彼若言由待自他境差別故，二體有別，可俱起者。應此二種皆非實有，有所待故。如長短等無別自體，待自他故方成二別，豈非是假。若許是假便違聖教。〕

〔述記：五十五等說十一善中八是實有。〕

若許慚愧實而別起，復違論說十徧善心。

〔述記：此大論中六十九說。〕

崇重輕拒若二別相，所緣有異應不俱生，二失旣同何乃偏責？

That is to say: with the heightened power of his respect for himself and his esteem for the Dharma, the yogin reveres virtue, respects good dharmas, feels ashamed of his transgressions and evil acts, counteracts his shamelessness, and ceases from all evil acts.

3. What is the sense of integrity (Apatrapya)?
It is the nature of this Caitta to contemn vileness and resist evil, this attitude being maintained by reason of the external world. Its activity consists in counteracting non-integrity (Anapatrapya) and arresting all evil acts.

That is to say: under the augmented influence of the fear of the censure and reprobation of the world, the yogin contemns vileness, resists evil, feels ashamed of his transgressions and sins, counteracts non-integrity, and ceases from all evil deeds.

2–3. The feeling of shame at one's transgressions is the common characteristic of these two dharmas (sense of shame and sense of integrity). This is why the sacred teachings (Abhidharma and Vikhyapana) say, incorrectly, that they have shame as their essential nature, [adding, it is true, 'by reason of oneself' and 'by reason of the world'; but this difference of origin does not constitute difference of character. The fundamental difference between the natures of these two dharmas is this: the nature of the sense of shame is veneration of the good and the virtuous, while that of the sense of integrity is resistance to evil].

Whoever holds that the sense of shame is a special characteristic of these two dharmas must also admit that shame and integrity are not of different natures. If this is the case, they cannot be associates of each other and cannot arise together, because sensations, conceptions, etc., which are associates, are of different natures.

If one establishes the difference between the two Caittas on the ground that the first (sense of shame) depends on oneself (that is to say, one feels ashamed of *oneself* for not being able to respect the good) and the second (sense of integrity) depends on others (that is to say, one feels ashamed for not being able to resist the evil imposed by *others*), then the two cannot be born at the same time; they would not be real entities, being relative and dependent, like the long and the short. This would be contradictory to the sacred teachings (Yogasastra, 55), which affirm that eight of the eleven good Caittas are real entities.[1]

If one holds that the two Caittas are real entities but are born separately in turn, one contradicts the Yogasastra, 69, which says that ten good Caittas are found together in all good minds.[2]

But it may be objected: – If veneration-respect (for the good) and contempt-resistance (in regard to evil) are, respectively, the special characteristics of the two Caittas, then the objects of veneration-respect and of contempt-resistance being different, the two would not be born together. This means that you are as much mistaken as I am. Why then do you condemn me alone?

---

[1] The three that are excluded are diligence, equanimity, and harmlessness.

[2] The exception is composure of mind, which manifests itself only in meditation.

誰言二法所緣有異？
不爾如何？
善心起時，隨緣何境，皆有崇重善及輕拒惡義。故慚與愧俱徧善心，所緣無別。

〔述記：此論主通。〕

豈不我說亦有此義？

汝執慚愧自相旣同，何理能遮前所設難？

然諸聖教說顧自他者，自法名自世間名他，或即此中崇拒善惡於己益損名自他故。

無貪等者，等無瞋癡。此三名根，生善勝故，三不善根近對治故。

云何無貪？
於有有具無著爲性。對治貪著，作善爲業。

〔述記：有謂三有之果，有具即能生三有之因。〕

云何無瞋？
於苦苦具無恚爲性。對治瞋恚，作善爲業。[1]

〔述記：苦謂三苦。苦具即彼能生苦者一切皆是。〕

善心起時，隨緣何境，皆於有等無著無恚。觀有等立非要緣彼。如前慚愧觀善惡立。故此二種俱徧善心。

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*[1] 三苦：苦苦，壞苦，行苦。

Reply Who says that the objects of the two dharmas are different?

Question: If they are not different, how do you explain it?

Reply: In point of fact, when a good mind is born, whatever may be its object of perception (the Four Noble Truths, the Three Precious Ones, etc.), it always manifests itself as veneration-respect for the good and contempt-resistance to the bad. For this reason, the two dharmas are always found together in all good minds. In other words, it is not necessary for the good mind to perceive a certain object in order to manifest a sense of shame and another object to manifest a sense of integrity.

Objection: Is it not true that what I said just now expresses exactly the same meaning?

Reply: You maintain that shame and integrity have the same characteristics. This being the case, how can you refute the objections which I have raised (: that the two cannot be born together at the same moment etc.)?

It should, however, be pointed out that, when the sacred teaching employs the expression 'depending on oneself', it means oneself and the Dharma; and, when it employs the expression 'depending on others', it means the external world and its laws. In another interpretation 'depending on oneself' signifies 'veneration for the good that is advantageous to oneself'; and 'depending on others' signifies 'resistance to the evil (perpetrated by others) that is harmful to oneself'.

4–6. The three roots of excellence

The expression 'non-covetousness and so forth' in the Stanza means non-covetousness (Alobha), non-anger (Advesa), and non-delusion (Amoha).

These three are called roots because they are the essential elements for the generation of good, and because they are directly opposed to the three roots of evil: covetousness, anger, and delusion.

4. What is non-covetousness (Alobha)?

It is the nature of this Caitta to remain detached from, and uninfluenced by, the three states of mortal existence in the three Dhatus and the causes of this triple existence. Its special activity consists in counteracting covetousness and accomplishing good deeds.

5. What is non-anger (Advesa)?

It is the nature of this Caitta to remain non-irritated by the three kinds of suffering and their causes.[1] Its special activity consists in counteracting anger and accomplishing good deeds.

When a good mind is born, whatever may be its object of perception, it always manifests itself as non-attachment in regard to existence and non-irritation in regard to suffering. This means that non-covetousness and non-anger are established in relation to 'existence' and 'suffering', but it is not necessary for the mind actually to consider existence and suffering in order to manifest these two Caittas. Similarly, the sense of shame and that of integrity

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[1] The three kinds of suffering are: suffering produced by direct causes; suffering by loss or deprivation; and suffering by the passing away or impermanence of all things.

云何無癡？

於諸理事明解爲性。對治愚癡作善爲業。

有義無癡即慧爲性。集論說此報教證智決擇爲體。生得聞思修所生慧，如次皆是決擇性故。

〔述記：問，若體即是別境慧者，何須善中唯說於慧，餘四別境善中不說也？〕

此雖即慧，爲顯善品有勝功能，如煩惱見，故復別說。

有義無癡非即是慧，別有自性。正對無明，如無貪瞋，善根攝故。

論說大悲無瞋癡攝，非根攝故。若彼無癡以慧爲性，大悲如力等應慧等根攝。

〔述記：瑜伽五十七卷說大悲以彼無瞋無癡二法爲體，非二十二根攝。若無癡以慧爲性，此大悲如十力應二十二根中慧根三無漏等根所攝。彼說十力四無畏等慧根等攝，不攝悲故。〕

又若無癡無別自性，如不害等應非實物，便違論說十一善中三世俗有，餘皆是實。

〔述記：不害以無瞋爲性。〕

〔述記：大論五十五說十一善中不放逸捨及十害三是世俗有，餘皆實有。〕

然集論說慧爲體者，舉彼因果顯此自性，如以忍樂表信自體，理必應爾。

〔述記：無癡之因及果皆通四慧。〕

〔述記：信中亦以忍樂即勝解欲，舉信因果以解信故。無癡亦然。〕

are established in relation to good and evil, but it is not necessary for the mind actually to experience good and evil in order to manifest these two Caittas. It follows from this that non-convetousness and non-anger accompany all good minds.

6. What is non-delusion (Amoha)?

It is the nature of this Caitta to understand clearly principles and things. Its special activity consists in counteracting ignorance and delusion and accomplishing good deeds.

According to one opinion, non-delusion is of the same nature as discernment, because the Abhidharma says that 'non-delusion has as its essential nature the certitude which arises from retribution, instruction, demonstration, and intuition.' These, [says the Tsa-tsi, which is a commentary on the Abhidharma by Sthiramati], are respectively the varieties of inborn discernment (which corresponds to retribution), audition (which corresponds to instruction), cogitation (which results in demonstration), and self-cultivation (which leads to the awakening of intuition), all of which have the quality of certainty as their essential nature.

[This being the case, why is non-delusion regarded as a good Caitta, instead of as a special Caitta?]

Although non-delusion is discernment by nature and is essentially a special Caitta, still, in order to indicate that the good aspect of discernment possesses a superior power for the accomplishment of good acts, it is separately regarded as a 'good Caitta', just as 'false views' (*drstis*), which belong to the bad aspect of discernment, are, because of their special power of causing grief or distress, specially regarded as fundamental klesas.

According to another opinion (Dharmapala), non-delusion is not discernment; it has a separate self-nature. For it is directly opposed to ignorance and, like non-covetousness and non-anger, it is comprised among the roots of good. Another reason is that the Yogasastra, 57, says that Mahakaruna (great compassion) is comprised in non-anger and non-delusion, not in the twenty-two Indriyas (roots). Now, if non-delusion had discernment as its essential nature, Mahakaruna, like the ten spiritual powers (Balas) etc., would be comprised in the Indriyas of discernment, the 'three pure roots' (Ajnasyami) etc.

Besides, if non-delusion had not a self-nature of its own, then, just as harmlessness (which is non-anger by nature), equanimity, etc., are not real entities, it would not be a real entity. This would be contradictory to the Yogasastra, 55, which says that, among the eleven good Caittas, three only are conventional existences, that is, vigilance, equanimity, and harmlessness, and that all the others are real.

It is true that the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that non-delusion is discernment by nature; but this text explains the nature of non-delusion in terms of its cause and fruit, just as it explains the nature of belief in terms of its cause (i.e., understanding or approbation, which is resolve) and of its fruit (i.e., fondness, which is desire). [The cause of non-delusion is discernment; its fruit is also discernment.]

以貪瞋癡六識相應，正煩惱攝，起惡勝故，立不善根。斷彼必由通別對治，通唯善慧，別即三根，由此無癡必應別有。

勤謂精進，於善惡品修斷事中勇悍爲性。
對治懈怠滿善爲業。

勇表勝進，簡諸染法。悍表精純，簡淨無記。
即顯精進唯善性攝。

此相差別略有五種。所謂被甲，加行，無下，無退，無足。

即經所說有勢，有勤，有勇，堅猛，不捨善軛，如次應知。

此五別者，謂初發心，自分勝進，自分行中三品別故。

或初發心，長時，無間，殷重，無餘修差別故。

或資糧等五道別故。

〔述記：問，旣通三乘，三乘無學，云何無足不捨善軛，果已滿故。〕

二乘究竟道欣大菩提故。諸佛究竟道樂利樂他故。

或二加行無間解脫勝進別故。

Covetousness (Lobha), anger (Dvesa), and delusion (Moha), associated with the six consciousnesses and comprised among the fundamental klesas, are principal factors in the production of evil: they are therefore established as the roots of evil. To cut them off, it is necessary to counteract or thwart them in a general way by means of good discernment and in a specific way by means of the three roots of good, non-covetousness, non-anger, and non-delusion. Hence non-delusion is a Caitta apart and distinct from discernment.

7. Zeal (Virya)

The word *ch'in* (diligence) in the Stanza refers to *tsing-tsin*, zeal (Virya). This Caitta has as its essential nature courage and tenacity of purpose in the cultivation of good and the abandonment of evil. Its special activity consists in counteracting indolence and completing all good spiritual practices.

The term 'courage' indicates undeflected progress (advance from moment to moment); hence it has nothing to do with the practice of defiled dharmas. The expression 'tenacity of purpose' indicates 'absolute purity'; hence it has nothing to do with the practice of non-defiled-non-defined dharmas. This signifies that zeal is exclusively good.

The varieties or phases of the quality of zeal are five in number: (1) the arraying of oneself in armour, i.e., cherishing a strong desire; (2) strenuous exercise, i.e., energetic self-cultivation; (3) non-depression or non-self-debasement, i.e., not underrating oneself or dreading the dharma; (4) non-retrogression, i.e., forging ahead despite adverse circumstances; and (5) non-self-satisfaction, i.e., boundless aspiration for supreme enlightenment.

These different phases are designated, in corresponding order, by the expressions of the Sutra: 'Having the inclination, the diligence, the courage, the indomitable will to advance, and the firm determination not to put aside the good yoke'.

These phases of zeal may also be explained in different ways:

(1) a. First manifestation of the Bodhi-heart; b. advance to a higher Bhumi, a superior plane of being; c.–e. self-cultivation in three progressive stages in any of the ten Bhumis in which the yogin finds himself.

(2) a. First manifestation of the Bodhi-heart, followed by four varieties of spiritual cultivation; b. cultivation for long periods of time; c. uninterrupted cultivation; d. zealous cultivation; e. complete and final cultivation (cultivation without residue).

(3) Zeal in relation to the five stages of the Path: *sambhara, prayoga, darsana, bhavana, nistha,* that is, the accumulation of spiritual provisions, intensified effort, unimpeded penetrating understanding, practice of the noblest virtues, and ultimate realization. These are the progressive stages of the superior way or the way of the Arhat, which comprises 'non-self-satisfaction' and 'non-abandonment of the good yoke'. The idea is that the Asaiksas of the two Vehicles, on their Path of Ultimate Realization, aspire to Mahabodhi; and the Buddhas on the same Path are earnestly desirous of benefiting and bringing happiness to all sentient beings.

(4) Zeal in relation to a. the two kinds of intensified effort (*prayoga*),

〔述記：加行中有近有遠，名三加行。〕

安謂輕安。遠離麤重，調暢身心，堪任爲性。
對治惛沈轉依爲業。

謂此伏除能障定法令所依止轉安適故。

不放逸者，精進三根，於所斷修防修爲性。
對治放逸，成滿一切世出世間善事爲業。

謂即四法，於斷修事皆能防修名不放逸，非別有體，無異相故。於防惡事修善事中離四功能無別用故。

雖信慚等亦有此能，而方彼四勢用微劣，非根徧策，故非此依。

豈不防修是此相用？

防修何異精進三根？

彼要待此方有作用。

此應復待餘，便有無窮失。

勤唯徧策，根但爲依，如何說彼有防修用。

the proximate and the remote, b. uninterrupted self-cultivation, c. emancipation, and d. spiritual advancement.

8. Composure of mind (Prasrabdhi)

The word *an* in the Stanza means *ch'ing-an*, ease and composure (Prasrabdhi).

This Caitta has as its essential nature the aptitude or capacity for meditation and contemplation. It is *ch'ing*, lightness, because it liberates the body and the mind from their heavy and gross aspect (*dausthulya*); it is *an*, ease and composure, because it harmonizes the body and the mind and places them in a state of composure and good comfort.

Its special activity consists in counteracting torpid-mindedness (Styana) and transforming the state of mind and body into one of ease and composure by the suppression or removal of the *dausthulyas* and *avaranas* which impede meditation and contemplation.

9. Vigilance (Apramada)

Vigilance is zeal plus the 'three roots of excellence', non-covetousness, non-anger, and non-delusion. It is the nature of this Caitta to guard against dharmas that should be abandoned (i.e., all the defiled dharmas) and cultivate those that should be cultivated. Its special activity consists in counteracting idleness and realizing and achieving all good dharmas, mundane and supramundane.

What is called vigilance consists of the four dharmas above-mentioned, zeal and the three roots of excellence, which possess the power to guard against dharmas that should be abandoned and cultivate those that should be cultivated. Vigilance has no nature of its own apart from these four dharmas, because it possesses no characteristics different from those of the four, and because, apart from the power of the four, it has no activity proper in the prevention of evil dharmas and the cultivation of good ones.

No doubt, faith, the sense of shame, and other good Caittas possess this same potentiality for good as opposed to evil; but, in comparison with the four, their activity is slight and commonplace; they are not roots of excellence like the three above-mentioned Caittas; and they do not stimulate good dharmas universally as zeal does. Hence they are not the supporting basis for vigilance, that is to say, the thing which is designated by the term 'vigilance'.

Objection – In regard to 'prevention' and 'cultivation', are they not characteristics and activities proper to vigilance? Since vigilance has its own nature proper, why do you say that it embodies the four dharmas as its essential nature?

Reply: – What is the difference between the prevention-cultivation of vigilance and that of the four dharmas?

Objection: It is in dependence upon vigilance that the four have this activity of prevention and cultivation.

Reply: We say, likewise, that vigilance must, in turn, depend on some other dharma, and so it follows *ad infinitum*.

Objection: Zeal is only the universal stimulator of good dharmas and the

汝防修用其相云何？

若普依持即無貪等，若徧策錄不異精進，止惡進善即總四法。

令不散亂應是等持，令同取境與觸何別？
令不忘失即應是念。

如是推尋不放逸用離無貪等竟不可得，故不放逸定無別體。

云何行捨？
精進三根令心平等正直無功用住爲性。
對治掉舉靜住爲業。
謂即四法令心遠離掉舉等障靜住名捨，平等正直無功用住。初中後位辯捨差別，由不放逸先除雜染，捨復令心寂靜而住。

此無別體，如不放逸離彼四法無相用故，能令寂靜即四法故，所令寂靜即心等故。

云何不害？
於諸有情不爲損惱無瞋爲性。能對治害悲慼爲業。
謂即無瞋，於有情所不爲損惱假名不害。

無瞋翻對斷物命瞋，不害正違損惱物害。
無瞋與樂，不害拔苦。是謂此二麤相差別。

three roots of excellence are their point of support. How can you say that these four Caittas have prevention and cultivation as their mode of activity?

Reply: What, then, according to you, is the mode of activity of prevention-cultivation? If by prevention-cultivation you mean that which, in general, serves as the support of good dharmas, that which nourishes good dharmas, then it is a question of non-covetousness etc. If you mean that which universally stimulates good dharmas, then prevention-cultivation is not different from zeal. Hence it is these four dharmas that prevent the bad and cultivate the good.

If by prevention-cultivation you mean that which causes the mind not to disperse itself, it is a question of Samadhi (meditation); if you mean that which causes the Citta-Caittas to take their object, it is a question of mental contact (Sparsa); if you mean that which prevents forgetfulness, it is a question of memory (Smrti). From these lines of reasoning we arrive at the conclusion that vigilance can have no activities apart from non-covetousness etc. (the four dharmas). Hence vigilance is not a dharma in itself; it has no nature of its own apart from the four dharmas.

10. What is equanimity (Upeksa)?

Equanimity has as its essential nature zeal and the 'three roots of excellence' which cause the mind to rest in a state of equality, rectitude, and effortlessness. Its special activity consists in counteracting mental agitation (Auddhatya) **and producing mental tranquillity.**

In other words, these four dharmas, causing the mind to be far-removed and separated from the barriers of agitation etc. and to rest in a state of tranquillity, are termed equanimity.

The qualities of equality, rectitude, and effortlessness correspond to the three stages of equanimity and indicate its species.

Vigilance precedes and expels all impure qualities (*samklesa*). Equanimity follows and causes the mind to rest in a state of quiescence and tranquillity.

Like vigilance, equanimity has no separate nature of its own, because it has neither character nor activity apart from the four dharmas, i.e., zeal and the three roots of excellence; because that which produces mental quiescence and tranquillity is the synthesis of these four dharmas; because that which is rendered quiet and tranquil is the Citta-Caittas to the exclusion of the four dharmas. It is the former meaning that is adopted here, that is to say, equanimity is understood as the dharma that can tranquillize the mind. This being the case, it is the same as the four dharmas in question.

11. What is harmlessness (Avihimsa)?

Harmlessness, which means 'not causing any injury and anguish to sentient beings', has non-anger as its essential nature. Its special activity consists in counteracting harmfulness and producing compassion. That is to say, non-anger or non-hatred, inasmuch as it does not cause injury and torment to sentient beings, is conventionally termed harmlessness.

Non-anger or non-hatred is opposed to anger or hatred which cuts off the life of beings; harmlessness is opposed to harmfulness which causes injury and anguish to beings. Non-anger gives pleasure (it is benevolence); harmless-

理實無瞋實有自體，不害依彼一分假立。

爲顯慈悲二相別故，利樂有情彼二勝故。

有說不害非即無瞋，別有自體謂賢善性。
〔述記：薩婆多師正理論等說謂賢善性。〕
此相云何？
謂不損惱。
無瞋亦爾，寧別有性？謂於有情不爲損惱，慈悲賢善，是無瞋故。

諸門分別於中有十二

第一· 義攝所餘

及顯十一義別心所，謂欣厭等善心所法。

雖義有別說種種名而體無異，故不別立。

欣謂欲俱無瞋一分，於所欣境不憎恚故。
〔述記：此性非欲，欲俱法也。〕

不忿恨惱嫉等亦然，隨應正翻瞋一分故。
〔述記：隨應之言顯不同欣與欲俱故，此忿等不然，各各別翻。又但是彼無瞋一分故言隨應。〕

厭謂慧俱無貪一分，於所厭境不染著故。

不慳憍等當知亦然，隨應正翻貪一分故。
〔述記：隨應之言前厭慧俱，此不爾故，又各各翻。〕

不覆誑諂無貪癡一分，隨應正翻貪癡一分故。

有義不覆唯無癡一分，無處說覆亦貪一分故。

ness relieves suffering (it is compassion). In this lies the difference between their apparent characters.

In fact, non-anger is a dharma which possesses a nature of its own, while harmlessness is merely a name established on the basis of a part of non-anger (that part which relieves suffering). These two dharmas are distinguished to indicate the distinct characteristics of benevolence and compassion, because these two virtues are essential elements of the well-being of sentient beings.

According to one opinion (Sarvastivadin), harmlessness is not non-anger, but possesses a separate nature of its own, that is, a good virtuous nature.

In what does this good virtuous nature consist?

One replies: In not causing injury or anguish.

But non-anger also is 'not causing injury or anguish'. How can harmlessness have a nature of its own? Non-injury and non-torment to sentient beings, a good virtuous nature, benevolence and compassion are all, in fact, qualities belonging to non-anger and non-hatred.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE GOOD CAITTAS

1. Good Caittas not comprised in the Eleven

The word 'and' in the Chinese version of the Stanza (' . . . *and* harmlessness') indicates that there are other good Caittas besides the eleven in question, Caittas of different meanings, such as pleasure or satisfaction, disgust, etc. The reason for their exclusion from the group is that although, on the basis of their meanings, they are called by different names, their nature is the same as that of the eleven Caittas in question; hence they are not separately established as good dharmas.

Pleasure or satisfaction is a part of non-anger and is associated with desire, because it is non-hatred and non-irritation in regard to objects which give pleasure or satisfaction. In the same way, this applies to such Caittas as non-fury, non-enmity, non-vexation, non-jealousy, etc. They are respectively opposed to fury, enmity, vexation, and jealousy. Being directly opposed to a part of anger, they are different parts of non-anger (*Advesa*) without being associated with desire (Chanda).

Disgust is a part of non-covetousness and is associated with discernment, because it is non-attachment to disgusting objects.

It should be understood that this is likewise true of such Caittas as non-parsimony, non-pride, etc. They are different parts of non-covetousness. Each of these dharmas is directly opposed to a part of covetousness without being associated with discernment.

Non-dissimulation, non-hypocrisy or frankness and non-duplicity or sincerity are different parts of non-covetousness and non-delusion, because they are directly opposed to parts of covetousness and delusion.

According to another opinion, non-dissimulation is a part of non-delusion only, because nowhere in the Treatise has it been said that it is a part of covetousness.

有義不慢信一分攝，謂若信彼不慢彼故。
有義不慢捨一分攝，心平等者不高慢故。
有義不慢慚一分攝，若崇重彼不慢彼故。
有義不疑即信所攝，謂若信彼無猶豫故。
有義不疑即正勝解，以決定者無猶豫故。
有義不疑即正慧攝，以正見者無猶豫故。
不散亂體即正定攝，正見正知俱善慧攝。
不忘念者即是正念。

悔眠尋伺通染不染，如觸欲等無別翻對。

第二· 問答廢立

何緣諸染所翻善中有別建立，有不爾者？

相用別者便別立之，餘善不然故不應責。

又諸染法徧六識者勝故翻之，別立善法。

慢等忿等唯意識俱。
〔述記：根本中慢等七隨惑之中忿等九法唯意識起，流染識少。所以不翻別立善法。〕

害雖亦然， 而數現起損惱他故， 障無上乘勝因悲故，
爲了知彼增上過失翻立不害。
〔述記：此則損自他。〕

失念散亂及不正知，翻入別境，善中不說。

第三· 徵責多少

染淨相翻，淨寧少染？

淨勝染劣，少敵多故。

Different opinions on non-conceit: (1) it is comprised in one part of faith or belief, because one does not manifest conceit towards that in which one has faith; (2) it is a part of equanimity, because, when the mind is equable and equanimous, it is not conceited; (3) it is a part of the sense of shame, because one is not conceited towards that person whom one esteems and reveres.

Different opinions on non-doubt: (1) it is comprised in faith or belief, because one does not cherish doubts about that in which one has faith; (2) it is right resolve, because that which is fixed and determined does not give rise to doubts or misgivings; (3) it is comprised in right discernment, because that which is understood or viewed correctly does not give rise to doubts or misgivings.

Non-distraction or non-dispersion is of the same nature as 'right meditation' (*samyak samadhi*):

Right view and right knowledge are both comprised in good discernment.

Non-forgetfulness is 'right memory'.

As regards the 'indeterminate' Caittas, namely, repentance, drowsiness, reflection and investigation, they can be defiled or non-defiled like the Universal Caittas or the Special Caittas (mental contact etc.; desire etc.). There are no good Caittas that constitute their corresponding opposites.

2. Why a list of eleven

Why is it that, among the good Caittas which are opposed to the defiled Caittas (klesas and upaklesas, twenty-six in all), some are specially catalogued in the list of eleven, while others are not?

Only those good dharmas which have special characteristics and special activities are specially catalogued in the list. The others, being devoid of special characteristics and activities, are not listed.

Further, the defiled dharmas which extend throughout the six consciousnesses have a capital importance. Those dharmas that are opposed to them are therefore established as good ones.

Now the seven fundamental klesas, of which conceit is the first, and the nine secondary upaklesas (excluding harmfulness), of which fury is the first, are associated with Manovijnana only. Although this is also the case with harmfulness, nevertheless, inasmuch as this Caitta manifests itself frequently, as it is injurious to oneself and to others, as it impedes the manifestation of compassion which is the noblest virtue underlying the supreme Vehicle, the opposite Caitta of harmlessness is established as a good dharma to show the extreme injuriousness and guilt of harmfulness.

Forgetfulness, distraction, and non-discernment are opposed to the special Caittas of memory, Samadhi, and discernment; consequently, their antitheses, non-forgetfulness etc., are not ranged among the eleven good dharmas.

3. Numbers of good and bad Caittas compared

Pure dharmas and defiled ones are opposed to each other. Why is it that the former are less numerous than the latter?

Pure dharmas are strong; defiled dharmas are weak: a small number of pure dharmas is sufficient to act as opponents to a large number of defiled dharmas.

又解理通說多同體，迷情事局隨相分多，故於染淨不應齊責。

第四· 假實

此十一法三是假有，謂不放逸捨及不害，義如前說。餘八實有，相用別故。

第五· 俱起

有義十一四徧善心，精進三根徧善品故，餘七不定。

推尋事理未決定時不生信故，慚愧同類依處各別，隨起一時第二無故。
要世間道斷煩惱時有輕安故，不放逸捨無漏道時方得起故，悲愍有情時乃有不害故。

論說十一六位中起，謂決定位有信相應，止息染時有慚愧起顧自他故，於善品位有精進三根，世間道時有輕安起，於出世道有捨不放逸，攝衆生時有不害故。
〔述記：瑜伽論五十五說六位中起十一善。〕

有義彼說未爲應理，推尋事理未決定心信若不生應非是善，如染心等無淨信故。

慚愧類異依別境同，俱徧善心前已說故。
若出世道輕安不生，應此覺支非無漏故。

若世間道無捨不放逸，應非寂靜防惡修善故，又應不伏

Again, pure dharmas, being concerned with the understanding of the general meaning of things, are all of the same nature, however extensively they are discussed as spiritual qualities, whereas defiled dharmas must necessarily be multiplied by reason of the particular characteristics of objects that confuse the feelings and desires. Therefore, there is no occasion to criticize our system by insisting on the exact equality of number between defiled dharmas and pure ones.

4. Real existence and existence in name only

Among the eleven good dharmas, three are existent in name, i.e., vigilance, equanimity, and harmlessness, as we have already explained. The remaining eight are 'real', possessing distinct characteristics and activities.

5. Universality

(1) According to one opinion, among the eleven good Caittas, four are universals, being found in all good mental activities: zeal and the three roots of excellence, because they penetrate the entire category of good dharmas. The seven others are not necessarily present in all good mental activities.

In fact, a. when one examines a thing or a principle, and before having arrived at a decision, one does not develop belief; b. the sense of shame and that of integrity being of the same species, but having different 'supports' and 'localities', when one is developed, the other is not; c. there is composure of mind only when one has cut off the klesas by the mundane Path; d. vigilance and equanimity are born on the supramundance Path only; there is harmlessness only when one has compassion for sentient beings.

The Yogasastra, 55, says that the eleven good Caittas are produced in six circumstances: (a) In the state of decision there is belief; (b) when one has eliminated the defiled dharmas, there is a sense of shame or one of integrity, by reason of oneself or of others;[1] (c) in the state where the category of good reigns, there are zeal and the 'three roots'; (d) on the mundane Path there is composure of body and mind; (e) on the supramundane Path there are equanimity and vigilance; (f) when one cherishes goodwill for all sentient beings, there is harmlessness.

(2) But, according to other masters, the preceding theory is wrong.

In fact, a. if belief is lacking in the state in which, on examining a thing or a principle, one has not arrived at a decision, this state is not good, just as a defiled or non-defined mind in which 'pure faith' is lacking is not good; b. the sense of shame and that of integrity, though of different natures and different supports, have the same object: hence both are found in all good minds, as we have seen in a preceding section; c. if composure of mind is not born on the supramundance Path, then this 'characteristic of Bodhi' is not pure;[2] d. if equanimity and vigilance were lacking on the mundane Path, the mind of the yogi treading this Path would not be calm and peaceful,

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[1] The nature of shame is 'to revere and respect good dharmas by reason of one's own power' while the nature of integrity is 'to contemn vileness and resist evil by reason of the external world'. See Section on 'The Good Caittas'.

[2] Composure of mind is one of the seven characteristics of Bodhi called Saptabodhyanga.

掉放逸故。 有漏善心既具四法， 如出世道應有二故。

〔述記：若捨不放逸唯出世道有，世間道心應非寂靜，以無捨故。亦應不能防惡修善，無不放逸故。既有寂靜等，故有捨不放逸。又世閒善心應不伏掉舉及伏放逸，無能治故。〕

善心起時皆不損物，違能損法有不害故。

論說六位起十一者， 依彼彼增作此此說， 故彼所說定非應理。

應說信等十一法中十徧善心， 輕安不徧， 要在定位方有輕安，調暢身心餘位無故。

決擇分說， 十善心所定不定地皆徧善心， 定地心中增輕安故。

有義定加行亦得定地名， 彼亦微有調暢義故， 由斯欲界亦有輕安，不爾，便違本地分說信等十一通一切地。

有義輕安唯在定有， 由定滋養有調暢故， 論說欲界諸心心所由闕輕安名不定地。

〔述記：六十三等說。〕

說一切地有十一者，通有尋伺等三地皆有故。

第六· 正義

此十一種前已具說， 第七八識隨位有無， 第六識中定位皆具，若非定位唯闕輕安。

有義五識唯有十種，自性散動無輕安故。

有義五識亦有輕安， 定所引善者亦有調暢故， 成所作智俱必有輕安故。

because it would lack the qualities to stop evil and cultivate good and also because it would be incapable of subduing agitation and idleness. The mundane Path must, like the supramundane one, have these two qualities in manifestation since the impure good mind is provided with the four dharmas (zeal and the three roots of excellence); e. when a good mind manifests itself, whatever it may be, this mind, in contrast with dharmas which do harm to others, is not injurious to others; hence it is definitely accompanied by harmlessness.

When the Sastra enumerates the six states in which the eleven good dharmas are produced, it claims only to indicate those states in which such and such a good dharma is particularly flourishing. Hence the theory which we are criticizing is not correct.

In fact, it should be stated that, among the eleven good Caittas, ten are found in all good minds, and that composure is not a Universal, partly because a state of meditation (*samadhi*) is necessary for the manifestation of this Caitta and partly because feelings of good comfort and joy of body and mind, essential elements of composure, are lacking in the other states.

The Yogasastra, 69, says, 'Ten good Caittas, in the worlds of Samadhi and non-Samadhi, accompany every good mind; but, in the world of Samadhi, there is added composure.'

There are different opinions on what should be understood by the 'Land of Samadhi'. According to one opinion, this expression also extends to the preparatory stage preceding Samadhi. There is here a certain subtle and gentle feeling of comfort and joy. Hence Kamadhatu also has composure. On the contrary hypothesis, how can the Yogasastra affirm that the eleven good dharmas, belief etc., are found 'in all lands'?

According to another opinion – which is correct – composure belongs solely to Samadhi in the superior Dhatus. In fact, it is from the nourishment of Samadhi that the feeling of comfort and joy arises. The Yogasastra, 63, also says that the Cittas and Caittas of Kamadhatu, by reason of the lack of composure, are named 'non-Samadhi'. Hence, when it says that the eleven good dharmas are found 'in all lands', it is speaking of the three lands of reflection, investigation, etc., not of Kamadhatu etc.

6–8. Associations

6. We have explained in what cases the eleven good dharmas are associated or non-associated with the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. As to the sixth consciousness, in the state of Samadhi it is accompanied by all the eleven; in the state of non-Samadhi, composure is necessarily lacking.

As to the five consciousnesses, there are two opinions. In the opinion of some, the five consciousnesses, being 'distracted' by nature, are never associated with composure: hence only ten good dharmas are associated with them. In the opinion of others, the Five may be associated with it, because when they are good as a result of Samadhi, they include the feeling of harmony and joy, and because the 'Perfect Achievement Wisdom' (Krtyanusthanajnana)

第七· 五受俱

此善十一何受相應？

十五相應，一除憂苦，有逼迫受無調暢故。

第八· 別境相應

此與別境皆得相應，信等欲等不相違故。

第九· 三性

十一唯善。

第十· 三界

輕安非欲，餘通三界。

第十一· 三學

皆學等三。

第十二· 三斷

非見所斷瑜伽論說信等六根唯修所斷非見所斷。

〔述記：五十七二十二根中說。〕

餘門分別，如理應思。

五· 煩惱心所

如是已說善位心所，煩惱心所其相云何？

頌曰：

煩惱謂貪瞋， 癡慢疑惡見。

論曰：

此貪等六性是根本煩惱攝故得煩惱名。

貪

云何爲貪？

[into which the five consciousnesses are to be transformed in due time] is necessarily associated with composure.

7. With what sensations are the eleven good dharmas associated?

Ten Caittas can be associated with all the five sensations. Composure is not associated with grief and sorrow (anxiety and suffering), because these two afflicting sensations are incompatible with the feeling of harmony and joy.

8. All of them, pure or impure, can be associated with the five Special Caittas (desire etc.), for there is no contradiction between belief etc. on the one hand and desire etc. on the other.

9–12. Moral nature, Dhatu, etc.

9. All are exclusively good.

10. Composure is lacking in Kamadhatu. The other Caittas are found in all the three Dhatus.

11. The eleven Caittas are found in all Saiksas, Asaiksas, and Naivasaiksanasaiksas.

12. They are not 'to be abandoned by insight into transcendent Truth', for the Yogasastra, 57, says that the six Indriyas – belief, zeal, memory, Samadhi, discernment, and the power of learning the Four Noble Truths – are to be abandoned by meditation and self-cultivation only, not by insight into transcendent Truth.

The other problems, including retribution etc., should be solved by the same process of reasoning.

5. THE KLESAS
Vexing Passions

We have explained the good Caittas. What are the characteristics of the klesas (vexing passions)?

The Stanza says:

12a

The klesas are covetousness (Raga), anger (Pratigha),

Delusion (Moha), conceit (Mana), doubt (Vicikitsa), and
false views (Kudrsti).

The Treatise says:

These six dharmas (covetousness etc.) receive the name of *klesa* because they constitute the fundamental klesas (Mulaklesas or roots of the upaklesas).

1. What is covetousness (Raga)?
It has as its essential nature defiled attachment to the states of mortal

於有有具染著爲性，能障無貪生苦爲業。

〔述記：有者謂後有，卽唯異熟三有果也。有具者，卽中有幷煩惱業及器世等三有具故，或無漏法。〕

謂由愛力取蘊生故。

瞋

云何爲瞋？

於苦苦具憎恚爲性，能障無瞋不安隱性，惡行所依爲業。

謂瞋必令身心熱惱，起諸惡業不善性故。

癡

云何爲癡？

於諸理事迷闇爲性。能障無癡一切雜染所依爲業。

謂由無明起疑邪見貪等煩惱隨煩惱業能招後生雜染法故。

慢

云何爲慢？

恃己於他高舉爲性，能障不慢生苦爲業。

謂若有慢，於德有德心不謙下，由此生死輪轉無窮受諸苦故。

此慢差別有七九種，謂於三品我德處生。

〔述記：於三品起四，於我起一，於德起二。〕

一切皆通見修所斷，聖位我慢旣得現行，慢類由斯起亦無失。

疑

云何爲疑？

於諸諦理猶豫爲性，能障不疑善品爲業，謂猶豫者善不生故。

existence (*bhava*) in the three Dhatus and the causes of this triple existence (*bhavopakaranas*).

[By Bhava is meant existence to come, the triple existence, which is only retribution. By Bhavopakarana is meant the intermediate existence, with the klesas, the acts, the receptacle world, and also the pure dharmas.]

Its special activity consists in impeding non-covetousness and engendering suffering, for it is through the force of 'craving-thirst for possession' (*trsna*) that the tenacious bonds, or skandhas (*upadanaskandhas*), attaching to mortality are born.

2. What is anger (Pratigha)?

Its nature is irritation where suffering and its causes are concerned. Its special activity is to impede non-anger, create discomfort, and cause bad acts to be done, because, by reason of anger, one is necessarily tormented in body and mind to the extent of performing evil actions. Anger is, in fact, bad by nature.

3. What is delusion (Moha)?

Its nature is confusion and obscurity with reference to principles and the meaning of things. Its special activity is to impede non-delusion and serve as the point of support for all impure dharmas, because it is by reason of delusion that one necessarily produces doubt, false views, klesas, upaklesas (covetousness etc.), wrong actions, and all impure dharmas that cause rebirth in the three Dhatus.

4. What is conceit (Mana)?

Its nature is to 'place oneself above others', i.e., to elevate oneself in relation to others. Its special activity is to impede non-conceit (Amana) and engender suffering.

In other words, when there is conceit or inflated opinion of oneself and one's virtues and abilities, the mind is not humble. As a result of this, the wheel of birth and death continues to turn endlessly and one experiences sufferings of all kinds.

Kinds of conceit: There are seven or nine kinds. Of the seven, four are related to the three categories (inferior, equal, superior), one related to the Skandhas, and two to qualities.

All kinds of conceit are to be 'abandoned or cut off by insight into Transcendent Truth (*darsana*) and self-cultivation (bhavana)'. Inasmuch as Self-conceit can manifest itself even among saints (Aryas), it is not incorrect to admit that inborn conceit is produced in the Path of Meditation and Self-cultivation.

5. What is doubt (Vicikitsa)?

It is uncertainty of mind with reference to all eternal verities and principles. Its special activity is to impede non-doubt and all categories of excellence. For good thoughts are never born in those who are in doubt about fundamental principles.

According to the opinion of various masters of the Greater Vehicle, doubt

有義此疑以慧爲體，猶豫簡擇說爲疑故。

〔述記：大論說猶豫簡擇說爲疑也。〕

毘助末底是疑義故，末底般若義無異故。

〔述記：所謂末底是慧異名，與般若無別體，於慧上加毘字助之。毘是種種義，卽種種慧也。〕

有義此疑別有自體，令慧不决，非即慧故。

瑜伽論說六煩惱中見世俗有即慧分故，餘是實有別有性故。

毘助末底執慧爲疑，毘助若南智應爲識。[1]

界由助力義便轉變，是故此疑非慧爲體。

惡見

云何惡見？

於諸諦理顚倒推度染慧爲性，能障善見招苦爲業。

謂惡見者多受苦故。

此見行相差別有五。

一薩迦耶見，謂於五取蘊執我我所一切見趣所依爲業。

此見差別有二十句，六十五等分別起攝。

二邊執見，謂即於彼隨執斷常障處中行出離爲業。

此見差別諸見趣中有執前際四徧常論，一分常論，及計後際有想十六，無想俱非各有八論，七斷滅論等，分別趣攝。

三邪見，謂謗因果作用實事及非四見諸餘邪執，如增上緣名義徧故。

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[1] 述記：訓釋辭中汝以末底是慧毘助之故說慧體爲疑，亦應若南是智毘助之故說智爲識。毘是種種義，由助智故變名爲識體非卽智，何以助末底疑體卽慧？又如職吉蹉是治療義，毘職吉蹉是疑義，豈以毘言助之疑體卽治療？

is discernment (Prajna) by nature, because (1) the Yogasastra says that doubt is uncertain discrimination; (2) the meaning of doubt (Vicikitsa) is *vimati*; the prefix *vi* denotes diversity or different kinds, and the word *mati* is synonymous with discernment.

According to another opinion, doubt is a dharma in itself, which causes discernment to be uncertain. It is not discernment. In fact, the Yogasastra says that, of the six klesas, Drsti 'view' has only relative existence, being a part of discernment, while the five other klesas are real dharmas possessing special natures of their own.

If one maintains that Vimati is discernment because the word *vimati* is formed from *mati* and the prefix *vi*, one should also say that Vijnana (consciousness) is Jnana (wisdom), because we have the word *jnana* and the prefix *vi*. The meaning of a root (*dhatu*) is modified by the prefix. Therefore doubt is not discernment by nature.

6. What are bad or erroneous views (*Kudrsti*)?

They have as their essential nature defiled discernment, that is, false or topsy-turvy speculations and judgments in regard to eternal verities and principles. Their mode of activity is to impede 'good views' and to produce suffering. For the man entertaining bad views most frequently experiences suffering.

The different aspects of bad views are five in number.

(1) *Satkayadrsti*: – To take the five Upadanaskandhas for 'I and mine'.[1] The special activity of bad views is to serve as a supporting basis for all false opinions.

This Drsti (view) comprises twenty erroneous ways of conceiving dharmas and also sixty-five ways all included in the category of discrimination (Vikalpa). [The Sanskrit is *satkaya: kaya* signifies 'accumulation'; *sat* signifies 'false'.]

(2) *Antagrahadrsti* (one-sided extreme views): – To conceive as eternal or as destructible the Atman claimed and postulated by the Satkayadrsti. This one-sided view is expressed in action as the obstruction of both the middle path, which lies between the extreme theses of eternity and annihilation, and ultimate emancipation (i.e., the attainment of Nirvana).

Varieties: – Among the varieties of one-sided extreme views there are: a. clinging to the past, four theories of general eternity and four of partial eternity; b. clinging to the future, sixteen theories of conscious existence, eight of unconscious existence, eight of neither-conscious-nor-unconscious existence, seven of annihilation, etc.

(3) *Mithyadrsti* (false views): – 'False views' refer to the negation of cause ('There is no alms-giving or good act as cause . . . '), of fruit 'There is no retribution . . . ', of action 'This world does not exist . . . ', and of realities 'There is no Arhat'. With the exception of the four other erroneous views – Satkayadrsti, Antagrahadrsti, and the two Paramarsas – they include all other false conceptions just as Adhipatipratyaya includes all *pratyayas* which are not Hetu, Alambana and Samanantarapratyaya.

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[1] The Five Upadanaskandhas are the five tenacious bonds, or skandhas, attaching to mortality.

此見差別，諸見趣中有執前際二無因論，四有邊等不死矯亂。

及計後際五現涅槃。

〔述記：此等皆不依我見起，故邪見攝。〕

或計自在世主釋梵及餘物類常恒不易。

或計自在等是一切物因，或有橫計諸邪解脫。

或有妄執非道爲道，諸如是等皆邪見攝。

四見取，謂於諸見及所依蘊執爲最勝能得清淨，一切鬬諍所依爲業。

五戒禁取，謂於隨順諸見戒禁及所依蘊執爲最勝能得清淨，無利勤苦所依爲業。

然有處說執爲最勝名爲見取，執能得淨名戒取者，是影略說，或隨轉門。

〔述記：如對法第一，大論第八二文，顯揚第一，五蘊等皆云，見取執爲最勝不言能得淨，戒取名得淨不言是勝，與小乘等同。〕

不爾，如何非滅計滅非道計道說爲邪見，非二取攝？

諸門分別

A. 俱生分別門

如是總別十煩惱中六通俱生及分別起，任運思察俱得生故。

疑後三見唯分別起，要由惡友及邪教力自審思察方得生故。

邊執見中通俱生者，有義唯斷，常見相麤惡友等力方引生故。

瑜伽等說何邊執見是俱生耶？謂斷見攝。

學現觀者起如是怖今者我我何所在耶？

故禽獸等若遇違緣，皆恐我斷而起驚怖。

Varieties: – Among the varieties of false views there are: a. relative to the past, two theories of non-causality, four theories about the limitation of the world, etc., and four false and confusing conceptions about the deathlessness of Brahma; b. relative to the future, five theories of Nirvana in this life which are part of Mithyadrsti, because they do not proceed from Atmadrsti.

Or else one believes in Isvara (Isvaradeva), in the master of the world (*mahesvaradeva*), in Sakra, in Brahma and in other beings of this type, regarding them as eternal and immutable; or one believes that Isvara is the universal cause of all things; or one admits false deliverances; or one considers that which is not the Path as being the Path. All these views and others are included in the category of false views (Mithyadrsti).

(4) *Drstiparamarsa*: – To consider as excellent (*paramatas*) and capable of producing purity (Nirvana) other false views and those skandhas which serve their support. The function of these false views is to furnish occasions for various disputes and struggles.

(5) *Silavrataparamarsa*: – To consider as excellent and capable of producing purity practices and exercises adopted by reason of these false views and the skandhas which serve as their support. The function of these views is to furnish occasions for useless endeavours and suffering.

Many texts, Abhidharma, Yogasastra, Pancaskandhaka, say that 'to consider as excellent' is Drstiparamarsa, and that 'to consider as capable of producing purity' is Silavrataparamarsa. These texts express themselves in an ambiguous and laconic manner or they follow the theory of the Hinayana. If their definitions were correct, why should the Yogasastra say that 'to consider non-annihilation as annihilation and the non-path as path' forms part of Mithyadrsti and not of the two Paramarsas?

PROBLEMS RFLATING TO THE KLESAS

1. Inborn klesas and those arising from speculation and discrimination

Of the ten klesas six are both inborn and pertaining to speculation and discrimination, because they can be born either spontaneously or by reflection. Doubt and the last three Drstis (*mithyadrsti* and the two *paramarsas*) arise only from speculation and discrimination, because they can only be born in consequence of the influence of bad friends and wrong teaching and as the result of personal reasoning and reflection.

It is said that Antagrahadrsti (one-sided extreme view) is both inborn and pertaining to speculation. But, according to one opinion, only the concept of annihilation (Ucchedadrsti) can be both inborn and pertaining to speculation; as to the concept of eternity (Sasvatadrsti), being crude, it is not born except in consequence of the influence of bad friends etc. The Yogasastra says, 'Which of the Antagrahadrstis is inborn? – That which is included in Ucchedadrsti (concept of annihilation). He who practises the meditation called "the penetration of Truth" (Satyabhisamaya) produces the fear as follows: "Now, where am I?" ' Hence animals, in the presence of hostile causes, fear annihilation of the self and abandon themselves to fear.

有義彼論依麤相說，理實俱生亦通常見。

謂禽獸等執我常存，熾然造集長時資具。

故顯揚等諸論皆說，於五取蘊執斷計常或是俱生，或分別起。

B. 自類相應門

此十煩惱誰幾相應？
貪與瞋疑定不俱起。
愛憎二境必不同故。
於境不決無染著故。
貪與慢見或得相應。

所愛所陵境非一故說不俱起，所染所恃境可同故說得相應。於五見境皆可愛故，貪與五見相應無失。

〔述記：謂若於他起愛染者必不陵彼，以境非同行相亦別，故不俱起。然緣己身起愛名所染，與所恃之我慢等境可一故，對法等說得相應。〕

瞋與慢疑或得俱起，所瞋所恃境非一故說不相應，所蔑所憎境可同故說得俱起。

初猶豫時未憎彼故說不俱起，久思不決便憤發故說得相應。

疑順違事隨應亦爾。

瞋與二取必不相應，執爲勝道不憎彼故。

此與三見或得相應，於有樂蘊起身常見不生憎故說不相應，於有苦蘊起身常見生憎恚故說得俱起。

斷見翻此，說瞋有無。

邪見誹撥惡事好事，如次說瞋或無或有。

Nevertheless, according to another opinion, this theory of the Yogasastra is aiming at Drsti of a coarse nature. In fact, the concept of eternity (Sasvatadrsti) is also inborn. For animals, considering the 'I' to be eternal, zealously accumulate provisions for a long period. Hence Vikhyapana says, 'Whether the five Upadanaskandhas are taken as eternal or destructible, it is either inborn Drsti or Drsti of speculation.'

2. Interrelations of the ten klesas

How are the ten klesas associated with one another?

Covetousness is not born simultaneously with anger or doubt, because objects of love and hatred are certainly not the same, and because there cannot be defiled attachment to objects that are not certain.

Covetousness may be associated with conceit and the five Drstis or erroneous views.

The loved object is not identical with the despised object. [If one has love for another, one does not despise that person.] Hence covetousness and conceit do not arise simultaneously. But *the body which gives* rise to *love* for oneself may be the same body that causes conceit towards others. Hence covetousness and conceit which, in this case, have the same object of perception can be associated with each other. As regards the five Drstis, there is no difficulty in the association of covetousness with these erroneous views, because one can love all of them.

Anger may be associated with conceit and doubt. – As the hated object is not identical with the esteemed object, i.e., the inner conceited self, anger is not associated with conceit. But as the despised outer object can be the same as the hated object, it may be said that anger can arise simultaneously with conceit. In the beginning one has no hatred for the object of which one is uncertain (i.e., about which one is entertaining doubts); hence anger is not associated with doubt. But, when the examination or the thought-process is prolonged without arriving at certainty, one is irritated; then anger is associated with doubt. Furthermore, anger is associated or non-associated with doubt according as the uncertain object is advantageous or disadvantageous.

Anger is not associated with the two Paramarsas (viewing as excellent false opinions and wrong practices), because one does not at all hate the object considered as part of the excellent Path.

Anger may be associated with the first three Drstis ('I-and-mine' views, one-sided extreme views, and false views). – One has no hatred when, in relation to skandhas of happiness, one conceives views of Atman and eternity: hence anger, in this case, is not associated with 'I-and-mine' views (Satkayadrsti) and views of eternity (Sasvatadrsti). The contrary applies when it is a question of skandhas of suffering. – As regards views of annihilation (Ucchedadrsti), the contrary applies: one rejoices at the thought of the annihilation of skandhas of suffering and becomes grieved and irritated at the thought of the annihilation of skandhas of happiness. False views (Mithyadrsti), according as they deny bad things or good things, are non-accompanied or accompanied by anger.

慢於境定，疑則不然，故慢與疑無相應義。

慢與五見皆容俱起，行相展轉不相違故。

然與斷見必不俱生，執我斷時無陵恃故。

與身邪見一分亦爾。

〔述記：慢多緣樂蘊生，與緣苦俱蘊我見一分及邪見撥無苦集諦理一分，不與慢俱起。〕

疑不審決，與見相違，故疑與見定不俱起。

五見展轉必不相應，非一心中有多慧故。

癡與九種皆定相應，諸煩惱生必由癡故。

C. 諸識相應門

此十煩惱何識相應？

藏識全無，末那有四，意識具十，五識唯三謂貪瞋癡，無分別故，由稱量等起慢等故。

D. 諸受相應門

此十煩惱何受相應？
貪瞋癡三俱生分別一切容與五受相應。
貪會違緣憂苦俱故，瞋遇順境喜樂俱故。

有義俱生分別起慢容與非苦四受相應，恃苦劣蘊憂相應故。

有義俱生亦苦俱起，意有苦受前已說故。

分別慢等純苦趣無，彼無邪師邪教等故。

〔述記：無分別慢等，即等一切分別貪瞋癡疑邪見見戒取等。〕

然彼不造引惡趣業，要分別起能發彼故。

〔述記義演：由前生強分別惑之勢力而造諸業名有分別也。〕

Conceit is not associated with doubt, because its object must be certain, whereas the object of doubt is not.

Conceit can be associated with the five erroneous views (Drstis), for the modes of activity of these Caittas are not contradictory. However, conceit is definitely not associated with views of annihilation (Ucchedadrsti), because, when one believes in the annihilation of the Atman, one neither despises another nor esteems oneself. Similarly, conceit is not associated with a part of Satkayadrsti ('I-and-mine' views) and Mithyadrsti (false views). [As a rule, conceit has as its object skandhas of happiness whereas Satkayadrsti of the damned has as its object skandhas of suffering: conceit is not associated with this Satkayadrsti].

Doubt, being uncertain, is contradictory to Drsti; hence it is certainly not associated with the five erroneous views.

The five Drstis are not associated among themselves, because two or many varieties of discernment cannot exist simultaneously in a single mind.

Delusion is necessarily associated with the nine klesas, because all klesas are born by reason of delusion.

3. Association of the ten klesas and the eight consciousnesses

How are the ten klesas associated with the eight consciousnesses?

The Alayavijnana is not associated with any of the ten klesas.

The seventh consciousness, Manas, is associated with four.

Manovijnana can be associated with all of them.

The five consciousnesses can be associated with only three: covetousness, anger, and delusion, because they are exempt from speculation and discrimination. Hence they are necessarily lacking in conceit and other klesas which are born of comparison etc.

4. Klesas and sensations (Vedanas)

How are the ten klesas associated with the five sensations?

Covetousness, anger and delusion, whether inborn or pertaining to speculation, can all be associated with the five sensations, because covetousness, in the presence of a hostile object, is associated with grief (in Kamadhatu) and sorrow, and because anger, in the presence of a propitious object (e.g., 'seeing one's enemy dead'), is associated with delight and joy.

According to one opinion, conceit, whether inborn or pertaining to speculation, can be associated with four sensations to the exclusion of sorrow, because, when one esteems or feels conceited about a sorrowful or vile thing (e.g., one's own 'I'), one experiences grief.

According to another opinion, inborn conceit can also be associated with sorrow, for we have seen that Manas can experience the sensation of sorrow. Conceit, covetousness, anger, delusion, doubt, and false views, if born of speculation and discrimination, are non-existent in those 'destinies' which are marked by pure suffering, because false masters, false teaching, and false personal reasoning are lacking there. Also, in these destinies, one does not perform acts which produce a bad destiny, because discrimination is necessary for the performance of such acts.

疑後三見容四受俱，欲疑無苦等亦喜受俱故。

〔述記：以地獄無分別惑故。〕

〔述記：欲界之疑先作惡行疑無苦集諦等，亦喜受俱故，以後苦無故。〕

二取若緣憂俱見等，爾時得與憂相應故。

有義俱生身邊二見但與喜樂捨受相應，非五識俱，唯無記故。

分別二見容四受俱，執苦俱蘊爲我我所，常斷見翻此，與憂相應故。

〔述記：分別二見得四受俱。在極苦處執苦俱蘊爲我我所，及常見者與憂相應，境可憂故，唯不善故。斷見執樂俱蘊，斷亦與憂俱故，恐失樂故。故言翻此喜樂等可知。非在五識等，故無苦俱義。〕

有義二見若俱生者亦苦受俱，純受苦處緣極苦蘊苦相應故。

論說俱生一切煩惱皆於三受現行可得，廣說如前，餘如前說。

〔述記：餘如前說，謂分別二見等同第一師。此中同五十九實義。〕

此依實義。隨麤相者，貪慢四見樂喜捨俱，瞋唯苦憂捨受俱起，癡與五受皆得相應，邪見及疑四俱除苦。

貪癡俱樂通下四地，餘七俱樂除欲通三，疑獨行癡欲唯憂捨。

〔述記：餘七俱樂除欲界，欲界意識無樂受故，通次上三地唯意識俱故。〕

餘受俱起，如理應知。

E. 別境相應門

此與別境幾互相應？

貪瞋癡慢容五俱起，專注一境得有定故。

Doubt and the last three Drstis (*mythiadrsti* and the two *paramarsas*) can be associated with four sensations, excluding sorrow (because in hell there is no klesa of speculation). – For in Kamadhatu doubts about the existence of sorrow, the cause of sorrow, etc., can be accompanied by delight.

The two Paramarsas (views that false opinions and wrong practices are excellent) are associated with grief when they refer to those erroneous views which accompany grief.

According to one opinion, the inborn 'I-and-mine' views and one-sided extreme views (Satkayadrsti and Antagrahadrsti) are only associated with delight, joy, and indifference, because they are not associated with the five consciousnesses (hence sorrow is lacking), and because they are exclusively non-defined (hence grief is lacking). These two Drstis, when they arise from speculation, can be associated with four sensations, adding grief, for to conceive the skandhas of suffering as 'I-and-mine' (Satkayadrsti) and as eternal (Sasvatadrsti) or else to conceive the skandhas of happiness as perishable and destructible (Ucchedadrsti) involves grief, whereas to conceive the former as destructible and the latter as eternal involves joy and delight.

According to another opinion, these two Drstis, when inborn, can also be associated with sorrow, because, in the region of pure suffering, being concerned with extremely painful skandhas, they are associated with sorrow. The Yogasastra, 59, says that 'all inborn klesas can manifest themselves in company with three sensations, sorrow, joy, and indifference', and the rest as above.[1] As regards the remainder which refers to the two Drstis, the explanations of the first masters are correct.

All that precedes is in accordance with correct doctrines. When the coarse characteristics are considered: (1) Covetousness, conceit, and the four erroneous views (Drstis) (to the exclusion of false views) are associated with joy, delight, and indifference; (2) anger is associated only with sorrow, grief and indifference; (3) delusion can be associated with all the five sensations; and (4) false views and doubts are associated with four sensations to the exclusion of sorrow.

The joy which accompanies covetousness and delusion is found in the four lower 'lands' (Kamadhatu and three Dhyanas); the joy which accompanies the seven other klesas is found in the three upper Dhyanas to the exclusion of Kamadhatu (because these klesas belong to the realm of Manas and because Manovijnana in Kamadhatu is foreign to joy.

Doubts and solitary delusion, in Kamadhatu, are associated exclusively with grief and indifference.

Other cases of association of klesas and sensations will be understood by the same process of reasoning.

5. Associations of the ten klesas with the five 'special' Caittas

How are these klesas associated with the 'special' Caittas?

Covetousness, anger, delusion, and conceit can be associated with all the

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[1] See Section on 'The Three Vedanas' and 'The Five Vedanas'.

疑及五見各容四俱。疑除勝解，不決定故。
見非慧俱，不異慧故。

F.　三性相應門

此十煩惱何性所攝？
瞋唯不善，損自他故。

上二界者唯無記攝，定所伏故。

若欲界繫分別起者，唯不善攝，發惡行故。
若是俱生發惡行者，亦不善攝，損自他故。
餘無記攝，細不障善，非極損惱自他處故。

當知俱生身邊二見唯無記攝，不發惡業，雖數現起不障善故。

G.　三界分別門

此十煩惱何界繫耶？
瞋唯在欲，餘通三界。
生在下地未離下染，上地煩惱不現在前，要得彼地根本定者彼地煩惱容現前故。

諸有漏道雖不能伏分別起惑及細俱生，而能伏除俱生麤惑，漸次證得上根本定。

彼但迷事依外門轉，散亂麤動正障定故。
〔述記：依外門轉，簡見道貪等唯緣內見等生故。〕

得彼定已，彼地分別俱生諸惑皆容現前。

five special Caittas, for, when they apply themselves with concentration to an object, they involve Samadhi.

Doubt and the five Drstis (erroneous views) can be associated with four Specials: for doubt, resolve is excluded, because it refers to uncertainty; for the Drstis, discernment is excluded, because two varieties of discernment cannot be simultaneous.

6. Moral categories of the ten klesas

In which moral categories are these ten klesas comprised?

Anger is exclusively bad, because it is harmful to oneself and to others. The remaining nine klesas are either bad or non-defined. In the two superior Dhatus, they are exclusively non-defined, whether they are inborn or pertaining to speculation, because they are 'subdued' by Samadhi. In Kamadhatu, when they pertain to speculation, they are exclusively bad, because they provoke bad action; when they are inborn, they are also bad in the case in which they provoke bad action, because they are then harmful to oneself and to others; when this is not the case, they are non-defined because they are subtle, because they are no obstacle to good, and because they do not gravely injure and torment oneself and others.

Inborn 'I-and-mine' views and one-sided extreme views (Satkayadrsti and Antagrahadrsti) are exclusively non-defined, because they do not provoke bad action and because, although frequently manifested, they are not obstacles to good.

7. The ten klesas and the Dhatus

How are these ten klesas related to the Dhatus?

(1) Anger is manifested in Kamadhatu only; the others, in all the three Dhatus.

(2) In the person born and residing in an inferior land (plane of consciousness), who has not abandoned the lower impurities, the klesas of the superior land do not manifest themselves. For them to manifest themselves in such a person it is necessary for him to have obtained the fundamental Samadhi (*mulasamadhi*) of the superior land.

The 'impure' or 'mundane' paths, although incapable of 'subduing' the klesas of speculation [that is to say, those that are abandoned by insight into Transcendant Truth] and the inborn, subtle klesas [i.e., those that are abandoned by meditation] (Satkaya and Antagrahadrsti), are capable of subduing the inborn coarse klesas. In this way the ascetic gradually obtains the superior fundamental Samadhi.

The crude klesas (covetousness, anger, and delusion) involve only errors about 'things', not about 'principles' (or truths); they, therefore, function externally [in opposition to covetousness and other klesas which function internally, taking as their object the Drstis etc., and which belong to the *darsanaklesa* category]; they are of the order of 'distraction', crude and unstable. Hence they are a direct obstacle to Samadhi. [Therefore, it is by subduing them that the ascetic obtains Samadhi.]

When the resident of an inferior land has obtained the meditation of a

生在上地，下地諸惑分別俱生皆容現起。

生第四定中有中者，由謗解脫生地獄故，

身在上地將生下時，起下潤生俱生愛故。

而言生上不起下者，依多分說，或隨轉門。

下地煩惱亦緣上地，瑜伽等說欲界繫貪求上地生味上定故。

〔述記：六十二卷說五種愛緣上，此但舉一，但得緣故。〕

旣說瞋恚憎嫉滅道，亦應憎嫉離欲地故。

〔述記：五十八文。〕

總緣諸行執我我所斷常慢者得緣上故。

餘五緣上其理極成。

而有處言貪瞋慢等不緣上者，依麤相說，或依別緣。

〔述記：對法第六五十八九等貪瞋慢及我見不緣上，此言等者，等取我見。〕

〔述記：或依別緣自身爲我，我見等不緣上故。〕

不見世間執他地法爲我等故，邊見必依身見起故。

上地煩惱亦緣下地，說生上者於下有情持己勝德而陵彼故。

〔述記：五十九說。〕

總緣諸行執我我所斷常愛者得緣下故。

疑後三見如理應思。

而說上惑不緣下者，彼依多分，或別緣說。

〔述記：五十八等云上不緣下彼依多分。〕

H. 三學分別門

此十煩惱學等何攝？

非學無學，彼唯善故。

superior land, the klesas of this superior land, both inborn and pertaining to speculation, can enter into operation.

(3) Klesas, inborn or pertaining to speculation, of an inferior land can manifest themselves in a person born and residing in a superior land. In fact, (a) a person born in the intermediate existence of the fourth Dhyana, if he denies deliverance, is reborn in hell; (b) a person living in a higher world, when the time comes for him to be reborn below, produces an inborn craving-thirst (*trsna*) for the lower world which 'moistens' the birth.

The texts say that a person born above does not produce the klesas of a lower world, but this declaration refers to the generality of cases; alternatively, it is in accordance with the views of the Lesser Vehicle.

(4) The klesas of a lower world can take as their object a higher world. In fact, (a) the Yogasastra, 62, in accordance with other texts, says, 'Covetousness of Kamadhatu, of both classes (*darsanaheya* and *bhavanaheya*), aspires to birth in a higher world to enjoy the superior Samadhi'; (b) it says, in Book 58, that a person filled with anger hates and is jealous of Nirodha (Cessation of Suffering) and the Marga (the Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering); for this reason, he should also hate and be jealous of the land of detachment; (c) Satkayadrsti which, in a general manner, conceives all impure dharmas (Samskrtas) as 'I-and-mine' (Atman and atmiya), Sasvatadrsti, Ucchedadrsti, and conceit can all take a higher world as their object; (d) as regards the five other klesas, delusion, doubt, false views, and the two Paramarsas, there is no doubt that they, too, can take a higher world as their object.

It is, however, said (Abhidharma, 6, and Yogasastra, 58) that covetousness, anger, conceit, etc., do not concern themselves with a higher world; but these declarations refer to klesas from the stand-point of their coarse characteristics or to that Atmadrsti (Self-belief) which, specially having in mind the person himself, does not concern itself with the superior world: one does not see that the world takes as the Atman the dharmas of another world; and the Antagrahadrsti (one-sided extreme view) is born on the basis of the Satkayadrsti ('I-and-mine' view).

(5) The klesas of a higher world also have a bearing on the lower world: (a) the Yogasastra, 59, says the person born above esteems his own eminent qualities by comparison with those of the inferior beings, and experiences contempt for them; (b) Satkayadrsti which considers impure dharmas (Samskrtas) in general as 'I and mine' (Atman and *atmiga*) and, consequently, Ucchedadrsti, Sasvatadrsti, and Trsna (thirst for possession) all have a bearing on the lower world. One should judge by the same process of reasoning all doubts and the last three Drstis which arise by reason of speculation and discrimination.

However, the Yogasastra, 58, says that superior klesas have no bearing on the lower world: this declaration is concerned with the generality of cases, or else with the Satkayadrsti etc.

8. The klesas and the Saiksa categories

How are these ten klesas related to the Saiksas, the Asaiksas, and those that are neither Saiksas nor Asaiksas (*naivasaiksanasaiksa*)?

I. 三斷分別門

此十煩惱何所斷耶？
非非所斷，彼非染故。

分別起者唯見所斷，麤易斷故。若俱生者唯修所斷，細難斷故。

見所斷十，實俱頓斷，以眞見道總緣諦故。

然迷諦相有總有別，總爲十種皆迷四諦，苦集是彼因依處故，滅道是彼怖畏處故。

別謂別迷四諦相起，二唯迷苦，八通迷四，身邊二見唯果處起，別空非我屬苦諦故。
〔述記：身邊二見多計諸有漏果法爲二見故唯迷苦。〕

謂疑三見親迷苦理。
二取執彼三見戒禁及所依蘊爲勝能淨。
於自他見及彼眷屬如此隨應起貪恚慢。

相應無明與九同迷，不共無明親迷苦理。

疑及邪見親迷集等，二取貪等準苦應知。

The klesas are related only to the third category which is 'neither Saiksa nor Asaiksa', because the two other categories are exclusively good.

9. The abandonment of the klesas

How are these ten klesas to be abandoned?

They are not 'not to be abandoned' (*aheya*), because the 'aheya' category is non-defiled.

Klesas arising from speculation and discrimination are 'to be abandoned by insight into Transcendent Truth' (*darsanheya*) only, because they are coarse and easily abandoned.

Inborn klesas can only be 'abandoned by meditation' (*bhavanaheya*), because they are subtle and difficult to abandon.

The ten klesas to be abandoned by insight into Truth are cut off altogether and instantaneously, because real insight into Truth includes an apprehension of all the Four Noble Truths.

Nevertheless, the erroneous understanding of the 'characteristics of the Noble Truths' is either general or particular. It is general in the sense that the ten klesas are all related to erroneous views on the nature of the Four Noble Truths and are not born without them; Suffering and the Cause of Suffering (Duhkha and Samudaya) are the cause and support of the klesas, while Cessation of Suffering and the Way leading to it (Nirodha and Marga) are the object of fear on their part. It is particular in the sense that the klesas arise from diverse erroneous views on the 'characteristics of the Four Noble Truths'. Two of these klesas (Satkayadrsti and Antagrahadrsti) involve errors about Suffering (Duhkha) only; the remaining eight involve errors about all the Four Noble Truths. In fact, the two Drstis in question have a bearing exclusively on the fruit (which is suffering); and the modes of activity of the Void and the Non-Atman have reference to the Noble Truth of Suffering (Duhkha).

The 'doubt' klesa and the three Drstis (Satkaya, Antagraha, Mithyadrsti) arise directly from an erroneous understanding of the meaning of suffering.

The two Paramarsas (Drstiparamarsa and Silaparamarsa: clinging to the false views and wrong practices of heterodox teachers) consider the above-mentioned three Drstis, the Silavratas, and the concomitant skandhas as excellent and purifying. They produce covetousness, anger, and conceit in their respective orders according as they are associated with the views of the person in question, the views of another person, and the skandhas which are related to those views.

'Associated' ignorance (Avidya) arises from the same error which characterizes the previously-explained nine klesas with which it is associated.

'Solitary' or non-associated ignorance arises directly from erroneous understanding of the meaning of suffering.

Doubt and false views arise directly from erroneous understanding of the meaning of the Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Way leading to the Cessation of Suffering.

Similarly the two Paramarsas, covetousness, etc., arise from errors about the meaning of suffering.

然瞋亦能親迷滅道，由怖畏彼生憎嫉故。

迷諦親疏麤相如是。

委細說者，貪瞋慢三見疑俱生隨應如彼。

〔述記：貪慢與三法俱，瞋與疑等四俱起者，隨應如彼。〕

俱生二見及彼相應愛慢無明雖迷苦諦，細難斷故，修道方斷。

瞋餘愛等迷別事生，不違諦觀，故修所斷。

〔述記：瞋及除前二見相應之外餘獨行愛慢及此相應無明，迷別有情或境事生，不迷於理，不違四諦觀，故修所斷。〕

J. 緣有事無事門

雖諸煩惱皆有相分，而所仗質或有或無，名緣有事無事煩惱。

K. 有漏緣無漏緣分別

彼親所緣雖皆有漏，而所仗質亦通無漏，名緣有漏無漏煩惱。

L. 緣事境緣名境分別

緣自地者相分似質名緣分別所起事境，緣滅道諦及他地者相分與質不相似故名緣分別所起名境。

餘門分別，如理應思。

〔述記：謂有無異熟，有漏無漏等，皆如理思。〕

六· 隨煩惱

已說根本六煩惱相，諸隨煩惱其相云何？

However, anger may also arise directly from errors about the Cessation of Suffering and the Way leading to it, because, in the fear of one or the other, one produces irritation or exasperation.

Such are the errors about the Noble Truths, direct or indirect, so far as their gross characteristics are concerned.

More subtly, covetousness and conceit associated with the first three Drstis and anger associated with doubt involve, directly or indirectly according to the case, errors about the Noble Truths.

The two inborn Drstis (Satkaya and Antagraha) and the three klesas of 'craving-thirst' (Trsna), conceit, and ignorance which are associated with them, although they involve errors about suffering, can, nevertheless, only be abandoned by meditation and self-cultivation (Bhavanamarga), because they are subtle and difficult to abandon.

Anger and 'craving-thirst', etc., which are different from the preceding thirst etc. [that is to say, thirst and conceit (which are not associated with the two inborn Drstis) and ignorance (which is associated with them)], involve errors about various other objects and do not contradict the meaning of the Noble Truths; therefore, they are to be abandoned by meditation and self-cultivation (Bhavanamarga).

10. Klesas with supporting archetypes (*savastuka*) and those without them (*avastuka*).

All klesas have a *nimittabhaga* (the objective aspect), but the archetype of this *nimitta* exists in some cases and does not exist in others; hence the distinction between klesas with supporting archetypes (*savastuka*) and those without them (*avastaka*).

11. Klesas of impure object and pure object

The immediate object (*nimitta*) is always impure, but the archetype of this object can also be pure; hence the distinction between klesas of an impure object and those of a pure object.

12. *Vastu* klesas and *Naman* klesas

When the klesa has a bearing on the dharmas of the land to which the person envisaged belongs, the *nimittabhaga* of this klesa is similar to the archetype: this klesa is therefore said to 'bear on an object which is a thing (*vastu*) produced by speculation'. When the klesa bears on the Cessation of Suffering (Nirodha), the Way leading to it (Marga), and the dharmas of another land, the *nimittabhaga* is not similar to the archetype; this klesa is therefore said to 'bear on an object which is a name (*naman*) produced by speculation'.

The other problems (those of retribution, of purity and impurity, etc.) should be solved by the same process of reasoning.

6. THE UPAKLESAS
Secondary Vexing Passions

We have studied the six fundamental klesas. What are upaklesas or secondary vexing passions? And what are their characteristics?

頌曰：

隨煩惱謂忿，　恨覆惱嫉慳，
誑諂與害憍，　無慚及無愧，
掉舉與惛沈，　不信幷懈怠，
放逸及失念，　散亂不正知。

論曰：

唯是煩惱分位差別，等流性故，名隨煩惱。

〔述記：釋頌之中隨煩惱字，謂忿等十及忘念不正知放逸……名隨煩惱。無慚無愧掉舉惛沉散亂不信懈怠七法雖別有體是前根本之等流性名隨煩惱。〕

此二十種類別有三，謂忿等十各別起故，名小隨煩惱。無慚等二徧不善故，名中隨煩惱，掉舉等八徧染心故，名大隨煩惱。

忿

云何爲忿？依對現前不饒益境憤發爲性。

〔述記：謂依現在可見聞事，或是有情，或是他見，即緣事生。〕

The Stanzas say:

12b

> The upaklesas (secondary vexing passions) are (1) fury (Krodha);
>
> (2) Enmity (Upanaha); (3) concealment or hypocrisy (Mraksa) (4) vexation (Pradasa); (5) envy (Irsyr); (6) parismony (Matsarya);

13

> (7) Deception (Sathya; (8) duplicity or fraudulence (Maya); (with) (9) harmfulness (Vihimsa); (10) pride (Mada);
>
> (11) Shamelessess (Ahri); (12) non-integrity (Atrapa or Anapatrapya);
>
> (13) Agitation or restlessness (Uddhava); (with) (14) torpid-mindedness (Styana);
>
> (15) Unbelief (Asraddha); (16) indolence (Kausidya);

14a

> (17) Idleness (Pramada); (18) forgetfulness (Musitasmrtita);
>
> (19) Distraction (Viksepa); and (20) non-discernment or thoughtlessness (Asamprajanya).

The Treatise says:

The upaklesas are so named: 1. because they are only certain states or modalities of the klesas: such are the ten beginning from fury (Krodha) (1–10), forgetfulness (Musitasmrtita), non-discernment (Asamprajanya) and idleness (Pramada); 2. because they are the efflux of the klesas: such are the others which, although having a nature apart from the klesas, are born by reason of them.

These twenty upaklesas are divided into three categories: 'small upaklesas', that is to say, the ten secondary klesas beginning from fury (Krodha), because they are born separately; 'medium upaklesas', that is to say, shamelessness (Ahrihya) and absence of integrity (Anapatrapya) which are found in all bad thoughts; 'great upaklesas', that is to say, the eight others [agitation (Uddhava) etc.], which are found in all defiled minds.

1. Fury (Krodha)

What is fury? Its nature is irritation caused by the presence of persons or objects that actually offend: e.g., things seen or heard; an offensive living being or opinions expressed by others.

Its special activity is to obstruct non-fury and, so to speak, 'to cause a stick or rod to be taken up' in a gesture of striking. [Example of moderate corporal

能障不忿執仗爲業，謂懷忿者多發暴惡身表業故。

〔述記：伏謂器杖，從麤猛多分說唯言執杖，亦有惡言故。〕

此即瞋恚一分爲體，離瞋無別忿相用故。

恨

云何爲恨？由忿爲先懷惡不捨結怨爲性。

能障不恨熱惱爲業，謂結恨者不能含忍恒熱惱故。

此亦瞋恚一分爲體，離瞋無別恨相用故。

覆

云何爲覆？於自作罪恐失利譽隱藏爲性，能障不覆悔惱爲業，謂覆罪者後必悔惱不安隱故。

有義此覆癡一分攝，論唯說此癡一分故，不懼當苦覆自罪故。

〔述記：言論說者，五十五。〕

有義此覆貪癡一分攝，亦恐失利譽覆自罪故。

論據麤顯唯說癡分，如說掉擧是貪分故。

然說掉擧徧諸染心，不可執爲唯是貪分。

惱

云何爲惱？忿恨爲先追觸暴熱很戾爲性，能障不惱蛆螫爲業。

謂追往惡觸現違緣心便很戾多發嚚暴，凶鄙麤言蛆螫他故。此亦瞋恚一分爲體，離瞋無別惱相用故。

嫉

云何爲嫉？殉自名利不耐他榮妒忌爲性，能障不嫉憂

violence: vocal violence may also be produced.] In fact, a person filled with fury produces many violent and bad bodily acts.

Fury is by nature a part of anger, because, apart from this klesa, fury has no characteristic or activity which belongs to itself.

2. Enmity (Upanana)

What is enmity? As a result of fury, its nature is the non-abandonment of bad feelings and the continuation of hostility-resentment.

Its special activity is to obstruct non-enmity and provoke and intensify vexation (Pradasa).

In fact, a hostile and resentful person is incapable of forgiving or tolerating, and always abandons himself to burning vexation.

Like fury, enmity is by nature a part of anger, because, apart from this klesa, enmity has no characteristic or activity that belongs to itself.

3. Concealment or hypocrisy (Mraksa)

What is concealment or hypocrisy (Mraksa)?

For fear of losing advantages or reputation, to dissimulate in order to hide one's offences: such is the nature of this upaklesa. Its special activity is to obstruct non-dissimulation and provoke the affliction of remorse.

In fact, the person who hides his sins must of necessity be afflicted later on with remorse and self-recrimination and lose all feelings of peace and security.

According to one opinion, this upaklesa is comprised in the fundamental klesa of delusion (Moha), because the Yogasastra, 55, says that it is a part of delusion: one hides one's sins because one does not fear the sufferings in store.

According to another opinion, which is correct, it is a part of covetousness and delusion, because if one hides one's sins, it is also for fear of losing advantages and reputation.

The Yogasastra envisages the gross-apparent character of hypocrisy: this is why it merely says that it is a part of delusion, just as it says that agitation is a part of covetousness. Now, as the Sastra also says that agitation penetrates all defiled minds, obviously one cannot admit that it is solely a part of covetousness.

4. Vexation (Pradasa)

What is vexation? Following on fury and enmity, vexation is a burning rage showing fierceness and violence. It manifests itself either in pursuit of an anterior object of fury-enmity or on encountering a new object of dislike. Its special activity consists in obstructing non-vexation and provoking a 'biting'.

In fact, no matter whether the object disliked is old or new, when the mind is in a rage, one utters shouting, violent, cruel and vulgar words as if one wanted to bite other people. Vexation, too, is by nature a part of anger, because, apart from this klesa. it has no characteristic or activity of its own.

5. Envy (Irsya)

What is envy? To desire one's own reputation and advantage and not to be able to stand the glory of another: its nature is jealousy, and its specific

慽爲業，謂嫉妒者聞見他榮深懷憂慽不安隱故。此亦瞋恚一分爲體，離瞋無別嫉相用故。

慳

云何爲慳？耽著財法不能惠捨祕悋爲性，能障不慳鄙畜爲業，謂慳悋者心多鄙澀畜積財法不能捨故。此即貪愛一分爲體，離貪無別慳相用故。

誑

云何爲誑？爲獲利譽矯現有德詭詐爲性，能障不誑邪命爲業，謂矯誑者心懷異謀多現不實邪命事故。此即貪癡一分爲體，離二無別誑相用故。

諂

云何爲諂？爲罔他故矯設異儀險曲爲性，能障不諂教誨爲業。謂諂曲者爲網帽他曲順時宜矯設方便爲取他意或藏己失，不任師友正教誨故。此亦貪癡一分爲體，離二無別諂相用故。

害

云何爲害？於諸有情心無悲愍損惱爲性，能障不害逼惱爲業，謂有害者逼惱他故。此亦瞋恚一分爲體，離瞋無別害相用故。

activity is to obstruct non-envy and provoke dissatisfaction and discouragement. The fact is that the envious person, hearing of the reputation or seeing the glory of another, abandons himself to dissatisfaction and discouragement and is not at peace.

Envy, too, is a part of anger, because, apart from this klesa, it does not possess any characteristic or activity that belongs to itself.

6. Parsimony (Matsarya)

What is parsimony? Its nature is to be attached to wealthy possessions and the Dharma and not to give them away. Its aim and object is to hide and save. Its special activity is to obstruct non-parsimony and provoke hard-heartedness and the amassing of material and immaterial goods. The fact is that misers are usually hard-hearted and amass wealth and Dharma without ever being able to give them away.

This upaklesa, by its very nature, is a part of covetousness and desire, for, apart from covetousness, it does not possess any characteristic or activity of its own.

7. Deception (Sathya)

What is deception? For the purpose of gaining advantages or reputation, to practise deceit and falseness by pretending to be possessed of high moral qualities: such is the nature of deception. Its special activity is to prevent frankness and candidness and provoke various actions leading to a 'depraved manner of life'. In fact, the deceitful person, full of insincere intentions and crafty machinations, affects qualities which he does not possess and leads a life of moral depravity.

This upaklesa, by its very nature, is a part of covetousness and delusion, because, apart from these two klesas, it has no characteristic or activity of its own.

8. Duplicity or fraudulence (Maya)

What is Duplicity? With a view to misleading and deceiving another, to resort to dangerous and crooked devices by which one falsely assumes counterfeit attitudes: such is the nature of duplicity. Its special activity is to prevent sincerity and moral exhortation.

In fact, the fraudulent person, with a view to misleading and deceiving another, tortuously and in accordance with circumstances, makes use of various expedients to gain ascendancy over the mind of that other person or to conceal his own faults; thus, he fails to receive right exhortations from his teachers and friends.

Duplicity is therefore a part of covetousness and delusion, because, apart from these two klesas, it has no characteristic or activity of its own.

9. Harmfulness (Vihimsa)

What is harmfulness? The absolute lack of compassion and loving-kindness for all sentient beings and the infliction of injury and distress on them: such is the nature of harmfulness. Its special activity is to prevent harmlessness and to torment others. The fact is that a harmful person usually torments others.

瞋害別相準善應說。

〔述記：瞋障無瞋，正障於慈。害障不害，正障於悲。〕

憍

云何爲憍？於自盛事深生染著醉傲爲性，能障不憍染依爲業，謂憍醉者生長一切雜染法故。此亦貪愛一分爲體，離貪無別憍相用故。

無慚

云何無慚？不顧自法輕拒賢善爲性，能障礙慚生長惡行爲業，謂於自法無所顧者輕拒賢善不恥過惡，障慚生長諸惡行故。

無愧

云何無愧？不顧世間崇重暴惡爲性，能障礙愧生長惡行爲業，謂於世間無所顧者崇重暴惡不恥過罪，障愧生長諸惡行故。

不恥過惡是二通相，故諸聖教假說爲體。
若執不恥爲二別相，則應此二體無差別。
由斯二法應不俱生，非受想等有此義故。

若得自他立二別者，應非實有，便違聖教。
若許此二實而別起，復違論說俱徧惡心。

〔述記：若此二體實許前後生者，復違瑜伽五十五等說俱徧惡心，有起不起非徧惡故。〕

This upaklesa is by nature a part of anger, because, apart from this klesa, harmfulness has no characteristic or activity of its own.

The difference between anger and harmfulness is established according to the good mental qualities to which the vices are directly opposed: [e.g., anger is directly opposed to loving-benevolence while harmfulness is directly opposed to compassion.]

10. Pride (Made)

What is pride? It is by nature the proud exaltation of the person who produces a defiled attachment to his worldly glory and prosperity. Its special activity is to counteract humility and furnish a supporting basis for impure dharmas. In fact, a person 'intoxicated with pride' usually produces and nourishes all dharmas of impurity.

Pride, too, is by nature a part of covetousness and desire, because, apart from these two klesas, it has no characteristic or activity of its own.

11. Shamelessness (Ahrikya)

What is shamelessness? It is by nature the utter disregard of oneself and the Dharma and light-minded contempt for the good and virtuous. Its special activity is to counteract the sense of shame and produce and nourish evil actions. In fact, the person who pays no heed to himself and the Dharma usually shows contempt for the good and virtuous and is entirely devoid of shame for his sins and transgressions. Opposing shame, he produces and nourishes all kinds of evil actions.

12. Non-integrity (Anapatrapya)

What is non-integrity? It is by nature the utter disregard of the world and the exaltation of violence and evil. Its special activity is to counteract integrity and produce evil actions. In fact, the person who has no consideration whatever for the world usually respects violence and evil, has no sense of shame for his sins, opposes integrity and produces and nourishes all kinds of bad actions.

Lack of shame with reference to sins and crimes is the common characteristic of shamelessness and non-integrity. That is why the sacred texts say that they are both shamelessness by nature. But that is an incorrect way of putting it, because, if these two dharmas had only shamelessness as their own special characteristic, they would be identical in nature. Then they would not arise simultaneously, [because the arising of one would be the same as that of the other]. In fact, sensation and conception, etc., which are simultaneous, are different in nature.

If one holds that the difference between these two dharmas is due to the fact that the first is shamelessness with reference to oneself and the second shamelessness with reference to others, then these two dharmas are not real things – contrary to the affirmation of the texts.

If one says that these two dharmas are real but arise one after the other, one contradicts the Yogasastra, 55, according to which they are both found in all ill-natured minds.

In fact, when an evil thought is produced, whatever its object may be, it

不善心時隨緣何境皆有輕拒善及崇重惡義，故此二法俱徧惡心，所緣不異無別起失。

然諸聖教說不顧自他者，自法名自世間名他，或即此中拒善崇惡於己益損名自他故。

而論說爲貪等分者，是彼等流，非即彼性。

掉舉

云何掉舉？令心於境不寂靜爲性，能障行捨奢摩他爲業。

有義掉舉貪一分攝，論唯說此是貪分故，此由憶昔樂事生故。
〔述記：五十五五十八顯揚對法皆唯說貪分故不言餘分故。〕

有義掉舉非唯貪攝，論說掉舉徧染心故。
〔述記：瑜伽五十八說徧染心故。〕

又掉舉相謂不寂靜，說是煩惱共相攝故，掉舉離此無別相故。

雖依一切煩惱假立，而貪位增，說爲貪分。

有義掉舉別有自性徧諸染心，如不信等。

非說他分體便非實，勿不信等亦假有故。

而論說爲世俗有者，如睡眠等隨他相說。
〔述記：五十五說世俗有者，如睡眠惡作二法名世俗有體仍是實，彼亦隨他相說故。〕

掉舉別相謂即囂動，令俱生法不寂靜故。

若離煩惱無別此相，不應別說障奢摩他，故不寂靜非此別相。
〔述記：故知不寂靜非此別體相。別體相者，即囂動故。〕

惛沈

is always accompanied by contempt for good and respect for evil. These two dharmas are therefore found in all ill-natured minds; the object being the same, it cannot be said that they must be born in turn.

It is true that the texts say: 'utter disregard of oneself and others'. By 'oneself' one must understand 'oneself and the Dharma': by 'others' one must understand 'the world'. Or the 'utter disregard of oneself' means 'contempt for good which is useful to oneself', and 'utter disregard of the world' means 'respect for evil which is harmful to others'.

The Yogasastra says that they are parts of covetousness, anger, delusion, etc. More correctly, they are the efflux of these klesas; they do not consist in covetousness etc.

13. Agitation or restlessness (Auddhatya)

What is agitation? By its very nature, it is 'that which causes the mind not to be peaceful and tranquil', *i.e.*, that which causes the mind to be restless *vis-a-vis* its object. Its special activity is to prevent equanimity and Samatha (mental stillness or mental quiescence).

Opinions are different on the relation between agitation and the klesas:

(1) Agitation is comprised in covetousness, because the Treatises (Yogasastra, 55 and 58, and Tsa-tsi) say only that it is a part of covetousness and that it is born through the memory of former agreeable things.

(2) It is not comprised in covetousness alone, because the Treatise (Yogasastra, 58) says that it penetrates all defiled minds.

Furthermore, its chief characteristic is non-quietude and non-tranquillity. This, say all the Treatises, is the common characteristic of all klesas. Agitation has no characteristic of its own apart from this common characteristic.

If agitation is defined as a part of covetousness, it is because it increases in the state of covetousness, but, in reality, it is a coventional designation of a certain aspect of all klesas.

(3) It exists by itself, apart from covetousness etc. For this reason it penetrates all defiled minds as do unbelief, indolence, etc. The fact that it is defined in the texts as part of a klesa does not mean that it is not real. In the same sense, unbelief, indolence, etc., should not be considered as being unreal simply because they are defined as different aspects of delusion; they are real mental qualities.

If the Yogasastra, 55, says that agitation is of relative existence, as it says of drowsiness and repentance, this is said 'according to the characteristics of another dharma'.

Agitation has a specific characteristic of its own; it is vociferation-excitement which causes the dharmas that arise simultaneously with it, Citta and Caittas, to be restless and unpeaceful. If agitation does not possess this specific characteristic apart from other klesas, why do the texts say specifically that it prevents Samatha (mental stillness or mental quiescence)? Hence non-peace or non-stillness is not the specific characteristic of agitation. [Its specific characteristic is vociferation-excitement.]

14. Torpid-mindedness or low-spiritedness (Styana)

云何惛沈？令心於境無堪任爲性能障輕安毘鉢舍那爲業。

有義惛沈癡一分攝，論唯說此是癡分故，惛昧沈重是癡相故。

有義惛沈非但癡攝，謂無堪任是惛沈相，一切煩惱皆無堪任，離此無別惛沈相故。

雖依一切煩惱假立，而癡相增，但說癡分。

有義惛沈別有自性，雖名癡分而是等流，如不信等，非即癡攝。

隨他相說名世俗有，如睡眠等是實有性。
〔述記：以癡增故名世俗有。〕

惛沈別相謂即瞢重，令俱生法無堪任故。

若離煩惱無別惛沈相，不應別說障毘鉢舍那，故無堪任非此別相。

此與癡相有差別者，謂癡於境迷闇爲相，正障無癡而非瞢重，惛沈於境瞢重爲相，正障輕安而非迷闇。

不信

云何不信？於實德能不忍樂欲心穢爲性。
能障淨信惰依爲業，謂不信者多懈怠故。

不信三相，翻信應知。

What is torpid-mindedness? It is by nature that which causes incapacity or incompetence of the mind with reference to an object. Its specific activity is to prevent composure of body and mind and Vipasyana (contemplation).

Different opinions on the relation between torpid-mindedness and the klesas:

(1) Torpid-mindedness is comprised in delusion, because the Yogasastra only says that it is a part of delusion, and also because mental torpidity and obscurity and a feeling of heaviness and languor, which are the two elements integrated in torpid-mindedness, are characteristics of delusion.

(2) It is not comprised in delusion alone, for the characteristic of torpid-mindedness is incompetence, and incompetence is the common characteristic of all klesas. Apart from incompetence, torpid-mindedness has no other characteristics of its own. Hence, if the Yogasastra only says that torpid-mindedness is a part of delusion, it is because this mental quality increases in the state of delusion, although it is in fact a conventional designation of a characteristic common to all klesas.

(3) Torpid-mindedness has a nature of its own. Although one can say that it is a part of delusion, it is, in fact, merely the efflux of delusion. Like unbelief and indolence, it is not comprised in delusion.

Taking into account the fact that it increases the power of another dharma, that is to say, delusion, a text says that it has a conventional or relative existence pertaining to worldly life, like drowsiness and repentance; but, in fact, it is a thing apart.

Its own specific characteristic is a 'dullness-heaviness' which causes the dharmas (Citta and Caittas) accompanied by it to be incompetent and incapable.

If torpid-mindedness has no specific characteristic of its own apart from the klesas in general, as the second master says, why is it specifically mentioned that it prevents Vipasyana (contemplation)? Hence incompetence or incapacity is not a specific characteristic of torpid-mindedness; its special characteristic is 'dullness-heaviness'.

What is the difference between delusion and torpid-mindedness? Delusion has as its special characteristic 'blindness-obscurity' with reference to its object; among the good dharmas, it is directly opposed to non-delusion; it is not 'dullness-heaviness'. On the other hand, torpid-mindedness has as its special characteristic 'dullness-heaviness' with reference to its object; among the good dharmas, it is directly opposed to composure of body and mind; it is not 'blindness-obscurity'.

15. Unbelief (Asraddhya)

What is unbelief? It is the contamination of the mind which causes non-recognition, non-predilection, and non-desire with respect to ultimate realities and those entities which possess apiritual qualities and potentialities. Its special activity is to counteract 'pure faith' and furnish a supporting basis for indolence. For unbelievers are usually lazy.

The three characteristics of unbelief are opposed to the three characteristics of belief.

然諸染法各有別相，唯此不信自相渾濁復能渾濁餘心心所，如極穢物自穢穢他，是故說此心穢爲性。

由不信故於實德能不忍樂欲非別有性。

若於餘事邪忍樂欲是此因果，非此自性。

懈 怠

云何懈怠？於善惡品修斷事中懶墮爲性，能障精進增染爲業，謂懈怠者滋長染故。

於諸染事而策勤者亦名懈怠，退善法故。
於無記事而策勤者於諸善品無進退故，是欲勝解，非別有性。如於無記忍可樂欲，非淨非染，無信不信。

放 逸

云何放逸？於染淨品不能防修縱蕩爲性，障不放逸增惡損善所依爲業，謂由懈怠及貪瞋癡不能防修染淨品法總名放逸，非別有體。

雖慢疑等亦有此能，而方彼四勢用微劣，障三善根徧策法故，推究此相如不放逸。

失 念

云何失念？於諸所緣不能明記爲性，能障正念散亂所依爲業，謂失念者心散亂故。

有義失念念一分攝，說是煩惱相應念故。

All defiled dharmas have their own special characteristics. Unbelief has as its special characteristic defilement and pollution. Besides, it defiles other dharmas, Citta and Caittas, just as a very dirty object is itself dirty and dirties other objects also. Hence it has as its essential nature the contamination of the mind.

By reason of unbelief, one has no recognition or predilection or desire with respect to ultimate realities and those entities possessing spiritual qualities and potentialities; but this non-recognition, non-predilection, etc., are not the essential nature of unbelief. False recognition, false predilection, etc., with respect to defiled dharmas are the cause and effect of unbelief, not its essential nature.

16. Indolence or sloth (Kausidya)

What is Indolence? It is by nature laziness in the cultivation of good dharmas and the abandonment of bad dharmas. Its special activity is to counteract zeal and multiply defiled dharmas. In fact, lazy persons usually multiply and nourish impure dharmas.

Diligent activity with reference to defiled dharmas is also called indolence, because this activity causes a retrogression of good dharmas. As regards activity relating to non-defined things, it does not involve progress or retrogression in good dharmas. It is therefore simply desire and resolve, not a Caitta apart. It is just the same with recognition-predilection-desire with reference to non-defined dharmas; it is neither pure nor impure, neither belief nor unbelief.

17. Idleness or negligence (Pramada)

What is Idleness? By its nature, it is self-indulgence and self-abandonment which renders one incapable of stopping the bad and cultivating the good. Its special activity is to counteract diligence and self-discipline, to increase the bad, and to ruin the good. It is by reason of indolence and the three fundamental klesas, covetousness, anger and delusion, that one is incapable of stopping defiled dharmas and cultivating pure ones: The general name of idleness is therefore given to these four vices. Idleness is therefore not a mental quality with its own specific nature distinct from that of the other qualities.

Although conceit, doubt and other klesas also have this capacity for not stopping evil and not cultivating good, nevertheless, compared with that of the four, their force is too weak to hinder the three roots of good and the quality of zeal, which are the general stimulus of good dharmas.

The characteristics of idleness can be deduced from those of vigilance.

18. Forgetfulness (Musitasmrtita)

What is forgetfulness? By its nature, it is the inability to remember clearly the various objects perceived. Its special activity is to counteract right memory (Samyaksmrti) and to furnish the supporting basis for mental distraction and confusion. The fact is that the minds of those whose memory is bad are usually confused and distracted.

Different opinions on the relation between forgetfulness and the klesas:

(1) Forgetfulness is comprised in memory, for the Abhidharma says that it is memory associated with the klesas.

有義失念癡一分攝，瑜伽說此是癡分故，癡令念失故名失念。

有義失念俱一分攝，由前二文影略說故，論復說此偏染心故。

散亂

云何散亂？於諸所緣令心流蕩爲性，能障正定惡慧所依爲業，謂散亂者發惡慧故。

有義散亂癡一分攝，瑜伽說此是癡分故。
〔述記：五十五說是癡分故。〕

有義散亂貪瞋癡攝，集論等說是三分故。

說癡分者偏染心故。謂貪瞋癡令心流蕩勝餘法故，說爲散亂。

有義散亂別有自體，說三分者是彼等流，如無慚等，非即彼攝，隨他相說名世俗有。

散亂別相謂即躁擾，令俱生法皆流蕩故。若離彼三無別自體，不應別說障三摩地。

掉舉散亂二用何別？

彼令易解，此令易緣。雖一剎那解緣無易，而於相續有易義故。染汙心時由掉亂力常應念念易解易緣，或由念等力所制伏，如繫猨猴有暫時住，故掉與亂俱偏染心。

不正知

云何不正知？於所觀境謬解爲性，能障正知毀犯爲

(2) It is comprised in delusion, for the Yogasastra says that it is a part of delusion. Inasmuch as it is the cause of the failure of memory, delusion receives the name of forgetfulness.

(3) It is comprised both in memory and in delusion, for the texts quoted from the Abhidharma and the Yogasastra are ambiguous and incomplete, and because the Yogasastra says that it penetrates all defiled minds.

19. Distraction (Viksepa)

What is distraction? By its nature, it is that which causes the mind to wander and disperse with reference to objects perceived. Its special activity is to impede right meditation (Samyak-Samadhi) and furnish the supporting basis for bad discernment (*kuprajna*). In fact, a distracted and confused person usually produces 'bad discernment'.

Different opinions:

(1) Distraction is comprised in delusion, for the Yogasastra, 55, says that it is a part of delusion.

(2) It is comprised in covetousness-anger-delusion, for the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that is a part of these three klesas. If the Yogasastra only says that it is a part of delusion, it is because it penetrates all defiled minds. Covetousness-anger-delusion, in causing the mind to wander and disperse, outweigh the other klesas, e.g., pride etc. That is why it is said that it constitutes distraction.

(3) It is a thing apart: correct opinion

The reason why it is considered as part of the three, covetousness-anger-delusion, is that it is their efflux. For the same reason, the Abhidharma also says, incorrectly, that shamelessness is part of the three. One text says that it has a conventional or relative existence: the explanation is the same as that given above.

What, then, is the special characteristic of distraction? It is the turbulence and perturbation which cause all dharmas that arise simultaneously with it, Citta and Caittas, to be dispersed. If distraction has no special nature of its own, apart from covetousness-anger-delusion, why is it specified that it impedes Samadhi?

What is the difference between the mode of functioning of agitation and that of distraction?

The first causes one to change one's ideas (to abandon the idea of permanence etc.), whereas the second causes one to change one's objects of perception. At a given moment, there can only be one idea and one object present in consciousness, but changes will be involved in a mental series. When the mind is defiled, the force of agitation and distraction causes one to change one's ideas and objects from moment to moment. Or else, if the mind is held and controlled by the inborn memory-meditation (Smrti-Samadhi), it will remain fixed for a moment like a monkey that is tied up. Hence both agitation and distraction penetrate all defiled minds.

20. Non-discernment (Asamprajanya)

What is non-discernment? It has as its essential nature an incorrect idea or

業，謂不正知者多所毀犯故。

有義不正知慧一分攝，說是煩惱相應慧故。

有義不正知癡一分攝，瑜伽說此是癡分故。
令知不正名不正知。

有義不正知俱一分攝，由前二文影略說故，
論復說此徧染心故。

與幷及言顯隨煩惱非唯二十，雜事等說貪等多種隨煩惱故。

隨煩惱名亦攝煩惱，是前煩惱等流性故。煩惱同類餘染汙法但名隨煩惱，非煩惱攝故。

唯說二十隨煩惱者，謂非煩惱唯染麤故。

此餘染法或此分位，或此等流，皆此所攝，隨其類別如理應知。

〔述記：或此等流謂身語業亦名隨煩惱。〕

諸門分別

A. 假實分別門

如是二十隨煩惱中小十大三定是假有，無慚無愧不信懈怠定是實有，教理成故。掉舉惛沈散亂三種有義是假，有義是實，所引理教如前應知。

〔述記：大中忘念放逸不正知。〕

B. 俱生分別門

二十皆通俱生分別，隨二煩惱勢力起故。

C. 自類相應門

此二十中小十展轉定不俱起，互相違故，行相麤猛各爲主故。

erroneous understanding of the object to be considered. Its special activity is to impede right understanding (Samprajanya) and to provoke transgressions. In fact, a person of erroneous understanding usually commits many transgressions.

Different opinions:

(1) Non-discernment is comprised in discernment (Prajna) because one text says that it is discernment associated with the klesas.

(2) It is comprised in delusion, because the Yogasastra says that it is a part of delusion. It is called non-discernment because it renders understanding erroneous.

(3) It is comprised both in discernment and in delusion, because the two texts quoted above are ambiguous and not explicit, and also because the Yogasastra says that this upaklesa is found in all defiled minds.

The words 'and' and 'with' in the Stanza indicate that upaklesas are not only twenty in number. The Ksudravastuka enumerates many kinds of covetousness etc: these are upaklesas.

The term 'upaklesa' also includes klesas which are by their very nature the efflux of the six fundamental klesas. As regards the remaining defiled dharmas which belong to the same category as the klesas, these are all called upaklesas in general as they are not included in the fundamental klesas.

If it is said that there are twenty upaklesas, it is because one understands by this term that which is not klesa, that which is exclusively defiled and gross.

The other defiled dharmas which are either modalities of the twenty upaklesas or their efflux (*e.g.*, acts of the body and the voice) are all included in the twenty. How they are included will be determined according to their particular characteristics.

Various Problems Relating to Upaklesas

1. Real existence or existence by designation

Among the twenty upaklesas, the ten minor and the three major ones (forgetfulness, idleness, and non-discernment) are, incontestably, figurative designations; shamelessness, non-integrity, unbelief, and indolence have a real existence: logic and the texts prove it. As regards agitation, torpid-mindedness, and distraction, opinions differ, some scholars saying that they are figurative designations, others that they have a real existence: we have given above the scriptural and logical reasons.

2. Inborn or pertaining to speculation

The twenty upaklesas can all belong to both categories, 'inborn' or 'pertaining to speculation' according to the category of the klesa by the force of which they are born.

3. Association of the upaklesas among themselves

The ten minor upaklesas are definitely not associated among themselves because they form obstacles to one another; in view of their gross and violent character, they can only be 'lords'.

中二一切不善心俱，隨應皆得小大俱起。

論說大八徧諸染心，展轉小中皆容俱起。

有處說六徧染心者，惛掉增時不俱起故。

〔述記：五十五說。〕

有處但說五徧染者，以惛掉等違唯善故。

〔述記：對法六中說五徧者，謂不信懈怠惛沈掉舉放逸五法，以此五法違唯善法。惛障輕安，舉障於捨，餘文可知。非如忘念等許違三性。〕

D. 諸色俱起門

此唯染故，非第八俱。第七識中唯有大八，取捨差別，如上應知。第六識俱容有一切。小十麤猛五識中無，中大相通五識容有。

E. 五受相應門

由斯中大五受相應。

有義小十除三，忿等唯喜憂捨三受相應，諂誑憍三四俱除苦。

有義忿等四俱除樂，諂誑憍三五受俱起，意有苦受前已說故。

〔述記：七唯欲界繫者，四受俱除樂，欲界意無樂故。〕

此受俱相如煩惱說。

〔述記：問忿等如何與喜俱？慳等如何與憂並？此如前根本煩惱中說。〕

實義如是。若隨麤相，忿恨惱嫉害憂捨俱，覆慳喜捨，餘三增樂。

中大隨麤，亦如實義。

The two medium ones, which are found in all ill-natured minds, can be associated with the minor and the major depending on the particular case.

The Yogasastra says that the eight major upaklesas penetrate all defiled minds. Hence, besides being associated among themselves, they can also be associated with the minor and the medium upaklesas.

However, the same treatise, 55, says that six upaklesas penetrate all defiled minds, excluding torpid-mindedness and agitation, because these two, when they are powerful, do not co-exist.

One can read elsewhere that only five penetrate all defiled minds: torpid-mindedness, agitation, unbelief, indolence, and idleness; because these five dharmas contradict only the good in contradistinction to forgetfulness and the other upaklesas which contradict the good, the bad, and the non-defined.

4. Associations with the consciousnesses

Being defiled, the upaklesas are not associated with the eighth consciousness.

Only the eight major ones are associated with the seventh consciousness. We have explained why some upaklesas are associated with certain consciousnesses and why others are not. All can be associated with Manovijnana. The ten minor ones, being crude and violent, have no associations with the five consciousnesses, which are relatively subtle; but such associations exist in the case of the medium and the major ones, which are found in all bad thoughts and all defiled minds.

5. Sensations and upaklesas

From the presence of the medium and the major upaklesas in all bad thoughts and all defiled minds, it will be clear that the medium and the major can be associated with all the five sensations.

Regarding the minor upaklesas:– According to one opinion, the ten minor upaklesas, fury etc., with the exception of duplicity, deception and pride, can only be associated with delight, grief, and indifference; duplicity-deception-pride can be associated with four sensations, namely, joy, grief, indifference, and delight, i.e., excluding sorrow.

According to another opinion, the ten minor upaklesas, with the exception of duplicity, deception, and pride, can be associated with four sensations, excluding joy; duplicity-deception-pride can be associated with all the five sensations, i.e., including joy. Sorrow is included because sorrow can be of the realm of Manas, as shown above.

[If it is asked how fury etc. can be associated with delight and how parsimony etc. can be associated with grief, the reply is that] the association of upaklesas with sensations is the same as that of klesas with sensations.

Such is the true theory. If gross characteristics are considered, then fury, enmity, vexation, envy, and harmfulness are associated with grief or indifference; dissimulation and parsimony with delight or indifference; the remaining three, duplicity, deception, and pride, with joy also, i.e., with delight, indifference, and joy.

What has been said about the medium and the major upaklesas is also true of their real nature. The crude characteristics of these upaklesas may also be considered in the same manner.

F. 別境相應門

如是二十與別境五皆容俱起，不相違故。

染念染慧雖非念慧俱，而癡分者亦得相應故。

念亦緣現曾習類境，忿亦得緣剎那過去，故忿與念亦得相應。

染定起時，心亦躁擾，故亂與定相應無失。

G. 根本相應門

中二大八十煩惱俱。

小十定非見疑俱起，此相麤動，彼審細故。

忿等五法容慢癡俱，非貪恚並，是瞋分故。

〔述記：忿恨惱嫉害容得慢癡二法俱。〕

慳癡慢俱非貪瞋並，是貪分故。

憍唯癡俱，與慢解別，是貪分故。

〔述記：憍唯癡俱，是貪分故，不與瞋貪並。與慢解別，不與慢俱。憍緣自高舉生，慢亦緣他下逸起，故不俱生。〕

覆誑與諂貪癡慢俱，行相無違貪癡分故。

H. 三性分別門

小七中二唯不善攝，小三大八亦通無記。

〔述記：小七中二唯不善，唯欲界繫，唯發惡行故。小三大八亦通無記，通色界有，〕

〔述記義演：小七中二唯是不善，除諂誑憍三法，以通色界有故。〕

I. 三果相應門

小七中二唯欲界攝，誑諂欲色，餘通三界。

生在下地容起上十一，耽定於他起憍誑諂故。

〔述記義演：由大八偏染心起，顯故不釋。〕

6. The upaklesas and the five special Caittas

All the twenty upaklesas can be associated with the five special Caittas, desire etc., for there is no repugnance between the twenty and the five.

Undoubtedly, defiled memory and defiled discernment are not found together with memory and discernment respectively. Nevertheless, being parts of delusion, they are associated with them.

It has been said that memory is related to an object already experienced, while anger is related to a present object. Nevertheless, memory also has for perception or reflection a present object which has just been experienced, and fury can have as its object also that which has just occurred. Hence fury can be associated with memory.

When defiled Samadhi is produced, the mind is 'turbulent' and perturbed. It is therefore not fallacious to conclude that distraction is associated with Samadhi.

7. Upaklesas and klesas

The two medium and the eight major upaklesas can be associated with all the ten klesas.

The ten minor upaklesas cannot be associated with erroneous views and doubt, for they are gross and mobile by nature while the latter, in general, are subtle reflections or speculations.

Fury, enmity, vexation, envy, and harmfulness can be associated with conceit and delusion, but they are not associated with covetousness or anger, because they are parts of anger.

Parsimony can be associated with delusion and conceit, because there is no contradiction with reference to the object; it is not associated with covetousness or anger, because it is part of covetousness.

Pride is associated with delusion only. It differs from conceit in that it cannot be associated therewith, being only part of covetousness and considering only the self, while conceit, which considers others, is also part of anger.

Dissimulation, deception, and duplicity are associated with covetousness-delusion-conceit, for their modes of activity are not contradictory, being all parts of covetousness-delusion.

8. Moral species of the upaklesas

Seven minor and two medium upaklesas are exclusively bad (for they belong only to Kamadhatu and produce only bad acts). Three minor upaklesas, deception, duplicity, and pride, and the eight major ones are also non-defined (because they exist in Rupadhatu).

9. Upaklésas and Dhatus

Seven minor upaklesas and two medium ones belong to Kamadhatu (world of sensuous desire) alone; deception and duplicity to Kamadhatu and Rupahatu (world of form); all the others belong to the three Dhatus, namely, Kamadhatu, Rupadhatu, and Arupyadhatu (formless world of pure spirit).

A being born and living in a lower world can produce eleven upaklesas of a higher world, for he who enjoys meditation and contemplation produces pride and, with reference to the other beings of Kamadhatu, deception and

若生上地起下後十，邪見愛俱容起彼故。

〔述記：若生上地起下後十。中有邪見俱有無慚等二，潤生愛俱有後八故。〕

小十生上無由起下，非正潤生及謗滅故。

〔述記：一非潤生，下十唯不善，潤生無記，故不與愛俱。又不謗滅，故不與邪見並。〕

〔述記義演：又非是謗滅故，不同邪見故不起。〕

中二大八下亦緣上，上緣貪等相應起故。

J. 以下緣上門

有義小十下不緣上，行相麤近不遠取故。

有義嫉等亦得緣上，於勝地法生嫉等故。

〔述記：言嫉等者，等取慳憍二法。〕

大八諂誑上亦緣下，下緣慢等相應起故，梵於釋子起諂誑故。憍不緣下，非所恃故。

K. 三學分別門

二十皆非學無學攝，此但是染，彼唯淨故。

L. 見斷等分別門

後十唯通見修所斷，與二煩惱相應起故。

見所斷者隨迷諦相或總或別，煩惱俱生，故隨所應皆通四部，迷諦親疏等皆如煩惱說。

duplicity. [The eight major upaklesas which make up the eleven are not set forth here because it is obvious that they penetrate all defiled minds].

A being born in a higher world can produce the last ten upaklesas of a lower world. For, in the intermediate existence which precedes his birth into the higher world, he can produce, with his false views, shamelessness and non-integrity and, with his 'craving thirst' (Trsna), i.e., the 'moistener of birth' which manifests itself at the last moments of his superior existence, he produces the eight major upaklesas.

As regards the ten minor upaklesas, there is no reason for them to be produced by a being of a higher world, because, being bad, they do not moisten birth; [and craving-thirst which moistens birth is non-defined: hence the ten do not accompany it]. Furthermore, they do not deny the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering (Nirodha). [To deny this Truth is Mithyadrsti, erroneous view. The absence of Mithyadrsti in the being concerned signifies that there is no association with the ten minor upaklesas.]

The two medium and the eight major upaklesas of a lower world can take as their object a higher world, for they are produced in association with covetousness, anger, etc., which aim at a higher world.

10. The perception of higher worlds

According to one opinion, the ten minor upaklesas of a lower world do not take as their object a higher world, for their modes of activity are gross and 'near' (i.e., superficial); consequently, they do not take 'distant' or 'lofty' objects.

According to another opinion, envy, parsimony, and pride can take as their object a higher world, for a being of the lower world may produce envy etc. with respect to the dharmas of a higher world.

The eight major upaklesas and duplicity-deception of a higher world also take as their object the lower world, for they are associated with conceit etc. which have a bearing on the lower world, and also because Brahma produces duplicity and deception with regard to the Arhat Asvajit.

Pride does not take as its object the dharmas of a lower world, for they cannot serve as its point of support.

11. Upaklesas and Saiksa categories

The twenty upaklesas are all comprised in the 'neither Saiksa nor Asaiksa' category, i.e., Naivasaiksanasaiksa, for they are exclusively defiled, and the Saiksa and Asaiksa categories are pure.

12. Abandonment of upaklesas

The last ten upaklesas are both Darsanaheya and Bhavanaheya (i.e., abandoned both by insight into Transcendent Truth and by meditation and self-cultivation), because they are born in association with klesas of two kinds, inborn and pertaining to speculation.

The upaklesas that are abandoned by insight into Transcendent Truth (Darsanaheya) arise in association with those klesas which are caused by general or particular errors about the 'characteristics of the Four Noble Truths'. In accordance with their special characteristics, they are all connected with these

前十有義唯修所斷，緣麤事境任運生故。

有義亦通見修所斷，依二煩惱勢力起故，緣他見等生忿等故。

見所斷者隨所應緣總別惑力皆通四部。

此中有義忿等但緣迷諦惑生，非親迷諦，行相麤淺不深取故。

有義嫉等亦親迷諦，於滅道等生嫉等故。

〔述記：嫉惱害慳憍五法亦親迷諦。〕

M. 有事無事門

然忿等十但緣有事，要託本質方得生故。

緣有漏等準上應知。

七· 不定心所

已說二十隨煩惱相，不定有四，其相云何？

頌曰：

不定謂悔眠， 尋伺二各二。

four Truths, and their relations with the direct and indirect errors about these Truths are the same as those between the fundamental klesas and those errors.

According to one opinion, the first ten upaklesas are abandoned by meditation and self-cultivation (Bhavanaheya) only, for they have a bearing on gross objects and arise spontaneously without any deliberation.

According to another opinion, the ten upaklesas are abandoned not only by meditation and self-cultivation but also by insight into Transcendent Truth (Darsanaheya), for they arise in dependence upon the power of the two kinds of klesas. The fact is that when one person sees another holding or expressing false views about the Atman (Atmagraha), etc., one may be filled with fury etc.

The upaklesas that are abandoned by insight into Transcendent Truth (Darsanaheya) are, in accordance with their special modes of association, related to the Four Noble Truths through the force of the fundamental klesas caused by direct or indirect errors about these Truths.

According to one opinion, the first ten upaklesas, fury etc., are produced indirectly in association with the fundamental klesas caused by errors about the Truths, and are not produced by direct errors about them, the reason being that their modes of activity are gross and superficial and, consequently, they do not penetrate deep in taking objects for perception.

According to another opinion, five of the first ten upaklesas, namely, envy, vexation, harmfulness, parsimony, and pride, are produced by direct errors about the Noble Truths. The fact is that envy may be caused with reference to the Cessation of Suffering and the Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering.

13. Existence of archetypes of objects

The first ten upaklesas, fury etc., are produced only by the perception of objects that really exist. They can only arise on the basis of the archetypes of those objects.

The perception of pure and impure objects (*nimittabhagas*) and the upaklesas arising therefrom can be understood by the same process or reasoning as that which was followed in the case of the fundamental klesas.

7. ANIYATAS
Indeterminate Mental Associates (Caittas)

We have explained the twenty upaklesas.

What are the characteristics of the four indeterminate mental qualities – the Aniyatas?

The Stanza says:

14b

> The indeterminate mental qualities refer to remorse
> (Kamkrtya), drowsiness (Middha),
>
> Reflection (Vitarka), and investigation (Vicara); these two
> couples can be of two kinds.

論曰：

悔眠尋伺於善染等皆不定故 。 非如觸等定徧心故。非如欲等定徧地故，立不定名。

悔謂惡作，惡所作業追悔爲性。 障止爲業。 此即於果假立因名，先惡所作業後方追悔故。

悔先不作亦惡作攝 ， 如追悔言我先不作如是事業是我惡作。

眠謂睡眠，令身不自在昧略爲性。障觀爲業。

謂睡眠位身不自在，心極闇劣，一門轉故。

〔述記：一門轉者，唯一意識都無五識。〕

昧簡在定，略別寤時，令顯睡眠非無體用。

有無心位假立此名，如餘葢纏心相應故。

有義此二唯癡爲體，說隨煩惱及癡分故。

有義不然，亦通善故，應說此二染癡爲體，淨即無癡，論依染分說隨煩惱及癡分攝。

有義此說亦不應理，無記非癡無癡性故。

應說惡作思慧爲體， 明了思擇所作業故。 睡眠合用思想爲體， 思想種種夢境相故。 論俱說爲世俗有故。 彼染汙者是癡等流，如不信等說爲癡分。

The Treatise says:

Remorse, drowsiness, reflection, and investigation are not necessarily good or bad or non-defined; they are not necessarily associated with all minds, like mental contact etc.; they do not necessarily penetrate all Bhumis (lands), like desire, resolve, etc., which penetrate the two superior Dhatus. To them is given therefore the name of Aniyatas, 'non-determined' or 'indeterminate Caittas'.

1. Remorse (Kaukrtya)

Remorse refers to 'evil-doing'. It is regret or repentance by nature – regret resulting from detestation of one's evil doings. Its special activity is to counteract Samatha or mental tranquillity. So we give to the effect the name of the cause; first, one detests or blames the act done, then one regrets it.

The regret for not having done an act is also comprised in remorse, for one may regret and say, 'I should have done this, but have not done it. I regard this failure on my part as a bad act which I detest and regret.'

2. Drowsiness (Middha)

Drowsiness is by nature that which causes the body to be uncomfortable and out of sorts and the mind to be obscure and inattentive. Its special activity is to counteract Vipasyana, intellection or contemplation.

In fact, in the state of drowsiness, one is not the master of his body; and his mind, on the one hand, is extremely obscure and feeble, and, on the other, is functioning only 'by one door', that is to say, expressing itself by Manovijnana only (the exterior sensory activities being suspended). Being 'obscure', drowsiness is distinguished from Samadhi; being 'inattentive', it is distinguished from 'the state of wakefulness'.

It is therefore clear that drowsiness is not without substance and activity of its own.

Sometimes the word drowsiness is used to designate a state of heavy torpor without thought, but this is only a conventional manner of speech, because drowsiness, like the other 'covers' and 'bonds' (Nivaranas and Paryavasthanas, i.e., the 'five covers' and 'eight bonds', i.e., vexing passions which stunt mental growth and hold the mind in bondage), is associated with the mind.

Opinions differ on the nature of remorse and drowsiness:

(1) Remorse and drowsiness are delusion by nature, for the Yogasastra says that they are constituent parts of the upaklesas and delusion.

(2) This is incorrect, for remorse and drowsiness can be good. Hence these two, when defiled, constitute delusion and, when pure, non-delusion. The Yogasastra, in the definition quoted above, is concerned only with the defiled part of these two Caittas.

(3) The theory of the second master is also imperfect, because remorse and drowsiness, when non-defined, are neither delusion nor non-delusion.

In fact, it is the nature of remorse to consist of two dharmas, volition and discernment, because, by the second, one clearly knows the acts done or not done, and, by the first, one examines and discriminates those acts. And drowsiness has as its essential nature two dharmas, volition and conception,

有義彼說理亦不然，非思慧想纏彼性故。

應說此二各別有體，與餘心所行相別故，隨癡相說名世俗有。

尋謂尋求，令心怱遽於意言境麤轉爲性。伺謂伺察，令心怱遽於意言境細轉爲性。此二俱以安不安住身心分位所依爲業。

〔文釋併說：尋伺而得則身心依於安份住住，不得則依於不安份住住。〕

並用思慧一分爲體，於意言境不深推度及深推度義類別故。

若離思慧，尋伺二種體類差別不可得故。

二各二者，有義尋伺各有染淨二類差別。
有義此釋不應正理，悔眠亦有染淨二故。
應說如前諸染心所有是煩惱隨煩惱性，
此二各有不善無記，或復各有纏及隨眠。

有義彼釋亦不應理，不定四後有此言故。
應言二者顯二種二，一謂悔眠，二謂尋伺。
此二二種種類各別，故一二言顯二二種。
此各有二，謂染不染，非如善染各唯一故。
或唯簡染，故說此言，有亦說爲隨煩惱故。

〔述記：此言唯爲簡染，以瑜伽五十五等說爲隨煩惱，恐同前唯染，故置通二言。〕

for it usually thinks of the various characteristics of the objects of a dream. That is why the Yogasastra says that they have a relative existence. When they are defiled, they are in fact the efflux of delusion, like unbelief etc.: that is why the Yogasastra says that they are a part of delusion.

(4) The theory of the third master is also incorrect. For that which constitutes the 'bonds' (Paryavasthanas) of remorse-drowsiness is neither volition nor discernment nor conception.

Let us therefore say that both remorse and drowsiness have special natures of their own, for their modes of activity are different from those of other Caittas. If the Yogasastra says that they are of relative existence, it is because they are confused with delusion.

3 and 4. Intellectual reflection (Vitarka) and investigation (Vicara)

Intellectual reflection (Vitarka) refers to mental search or study; its nature is to cause the mind to be earnest and ardent and to examine in a *crude* manner the objects of mental discourse. Investigation (Vicara) refers to thorough and detailed research; its nature is to cause the mind to be earnest and ardent and to examine in a *subtle* manner the objects of mental discourse. The special activity of these two Caittas is to serve as the cause of mental and corporeal states of comfort and discomfort (comfort when one acquires the necessary knowledge as a result of the reflection and investigation, and discomfort when one fails to do so).

Both Caittas make use, as their essential nature, of certain constituent parts of volition (Cetana) and discernment (Prajna). They are different in that the first is not profound in its reflection on the objects of mental discourse while the second is profound in its investigation of them.

Apart from volition and discernment, they have neither a specific nature nor any specific activity of their own.

The Stanza says that 'these two couples [of Caittas] can be of two kinds'.

Difference of interpretation:

(1) Both reflection and investigation can be of two kinds, defiled or pure.

(2) This first explanation does not accord with reason, for remorse and drowsiness can also be defiled or pure. It should therefore be said that the first 'two' refer to defiled Caittas enumerated above, i.e., to klesas and upaklesas, and that the second 'two' are of two kinds, i.e., bad and non-defined, or else that they both have the 'eight bonds' and drowsiness as constituent parts of themselves.

(3) This second explanation is also incorrect, because Vasubandhu is concerned with the last four Caittas named Aniyatas. The first 'two' designates two species: a. remorse and drowsiness, b. reflection and investigation. These two couples in fact form two distinct species. Each of the four has two natures, defiled and non-defiled, in contradistinction to Caittas that have only one single nature, either good or defiled by definition. Or, on another interpretation, the author says that the four are of two natures to distinguish them from the defiled. Again, because a text (Yogasastra, 55) says that the four are upaklesas, the author wishes to stress that they are not necessarily upaklesas.

爲顯不定義說二各二言，故置此言深爲有用。

諸門分別

A. 假實分別門

四中尋伺定是假有，思慧合成聖所說故。

悔眠有義亦是假有，瑜伽說爲世俗有故。
〔述記：五十五說是世俗有故。〕
有義此二是實物有，唯後二種說假有故，世俗有言隨他相說，非顯前二定是假有。
〔述記：隨他相說，以說爲癡分故，非言世俗便顯是假。〕
又如內種體雖是實，而論亦說世俗有故。
〔述記：五十二說。〕

B. 自相應門

四中尋伺定不相應，體類是同麤細異故。

依於尋伺有染離染立三地別，不依彼種現起有無，故無雜亂。

〔瑜伽師地論：有尋有伺地，有尋無伺地，無尋無伺地。〕

俱與前二容互相應，前二亦有互相應義。

C. 識相應門

四皆不與第七八俱，義如前說，悔眠唯與第六識俱，非五法故。

有義尋伺亦五識俱，論說五識有尋伺故。
又說尋伺即七分別，謂有相等。雜集復言任運分別，謂五識故。
〔述記：大論第五末說尋伺卽七分別，謂有相，無相，任運，尋求，伺察染汙，不染汙。〕
〔述記義演：有相者，謂現在境及過去境。無相者，謂緣未來。〕

The expression 'these two couples can be of two kinds' explains the sense of the term *aniyata*, non-determined or indeterminate, and is therefore extremely useful.

PROBLEMS RELATING TO ANIYATS

1. Real existence and existence by designation

No doubt reflection and investigation exist by designation only, because the texts say that they are constituted by volition and discernment.

Diversity of opinion concerning remorse and drowsiness

(1) Remorse and drowsiness also exist by designation only, for the Yogasastra, 55, says that they are of relative existence.

(2) These two Caittas have a real existence, for it is only reflection and investigation that are stated to exist by designation. If the Yogasastra declares that they have a relative existence, it is referring to a definition which makes of them a part of delusion; it does not intend to say that they only have existence by designation. In fact, although Bijas are real things, the Yogasastra, 52, also says that they have relative existence only.

2. Association among themselves

Reflection and investigation cannot be associated, because, although they are of the same substance and of the same kind, they are different in matters of grossness and subtlety.

The difference between the three Bhumis (domains or lands) [(1) Bhumi with reflection and investigation; (2) Bhumi with reflection but without investigation; (3) Bhumi without reflection and investigation] is established by reason of the detachment and non-detachment from desire of reflection-investigation, not by reason of the presence or the absence of reflection-investigation whether potentially or in manifestation. Hence the three Bhumis are not confused.

Reflection and investigation may be associated with remorse and drowsiness.

Remorse and drowsiness may be associated with each other.

3. Association with the consciousnesses

The four Aniyatas cannot be associated with the eighth and seventh consciousnesses as has been explained before.

Remorse and drowsiness are associated only with the sixth consciousness, for they are not dharmas that can be associated with the five consciousnesses.

Diversity of opinion concerning reflection-investigation and the five consciousnesses:

(1) Reflection and investigation are associated with the five consciousnesses. In fact, the Yogasastra, 5, says that the five consciousnesses have reflection-investigation. It also says that reflection and investigation have seven differentiations (Vikalpas), namely, perception of present and past objects, perception of future objects, spontaneous perception of objects, reflection on objects, investigation of objects, impure perception, i.e., associated with klesas, and pure perception, i.e., associated with good Caittas. And the

有義尋伺唯意識俱。論說尋求伺察等法皆是意識不共法故。又說尋伺憂喜相應，曾不說與苦樂俱故。

捨受徧故可不待說，何緣不說與苦樂俱？

雖初靜慮有意地樂，而不離喜，總說喜名。

雖純苦處有意地苦，而似憂故總說爲憂。

又說尋伺以名身等義爲所緣，非五識身以名身等義爲境故。

然說五識有尋伺者，顯多由彼起，非說彼相應。

雜集所言任運分別謂五識者，彼與瑜伽所說分別義名有異。彼說任運即是五識，瑜伽說此是五識俱分別意識相應尋伺。

故彼所引爲證不成，由此五識定無尋伺。

D. 五受俱不俱門

有義惡作憂捨相應，唯慼行轉，通無記故。
睡眠喜憂捨受俱起，行通歡慼中庸轉故。
尋伺憂喜捨樂相應，初靜慮中意樂俱故。

有義此四亦苦受俱，純苦趣中意苦俱故。

E. 別境相應門

Tsa-tsi of Sthiramati also says that spontaneous differentiation refers to the five consciousnesses.

(2) Reflection and investigation are associated only with Manovijnana. In fact, a. the Yogasastra says that they are dharmas belonging exclusively to Manovijnana; b. it says that they are associated with grief and delight, and has never said that they are associated with sorrow and joy.

There is no reason whatever why indifference, which is universal, should be mentioned in this connection; but why does the Sastra not speak of sorrow and joy? Is it not because reflection and investigation do not belong to the five physical sense-consciousnesses?

As mentioned above, reflection and investigation are associated with delight; although the first Dhyana (first stage of meditation) includes a joy of the realm of Manas, nevertheless, as this joy is not separated from delight, it is grouped under the general name of delight.

They are associated with grief: although the destinies marked by exclusive suffering include a sorrow of the realm of Manas, nevertheless, as this sorrow resembles grief, it is embodied in the general term of grief.

The Yogasastra also says that reflection and investigation have as their objects names (*namakaya*), phrases (*vyanjanakaya*), and syllables (*padakaya*), and also the meaning that they express; and these are not taken as objects of the five consciousnesses.

It is true that the Yogasastra says that the five consciousnesses have reflection-investigation, but this is just to show that these Five are born in a large number of cases by reason of reflection-investigation, and not to teach that they are associated with them.

As to the declaration by Tsa-tsi that spontaneous differentiation refers to the five consciousnesses, this declaration is in contradiction with the Yogasastra: the Tsa-tsi understands by 'spontaneous differentiation' the five consciousnesses, whereas the Yogasastra designates as 'spontaneous' that differentiation which is the reflection-investigation associated with Manas which is associated with the Five.

Hence the texts quoted as arguments are not demonstrative, and we conclude that the five consciousnesses are not associated with reflection-investigation.

4. Association with the sensations – Two opinions

(1) Remorse is associated with grief and indifference, partly because it causes distress and partly because it can be non-defined. Drowsiness is associated with delight, grief, and indifference, because it can be agreeable, distressing, and neutral. Reflection and investigation are associated with grief, delight, indifference, and joy, because, in the first Dhyana, Manas is accompanied by joy.

(2) These four Aniyatas are associated with sorrow also, because, in destinies marked by exclusive suffering, Manas is accompanied by sorrow.

5. Association with 'special' Caittas

The four Aniyatas are associated with all the five special Caittas, because

四皆容與五別境俱，行相所緣不相違故。

F. 與善俱起門

悔眠但與十善容俱，此唯在欲，無輕安故。
尋伺容與十一善俱，初靜慮中輕安俱故。

G. 煩惱相應門

悔但容與無明相應，此行相麤，貪等細故。
睡眠尋伺十煩惱俱，此彼展轉不相違故。

H. 隨惑俱轉門

悔與中大隨惑容俱，非忿等十各爲主故。
睡眠尋伺二十容俱，眠等位中皆起彼故。

I. 三性分別門

此四皆通善等三性，於無記業亦追悔故。

有義初二唯生得善，行相麤鄙及昧略故，後二亦通加行善攝，聞所成等有尋伺故。

有義初二亦加行善，聞思位中有悔眠故。

後三皆通染淨無記，惡作非染，解麤猛故。
四無記中悔唯中二，行相麤猛非定果故。
〔述記：淨四無記中悔唯是威儀工巧二法，威儀工巧二法四無記中是中二故，謂異熟爲第一變化爲第四故。以彼惡作行相麤猛不與業異熟心俱，非定果故亦不說與變化心俱。〕

眠除第四，非定引生，異熟生心亦得眠故。

尋伺除初，彼解微劣，不能尋察名等義故。

there is no contradiction among the objects and aspects of the four Aniyatas and the five special Caittas.

6. Association with good Caittas

Remorse and drowsiness are associated with ten good Caittas only, because, being found only in Kamadhatu (the world of sensuous desire), they are not associated with composure of mind. Reflection-investigation can be associated with all the eleven good Caittas, because, in the first Dhyana, they are associated with composure of mind.

7. Association with the ten klesas

Remorse is only associated with ignorance (Avidya), i.e., delusion, because its mode of activity is gross while covetousness, anger, etc., are subtle. Drowsiness, reflection and investigation are associated with all the ten klesas, because there is no contradiction or conflict among these three Aniyatas and the ten klesas.

8. Association with the upaklesas

Remorse can be associated with the medium and the major upaklesas, not with the ten minor ones of which fury is the first, because these ten are each born separately. Drowsiness, reflection and investigation can be associated with all the twenty upaklesas, because one can, in a state of sleep etc., produce fury etc.

9. Moral Species.

The four Aniyatas can be of three kinds, good, bad, and non-defined, because a non-defined act may involve remorse.

According to one opinion, the first two, remorse and drowsiness, only involve the good that is inborn, i.e., innate good qualities, because the mode of activity of the first is gross, and that of the second is obscured and constricted. Reflection and investigation, on the contrary, can be comprised in the good that is cultivated by intensified efforts, because they exist in the wisdom obtained from audition, cogitation, and cultivation.

According to another opinion, remorse and drowsiness are also 'cultivated good', because they can be found in the above states of audition, intellection, etc.

The last three Aniyatas can be impure-non-defined and pure non-defined; the first, remorse, is never impure because of the grossness and violence of its mode of activity. Being pure non-defined, it will only belong to the two intermediate categories, i.e., the second and the third, because, by reason of its grossness and violence, it is not associated with the *vipaka* mind (first category), and, furthermore, it is not the fruit of meditation (fourth category).

Drowsiness cannot be the fruit of meditation either, but one of the *vipaka* minds may include it. It may therefore belong to the first three categories.

Reflection and investigation can be of the last three categories, not of the first, *vipaka*,for the activity of the *vipaka* mind is weak and crude: this mind is incapable of investigation and judgment with reference to names, phrases, etc.

J. 界繫分別門

惡作睡眠唯欲界有，尋伺在欲及初靜慮，餘界地法皆妙靜故。

悔眠生上必不現起，尋伺上下亦起下上。
下上尋伺能緣上下。

有義悔眠不能緣上，行相麤近極昧略故。
有義此二亦緣上境，有邪見者悔修定故，夢能普緣所更事故。

K. 三學分別門

悔非無學，離欲捨故。

睡眠尋伺皆通三種。求解脫者有爲善法皆名學故，學究竟者有爲善法皆無學故。

L. 三斷門

悔眠唯通見修所斷，亦邪見等勢力起故。
〔述記：悔眠通見修斷，不通不斷。〕

非無漏道親所引生故。亦非如憂，深求解脫故。
若已斷故名非所斷，則無學眠非所斷攝。

尋伺雖非眞無漏道，而能引彼，從彼引生，故通見修非所斷攝。
〔述記：二法雖非無分別智眞無漏道相應名無漏引，或加行時引無漏道故，從後得智之所引生俱時引故，亦通非斷等。〕

有義尋伺非所斷者，於五法中唯分別攝，瑜伽說彼是

10. Aniyatas and Dhatus

(1) Remorse and drowsiness are found in Kamadhatu only, for the two higher Dhatus are too sublime to leave any room for these mental states. Reflection and investigation exist in Kamadhatu and in the first Dhyana of Rupahatu, because the seven other 'lands' (the upper worlds) are wonderfully calm and free from turbulent mental activity.

(2) A person born above (i.e., in a higher 'land' of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu) has no occasion whatever for remorse or drowsiness.

A person born in a higher Dhatu can engage in reflection and investigation in a lower one, and, conversely, the person in a lower Dhatu can engage in these mental activities in a higher one.

Reflection and investigation in a superior Dhatu can have as their object an inferior Dhatu, and *vice versa.*

According to one opinion, remorse and drowsiness cannot take a superior object on account of the gross and superficial character of the first and the extremely obscured and constricted nature of the second. But it may be replied that a man of false views may regret having practised meditation; hence remorse can have a bearing on a superior object. One argues further that a dream can have a bearing on things already experienced.

11. Aniyatas and Saiksa categories

Remorse is not a mental quality of an Asaiksa, because he who is detached from sensuous desires has abandoned it.

Drowsiness, reflection and investigation can belong to all the three categories. All good dharmas of the active, mundane class (Samskrta) of the aspirant who seeks deliverance are named 'Saiksas'; all those of the Yogin who has attained perfection in his studies are named 'Asaiksas'.

12. Abandonment of Aniyatas

(1) Remorse and drowsiness are *darsanaheya*, to be abandoned by insight into Transcendent Truth, and *bhavanaheya*, to be abandoned by meditation and self-cultivation; they are not *aheya*, not to be abandoned.

They are *darsanaheya* because, as they can be born through the force of false views (Mithyadrsti, which is *darsanaheya*) etc., they can have this Drsti as their object (and are consequently to be abandoned as this Drsti itself is to be abandoned, that is, by *darsana*).

They are not *aheya*: a. because they are not directly provoked by the Pure Path; b. because remorse does not seek deliverance as grief does; c. if one says that drowsiness is *aheya* when it has already been abandoned, we have to admit that the drowsiness of the Asaiksa is *aheya*.

(2) Although reflection and investigation do not form part of the 'True Pure Path' (which is the Tattvadarsanamarga, the Avikalpakajnana or Mulajnana, i.e., the fundamental transcendental wisdom or the knowledge of the fundamental identity of all things), nevertheless they can bring about this Path and be born from this Path. Consequently, they can be *aheya*. They can also, without any difficulty, be *darsanaheya* and *bhavanaheya*.

According to one opinion, reflection and investigation are *aheya* because

分別故。

〔述記：大論第五說尋伺決擇四句云，諸尋伺皆分別。〕

有義此二亦正智攝，說正思惟是無漏故，彼能令心尋求等故。又說彼是言說因故。

〔述記：顯揚第二等說正思惟是無漏故。〕

未究竟位於藥病等未能徧知，後得智中爲他說法必假尋伺，非如佛地無功用說，故此二種亦通無漏。

雖說尋伺必是分別，而不定說唯屬第三，後得正智中亦有分別故。

餘門準上，如理應知。

八・　心所與心爲一爲異

如是六位諸心所法爲離心體有別自性？
爲即是心分位差別？設爾何失？

二俱有過。若離心體有別自性，如何聖教說唯有識？又如何說心遠獨行，染淨由心，士夫六界？

莊嚴論說復云何通？如彼頌言，許心似二現，如是似貪等，或似於信等，無別染善法。

若即是心分位差別，如何聖教說心相應，他性相應非自性故？

〔述記：十卷楞伽頌第九十卷。皆有相應之言等故。……如對法第五相應品等說二體不俱故，及五十六說他性相應非自性等。〕

they are grouped in the Vikalpa category of the list of five dharmas;[1] the Yogasastra, 5, says that reflection and investigation are Vikalpa.

According to another opinion, they are also grouped in the Samyagjnana category (fundamental wisdom) of this list,[1] because a. in the Vikhyapana and other Sastras, right cogitation is pure; b. it can cause the mind to start reflecting etc.; and c. it is the cause of speech. [Hence reflection and investigation can be pure.]

Before the ultimate stage of perfection is reached (that is, in the case of the saints of the two Vehicles and the Bodhisattvas of the ten Lands), there is, as yet, no absolute knowledge with regard to medical remedies and illnesses. Hence, during the period of manifestation of the 'Subsequent Wisdom', reflection and investigation are necessary in order to teach the Dharma. This is different from the case of the Buddhas (state of perfection) whose speech is produced without any mental effort. Hence these two Aniyatas are also pure.

Although the Yogasastra says that reflection and investigation are Vikalpa, yet it does not specify that they belong only to the third category of the list of five dharmas. This is because both the 'subsequent wisdom' (*Vikalpakjnana*) and the 'fundamental wisdom' (Samyagjnana) involve Vikalpa.

Other problems relating to the Aniyatas should be solved according to the principles we have already laid down.

8. RELATIOS BETWEEN CITTA AND CAITTAS

With regard to the six categories of Caittas – Universal, Special, Good, Klesas, Upaklesas, Indeterminate – have they, apart from Citta (mind), a self-nature, a *svabhava*, of their own? Or are they merely particular forms of Citta? Are there any flaws in these two theses?

Both theses are inadmissible. For, if the Caittas are things apart from Citta, having a self-nature of their own, how can one explain the many sacred texts which teach that only consciousness exists? And how can one explain the other texts in which it is said: 1. 'the mind goes alone into the distance'; 2. 'defilement by the mind, purification by the mind'; 3. 'a man is constituted of six Dhatus: four Mahabhutas, Akasa, and Vijnana (consciousness)'?

And how can one explain the Alamkarasastra in which one stanza reads: 'We affirm that the mind, itself unique, appears double, as object and subject (*grahya, grahaka*) or as image and vision (*nimitta* and *darsanabhaga*); similarly it appears as covetousness etc., as belief etc.: there are no defiled or good dharmas apart from Citta'?

On the other hand, if the Caittas are merely particular forms of Citta, how is it possible to explain the other texts: those that speak of the 'associates of the mind' (Lankavatara)? For, assuredly, there cannot be associations except among different things (Abhidharma, 5, and Yogasastra, 56). And how can one explain the saying 'Citta is born with the Caittas as the sun with the

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[1] The five dharmas or categories are: name (*namon*), appearance (*nimitta*), mental discrimination (*vikalpa*), fundamental wisdom (*samyagjnana*), and Absolute Reality (*Bhutatathata*).

又如何說心與心所俱時而起如日與光？
〔述記：此楞伽經十卷成者第七卷中五法品說。〕

瑜伽論說復云何通？彼說心所非即心故，如彼頌言，
五種性不成，分位差過失，因緣無別故，與聖教相違。

應說離心有別自性，以心勝故說唯識等。

心所依心勢力生故，說似彼現，非彼即心。

又識心言亦攝心所，恒相應故。

唯識等言及現似彼，皆無有失。

此依世俗，若依勝義，心所與心非離非即，諸識相望
應知亦然，是謂大乘眞俗妙理。

light' (Lankavatara)? And how can one explain the Yogasastra, which declares that the Caittas are not Citta, and cites a stanza which reads:

> The five Gotras – that is to say the five Skandhas – are not established. The theory of particular forms of mind is erroneous, because one cannot conceive any variety of causes and conditions [which is the reason of the variety of forms]. Furthermore, this system is contradicted by the sacred texts.

The truth is that, apart from Citta, the Caittas are things in themselves. Without any doubt, the texts say, 'All is Mere-Consciousness'; but they express themselves thus because Citta is fundamental. They say that Citta appears as Caitta: for the reason that the Caittas depend on Citta for support and are born by the force of Citta; but that does not mean that the Caittas are Citta. Furthermore, by the words consciousness, mind, or Citta, the texts understand 'consciousness or Citta with Caittas', because Caittas are always associated with consciousness or Citta. The expressions 'Mere-Consciousness' and 'appearing as Caittas' are therefore correct.

All this is viewed from the stand-point of relative truth. From the absolute point of view, Citta and the Caittas are neither distinct nor identical. This is the same with the consciousnesses among themselves. Such is, in the Mahayana, the marvellous nature of Samvrti (worldly truth) and Paramartha (Absolute Truth).

第五章・　六識現起分位

已說六識心所相應，云何應知現起分位？

頌曰：

依止根本識，　五識隨緣現，
或俱或不俱，　如濤波依水。
意識常現起，　除生無想天，
及無心二定，　睡眠與悶絕。

一・　本識

論曰：

根本識者阿陀那識，染淨諸識生根本故。

依止者，謂前六轉識以根本識爲共親依。

§ 5. CONDITION OF MANIFESTATION OF THE SIX CONSCIOUSNESSES

We have studied the associations of the six consciousnesses with their Caittas. What are the conditions in which they manifest themselves?

The Stanzas say:

15

In dependence upon the root consciousness (i.e., the eighth consciousness, Alayavijnana)

The five consciousnesses (of the senses) manifest themselves in accordance with various causes and conditions,

Sometimes together, sometimes separately,

Just as waves manifest themselves in dependence upon the conditions of the water.

16

But the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana) manifests itself at all times,

Except for beings born into the 'heavenly world without thought' (among Asamjnidevas in whom thinking has entirely ceased),

Except also for those in the two mindless Samapattis (two forms of meditation in which there is no more activity of thought) and

Those who are in states of stupor or unconsciousness.

I ROOT CONSCIOUSNESS (MULAVIJNANA)

The Treatise says:

The root consciousness is the Adanavijnana or the Alayavijnana because it is the root from which all pure and impure consciousnesses grow into manifestation.

The expression 'in dependence upon' in the Stanza means that the six evolving consciousnesses (the Five and Manovijnana) take this root consciousness as their common and immediate basis and support.

二· 五識

五識者，謂前五轉識種類相似故總說之。

〔述記：種類相似，故總說之。一謂俱依色根，二同緣色境，三俱但緣現在，四俱現量得，五俱有間斷，種類相似故總合說。〕

隨緣現言顯非常起。

緣謂作意根境等緣。

謂五識身內依本識外隨作意五根境等衆緣和合方得現前，由此或俱或不俱起，外緣合者有頓漸故。

如水濤波隨緣多少。

〔述記：彼解深密等說，廣慧如大暴流水若有一浪生緣現前唯一浪轉，乃至若多浪生緣現前有多浪轉，諸識亦爾，如暴流阿陀那故乃至諸識得轉等。此以五識喻於濤波，本識喻暴水。〕

此等法喻廣說如經。

〔述記：如解深密等言。〕

三· 意識

由五轉識行相麤動，所藉衆緣時多不具，故起時少不起時多。

第六意識雖亦麤動，而所藉緣無時不具，由違緣故有時不起。

第七八識行相微細，所藉衆緣一切時有，故無緣礙令總不行。

又五識身不能思慮，唯外門轉，起藉多緣，故斷時多現行時少。

〔述記：不能思慮，無尋伺故。不能自起，藉他引故。緣麤事故，唯外門轉，唯緣外境，不內緣種根理等故。〕

第六意識自能思慮，內外門轉，不藉多緣，唯除五位常能現起，故斷時少現起時多，由斯不說此隨緣現。

2 THE FIVE CONSCIOUSNESSES

'The five consciousnesses' refer to the first five evolving consciousnesses, i.e., visual consciousness etc., which, being similar in category, are spoken of together. [In fact, they all depend for support on material organs; they all perceive material and actual objects in an immediate manner; and they are all subject to interruption.]

The words, 'manifest themselves in accordance with various causes and conditions', indicate that this manifestation does not occur constantly. By 'various causes and conditions' the author means such factors as the act of attention (*manaskara*) of Manovijnana, the sense-organs (*indriyas*), (whose attention is directed in accordance with Manovijnana), the external objects (*visaya*) towards which this attention is directed, etc. [By 'etc.' the author means space, light, the Bijas of the Alayavijnana, etc.]

This means that the five consciousnesses are dependent internally upon the Mulavijnana (Alaya), and that, externally, they can only manifest themselves by conforming to a concatenation of conditions, such as the act of attention (*manaskara*), the five sense-organs (*indriyas*), the external objects sensed by these organs (*visaya*), etc.

Consequently 'they arise sometimes together, sometimes separately' according as the combining of external factors occurs suddenly or gradually.

Thus, they are like the waves on water, which, depending on the conditioning factors, are sometimes numerous, sometimes few. This comparison, with others, is explained in detail in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra.

3 THE MANOVIJNANA

The operations of the five consciousnesses are crude and unstable, and the conditioning factors on which they depend are often incomplete. Therefore they act only sometimes, and very often do not act at all.

As to the sixth consciousness, Manovijnana, it too is crude and unstable. Nevertheless, the conditioning factors on which it depends are always present, so that it is only when adverse factors are present that it is prevented from operating.

In the case of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, their operations are fine and subtle, and the conditioning factors on which they depend are at all times present. Therefore no adverse condition can ever prevent them from operating *in toto*.

Furthermore, the five consciousnesses are incapable of intellectual operation; [because they are devoid of the faculties of reflection and investigation; they cannot arise by themselves, being dependent on Manovijnana for direction; they have a bearing only on gross objects;] they only function externally; they depend on many conditioning factors; therefore they are generally interrupted and are seldom in activity.

The Manovijnana is capable of intellectual operation (being possessed of powers of reflection and investigation); it functions both internally and

五位者何？
生無想等。

四・　無想天

無想天者，謂修彼定厭麤想力，生彼天中違不恒行心及心所，想滅爲首名無想天。

故六轉識於彼皆斷。

有義彼天常無六識，聖教說彼無轉識故。
說彼唯有有色支故。又說彼爲無心地故。
〔述記：瑜伽第十三卷說。〕

有義彼天將命終位要起轉識然後命終，彼必起下潤生愛故。

瑜伽論說後想生已，是諸有情從彼沒故。
〔述記：瑜伽五十六說。〕

然說彼無轉識等者，依長時說，非謂全無。

有義生時亦有轉識，彼中有必起潤生煩惱故。

如餘本有初必有轉識故。

瑜伽論說若生於彼唯入不起，其想若生從彼沒故。
〔述記：第十二卷解無想定中說。〕

externally (for it knows principles and things); it does not depend on many conditions; it can always manifest itself except in five cases. Hence it is generally in operation and rarely interrupted. This is why the Stanza does not say that it is born 'in accordance with causes and conditions', that is to say, 'when the necessary conditions are present'.

What are the five states in which Manovijnana is lacking?

Birth among the Asamjnidevas in whom Samjna (thinking) has entirely ceased, the two mindless Samapattis, etc.

4. BIRTH AMONG ASAMJNIDEVAS

By the force of the meditation of Asamjnisamapatti, of disgust with reference to all crude thinking (Samjna) (that is to say, with reference to the first six consciousnesses in contradistinction to the subtle thinking of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses), the ascetic is reborn among the devas of Brhatphala who are named Asamjnidevas. They are so named because their mode of existence has as its first principle 'the destruction of thinking' (Samjnanirodha), a destruction contradictory to the non-perpetual Cittas and Caittas (that is to say, to the six consciousnesses and their associated activities). Hence all the first six consciousnesses are cut off in the mode of existence of these Asamjnidevas.

DIVERSITY OF OPINION

1. According to the first masters, these devas are always lacking in the six consciousnesses, because the sacred teaching says that they are devoid of Pravrttivijnanas; that they have only *rupanga* (instead of nama-rupanga);[1] and that their 'land' is one of the six mindless Bhumis (*acittakabhumi*) (Yogasastra 13).

2. According to the second masters, in the state preceding death, they must of necessity produce Pravrttivijnana: for they must, at the end of their life, produce Trsna (craving-thirst) which 'moistens' their lower birth; because the Yogasastra, 56, says: 'Later, when Samjna (thinking) is reborn, these beings fall from their deva existence.'

One text says that they are without Pravrttivijnana: this declaration refers to the great length of their existence and does not imply the complete absence of Pravrttivijnana.

3. According to the third masters, they have also Pravrttivijnana at the time of their birth: (1) because they must produce, in the course of their intermediate existence, a klesa that moistens birth; (2) because these devas, at the first stage of their 'central existence', must have Pravrttivijnana just as the devas of other heavens have in the first stages of their central existence; (3) because the Yogasastra, 12, says, 'If he is born among these devas, the one thing he does is to enter into a mindless meditation without producing Samjna; the moment he produces Samjna, he falls from heaven.'

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[1] See following Section on The Twelve Angas.

彼本有初若無轉識如何名入？先有後無乃名入故。

決擇分言所有生得心心所滅名無想故。

〔述記：五十三卷解無想天云。〕

此言意顯彼本有初有異熟生轉識暫起，宿因緣力後不復生，由斯引起異熟無記分位差別說名無想。

〔述記：彼天本有初位有六轉識報心暫起，宿習無心定因緣力故後不復生心。〕

如善引生二定名善。

〔述記：二定名善，隨能引心故。此亦隨生得無記心滅，故彼果名無記。〕

不爾轉識一切不行，如何可言唯生得滅？

故彼初位轉識暫起。

彼天唯在第四靜慮，下想麤動難可斷故，上無無想異熟處故。

即能引發無想定思能感彼天異熟果故。

五· 無心二定

及無心二定者，謂無想滅盡定俱無六識故名無心。

(一) 無想定

無想定者，謂有異生伏徧淨貪未伏上染，由出離想作意爲先，令不恒行心心所滅，想滅爲首立無想名，令身安和故亦名定。

〔述記：徧淨者，謂第三禪天，〕

Now, if the first stage of the central existence does not include Pravrttivijnana, how can it be said that the being has 'entered' (into a mindless state)? For him to have 'entered' (into the mindless existence), it is necessary that he should first of all have Pravrttivijnana and that, later, he should no longer have it.

The Yogasastra, 53, says, 'What is called Asamjnika (character of the mindless devas) is the destruction (*nirodha*) of all the original Citta and Caittas.' This text shows that the Asamjnidevas produce for a short period of time, at the beginning of their central existence, Pravrttivijnana of the *vipakaja* class (i.e., born of retribution), and that, subsequently, as a result of former causes (i.e., preparation for Asamjnisamapatti), this Pravrttivijnana is no longer born. This cessation of the original sixth consciousness brings about a mindless state (*acittaka*) which is a 'non-defined state of the retribution class (*vipaka*)' and which is called Asamjnika. Asamjnika is called 'non-defined' by reason of the non-defined nature of the original 'retribution' Vijnana that is destroyed, just as the two Samapattis are called 'good' by reason of the goodness of the mental activities that produce them. If, contrary to this doctrine, Pravrttivijnana had never grown into manifestation in these devas, how could the Yogasastra speak of the destruction (*nirodha*) of the original Citta-caittas? Hence Pravrttivijnana is produced, for a short time, at the beginning of the existence of the Asamjnidevas.

These devas reside only in the fourth Dhyana: below that, the Samjna is so crude and unstable that it is difficult to cut it off; above that, there is no place for the retribution of Asamjnika. The volition (*cetana*) which produces the Asamjnisamapatti is capable of producing the fruit of retribution (general and particular) for these devas of the fourth Dhyana.

5 THE TWO SAMAPATTIS (MEDITATIONS)

The Stanza says, 'the two mindless Samapattis' or 'Samapattis without mind'. These refer to the Asamjnisamapatti and the Nirodhasamapatti. They are called 'mindless' or 'without mind' by reason of the absence of the six consciousnesses.

1. Asamjnisamapatti

This Samapatti belongs to a class of ordinary people called Prthagjanas who have 'subdued' or 'subjugated' (not definitely cut off) the passion of covetousness existing in the realm of Subhakrtsna, the heaven of the third Dhyana, but not the impure covetousness of the superior Dhyanas. They cherish, as their antecedent or motive power, the false idea that this Samapatti constitutes Nirvana. Although this Samapatti causes the destruction of all the non-perpetual Citta-caittas (the first six consciousnesses), nevertheless, inasmuch as 'destruction of Samjna' (Samjnanirodha) is regarded as the first principle, it is named Asamjnin (absence of cogitation). And as it produces tranquillity of the body and joyfulness of the heart, it is also called Samapatti.

(1) There are three degrees in the cultivation and practice of this Samapatti:

修習此定品別有三，下品修者現法必退，不能速疾還引現前，後生彼天不甚光淨形色廣大，定當中天。

中品修者現不必退，設退速疾還引現前，後生彼天雖甚光淨形色廣大而不最極，雖有中夭而不決定。

上品修者現必不退，後生彼天最極光淨形色廣大，必無中夭，窮滿壽量後方殞沒。

此定唯屬第四靜慮。

又唯是善，彼所引故。下上地無，由前說故。

四業通三，除順現受。

有義此定唯欲界起，由諸外道說力起故，人中慧解極猛利故。

有義欲界先修習已後生色界能引現前，除無想天至究竟故。

此由厭想欣彼果入，故唯有漏，非聖所起。

(二) 滅盡定

滅盡定者，謂有無學或有學聖，已伏或離無所有貪，上貪不定，由止息想作意爲先，令不恒行恒行染汙心心所滅，立滅盡名，令身安和故亦名定。由偏厭受想亦名滅彼定。

a. Inferior degree:

The ascetic of this degree necessarily falls from the Samapatti during his present life, and, having fallen, he is incapable of quickly getting it back. Later on, when he is reborn among the mindless devas, his inner light is not very pure and his dimensions not very large, and death necessarily comes before the time.

b. Medium degree:

The ascetic of this degree does not necessarily fall from the Samapatti during his present life; if he falls from it, he will quickly return to it. Later on, when he is reborn among the devas, his inner light is very pure and his dimensions very large, but they are not at their maximum; although death may come before the time, it is not certain whether or not this will happen.

c. Superior degree:

The ascetic of this degree definitely does not fall from the Samapatti during his present life; later on, when he is reborn among the mindless devas, his brightness and dimensions are at their maximum, and, definitely, there is no death before the end of his full life in this superior world; he only dies after having lived out his full life of five hundred Mahakalpas.

(2) This Samapatti is found only in the fourth Dhyana; it is exclusively good because it is brought about by this Dhyana. It does not belong to the superior or inferior worlds for reasons mentioned above.

(3) This Samapatti constitutes an act the retribution of which may be of three categories, but never of the present life.

(4) According to some masters, this Samapatti is practised only in Kamadhatu [and only by those beings who have a human existence], because it is produced by the force of the teachings of Tirthikas (outside cults), and because the intelligence of man is extremely acute.

According to other masters, when one has first practised this Samapatti in Kamadhatu and is reborn in Rupadhatu, one can cause it to be present for oneself: not always, however, when reborn among the mindless devas, because that is the ultimate realm to be reached.

This Samapatti is impure and is never practised by the saints (aryas), because one enters into it through disgust for Samjna and lust for the fruit of the Samapatti (existence among mindless devas conceived as Nirvana).

2. Nirodhasamapatti

This Samapatti belongs to the saints, to those Asaiksas or Saiksas who have subdued or rejected the passion of covetousness existing in the realm of Akimcanya (third state of Arupya), in which there still remains or no longer remains the covetousness of the superior realm [the realm of Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana (Bhavagra), fourth state of Arupya].

It has as antecedent or motive power the idea that it is the cessation of all crude and defiled thoughts.

Inasmuch as it causes the non-perpetual Cittas-caittas (six consciousnesses) and the perpetual but defiled Cittas-caittas (seventh consciousness) to be entirely destroyed or annihilated (*nirodha*), it is given the name of Nirodha;

修習此定品別有三，下品修者現法必退，
不能速疾還引現前。中品修者現不必退，
設退速疾還引現前。上品修者畢竟不退。

〔述記：此定有三品。如五十三說。〕

此定初修必依有頂遊觀無漏爲加行入，次第定中最居後故。

雖屬有頂而無漏攝。

若修此定已得自在，餘地心後亦得現前。

雖屬道諦而是非學非無學攝，似涅槃故。

此定初起唯在人中，佛及弟子說力起故，人中慧解極猛利故。

後上二界亦得現前，鄔陀夷經是此誠證，無色亦名意成天故。

於藏識教未信受者，若生無色不起此定，恐無色心成斷滅故，已信生彼亦得現前，知有藏識不斷滅故。

要斷三界見所斷惑方起此定，異生不能伏滅有頂心心所故，此定微妙要證二空隨應後得所引發故。

〔述記：二乘人唯證人空後得引,菩薩佛入二空後得智皆得引入。〕

and, as it produces tranquillity of the body and joyfulness of the heart, it is also called Samapatti. As it involves a special disgust for thought and sensation (Samjna and Vedana), it is also named Samjnaveditanirodhasamapatti (i.e., meditation in which thinking and sensation have entirely ceased).

(1) There are three degrees in the cultivation and practice of this Samapatti:

a. Inferior degree:

The ascetic of this degree necessarily falls from the Samapatti during his present life, and, having fallen, is incapable of quickly getting it back.

b. Medium degree:

The ascetic of this degree does not necessarily fall; even if he does, he recovers it very quickly.

c. Superior degree:

The ascetic of this degree does not fall at all. (Yogasastra, 53).

(2) First practice of this Samapatti: – The ascetic who enters into this Samapatti for the first time must begin, by way of preparation, with a discursive and pure meditation of the realm of Bhavagra, because it is the highest and most exalted of the Anupurvasamapattis.

The Samapatti, although it belongs to Bhavagra, is 'pure'.

He who, as a result of diligent practice, has already mastered this Samapatti can cause it to be present for himself in other realms.

Although it belongs to Margasatyr (the Noble Truth about the Way leading to the Cessation of Suffering), this Samapatti is nevertheless of the category of Naivasaiksanasaiksa (i.e., neither Saiksa nor Asaiksa), for it resembles Nirvana.

It is only in the state of man that one can, for the first time, obtain this Samapatti, for it is produced by the force of the teachings of the Buddha and his disciples, and because the intelligence of man is extremely acute.

Further, having practised this Samapatti in a human existence, one can cause it to be present for oneself in the existences of the two higher Dhatus. The Udayisutra proves that the beings of Arupya also receive the name of 'spiritual devas' or 'mind-created devas' (*manomayadevas*).

Persons who do not believe in the teaching relating to the Alayavijnana, if born in Arupya, do not produce this Samapatti, fearing in fact that the absence of Rupa and Citta will be annihilation. But those who believe can produce it even when they are born in Arupya, because they know that this Samapatti is not annihilation since there is an Alayavijnana.

(3) To produce this Samapatti one must, first of all, have cut off the Anusayas (delusive passions) of the three Dhatus 'which are to be cut off by insight into Transcendent Truth (*darsanaheya*)', for Prthagjanas are incapable of 'subduing' and 'destroying' the Citta-Caittas of Bhavagra; because this Samapatti, so subtle and sublime, cannot be brought about except by the 'Subsequent Wisdom' which succeeds the realization of the two Voids, namely, voidness of the Atman (*pudgalasunyata*, which concerns the two Vehicles) and voidness of the Atman and all dharmas (*pudgala* and *dharmasunyata*, which concerns Bodhisattvas).

有義下八地修所斷惑中，要全斷欲，餘伏或斷，然後方能初起此定，欲界惑種二性繁雜障定強故，唯說不還三乘無學及諸菩薩得此定故，彼隨所應生上八地皆得後起。

〔述記：世親攝論第三云唯說不還等五人得故。〕

有義要斷下之四地修所斷惑，餘伏或斷，然後方能初起此定，變異受俱煩惱種子障定強故，彼隨所應生上五地皆得後起。

若伏下惑能起此定，後不斷退生上地者，豈生上已卻斷下惑？

斷亦無失，如生上者斷下末那俱生惑故。

〔述記：如生上二界卻斷下第七中惑，以必金剛心方斷故。〕

然不還者對治力強，正潤生位不起煩惱，但由惑種潤上地生。雖所伏惑有退不退，而無伏下生上地義，故無生上卻斷下失。

〔述記：此第三果對治道強，以欲界治道皆圖滿故，非初二果。〕

As to the Anusayas 'which are to be cut off by meditation' (*bhavanaheya*), what are the varieties from which the candidate for Nirodhasamapatti must liberate himself? Opinions differ.

a. Among the *bhavanaheyas* of the eight inferior realms (Kamadhatu, the four Dhyanas and the first three Arupyas), the candidate must have completely cut off the Anusayas of Kamadhatu, and cut off or subdued the others: only then will he be able, for the first time in a human existence, to produce this Samapatti. The reason is that the Anusayas of Kamadhatu, which are of two kinds (bad and non-defined), are numerous and confused and have a particular violence in impeding meditation. They must therefore be completely cut off.

[We know that ascetics of the first two 'fruits' do not obtain this Samapatti]. According to the Samgraha-Sastra, 3, Yogins of only five categories obtain it, namely, the Anagamins (who need not return to mortality), the Arhats of the three Vehicles, and the Bodhisattvas. These yogins, in different ways liberated from the Anusayas, when reborn in the eight superior realms, can produce this Nirodhasamapatti there again.

b. According to other masters, to produce Nirodhasamapatti for the first time, one must have cut off the *Bhavanaheyas* of the first four realms (Kamadhatu and the first three Dhyanas), having cut off or subdued the others. The reason is that the Bijas of the klesas associated with the 'sensations of change' (sensations of sorrow etc.) have a particular violence in impeding meditation: (these sensations exist in the first four realms). The yogins who are thus in different ways liberated from the Anusayas, when reborn in the five superior realms, can produce this Nirodhasamapatti there again.

But the Sarvastivadin objects: – You say that a person (Prthagjana or Arya) who has subdued the inferior Anusayas can produce Nirodhasamapatti. Later on, without having cut off the Bijas by the pure Path, without having fallen through the production of klesas, this person is reborn in the superior realm (Bhavagra). Born up there, will he be able to cut off the inferior Anusayas (of the fourth Dhyana etc.)?

One could reply that it is not difficult for that person to cut off the inferior Anusayas; he can do so just as a person born in the two higher Dhatus can cut off the inborn inferior Anusayas of Manas (by the Vajrasamadhi).

However, the true doctrine is as follows:–

In regard to the Anagamin (who has obtained the third 'fruit' and need not return to mortality), his power of opposition to klesas is strong, [because all his ways of dealing with Kamadhatu are perfect. This is not the case with those who have obtained only the first two fruits, i.e., the Srotaapanna and the Sakrdagamin, who do not practise the six Paramitas in opposition to the klesas of Kamadhatu]. Also, at the moment when he 'moistens' his future rebirth, he does not produce the actual klesas of the higher Dhatu. It is by the Bijas of the Anusayas of the higher Dhatu that he moistens his rebirth in a higher Dhatu. Whether a person retreats or does not retreat from his operations designed to dominate the inferior Anusayas, it is irrelevant that, in order to subdue these Anusayas (that is to say, to prevent them from growing into

若諸菩薩先二乘位已得滅定後廻心者，一切位中能起此定。

〔述記：卽一切地三大劫中能入此定。〕

若不爾者，或有乃至七地滿心方能永伏一切煩惱，雖未永斷欲界修惑，而如已斷能起此定，論說已入遠地菩薩方能現起滅盡定故。

〔述記：若頓悟菩薩義卽不定。〕

〔述記：六十二卷說遠地者卽第七遠行地故。〕

有從初地即能永伏一切煩惱，如阿羅漢，彼十地中皆起此定，經說菩薩前六地中亦能現起滅盡定故。

六· 睡眠與悶絕

無心睡眠與悶絕者，謂有極重睡眠悶絕，令前六識皆不現行。

疲極等緣所引身位違前六識故名極重睡眠。

此睡眠時雖無彼體，而由彼似彼故假說彼名。

風熱等緣所引身位亦違六識，故名極重悶絕。

或此俱是觸處少分。

除斯五位意識恒起。

死生

正死生時亦無意識，何故但說五位不行？

manifestation), that person must be reborn in a higher world. Therefore, the objection that 'born above, one would cut off the lower' vanishes.

(4) As to those Bodhisattvas who, as a result of their practice of the two Vehicles, have obtained the Nirodhasamapatti, and who, later on, turn their minds towards Mahayana, they are able, during the three Mahakalpas, to produce this Samapatti in all Bhumis of a Bodhisattva.

For Bodhisattvas of another type ('instantaneous realization'), there are several solutions to the problems. It can happen that some Bodhisattvas have to attain the 'full mind' of the seventh Bhumi before they are capable of completely subduing the klesas of the six consciousnesses in all the three Dhatus (Kamadhatu etc.). Before that stage is reached, although they have, as yet, not completely cut off the *Bhavanaheyas* of Kamadhatu, they can produce Nirodhasamapatti as if they had already cut them. The Yogasastra, 62, says, 'Only those Bodhisattvas who have entered into Duramgama (seventh Bhumi) are capable of producing Nirodhasamapatti.'

It can also happen that, after the first Bhumi, the Bodhisattva, like an Arhat, can completely subdue all klesas; then, in the course of all the ten Bhumis, he produces the Samapatti. This is why the Sutra (Dasabhumi etc.) says that, in the first six Bhumis, the Bodhisattva can also produce Nirodhasamapatti.

6. STUPOR AND UNCONSCIOUSNESS
Middha and Murchana

These two Aniyatas of mindless stupor (Middha) and unconsciousness (Murchana) signify that there are 'extremely heavy' forms of stupor and unconsciousness which cause all the first six consciousnesses to be suspended, and which therefore justify the description that they are devoid of mental activity (*acittaka*).

By stupor (extremely heavy drowsiness) is meant a state of body resulting from extreme fatigue and other causes, a state incompatible with the six consciousnesses. Although this state is not 'mental' and has not the nature of drowsiness, it is given the name of drowsiness (Middha) just the same, because it proceeds from drowsiness and is similar to it.

By unconsciousness is meant a state of body provoked by disturbance of humours, high fever, incantations, etc., a state incompatible with the six consciousnesses.

Alternatively, it can be said that both stupor and unconsciousness are parts of the tangible.

It is clear from this that, except in the five mindless states explained above, Manovijnana is always in manifestation.

BIRTH AND DEATH

The question arises: at the moment of birth or death Manovijnana is also missing. Why is it, then, that you mention only five states which prevent it from functioning (birth among Asamjnidevas, the Asamjnisamapatti, the

有義死生及與言顯。

彼說非理，所以者何？但說六時名無心故，謂前五位及無餘依，應說死生即悶絕攝，彼是最極悶絕位故。
〔述記：以大論第十三但說六時名無心故，謂前五位及二乘無餘依位。〕

說及與言顯五無雜。

此顯六識斷已後時依本識中自種還起，由此不說入無餘依。

此五位中異生有四，除在滅定，聖唯後三，於中如來自在菩薩唯得存一，無睡悶故。

Nirodhasamapatti, mindless Middha and mindless Murchana)? You should add two other states, birth and death, to these five. One reply to this question is that these two states would be indicated by the word 'and' in the Stanza.

This opinion is contrary to reason. Why? Because the Yogasastra, 13, teaches that six states are 'devoid of mental activity'; that is to say, the five above-mentioned states plus Nirupadhisesanirvana (Nirvana-without-residue, i.e., the Nirvana state in which there are no vestiges of the karma of suffering). It should therefore be said that the states of birth and death are comprised in the state of unconsciousness, because they are states of extreme coma. The word 'and' shows that the five states are not confused.

Why does the author not mention Nirupadhisesa? Because the six consciousnesses, cut off during the five states, arise again by reason of their Bijas that are stored in the Alayavijnana. This is not a case in which one enters into Nirupadhisesa eternally.

Of these five states, the Prthagjanas can take four to the exclusion of Nirodhasamapatti; the saints (Aryas) may take the last three; the Tathagata and the Bodhisattvas of the eighth Bhumi take the Nirodhasamapatti alone, being strangers to stupor and unconsciousness.

是故八識一切有情心與末那二恒俱轉，若起第六則三俱轉，餘隨緣合起一至五則四俱轉乃至八俱，是謂略說識俱轉義。

若一有情多識俱轉，如何說彼是一有情？

若立有情依識多少，汝無心位應非有情。

又他分心現在前位，如何可說自分有情？

然立有情依命根數或異熟識俱不違理，彼俱恒時唯有一故。

一身唯一等無間緣，如何俱時有多識轉？

既許此一引多心所，寧不許此能引多心？
又誰定言此緣唯一？說多識俱者，許此緣多故。

又欲一時取多境者，多境現前寧不頓取？
諸根境等和合力齊，識前後生不應理故。

§ VI. SIMULTANEITY OF THE CONSCIOUSNESSES

AMONG all living beings, two consciousnesses are always simultaneous, the Alayavijnana and Manas. When the Manovijnana is produced, three are simultaneous. When, by reason of a concatenation of causes and conditions, one or more of the five consciousnesses are produced, then four, five, six, seven or eight consciousnesses are simultaneous.

1. If several consciousnesses are simultaneous in *one* being, how can it be said that it is one being? There should be as many beings as there are consciousnesses.

To this difficulty of the Sarvastivadins and other schools, there are several replies. – If you establish a living being by reason of one or more consciousnesses, then, in the case of one who has entered into a mindless samapatti (a state in which the six consciousnesses are absent), there will be no being. Furthermore, in your system, if a being of a certain Dhatu, say the Rupadhatu, has manifested in him a mind of a superior or inferior Dhatu (i.e., the Arupyadhatu or Kamadhatu), how can it be said that he belongs to his own Dhatu, that is, to the Dhatu whereto he is born?

In fact, what constitutes a being and his unity is the Jivitendriya (that is to say, the assemblage of Bijas which receive metaphorically this name) or else the Vipakavijnana (that is to say, the eighth consciousness in action). These two explanations are reasonable, for the Jivitendriya and the Vipakavijnana are perpetual and unique.

2. In any being there exists at a given moment only one 'Samanantarapratyaya' (condition quâ antecedent). How can several consciousnesses arise into operation at the same moment?[1]

Reply: – Since you admit that this unique Samanantarapratyaya at a given moment can help bring into being numerous Caittas, why do you not admit that it can also help bring into being numerous kinds of Citta? In fact, who affirms the unique character of the Samanantarapratyaya, holding that it belongs to one consciousness only? Whoever admits the simultaneity of the various consciousnesses maintains that the Samanantarapratyaya is manifold.

We think that one perceives at the same time many objects, colours, sounds, etc. Why should the various consciousnesses not perceive at the same time when various objects are presented at the same time? The conditioning factors of several consciousnesses such as sense-organs, objects, etc., being complete simultaneously, it is contrary to reason to maintain that these consciousnesses should be born successively.

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[1] 'Samanantarapratyaya' (condition quâ antecedent) means that the eight actual consciousnesses (*darsana* and *samvrttibhaga*) and their Caittas (to the exclusion of Rupa, the Viprayuktas, the Bijas, and the Asamskrtas) constitute a preceding group which passes away to give place to a subsequent group of the same species, opening the way to that group and leading it in such a way that it immediately comes into being. See following Section on 'The Four Pratyayas' in Book VI.

又心所性雖無差別，而類別者許多俱生，寧不許心異類俱起？

又如浪像依一起多，故依一心多識俱轉。
〔述記：以外喻識，如多波浪鏡像以一大海一鏡爲依起多浪多像故，依一本識心多識俱起，此並五十一七十六解深密文。〕

又若不許意與五俱，取彼所緣應不明了，如散意識，緣久滅故。

如何五俱唯一意識於色等境取一或多？

如眼等識各於自境取一或多，此亦何失？
相見俱有種種相故。
〔述記：論主喻曰，如眼等識各於色等取一或二十種等旣無失者，此意亦然，了一切法是其作用故。以諸識見相二分各有種種相故，見有分明多用，境有爲多識所取作用相故。〕

何故諸識同類不俱？

於自所緣若可了者一已能了，餘無用故。

若爾，五識已了自境，何用俱起意識了爲？

五俱意識助五識令起，非專爲了五識所緣。

又於彼所緣能明了取異於眼等識，故非無用。

由此聖教說彼意識名有分別，五識不爾。
〔述記：解深密說第六識爲眼等識俱一分別意識。〕

多識俱轉，何不相應？

非同境故。設同境者，彼此所依體數異故，如五根識互不相應。

You admit that the Caittas, which do not differ in nature but differ in kind, are simultaneous. Why, then, do you not admit that several Cittas of different kinds should be born together?

Do we not see that several waves, supported on one single expanse of water, and several reflections, supported on one single mirror, are born together? Why should not several consciousnesses, supported by the root-consciousness (Mulavijnana), arise simultaneously?

Finally, if you deny that the Manovijnana perceives the objects of the five consciousnesses in company with these Five, it will not be clear and vivid when it perceives these objects, just as, at least in the normal non-withdrawn state of mind, a distracted Manovijnana does not clearly perceive objects which have long disappeared.

3. How can the Manovijnana, at one and the same moment, in company with the Five, and among the colours, sounds, etc., perceive one or several objects?

Just as the eye-consciousness etc., each in its own realm, perceive one or several objects. Where is the difficulty in this case? The special activity of the Manovijnana is to perceive and apprehend all dharmas: the *darsana* and *nimittabhaga* of the consciousnesses present a great variety of phenomena.

4. Why is it that consciousnesses of the same kind are not simultaneous?

One visual consciousness can apprehend its object by one perception: another simultaneous visual consciousness would be useless.

This being the case, the five consciousnesses are already aware of their respective objects. What is the use of having a Manovijnana arise simultaneously with them in order to be aware of their objects?

The Manovijnana, simultaneous with the Five, aids them and enables them to be born: it does not arise for the sole and specific purpose of perceiving and apprehending their objects. However, it clearly perceives these objects, in contradistinction to the Five. Therefore it is not useless.

This is why the Samdhinirmocana Sutra says that the Manovijnana is called *savikalpaka*, i.e., possessed of the faculty of discrimination and differentiation: being provided with reflection-investigation, it perceives and apprehends clearly. It is not so with the five consciousnesses.

5. Since the various consciousnesses are simultaneous, why are they not 'associated' (*samprayukta*)?

Because they do not have the same object; even if they have the same object, they are different as to the nature and the number of their supporting bases (*asraya*), just as the five sense consciousnesses are different in these respects.

第七章· 能變一異

八識自性不可言定一，行相所依緣相應異故，又一滅時餘不滅故，能所熏等相各異故。

亦非定異，經說八識如水波等無差別故，定異應非因果性故，如幻事等無定性故。

〔述記：十卷楞伽第十卷頌說八識如大海水波無有差別相，〕

如前所說識差別相依理世俗非眞勝義，眞勝義中心言絶故。

如伽他說，心意識八種，俗故相有別，眞故相無別，相所相無故。

〔述記：卽十卷楞伽第十卷頌也。心意識等以理俗諦隨事差別相故可說有別，約勝義勝義眞故相無別也。〕

§ VII. RELATIONS OF THE EIGHT CONSCIOUSNESSES

The eight consciousnesses cannot, in their essential natures, be said to be definitely one (i.e., forming a single whole). This is because their modes of activity, the conditioning causes on which they depend, and their associated qualities, are different. It is also because one of them may perish without the others doing so, and because they differ in character in that the first seven can perfume while the eighth is perfumed.[1]

At the same time they are not definitely different (i.e., being separate units), for, as is noted in the sutra (Lankavatara), the eight consciousnesses are like the waves which cannot be differentiated from the water. This is because, if they were definitely different, they could not be as cause and effect to one another. Thus, they are like the tricks of a magician, for which no definite nature can be ascertained.

As to what has been said previously regarding the varying characteristics of the different consciousnesses, this conforms to a worldly kind of reasoning (*yuktisamvrti*); it is not Ultimate Truth (*paramarthaparamartha*). From the latter point of view, the eight consciousnesses can neither be thought or spoken of.

As is said in a stanza of the Lankavatara Sutra: 'From a popular point of view, the mind (Citta), intellection (Manas), and the other consciousnesses, eight kinds in all, have different characteristics; but, from the point of view of Ultimate Truth, they have not. For neither their own characteristics (*laksana*) nor those things on which they confer characteristics (*laksya*) have any existence.'

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[1] The eighth consciousness, Alayavijnana, is perfumed; the other seven perfume.

BOOK V

VIJNAPTIMATRATA

(MERE-CONSCIOUSNESS)

唯 識 所 變

所變相

第一章· 唯識所變

已廣分別三能變相爲自所變二分所依。

云何應知依識所變假說我法非別實有，由斯一切唯有識耶？

頌曰：

是諸識轉變，　分別所分別，
由此彼皆無，　故一切唯識。

論曰：

是諸識者，謂前所說三能變識及彼心所。皆能變似見相二分，立轉變名。

所變見分說名分別能取相故。

所變相分名所分別，見所取故。

由此正理，彼實我法離識所變皆定非有，離能所取無別物故，非有實物離二相故。

是故一切有爲無爲若實若假皆不離識。

§ I. VIJNAPTIMATRATA

We have examined the three categories of consciousness that are capable of evolution and manifestation, namely, the Alayavijnana, Manas, and the first six consciousnesses, and explained that each of these eight consciousnesses is the basis or infrastructure for a twofold manifestation, the perceived division and the perceiving division (*nimittabhaga* and *darsanabhaga*). We have said that Atman and dharmas are merely conventional designations of this double manifestation of consciousness, of its Nimittabhaga and Darsanabhaga; that they are not real entities apart from these two Bhagas; and that, in consequence, 'all is mere consciousness' or 'nothing exists but consciousness'. How should one understand this thesis?

The Stanza says:

17

> The various consciousnesses manifest themselves in what seem to be two divisions:
>
> Perception (*Darsanabhaga*) and the object of perception (*nimittabhaga*).
>
> Because of this, Atman and dharmas do not exist.
>
> For this reason, all is mere consciousness.

The Treatise says:

1. DHARMAPALA

'The various consciousnesses' refer to the three evolving categories of consciousness previously discussed and their mental qualities. The term 'evolving' is applied to them because they are all capable of evolving into two seeming aspects: that of the perceiving division and that of the perceived division.[1]

The perceiving division manifested is termed 'discrimination' (*vikalpa*), because it apprehends the perceived division.

The perceived division manifested is termed 'that which is discriminated', because it is apprehended by the perceiving division.

According to this correct principle, there are definitely no 'real' Atman or dharmas aside from what is thus evolved from consciousness. For, apart from what thus apprehends or is apprehended, there exists nothing else; there are no 'real' things apart from these two aspects (Bhagas). Therefore, everything phenomenal (Samskrta) and noumenal (Asamskrta), everything seemingly

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[1] For these terms, see Book I.

唯言爲遮離識實物，非不離識心所法等。

〔述記：遮離能變等識外實我法名爲唯識非不離識心所及見相分色眞如等，故不離識名唯識也。〕

或轉變者謂諸內識轉似我法外境相現。

此能轉變卽名分別，虛妄分別爲自性故，謂卽三界心及心所。

此所執境名所分別，卽所妄執實我法性。

由此分別變似外境假我法相。

彼所分別實我法性決定皆無，前引教理已廣破故。

是故一切皆唯有識，虛妄分別有極成故。

〔述記：有爲無爲實假等法皆唯有識，以能轉變虛妄分別二十部等說體非無，有極成故。〕

〔述記：旣爾，眞如及心所等不是心能變分別，不是心外所分別法，此爲有無？〕

唯旣不遮不離識法，故眞空等亦是有性。

〔述記：唯言不遮不離識法，其眞如及心所等亦不離識，故體皆有。〕

由斯遠離增減二邊，唯識義成，契會中道。

'real' and 'false' alike, is inseparable from consciousness. The word 'mere' (in the term Mere-Consciousness)[1] is used to deny that there are any 'real' things aside from consciousness (Atman and dharmas existing as such), but not to deny that the mental functions (Caittas), the two Bhagas, Rupa, Tathata, etc., in so far as they are inseparable from consciousness, do exist.

2. NANDA

The use of the term 'parinama' (evolution, transformation, or manifestation) in the Sanskrit text indicates that the internal consciousness produces manifestations of what seem to be an Atman and the dharmas of the external world.

This evolving consciousness is entitled 'discrimination' (*vikalpa*). Because of its essential nature, it falsely discriminates things as being real, namely, the minds (Cittas) and their mental functions (Caittas) pertaining to the Threefold World or the Three Dhatus. The objects to which it adheres are termed 'objects which are discriminated', and consist of an Atman and dharmas which it falsely regards as real.

In this way, discrimination evolves what seem to be external objects, consisting of a false Atman and dharmas.

But the Atman and dharmas thus discriminated as real have very definitely no existence. We have already, by the use of quotations from sacred teachings and by logical reasoning, substantially refuted this idea of their real existence.

Therefore, everything is Mere-Consciousness (or Representation-Only or Mere Ideation). For the existence in itself of false discrimination is definitely accepted as an established fact by the twenty Schools.

[But some one objects, 'the Tathata, the Caittas, etc., are not the mind that discriminates; nor are they dharmas imagined as external; can you say whether they exist or do not exist?']

The word 'mere', *matraka*, does not deny the dharmas as long as they are inseparable from consciousness, and in this sense Tathata, the Caittas and so forth do exist.

In this way, the Masters – the three Masters, Dharmapala, Nanda and Sthiramati – avoid the two extremes of either adding (something to consciousness) or reducing (consciousness to nothing). The doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata (Mere-Consciousness) is therefore established to conform to the Middle Way.

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[1] That is, the word 'matra' in the term Vijnaptimatrata.

第二章· 以教理成立唯識義

由何教理唯識義成？

豈不已說？

雖說未了，非破他義己義便成，應更確陳成此教理。

〔述記：外人問曰，前雖已略說，仍成未了，前雖破我義，然非由破他之義故己義便成，應更確陳成此唯識之教理。〕

一· 教

如契經說三界唯心，

〔述記：卽十地經第八卷第六地文。〕

又說所緣唯識所現。

〔述記：解深密經文。〕

又說諸法皆不離心。

〔述記：楞伽經文。〕

又說有情隨心垢淨。

〔述記：舊維摩云，心淨故衆生淨，心垢故衆生垢。〕

又說成就四智菩薩能隨悟入唯識無境。

一相違識相智，謂於一處鬼人天等隨業差別所見各異，境若實有此云何成？

二無所緣識智，謂緣過未夢境像等，非實有境，識現可得。彼境旣無，餘亦應爾。

三自應無倒智，謂愚夫智若得實境，彼應自然成無顚倒，不由功用應得解脫。

§ II. PROOFS OF VIJNAPTIMATRATA

Mere-Consciousness

On the basis of which sacred texts, by what processes of reasoning, is the doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata established?

Have we not already explained this?

You have, but not completely. You have refuted my thesis, but the refutation of another person's thesis is not sufficient to establish your own principle. It is necessary to expound anew, and with precision, the sacred texts and the demonstrative reasonings.

1. THE SUTRAS

The sacred texts which affirm Vijnaptimatrata are numerous. Let us quote a few of them.

1. Dasabhumaka: 'In the Three Worlds (Dhatus) there is nothing but mind.'

2. Samdhinirmocana: 'Objects of perception are merely manifestations of consciousness.'

3. Lankavatara: 'All dharmas are inseparable from mind.'

4. Vimalakirti: 'Sentient beings become pure or impure in accordance with the mind.'

The Sutra teaches that Bodhisattvas who have perfected the Four Wisdoms (*jnana*) will, following their enlightenment, penetrate the truth of Vijnaptimatrata and of the absolute non-existence of real objects (*visaya*).

These Four Wisdoms are:

(1) The mystic knowledge of the cause of contradictory concepts: This means that the same thing perceived by ghosts, human beings, and deities (*devas*) appears differently to them according to their past deeds. If there is really an external sphere of objects, how can this diversity be possible?

(2) The wisdom which verifies that consciousness deprived of object permits clear perception:

This means that the past, the future, images in dreams, things imagined, etc., have no real, objective bases. They are possible because they are manifestations of consciousness. If these objective bases are non-existent, the rest is also non-existent.

(3) The wisdom which understands exactly without effort:

This means that if the intelligence of ignorant people is able to perceive the real sphere of objects, they should naturally achieve freedom from perverted views

四隨三智轉智。

一隨自在者智轉智，謂已證得心自在者隨欲轉變地等皆成。境若實有，如何可變？

〔述記：唯第八地以去，任運實變大地等得爲金寶令有情用，故境隨智轉所欲皆成。〕

二隨觀察者智轉智，謂得勝定修法觀者，隨觀一境衆相現前。境若是實，寧隨心轉？

〔述記：謂諸聲聞獨覺等。〕

〔述記：謂一極微，觀爲無常苦空無我相皆顯故。〕

三隨無分別智轉智，謂起證實無分別智，一切境相皆不現前。境若是實，何容不現？

菩薩成就四智者，於唯識理決定悟入。

又伽陀說，心意識所緣，皆非離自性，故我說一切，唯有識無餘。

〔述記：即厚嚴經。〕

此等聖教，誠證非一。

二・理

極成眼等識，五隨一故，如餘，不親緣離自色等。

〔述記：極成之眼簡不共許非極成有法故。即大乘他方佛眼識，小乘佛非無漏眼識，最後身菩薩不善眼識，各有自他不極成故。〕

餘識識故，如眼識等，亦不親緣離自諸法。

〔述記：謂第六識，五識之餘。〕

and should be able to achieve emancipation without any effort. [Since they are not emancipated, it shows that the objective spheres they perceive are not real at all.]

(4) The wisdom that changes with the following three wisdoms:

a. Changing with the wisdom of the Bodhisattva who has attained mastery of mind. This means that the Bodhisattva of the Eighth Land who has attained 'mastery of mind' is capable of changing and transforming things at will, changing earth [into gold] and so forth without fail according to his desires. If an external sphere really exists, how can such a transformation be possible?

b. Changing with the wisdom of the Sravaka or Pratyekabuddha who meditates and has attained the power of inner perception: This means that, when the Sravaka or the Pratyekabuddha, who has achieved supreme calmness (*samapatti*) and has practised the meditation of the Dharma, meditates on one sphere of objects, the various characteristics of the objects appear before him: impermanence, suffering, etc. If the sphere is real, why does it change according to his mind?

c. Changing with the wisdom of pure intuition or knowledge of the fundamental identity of all things (*nirvikalpakajnana*). This means that, when a Bodhisattva has attained the fundamental, non-discriminating wisdom of pure intuition which reveals the true nature of things, all spheres of objects and their characteristics will cease to appear. If there are real spheres of objects, why should they cease to appear?

The Bodhisattva who has achieved the Four Wisdoms will definitely understand and penetrate the principle of Vijnaptimatrata.

5. Ghanavyaha Sutra: One stanza says,

'The objects of mind, Manas, and the other consciousnesses are not distinct from their own nature (*svabhava*).

Therefore, I declare that all things are mere consciousness and there is nothing else [which is external to the mind].'

Numerous indeed are the sacred texts which bear testimony to the truth of this doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata.

2. REASONING

1. Each of the five 'commonly acknowledged' consciousnesses (the eye-consciousness, etc.), about which we are all in full agreement, inasmuch as it is one of the Five, like the other four, does not directly perceive any object distinct from itself. [In other words, the eye-consciousness does not perceive sound; nor does the ear-consciousness perceive form or colour, and so forth. However, this is not the case with the eye-consciousness of the Buddha, or of the Bodhisattva in his final incarnation.]

2. The other 'commonly acknowledged' consciousness, – the sixth, i.e., Manovijnana, — because it is a consciousness, like the Five, does not directly perceive dharmas distinct from itself either.

此親所緣定非離此，二隨一故，如彼能緣。

所緣法故，如相應法，決定不離心及心所。

此等正理誠證非一，故於唯識應深信受。

我法非有，空識非無，離有離無，故契中道。

慈尊依此說二頌言，虛妄分別有，於此二都無，此中唯有空，於彼亦有此。故說一切法，非空非不空，有無及有故，是則契中道。

〔述記：辨中邊論初卷所說彌勒本頌。〕

〔述記：虛妄分別有，即有三界虛妄心也。於此二都無者，謂能取所取二，或我法二，於此妄心之上都無。此中唯有空者，謂此妄心中唯有眞如，眞如是空性，依空所顯故。於彼亦有此者，彼者彼空性中，亦有此者謂有妄分別。故說一切法者，謂有爲無爲。依此二無名之爲空，故此二攝法盡。非空非不空者，謂由空性故及妄分別故言非空，以二諦有故。非不空者，謂所取能取二或我法二，二皆無故非不空也。有無及有故者，有謂妄分別有故，無謂二取我法無故，及有者謂於妄分別中有眞空故，於眞空中亦有妄分別故。是則契中道者，謂非一向空如清辨，非一向有如小乘，故名處中道。謂二諦有不同清辨，二取無不同小部，故處中道。〕

此頌且依染依他說，理實亦有淨分依他。

三· 外人難辭

若唯內識似外境起，寧見世閒情非情物處時身用定不定轉？

指 解

如夢境等，應釋此疑。

〔述記：此文外人難辭也。若唯內識無心外境，如何現見世閒非情物處時二事決定？世間有情身及非情用二事不決定轉？此中言總，意顯處時用三是非情身是有情。此依二十論。據理而言，四事皆通。〕

3. The immediate object of the six consciousnesses is not distinct from these consciousnesses, because it is one of their two Bhagas (i.e., the *nimittabhaga*), just as the perceiving division (i.e., the *darsanabhaga*) is not distinct from consciousness since it is consciousness in its essential nature.

4. The immediate object of consciousness, because it is an object, like the associated mental activities, is definitely not separable from Citta and Caittas.

Arguments and philosophical reasoning to prove this Doctrine of Vijnaptimatra are numerous. We should therefore believe deeply in and accept it.

Conclusion: Logical reasoning and the Scriptures combined

The Atman and dharmas are non-existent; Tathata (the Void or Emptiness) and consciousness are not inexistent. Atman and dharmas lie outside the category of existence; Tathata and consciousness lie outside the category of non-existence. We have, therefore, in this doctrine, the Middle Way.

This is what Lord Maitreya says in two stanzas of the Madhyantavibhaga:

'The mind that falsely discriminates exists; the duality (Atman and dharmas) which manifests itself in it is absolutely non-existent; in this false discrimination is Emptiness only (Tathata); in Emptiness, too, there is this false discrimination. I therefore say that all dharmas are neither empty nor non-empty. There is existence of false discrimination, non-existence of the duality of Atman and dharmas, existence of Emptiness in false discrimination, and existence of false discrimination in Emptiness. That is the Middle Way.'

Lord Maitreya considers here only the defiled Paratantra. But a pure Paratantra also exists.

3. Replies to Objections

1. Outsider: If what seem to be external spheres of objects are nothing but manifestations of inner consciousness, why is it that the things which we see in the world, whether sentient beings or non-sentient objects, such as places, times, people, and functions, are in some cases determinate, in others indeterminate?"

Reply:

Your doubt may be dispelled by comparison with the world of dreams.

[K'uei Chi's Commentary:

'The outsider objects that, if there is only inner consciousness and no objects apart from mind, why is it that, among things as we see them in the world, inanimate ones such as place and time are both determinate, whereas animate ones, such as bodies, as well as their functions which are inanimate, are both indeterminate? The general idea in this statement is that place, time, and function are inanimate things, whereas bodies are animate things. Here we should rely on the reasoning presented in the Twenty Stanzas, where these four points are all explained.']

〔唯識二十論云：

若識無實境…… 何因此識有處得生，非一切處？何故此處有時識起，非一切時？同一處時，有多相續，何不決定隨一識生？如眩翳人見髮蠅等，非無眩翳有此識生。復有何因，諸眩翳者所見髮等，無法等用；夢中所得飲食刀仗毒葯衣等，無飲等用；尋香城等，無城等用？餘髮等物，其用非無。若實同無色等外境，唯有內識，似外境生，定處，定時，不定相續，有作用物，皆不應成。〕

〔馮友蘭中國哲學史云：

第一難謂吾人普通常識，以爲心外有境。如見某山，此山乃離識實有。故唯到此山處，方見此山；非於一切處，皆能見此山。此所謂處定也。如謂某山是識所現，則何故吾人之識只現此山於一處，不現於一切處耶？何故現此山之識，〝有處得生，非一切處〞耶？〕

〔第二難謂吾人普通常識，以某山爲離識實有，故只於到此山處之時，方見此山。此所謂時定也。若謂此山是識所現，則何故吾人之識只現此山於一時，不現於一切時耶？何故〝此處有時識起，非一切時〞耶？〕

[Translator's Note:

The work here referred to is the Wei-shih Erh-shih Lun or Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Vijnaptimatrata. It is Hsüan Tsang's translation of a short treatise in twenty stanzas by Vasubandhu, together with an accompanying commentary by Dharmapala. Because it greatly expands the brief questions and answers recorded above in the present Treatise, we should turn to it for an understanding of the four major objections to the Vijnaptimatrata doctrine and their refutation. These objections are first enumerated in the Wei-shih Erb-shih Lun[1] as follows:

'If consciousness is without real objects, why does this consciousness arise in a certain place, and not in all places? Why, in this place, does the consciousness arise at a certain time, and not at all times? When many streams of consciousness are together at one time and place, why is the consciousness not determined in such a way as to arise according to some particular one of them, just as a person with defective eyes sees hairs and flies, while those with good eyesight are not conscious of them? Again, why is it that the hairs, etc., seen by a person with defective eyes do not function as hairs, etc.? The drink, food, knives, cudgels, poisons, clothes, etc., which we perceive in a dream lack the functions of (real) drink, etc. A City of the Gandharvas cannot be used as a city. But other hairs and things [of ordinary waking experience] are not without use. If they (i.e., dream and waking) are really the same in that in neither case are there (real) external objects, there being only an inner consciousness which produces these seeming external objects, then (1) their determination in space, (2) their determination in time, (3) the indetermination of the stream of consciousness (which does the perceiving in each case), and (4) the existence of functioning things are all without foundation.'

Fung Yu-Lan, in his History of Chinese Philosophy, translated by Derk Bodde, explains the above passage as follows:

'The first of these objections is based on the fact that, according to common knowledge, a world external to the mind does actually exist. A mountain, when we look at it, for example, has real existence quite apart from our own consciousness of it. This fact explains why we are able to perceive it only when we ourselves actually go to the place where it is; we cannot perceive it anywhere else, as might be expected were it merely a product of our own consciousness. This fact is termed "determination in space".

'The second objection, like the first, is based on the commonly acknowledged fact that the mountain does have real existence apart from our own consciousness. This is why we are able to see it only at that particular time when we go to the place where it is, and not at other times, as again might be expected were it merely a product of our own consciousness. This fact is termed "determination in time".

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[1] Translated into English by Clarence H. Hamilton and published by American Oriental Society in 1938.

〔第三難謂如有一身，其眼眩翳，見有虛假髮蠅等。此虛假髮蠅，非識外實境；故唯眼眩翳者見之，眼不眩翳者不見也。此所謂〝決定隨一識生〞也。若吾人普通所謂外境，亦非識外實境，則何故非有人見之，有人不見之，如眼眩翳者所見之虛妄髮蠅等耶？〕

〔第四難謂眼眩翳者所見髮等，無髮等用。夢中所見之物，亦無其用。〝尋香城〞乃幻術所現之城，亦無城用。但一般人所見之髮城等，因係心外實物，故能各有其用。若此髮城等亦非心外實物，則何不同於眼眩翳者所見之虛假髮蠅及尋香城等亦無實用耶？故總之，〝若實同無色等外境，唯有內識，似外境生，則定處，定時，不定相續，有作用物，皆不應城〞。〕

〔二十唯論論中，答上四難云：

〝如夢中雖無實境，而或有處見有村園男女等物，非一切處。卽於是處或時，見有彼村園等，非一切時。由此雖無離色實境，而處時定非不得成。說如鬼言，顯如餓鬼，河中膿滿，故名膿河。如說酥瓶，其中酥滿。謂如餓鬼，同業異熟，多身共集，皆見膿河，非於此中定唯一見。

〝等言顯示或見糞等，及見有情執持刀仗，遮捍守護，不令得食。

〝由此雖無離色實境，而多相續不定義成。又如夢中境雖無實，而有損失精血等用。由此雖無離色實境，而有虛妄作用義成。

'The third objection runs as follows: Suppose a given individual suffers from faulty eyesight, which causes him to see hairs, flies, etc., where there are none. These imaginary hairs and flies do not belong to the real world which, according to the ordinary view, exists independently of consciousness. This is why they are perceived only by the person suffering from defective eye-sight but not by other people having normal vision. According to the Vijnaptimatrata doctrine, however, nothing whatsoever in the outside world really has any existence in itself; everything is simply a product of our own consciousness. Yet, if this be so, why is it that all the things in it are seen by all persons alike? Why should not certain things be seen only by certain persons, just as the hairs and flies of the man with defective eyesight are seen only by him and not by everyone else?

'The fourth objection is that the hairs, etc., seen by the man with defective eyesight, since they are imaginary, cannot actually function. The same is true of the things seen in a dream, or of the imaginary city conjured up by the Gandharvas. In the case of the ordinary hairs and cities, however, as seen by all men generally, these can all actually function, the reason being that they all really exist as objects external to the mind. For if this were not so, would they not be as incapable of functioning as are the hairs and flies of the man with defective eyesight, or the cities of the Gandharvas?'

The *Wei-shih Erh-shih Lun* gives the following refutation of these four objections:

'The case is like that of a dream, in which there are no real objects, and yet it is in a certain place that such things as a village, a garden, a man, or a woman are seen, not in all places; and in this place it is at a certain time that this village, garden, etc., are seen, not at all times. From this fact, though there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet spatial and temporal determination can be established.

'The words (in the preceding text) "as the ghosts" refer to hungry ghosts. The river (mentioned in it) is called the river of pus because it is full of pus, just as we speak of a ghee-bottle, meaning that it is full of ghee (clarified butter). That is, the case is like that of hungry ghosts who, because of the "different maturing" (in each of them) of the same kind of deeds, are assembled together and all in common see the river of pus; it is not determined that in this (assembly) there is only one person who sees. The 'etc.' (of the preceding text) signifies the other things seen (by the hungry ghosts), such as ordure, etc., and creatures holding swords and clubs who ward them off and stand guard, so as not to allow them to get food. From this reasoning, we see that, though there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet the principle of the indetermination of the many streams (of consciousness which do the perceiving) is explained.

'Again, as in a dream, although the objects are unreal, they yet have a function, such as causing the loss of semen, blood, etc. From this, although there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet the principle that unrealities can function is established.

〝如是且依別別譬喻，顯處定等，四義得成。〞〕

〔中國哲學史云：
夢中雖無心外實境，而亦可於某處某時見某村園，非於一切處一切時見此村園。可見〝雖無離識實境，而處時定非不得成。〞〕

〔又如衆餓鬼，因其業同，故皆見河為膿河而不可飲，並非只一餓鬼見餘不見也。可見〝雖無離識實境，而多相續不定義〞亦可成。〕

〔又〝譬如夢中夢兩交會，境雖無實，而男有損精，女有損血等用〞可見〝雖無離識實境，而有虛妄作用義〞亦可成立。故總之，〝雖無離識實境，而處定等四義皆成。〞〕

何緣世尊說十二處？

依識所變，非別實有。

爲入我空說六二法。

如遮斷見說續有情。

爲入法空復說唯識，令知外法亦非有故。

此唯識性豈不亦空？

不爾。

如何？

非所執故。

'Thus also, relying upon diverse examples, we show that the four principles of spatial determination, etc., can be established.'

Fung Yu-Lan explains as follows:

'Thus, even in a dream, the phenomena of which admittedly possess no reality apart from the mind, a village or a garden is seen only at a certain time and place, not at all times and places. From this fact we may deduce that, "though there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet spatial and temporal determination can be established."

'Again in the case of the horde of hungry ghosts, because their *karma* or deeds are the same, they all equally see the river of pus which cannot be drunk; it is not the case that this river is seen by only one of them and not by all. From this fact we may deduce that, "though there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet the principle of the indetermination of the many streams (of consciousness which do the perceiving) is explained."

'And yet again, "when, for example, it is dreamed that there is sexual intercourse between two persons, although the objects (of this dream) are unreal, they yet function so that (the dreamer), if a man, loses semen, and, if a woman, loses blood." From this fact we may deduce that, "although there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet the principle that unrealities can function is established." In summary, therefore, although there are no real objects apart from consciousness, yet the four principles of spatial determination, etc., are all established.']

2. *Outsider*: If only consciousness exists, why did the World-Honoured One (Bhagavat, the Buddha) teach the existence of Twelve Bases (Ayatanas) (the five senses, the mind, and their organs)?

Reply: These are transformations based on consciousness. They are not real entities separated from consciousness. In order to introduce his disciples to the truth of the 'emptiness of Atman' (*pudgalasunyata*), He spoke of the six couples, that is, the six internal bases and the six external bases, just as He spoke of the continuity of sentient beings in order to deny the false view that all things would be annihilated. And in order to introduce them to the truth of the 'emptiness of dharmas' (*dharmasunyata*), He also spoke of Mere-Consciousness so that they might know that external dharmas are also non-existent.

3. Outsider: Is the nature of Vijnaptimatrata itself not also empty?

Reply: No.

Outsider: Why?

Reply: Because it is not something that is adhered to. By Dharmasunyata, 'emptiness of dharmas', we understand the non-existence as such of those supposedly real dharmas which are rather manifestations of consciousness and

謂依識變妄執實法理不可得說爲法空，非無離言正智所證唯識性故說爲法空。

此識若無便無俗諦，俗諦無故眞諦亦無，眞俗相依而建立故。

〔述記：若唯識無便是無俗諦，俗諦卽依他故。〕

撥無二諦是惡取空，諸佛說爲不可治者。應知諸法有空不空，由此慈尊說前二頌。

若諸色處亦識爲體，何緣乃似色相顯現一類堅住相續而轉？

名言熏習勢力起故。

與染淨法爲依處故。

謂此若無應無顚倒，便無雜染亦無淨法，是故諸識亦似色現。

如有頌言，亂相及亂體，應許爲色識，及與非色識，若無餘亦無。

〔述記：攝論第四無著頌本。〕

〔述記：一類者，是相似義。前後一類無有變異，亦無間斷，故名堅住。天親云，多時住故，卽此說名相續而轉。一類堅住，卽是相續而轉。〕

〔述記：謂由無始名言熏習住在身中，由彼勢力此色等起相續而轉。……由元迷執色等境故生顚倒等，色等若無應無顚倒，顚倒卽諸識等緣此境色而起妄執名爲顚倒。此識等顚倒無故便無雜染。雜染卽是煩惱業生，或顚倒體卽是煩惱業生。此等無故便無二障雜染。二障雜染無故無漏淨亦無。無所斷故，何有清淨？〕

which are falsely conceived and adhered to, i.e., dharmas not undeniably established. It does not mean the non-existence of the nature of Vijnaptimatrata which is ineffable and inconceivable, and which is 'realized' by the two pure wisdoms, the fundamental and the secondary.

If there were no Vijnaptimatrata, there would be no worldly (relative) truth (Samvrtisatyr – *paratantra*), and, if there were no worldly truth, there would be no Absolute Truth (Paramarthasatyr), for the Two Levels of Truth are established on the basis of each other.

To reject the Two Levels of Truth is to cherish false ideas of Emptiness or Voidness, a disease which the Buddhas consider to be incurable. It should therefore be understood that some dharmas are empty and others not. This is why Lord Maitreya recited the two stanzas which we have quoted above.

4. *Outsider*: If the bases of the various forms of matter (*rupayatana*) perceived by the sense-organs have their substance in consciousness, why is it that consciousness manifests itself in the semblance of characteristics of matter and evolves in a continuous series that is homogeneous, solid, and abiding?

Reply: Because these manifestations are produced by the force of the Bijas of names and concepts [which have resided in the body since before the beginning of time], and because the various consciousnesses are the essential basis for pure and impure dharmas. Without this Bija-force, there would be no perversion of truth, and thus there would be neither defiled dharmas nor pure dharmas. That is why the various consciousnesses manifest themselves in the semblance of matter. As a stanza of the Samgraha says, 'The cause of delusion, and delusion itself, should be admitted as form-consciousness and non-form-consciousness respectively. If the first is lacking, the second will be lacking too.

[The objector here asks: If the various kinds of matter or *rupa* perceived by the sense-organs (i.e., what we would term the objective world) have consciousness as their substance, why then are they 'homogeneous, solid, and abiding', i.e., why are they not transient and unstable? K'uei Chi comments: 'Homogeneous' conveys the idea of mutual similarity. It means a continuing homogeneity from first to last, without any evolving differences or interruptions. Hence the term 'solid and abiding'. Vasubandhu says: 'It is to remain abiding at all times, that is to say, it refers to an evolution (of consciousness) which continues uninterruptedly. What is homogeneous, solid, and abiding is an evolution which continues uninterruptedly.' He further comments on the reply as follows:

'This means that within the individual, since before the beginning of time, there has been the perfuming influence of names and concepts. Through the force of this influence, the matter, etc., (of the seemingly external world) arises and continues to be evolved in an endless sequence . . . Delusion arises simply because of the adherence to the matter, etc., of this (external) world (as real). Hence, if it were not for this matter, etc., there would be no delusion. Delusion consists of the erroneous adherence to the world of matter, which is

色等外境分明現證，現量所得，寧撥爲無？

現量證時不執爲外，後意分別妄生外想。

故現量境是自相分識所變故亦說爲有，意識所執外實色等妄計有故說彼爲無。

又色等境非色似色，非外似外，如夢所緣，不可執爲是實外色。

若覺時色皆如夢境不離識者，如從夢覺知彼唯心，何故覺時於自色境不知唯識？

如夢未覺不能自知，要至覺時方能追覺。覺時境色應知亦爾，未眞覺位不能自知，至眞覺時亦能追覺。未得眞覺恒處夢中，故佛說爲生死長夜。由斯未了色境唯識。

外色實無可非內識境，他心實有，寧非自所緣？

the product of consciousness. If there were no delusion thus produced by consciousness, there would be no defiling elements. These defiling elements are engendered through the deeds of the evil passions (klesas); that is, delusion is in its essence produced through the deeds of these passions. Hence, were these absent, the barriers of defilement would not exist. And if the barriers of defilement did not exist, then there would also be no (contrasting) purity. There would be nothing impure needing to be eliminated, and therefore no need for the clean and pure']

5. *Outsider*: The external spheres of matter, colour, etc., are clearly and immediately apprehended and corroborated by the five consciousnesses, eyes, ears, etc. How can you deny the existence of that which is perceived through immediate apprehension (Pratyaksa)?

Reply: When the external spheres are apprehended through immediate perception, they are not regarded as external. It is only later that Manovijnana, through its discrimination, erroneously creates the notion of externality. Thus, the objective spheres immediately apprehended are the 'perceived division' (*Nimittabhaga*) of the consciousnesses themselves. Since they are manifestations of consciousness, we say they exist. But inasmuch as they are regarded by Manovijnana as constituting external and real matter, etc., and are thus erroneously imagined to be existent, we say they are non-existent. Furthermore, objective spheres of colour and so forth are not colours though they seem to be so, and are not external though they seem to be so. They are like objects in a dream, which cannot be regarded as real and external.

6. *Outsider*: You have said that the things seen during one's waking state are all like objects in a dream and are inseparable from consciousness. But, on awakening from a dream, we know that the dream is only in our mind. Why, then, is it that, when we are awake, we do not know that the sphere of objects perceived by us is Mere-Consciousness?

Reply: As long as we have not awakened from the dream, we are incapable of realizing that the objects of the dream are unreal. It is only after we have awakened that, in retrospect, we come to realize this. We should know that the same is true of our knowledge regarding the sphere of material objects in our waking life. Until we have truly awakened, we cannot ourselves know, but, when we reach the state of true Awakening (Enlightenment), we shall be able, in retrospect, to realize it. Before this genuine Awakening is achieved, we perpetually remain as in a dream. This is why the Buddha spoke of the long night of transmigratory existence, characterized by ceaseless rounds of birth and death. He did so because of our failure to understand that the sphere of material objects is Mere-Consciousness.

7. *Outsider*: It is true that external matter is really non-existent; but it may be granted that it is not the object of internal consciousness. For instance,

誰說他心非自識境？但不說彼是親所緣。

謂識生時無實作用，非如手等親執外物，日等舒光親照外境。

但如鏡等似外境現名了他心，非親能了。親所了者，謂自所變。

故契經言，無有少法能取餘法，但識生時似彼相現名取彼物。

如緣他心，色等亦爾。

〔述記：解深密言，無有少法無少實法能取餘法。餘者，心外實法也。非自實心能取他實心，但識生時心似彼他心相現名取他心也。……緣他相分色，自身別識所變色等亦爾。〕

既有異境，何名唯識？

奇哉固執，觸處生疑，豈唯識教但說一識？

不爾，如何？
汝應諦聽，若唯一識。寧有十方凡聖尊卑因果等別，誰爲誰說，何法何求？故唯識言有深意趣。

識言總顯一切有情各有八識，六位心所，所變相見，分位差別，及彼空理所顯眞如。

the mind of another person does really exist. Why, then, is it not the object of one's own consciousness?

Reply: Who says that another person's mind is not the object of one's own consciousness? We only deny that it is its immediate and direct object. This means that, when the consciousness of another person's mind manifests itself, it (that other mind) has no real function in one's own consciousness. Thus, the case is different from that of the hands, etc., which directly grasp external things themselves, or the sun, etc., which directly spreads its light itself, thus shining upon external objects. (In its relationship to another person's mind,) one's consciousness is only like a mirror in which there appears what seems to be an external sphere of objects. One's mind is then said to understand the mind of the other person, but it cannot understand another mind immediately and directly. What it does understand directly is only what it itself develops. That is why the Samdhinirmocana Sutra says: 'There is not the least thing [one's own mind] that can apprehend (i.e., perceive) any other thing [other minds]. The only point is that, when consciousness is born, it manifests a semblance of another thing, and is then said to apprehend that thing. In this way, one's own mind seems like perceiving another person's mind as an object, as it perceives material things, etc., (which are evolved out of that mind).'[1]

8. *Outsider*: Since there exists an object [another mind] distinct (from one's own consciousness), how can this be called Mere-Consciousness (Vijnaptimatrata)?

Reply: How extraordinarily opinionated! And how sceptical you are regarding all things that you come into contact with! Do you think that the doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata teaches the existence of only one single consciousness?

If not, what then?

You should listen attentively. If there were only one single consciousness, how would the distinctions be evolved between all the enlightened beings and ordinary people, between the honoured ones and lowlier men, or between the causes and the fruits of the ten cardinal directions? Who would then expound the Buddhist Teaching, and for whom would this doctrine be expounded? What Dharmas would the Buddha teach? And what goal would there be to be sought? Verily, the expression Vijnaptimatrata has a profound meaning.

The word 'consciousness' generally expresses the idea that each sentient being possesses eight consciousnesses, which are consciousness in their essential

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[1] [K'uei Chi comments: ' "Not the least thing" means that not the least real thing (i.e., no consciousness) can apprehend (i.e., perceive) any other thing. "Other" refers to those "real" things which lie outside (one's own) mind. One's own real mind cannot apprehend another person's mind. It is only a case in which, when consciousness is born, one's own mind manifests a semblance of that other mind and is then said to apprehend that mind . . . The same is true when one's own mind takes as its object the physical matter which constitutes the objective division of that other (person's consciousness): the case is similar to that of the physical matter developed by the separate senses belonging to a single individual.']

識自相故，識相應故，二所變故，三分位故，四實性故，如是諸法皆不離識總立識名。

〔述記：分位差別：色心分位二十四不相應等。〕

唯言但遮愚夫所執定離諸識實有色等。

若如是知唯識教意，便能無倒善備資糧，速入法空，證無上覺，救拔含識生死輪廻。非全撥無惡取空者違背教理能成是事，故定應信一切唯識。

nature; six categories of mental activities, which are associated with consciousness; the two Bhagas of *Nimitta* and *Darsana*, which are evolved from consciousness and its Caittas; the Viprayuktas which consist of three categories of dharmas (the Caittas, Rupa, and dharmas not associated with the mind); and Tathata (True Thusness or True Reality) which is revealed through the realization of Sunyata (Voidness of Atman and dharmas) and which is the true nature of the four preceding categories. Hence all dharmas, whichever they may be, are not separable from consciousness. For this reason, the general term 'consciousness' has been created. The word 'mere' (*matra*) is employed to deny the existence of real matter, etc., as distinct from the various consciousnesses, which existence is admitted by ignorant people, including the adherents of the two Vehicles.

The man who understands in this manner the meaning of Vijnaptimatrata will unquestionably be able to equip himself adequately with all kinds of spiritual provisions and to penetrate rapidly into the 'voidness of dharmas' (*dharmasunyata*), to realize supreme Bodhi, and to save all sentient beings from the whirlpool of Samsara (Transmigration). Such success can never be achieved by the total negator who wrongly assumes the voidness of all things and acts in opposition to the Scriptures and reason. One must therefore believe that all is Mere-Consciousness.

BOOK VI

CAUSALITY AND SAMSARA

因果與生死流轉

因果與生死流轉

答難初頌

若唯有識都無外緣，由何而生種種分別？

〔述記：分別者，即八識等。〕

頌曰：

由一切種識，　如是如是變，
以展轉力故，　彼彼分別生。

論曰：

一切種識謂本識中能生自果功能差別。

〔述記：此種子識，即本識中能生一切有爲法種，各能生自果功能之差別，故名一切種。〕

此生等流，異熟，士用，增上果故，名一切種。

除離繫者，非種生故。彼雖可證而非種果，要現起道斷結得故。

〔述記：以是無爲，非種生故。彼無爲可證，非種子果，要現起無漏勝道斷結方得，不由種故。〕

有展轉義非此所說，此說能生分別種故。

CAUSALITY AND SAMSARA

IF only consciousness exists, without any external causation, from what are generated the many kinds of distinctions [e.g., the eight consciousnesses, the Samprayuktas, the two Bhagas, the Viprayuktas]?

The Stanza says:

18

From the consciousness which contains all Bijas (seeds) (the Alayavijnana)

Such-and-such evolution or transformation takes place.

Through the force of the mutual co-operation of the actual Dharmas

Such-and-such kinds of distinction are engendered.

The Treatise says:

1. By 'Consciousness which contains all Bijas', *sarvabija vijnana*, are meant the various powers and potentials (*sakti*, Bijas) in the root consciousness (Mulavijnana or Alayavijnana) which are capable of engendering spontaneously their own fruits (i.e., all conditioned dharmas, *samskrta*).

These creative powers or Bijas are called *sarvabija* (i.e., all seeds) because they engender four kinds of fruit, namely, *nisyanda, vipaka, parusakara*, and *adhipatiphala*.[1] The only exception is the *visamyogaphala*, i.e., 'the fruit of disentanglement or detachment', which is not born of Bijas, which is a 'non-conditioned' dharma (*asamkrta*). This fruit, which is born as a result of the 'separation from all the klesas or the two "barriers" (*avaranas*)' can be 'realized', but it is not the 'fruit of the Bijas', *bijaphala*. One attains it by practising the 'pure, excellent Way' and sundering the 'ties' of the klesas. In such cases, there is mediate causality: [the Bijas produce wisdom, *jnana*; wisdom sunders the ties; *visamyoga* is then attained.] But this is not the theme to be treated here. The Stanza, employing the term *sarvabija*, considers the Bijas in their immediate causality, which is to produce all kinds of distinction (Vikalpas), all *samskrtas*, all Paratantras.

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[1] The Five Fruits or Effects:

(1) Vipakaphala, fruit maturing at varying times, e.g., pleasure and goodness are in differing categories; present organs accord in pleasure or pain with their past good or evil deeds;
(2) Nisyandaphala, fruit of the same order, e.g., goodness reborn from previous goodness;
(3) Parusakaraphala, fruit pertaining to present position and function, the rewards of moral merit in previous lives;
(4) Adhipatiphala, superior fruit or position arising from previous earnest endeavour and superior capacity;
(5) Visamyogaphala; fruit of freedom from all klesas or bonds, Nirvana fruit.

此識爲體故立識名，種離本識無別性故。

種識二言簡非種識，有識非種，種非識故。

〔述記：簡非種識。謂有識非種卽現起諸識非內種子，有種非識卽外麥等非識自體分故。〕

又種識言顯識中種，非持種識，後當說故。

此識中種，餘緣助故，卽便如是如是轉變，謂從生位轉至熟時。顯變種多，重言如是。

謂一切種攝三熏習共不共等識種盡故。

展轉力者，謂八現識及彼相應相見分等，彼皆互有相助力故。

〔述記：展轉力者，謂八現行識及八識相應心所。此卽識等自證分及此所變相見二分并不相應及無爲法。〕

卽現識等總名分別，虛妄分別爲自性故。

〔述記：卽現行識相見分相應不相應皆名分別，以妄分別爲自性故，皆不離識，故識爲性。〕

分別類多，故言彼彼。

此頌意說雖無外緣，由本識中有一切種轉變差別，及以現行八種識等展轉力故，彼彼分別而亦得生。何假外緣方起分別？

諸淨法起應知亦然，現淨種現行爲緣生故。

〔述記：無漏法生亦如分別，亦以無漏種及無漏識相見分等現行爲緣生故。〕

The Bijas have their substance in consciousness; hence they are designated by the term consciousness. They have no special nature apart from the root consciousness (Mulavijnana).

The Stanza employes the two terms Bija and consciousness to discard that which is not at once Bija and consciousness. In fact, certain consciousnesses (e.g., actual consciousnesses) are not Bijas, and certain Bijas are not consciousness (e.g., 'external' grains, wheat, etc.).

Furthermore, the term *bijavijnana* (seed-consciousness) indicates the Bijas that are inherent in consciousness, not the consciousness that holds the Bijas. This will be elucidated in a later section.

The Bijas of the eighth consciousness (which are the causative condition, *hetupratyaya*, of the various kinds of distinction), thanks to the help of the three other conditioning factors (Pratyayas), undergo such-and-such transformations, that is to say, from the state of birth they pass on to the point of maturity. The Stanza repeats the word 'such' (such-and-such) to indicate that each of the Bijas transforms itself in its own way to engender different kinds of distinction.

In fact, the expression *sarvabija* includes all the consciousness-bijas of the three perfuming categories, common Bijas, non-common Bijas, and so forth.

2. The actual consciousnesses are the three other conditioning factors (Pratyayas).

The expression 'mutual co-operation' in the Stanza signifies that the eight actual consciousnesses, their Caittas, the two Bhagas (*darsana* and *nimitta*) which are manifestations of all these, and also the Viprayuktas and the Asamskrtas, all have the power to assist and co-operate with one another.

3. The fourth sentence in the Stanza explains the fruit.

The actual consciousness and the rest [: the eight actual consciousnesses, Darsana and Nimittabhaga, Samprayuktas and Viprayuktas] are designated by the general term 'discrimination', because in their essential nature they are all false discriminations.

In view of the variety of these kinds of distinction (Vikalpas). the Stanza says: 'such-and-such kinds of distinction'.

4. The meaning of this Stanza is as follows:

Though there is no external causation, yet, because of the differing evolutions of all the Bijas present in the Alayavijnana, and by the force of the mutual assistance of the eight actual consciousnesses, etc., such-and-such kinds of distinction are produced. Why assume an external cause to explain their birth?

The birth of pure dharmas should be understood in the same manner. They are produced by the pure Bijas of the Alayavijnana and through the activity of the pure actual consciousnesses.

[The Alayavijnana contains both pure and impure seeds. The pure seeds spontaneously produce pure *dharmas* or things, and the impure seeds impure dharmas. Thus, from the Alaya are produced all dharmas, pure and impure alike, and these in turn react upon the *Alaya* by 'perfuming' it. This is why the Treatise says: 'The Alayavijnana and the impure dharmas interact on one another as cause and effect, just as the wick and the flame (interact to) produce the incandescence (of a lamp), or bundles of reeds (stacked side by side) support one another. It is only through these two (The Alaya and the impure dharmas) that causality is established. There need be no other causality'. Precisely the same process of reciprocal causation also operates between the *Alaya* and the pure *dharmas*. Thus the Alaya is in itself both cause and effect, and in itself is capable of producing all things, both pure and impure. What need, then, to look for external causation? The fact that all sentient beings are bound to the perpetual flux of life and death 'springs from internal causation, independent of external causes. Therefore, there is nothing but Consciousness.']

第一章・　四緣

所說種現緣生分別，云何應知此緣生相？

緣且有四。

一・　因緣

一因緣，謂有爲法親辦自果。

此體有二，一種子，二現行。

種子者，謂本識中善染無記諸界地等功能差別。
〔述記：等者，等取有漏無漏，色非色，報非報等種種各別種子。〕

能引次後自類功能，及起同時自類現果，此唯望彼是因緣性。
〔述記：謂能引次後自類功能，顯自類相生義。〕

現行者，謂七轉識及彼相應所變相見性界地等，除佛果善極劣無記，餘熏本識生自類種，此唯望彼是因緣性。

第八心品無所熏故。
〔述記：第八心品更無所熏，己即所熏故，餘七並能熏故。〕

非簡所依獨能熏故。
〔述記：非簡去所依之心，而心所獨能熏故。〕

極微圓故，不熏成種。
〔述記：因中第八及六識中異熟之心並不熏者，以極微故不能熏。……佛果上第八以極圓故不熏成種。〕

現行同類展轉相望皆非因緣，自種生故。

§ I. THE FOUR PRATYAYAS

Conditioning Factors

It has been said that the various kinds of distinction (Vikalpas) are born through having as conditioning factors (Pratyayas) the Bijas and the actual dharmas. In what way should we understand this causality?

The Pratyayas (conditioning factors) are four in number, Hetupratyaya, Samanantarapratyaya, Alambanapratyaya, and Adhipatipratyaya.

1. HETUPRATYAYA

Condition quâ Cause

Hetupratyaya (causative condition) means that the conditioned dharams (*samskrta*) produce without mediation their own fruit. The substance of this Pratyaya is twofold: (1) the Bijas that engender and (2) the actual dharmas that perfume.

1. Bijas. – Bijas are the different powers or potentials (*sakti*) of the Mulavijnana, good, bad, non-defined, of all Dhatus, of all Lands, of Rupa, of non-Rupa, etc. The Bijas are Hetupratyaya in a double action: on the one hand, they lead to the production of Bijas which are of the same species and which are subsequent to them (the Bija creates a Bija similar to itself); on the other hand, they produce actual consciousnesses of the same species which are simultaneous with them.

2. Actual dharmas. – Actual dharmas refer to the seven evolving or transforming consciousnesses or Pravrttivijnanas (*samvittibhagas*), with their Caittas, their two Bhagas, good, bad, etc., of all Dhatus, of all Lands, pure, impure, etc. – with the exception of the good dharmas of the Buddha and the non-defined extremely-weak dharmas – which perfume the Mulavijnana and engender Bijas of their own species. The actual dharmas are Hetupratyaya in this single operation only.

(1) The eighth actual consciousness (the consciousness with its Bhagas, Caittas, etc.) does not perfume. The eighth, being itself 'the perfumable', does not perfume anything. But, it may be asked, do not the Caittas perfume, since their King, the eighth consciousness, is perfumable? No, because the Caittas, apart from their king and support, cannot perfume by themselves. In the case of non-Buddhas, the eighth and the first six consciousnesses, when they proceed from retribution (*vikapaja*), are extremely weak; so they do not perfume; in the case of the Buddha, the eighth is perfect in all perfections; hence it is not perfumable.

(2) The successive moments of manifestation of the same species of actual

一切異類展轉相望亦非因緣，不親生故。

有說異類同類現行展轉相望爲因緣者，應知假說或隨轉門。

〔述記：假說爲因緣，實是增上緣等故。或隨轉門者，隨順薩婆多說俱有等五因爲因緣故。〕

有唯說種是因緣性，彼依顯勝，非盡理說，聖說轉識與阿賴耶展轉相望爲因緣故。

〔述記：云何顯勝？謂常相續，故勝。〕

二· 等無閒緣

二等無閒緣，謂八現識及彼心所，前聚於後，自類無閒。等而開導，令彼定生。

〔述記：簡色不相應種子無爲非此緣性。〕

多同類種俱時轉故，如不相應，非此緣攝。

由斯八識非互爲緣。

〔述記：八識相望非互爲緣，多類竝生故。〕

心所與心雖恒俱轉，而相應故和合似一不可施設離別殊異，故得互作等無閒緣。

〔述記：同一所緣及同所依，同一時轉，同一性攝。〕

dharmas are not Hetupratyaya between themselves, because each of them is born from its own Bija.

(3) Nor are dharmas of different species Hetupratyaya between themselves, because there is no immediate and direct generation between them. [The Bijas of the eye-consciousness are not the *Hetupratyaya* of those of the ear-consciousness.]

(4) According to one text (Tsa-tsi), the actual dharmas whether of the same or of different species, are Hetupratyaya between themselves: this is because the author has expressed himself in incorrect terms; he is in fact referring to Adhipathipratyaya (condition quâ contributory factor) or has accepted the opinion of the Sarvastivadins.

In several passages, the Yogasastra describes single Bijas as Hetupratyaya, partly because their action is manifest and partly because, forming as they do a continuing series, they are important. This is not a perfectly correct theory, because other declarations in the same Treatise have clearly established that the Pravrttivijnanas (i.e., the six consciousnesses and actual Manas), on the one hand, and the eighth consciousness, on the other, are reciprocally Hetupratyaya. [There are three modes of hetupratyayata: Bijas engendering Bijas, Bijas engendering actual dharmas, actual dharmas perfuming Bijas.]

2. SAMANANTARAPRATYAYA

Condition quâ Antecedent

Samanantarapratyaya, a condition quâ antecedent, means that the eight actual consciousnesses (*darsana* and *samvittibhaga*) and their Caittas (to the exclusion of Rupa, the Viprayuktas, the Bijas, and the Asamakrtas) constitute a preceding group which passes away to give place to a subsequent group of the same species, opening the way to that group and acting in such a way that it immediately comes into being.

1. In regard to the innumerable Bijas of the same species, they are coexistent and, therefore, like unassociated dharmas (Viprayuktas), are not Samanantarapratyaya.

2. According to the same principle, the eight consciousnesses are not Samanantarapratyaya between themselves, because several species of consciousness coexist.

3. It is true that the Caittas coexist at all times with Citta; but they are 'associates' (*samprayukta*) of Citta (having the same object and the same supporting base, *indriya*; arising at the same time, and being of the same nature): they are therefore united with Citta in such a way that they form a sort of unity, and it is impossible to separate and differentiate between them. It is said therefore that Citta and Caittas are, reciprocally, Samanantarapratyaya. [The previous Citta is the Samanantarapratyaya of the subsequent Caitta of the same group.]

入無餘心最極微劣，無開導用，又無當起等無閒法，故非此緣。

〔述記：第八十說，入無餘心前先入滅定滅六轉識，後方滅餘識。〕

云何知然？

論有誠說，若此識等無閒彼識等決定生，卽說此是彼等無閒緣故。

〔述記：大論第三及五十一顯揚第十八與此文同。〕

(一)　阿陀那識爲緣

卽依此義應作是說，阿陀那識三界九地皆容互作等無閒緣，下上死生相開等故。

有漏無閒有無漏生，無漏定無生有漏者，鏡智起已必無斷故。

善與無記相望亦然。

此何界後引生無漏？

或從色界，或欲界後。

〔述記義演：卽是頓悟漸悟菩薩二人。若頓悟，色界後生無漏。若漸悟，卽唯欲界後引生無漏第八。〕

謂諸異生求佛果者，定色界後引生無漏，後必生在淨居天上大自在宮得菩提故。

〔述記：色界中無二乘廻心者。〕

〔述記義演：十地菩薩生第四禪，依後報身上得成佛。〕

二乘廻趣大菩提者，定欲界後引生無漏，廻趣留身唯欲界故。彼雖必往大自在宮方得成佛，而本願力所留生身是欲界故。

〔述記：上界無此廻心聖故。〕

有義色界亦有聲聞廻趣大乘願留身者，旣與教理俱不相違，是故聲聞第八無漏色界心後亦得現前。

4. At the moment of entry into Nirupadhisesanirvana (Final-Nirvana-without-residue, i.e., Nirvana without vestiges of reincarnation), the mind is extremely weak and, in consequence, has not 'the strength to open the way and lead'. Further, it does not produce a subsequent dharma of a similar nature. Hence it is not Samanantarapratyaya.

How do you explain this?

It has been truly said in the Yogasastra that 'if, immediately after the former consciousness-associates, the latter consciousness-associates are born, then the former are the Samanantarapratyaya of the latter.' (Yogasastra, 3 and 51, and Vikhyapana, 18).

(1) The Adanavijnana as Samanantarapratyaya

In accordance with this doctrine, it may be said that the Adanavijnana of any one of the three Dhatus and any one of the nine Lands can be the Samanantarapratyaya of an Adanavijnana of any Dhatu and any Land, because, in the cycles of birth and death, the superior existences are introduced and brought about by the inferior existences, and vice versa.

An impure Adanavijnana (non-Buddha) can be succeeded by a pure Adanavijnana (Buddha); but the reverse is impossible, because the Great Mirror Wisdom (Adarsajnana), once attained, is never cut off.

The same relations exist between a good Adanavijnana and a non-defined Adanavijnana: the good succeeds the non-defined; the non-defined does not succeed the good.

To which Dhatu does the impure Adanavijnana belong which is succeeded by the pure Adanavijnana? [In other words, to which Dhatu does the existence belong with which one attains Buddhahood?] There are two opinions:

(1) To Rupadhatu belong Bodhisattvas of instantaneous enlightenment and to Kamadhatu belong those of gradual enlightenment.

All Prthagjanas who aspire to the fruit of Buddha, who do not enter into the two Vehicles, must necessarily be born in [the fourth dhyana heaven of] Rupadhatu before they can produce pure Adanavijnanas and become Buddhas. Later they are reborn and reside, above the Suddhavasikas, in the Pure Land of Mahesvarabhuvana and there obtain Bodhi.

The Saints of the two Vehicles (Saiksas and Asaiksas) who turn their minds to Mahabodhi must necessarily be born in Kamadhatu before they can produce pure Adanavijnanas, because it is only in Kamadhatu that they can turn their minds to Mahabodhi and preserve their bodies. Although they must of necessity proceed to the Pure Land of Mahesvarabhuvana to attain Buddhahood, because they can only become Buddhas in that excellent place, nevertheless their 'bodies of birth' [the natural bodies, fruit of retribution], which they preserve by the force of their 'great vows and resolutions' (*maha-pranidhava*), are Kamadhatu bodies.

(2) According to another opinion, which is correct, it is neither at variance with the texts nor with logical reasoning that some Sravakas turn their minds to Mahabodhi and preserve their bodies not only in Kamadhatu but also

然五淨居無廻趣者，經不說彼發大心故。

〔述記：此言經者，大般若說。〕

(二)　末那識爲緣

第七轉識三界九地亦容互作等無間緣，隨第八識生處繫故。

有漏無漏容互相生，十地位中得相引故。

善與無記相望亦然。

於無記中染與不染亦相開導，生空智果前後位中得相引故。

〔述記：染者人執，不染者法執。生空智果者，智者卽是無分別智，果者卽後得智及此所引滅定，皆唯不染。〕

此欲色界有漏得與無漏相生，非無色界，地上菩薩不生彼故。

(三)　意識爲緣

第六轉識三界九地有漏無漏善不善等各容互作等無間緣，潤生位等更相引故。

〔述記：如來第八地已去菩薩得起一切處心。〕

初起無漏唯色界後，決擇分善唯色界故。

(四)　五識爲緣

眼耳身識二界二地，鼻舌兩識一界一地，自類互作等無間緣。善等相望應知亦爾。

in Rupadhatu. Consequently, for the Sravakas also, the pure eighth consciousness can follow immediately the consciousness of Rupadhatu.

As regards the fact that in the five Suddhavasikas there are no saints turning their minds to Mahabodhi, this is because the Mahaprajnaparamitasutra does not say that they manifest 'the great mind of Bodhi' necessary for their reorientation towards the Greater Vehicle.

(2) Manas as Samanantarapratyaya

Manas (seventh Pravrttivijnana) of any one Dhatu and any one Land can be Samanantarapratyaya of Manas of any other Dhatu and any other Land, because Manas is tied to the place of birth of the eighth consciousness.

Impure or pure Manas can be the Samanantarapratyaya of impure or pure Manas, because the two states of Manas can succeed one another in the course of the ten Bhumis according to whether the yogin is entering pure or impure contemplations.

In the same way, good and non-defined states succeed one another.

Among the non-defined states, the defiled state (characterized by the presence of *pudgalagraha*) and the non-defiled state (characterized by the presence of *dharmagraha* only) succeed one another, because non-defiled states (wisdom of *pudgalasunyata*, i.e., 'non-discriminating wisdom', and its two fruits, 'subsequent wisdom' and *nirodhasamapatti*) can follow and precede defiled states.

It is only in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu that pure and impure Manas are reciprocally Samanantarapratyaya; not in Arupyadhatu, because Bodhisattvas of the higher Lands are not born in this Dhatu.

(3) Manovijnana as Samanantarapratyaya

The Manovijnana of any one of the three Dhatus and any one of the nine Lands, pure, impure, good, bad, etc., can be Samanantarapratyaya of the Manovijnana of any other Dhatu, etc. In fact, at the moment of the 'moistening of birth', i.e., the moistening and fertilizing of the ripened Bijas which causes birth into a certain Dhatu, the Manovijnanas of the three Dhatus and the nine Lands can reciprocally engender one another. [The Buddha and the Bodhisattvas of the three superior Bhumis can engender minds in all spheres of consciousness.]

It is only as a sequel of the mind of the fourth dhyana heaven of Rupadhatu that the pure Manovijnana is born for the first time (at *darsanamarga*), because the pure mind of *nirvedhabhagiya* (true discrimination or wisdom which precedes *darsanamarga*) belongs to Rupadhatu.

(4) The Five Consciousnesses as Samanantarapratyaya

The consciousnesses of the eye, the ear, and the body, of Kamadhatu and the first dhyana heaven of Rupadhatu are, each according to its kind, Samanantarapratyaya of each other. The same applies, in the land of Kamadhatu, to

〔述記義演：若眼耳身三識卽欲界及初禪上下界更互爲緣也，若鼻舌二識唯在欲界有，上界無，卽不可言上下界互爲緣。若欲界鼻舌二識善等三性，亦更互爲等無閒緣。〕

有義五識有漏無漏自類互作等無閒緣，未成佛時容互起故。

〔述記義演：此有二師說，此師意說初地轉五識得成事智，乃至十地中皆容與有漏互起。〕

有義無漏有漏後起，非無漏後容起有漏，無漏五識非佛無故，彼五色根定有漏故，是異熟識相分攝故。

〔述記：此第二師，唯佛地得。〕

〔述記：問，有漏根生無漏識 有何義違。〕

有漏不共必俱同境根發無漏識，理不相應故。

〔述記：謂有漏者，簡無漏根，無漏根發無漏識無違故。不共者，簡有漏第八識是共，故可爲無漏識依。必俱者，顯非等無閒緣，等無閒緣根前後生故得依有漏。同境者，簡第七爲六依，彼雖有前義非同境故，此有漏根發無漏識不相應故。〕

此二於境明昧異故。

三· 所緣緣

三所緣緣，謂若有法是帶己相心或相應所慮所託。

〔述記：帶者是心似彼境相義，卽能緣之心有似所緣之相名帶，相者相狀，謂能緣心等帶此色等己之相也。〕

此體有二，一親二疏。若與能緣體不相離，是見分等內所慮託，應知彼是親所緣緣。

若與能緣體雖相離，爲質能起內所慮託，應知彼是疏

the consciousnesses of the nose and the tongue. In the same way the good, bad, and non-defined perceptions of each of the five consciousnesses can succeed one another.

For those Masters who think that a Bodhisattva attains the Krtyanusthanajnana (wisdom of creative achievement) as soon as he enters into the Bhumis, the pure and impure elements of the five consciousnesses are Samanantarapratyaya of each other, each according to its kind, because, prior to the attainment of Buddhahood, the Krtyanusthanajnana permits the reciprocal emergence of the pure and impure elements of the Five.

For those Masters who reserve the Krtyanusthana for Buddhas alone, the five impure consciousnesses are, at the moment of the attainment of Buddhahood, Samanantarapratyaya of the five pure consciousnesses; the pure are never Samanantarapratyaya of the impure, for non-Buddhas never have the five pure consciousnesses. In fact, their five material organs are definitely impure, forming as they do a part of the *nimittabhaga* of the eighth consciousness, Vipakavijnana, which only becomes pure on the acquisition of the qualities of a Buddha.

[But, it may be asked, why should the five impure organs not engender pure consciousness?]

The explanation is that the five impure organs are the special supporting basis for the consciousnesses that correspond to them in contradistinction to the Alayavijnana which is the general supporting basis for all consciousnesses and which can be impure without Manovijnana necessarily being so. They are simultaneous to the consciousnesses that correspond to them and cannot be compared to the impure dharmas which are Samananpratyaya of pure dharmas. They have the same object as the consciousnesses which correspond to them, while Manas has not the same object as Manovijnana and can in consequence be impure without the latter necessarily being so.

It is therefore impossible for the five impure organs to engender pure consciousnesses. The five impure organs are 'dark and obscure' and cannot produce pure consciousness which must be 'clear and bright'.

3. ALAMBANAPRATYAYA

Condition quâ Perceived Object

Alambanapratyaya is the 'condition quâ perceived object'. By this is meant the dharma that exists, on which the mind and its associates are based, and which is perceived and known by the mind that is born similar to it.

Alambana is of two kinds: immediate and remote.

1. The dharma which is not separated from the perceiving consciousness and which the *darsanabhaga* contemplates and takes as its supporting basis is the immediate Alambanapratyaya.

2. The dharma which, although separated from the perceiving consciousness,

所緣緣。

親所緣緣能緣皆有，離內所慮託必不生故。

疏所緣緣能緣或有，離外所慮託亦得生故。

〔述記：如執實我，雖無本質，然離彼法心亦生故。〕

〔述記義演：如緣實我法及緣過未等，雖無本質心亦得生。〕

第八心品，有義唯有親所緣緣，隨業因力任運變故。

有義亦定有疏所緣緣，要仗他變質自方變故。

有義二說俱不應理，自他身土可互受用，他所變者爲自質故。

自種於他無受用理，他變爲此不應理故，非諸有情種皆等故。

應說此品疏所緣緣，一切位中有無不定。

第七心品，未轉依位是俱生故，必仗外質，故亦定有疏所緣緣。已轉依位此非定有，緣眞如等無外質故。

〔述記：此識因中有漏者是俱生起，任運無力，必仗第八識以爲外質自方變故。旣非業果體，力須藉質起。無漏位不定有，緣眞如虛空去來無外質故。〕

第六心品行相猛利，於一切位能自在轉，所仗外質或有或無，疏所緣緣有無不定。

〔述記：此識因果位能自在轉，或分別起，或是俱生，故一切種所仗本質有無不定。〕

前五心品，未轉依位麤鈍劣故必仗外質，故亦定有疏所緣緣。已轉依位，此非定有，緣過未等無外質故。

〔述記：眼等五識，必仗第八或第六所變外質方起。〕

〔述記：或說亦緣眞如，有說不得，但緣去來等故。〕

is the archetype capable of producing, within that consciousness, the image (*nimittabhaga*) whereupon the *darsanabhaga* supports itself and which it perceives; such is the remote alambanapratyaya.

Every consciousness has an immediate Alambanapratyaya, because no consciousness can be born without perceiving and supporting itself on an object which is internal to it.

Not every consciousness has a remote Alambanapratyaya, for consciousness can manifest itself without any archetype external to it and corresponding to its *nimittabhaga*. [For example: past and future things, Atman, etc.]

(1) With reference to the Alambana of the eighth consciousness, there are three opinions.

a. The eighth has only the immediate Alambana, because it manifests itself spontaneously as objects through the force of past deeds and internal causes.

b. The eighth has also the remote type of Alambana, for, when it manifests itself as the body of another person, it must, to that end, be based on the manifestation of the eighth consciousness of that person (archetype). In this manner, it may manifest itself as a *nimitta* which is its immediate Alambana.

c. Neither theory accords with reason:

(a) Different persons have 'experience' of the bodies and the lands of one another, for the manifestation of the eighth consciousness of one person is the archetype of the manifestation of that of another person. (b) One person cannot have any experience of the Bijas or indriyas of another person: the eighth consciousness of one person does not manifest itself as the Bijas or indriyas of another person. This is because the Bijas of different beings are unequal in number. Let us say, then, that the eighth consciousness, whether in the case of non-Buddhas or in the case of Buddhas, may or may not have the remote type of Alambana.

(2) Manas, before its 'internal revolution' (i.e., the attainment of Buddhahood), always has a remote alambana. Being always innate, it does not manifest itself as an immediate Alambana (its *nimittabhaga*) except by reason of an external archetype (that is to say, the eighth consciousness). After the revolution, it may or may not have a remote Alamabana; it does not have it when it has as its object Tathata, Sunyata, and past or future dharmas.

(3) The Manovijnana is by nature keen and lively; at all stages, before as after its 'internal revolution', it is capable of autonomous functioning, because it is either innate or evolved from the imagination, which means that the archetype on which it depends is sometimes present and sometimes lacking (e.g., when it envisages an Atman . . .). Thus, it has or has not, as the case may be, a distant Alambana.

(4) The five consciousnesses, before the revolution, are crude, dull and weak: hence they must depend on an archetype (i.e., the manifestation, *nimitta*, of the eighth or of the sixth consciousness) [when the eye sees a chimera or a *maya*]; hence they always have a distant Alambana. After the revolution, there is no rule. They do not have a distant Alambana when they have as their object past or future dharmas [and again when, as some admit, they have Tathata as their object.]

四· 增上緣

四增上緣，謂若有法有勝勢用，能於餘法或順或違。

雖前三緣亦是增上，而今第四除彼取餘，爲顯諸緣差別相故。

此順違用於四處轉，生住成得四事別故。
〔述記義演：生者，三界法生。住者，……一切有情草木萬物皆依地而住也。成者，謂成立成辦。成立者，宗因譬喻爲建立。成辦者，謂工巧智爲先，劬勞爲建立，得者，……證得涅槃。……隨法者謂有漏世間修慧也。〕

然增上用隨事雖多，而勝顯者唯二十二，應知卽是二十二根。

前五色根以本識等所變眼等淨色爲性。

男女二根身根所攝故，卽以彼少分爲性。

命根但依本識親種分位假立，非別有性。

意根總以八識爲性。

五受根如應各自受爲性。

信等五根卽以信等及善念等而爲自性。
〔述記：信等，等取精進。及善念等者，等取定慧。〕

未知當知根體位有三種。
一根本位，謂在見道，除後剎那，無所未知可當知故。

4. ADHIPATIPRATYAYA

Condition quâ Contributory Factor

Adhipatipratyaya is the 'condition quâ contributory factor', 'condition in general', a real dharma (conditioned or unconditioned, as opposed to imaginary dharmas), possessing potent energy and capable of promoting (first nine hetus) or counteracting (tenth *hetu*) the evolution of another dharma.

The dharmas which are Hetu, Alambana, Samanantarapratyaya, are also Adhipatipratyaya; but, for the purpose of indicating the variety of modes of causality (*pratyaya*), a fourth category is established under the name of Adhipatipratyaya for all those dharmas which are Pratyayas regardless of their causality quâ Hetu, etc.

The promoting and counteracting activity of Adhipatipratyaya operates in four ways: (1) generation of dharmas of the three Dhatus; (2) sustainment, like the earth which sustains sentient beings, the vegetable kingdom, and all other things; (3) realization, which is of two kinds: reason and example in arguing, and technique and labour in industry; (4) attainment of Nirvana or of worldly dharmas.

Although the activity of Adhipatipratyaya is multiple and varies according to the different kinds of dharmas, yet, essentially and manifestly, it consists of only twenty-two modes: these are the twenty-two Indriyas (roots, organs, or powers).

1–5. The five material Indriyas or organs. They have as their essential nature the subtle Rupa (eyes, etc.) which is the manifestation of Mulavijnana, etc.

6–7. The two sexual organs, being comprised in the Kayendriya (body), are a part of this Indriya.

8. The vital organ, *jivitendriya*, does not exist in itself; as we have seen, it is simply the designation of a certain aspect of the Bijas.

9. The mental mana-indriya: It has as its essential nature the eight consciousnesses.

10–14. The five organs of sensation have as their essential nature the five sensations that are associated, to varying extents according to the case, with the eight consciousnesses.

15–19. The five moral Indriyas or roots, belief, etc., have as their nature two good Caittas, belief and zeal, and, among the special Caittas, good memory, Samadhi, and discernment.

20. Anajnatamajnasyamindriya, the Indriya or power to learn [the Four Noble Truths].

二加行位，謂煖頂忍世第一法，近能引發根本位故。

三資糧位，謂從爲得諦現觀故發起決定勝善法欲乃至未得順決擇分所有善根名資糧位，能遠資生根本位故。

於此三位信等五根意喜樂捨爲此根性。

加行等位於後勝法求證愁慼亦有憂根，非正善根，故多不說。

前三無色有此根者，有勝見道傍修得故。

或二乘位廻趣大者爲證法空，地前亦起九地所攝生空無漏，彼皆菩薩此根攝故。

〔述記：此或是二乘第三果以去迴趣大者爲證初地法空，地前亦起九地所攝生空無漏智。九地者，六色界，三無色。彼先生空智爲菩薩觀起，順菩薩觀故，皆此根攝，說彼有此根非違理也。〕

〔述記義演：未知根於見道證法空觀時立。〕

菩薩見道亦有此根，但說地前，以時促故。

始從見道最後刹那乃至金剛喻定，所有信等無漏九根皆是已知根性。

未離欲者於上解脫求證愁慼亦有憂根，非正善根，故多不說。

(1) It is necessary to distinguish three states and three periods:

a. Mulavastha (fundamental state). This refers to the Darsanamarga (Insight into Transcendent Truth) to the exclusion of the last moment preceding the attainment of this insight when nothing remains unknown.

b. Prayogavastha (the stage of intensified effort), immediate preparation for Darsanamarga. This refers to the Nirvedhabhagiyas[1] which can lead directly to Mulavastha.

c. Sambharavastha (the stage of moral provisioning), distant preparation for Darsanamarga. This refers to the period after entry into the Kalpa, – from the moment when the yogin, with a view to obtaining the Satyabhisamaya (Realization of Truth), produces the aspiration for the 'definitely superior and most excellent Dharma' (Nirvana) up to, but not including, the Nirvedhabhagiyas:[1] all the roots of excellence in this interval constitute Sambharavastha, the period of equipment, because they organize and produce indirectly the Mulavastha.

(2) The five moral Indriyas of these three periods, belief, etc., with Manas and the three sensations of delight, joy, and indifference, nine Indriyas in all, constitute the Anajnatam. – No doubt, in the course of the two preparatory periods, in the search of the Supreme Dharma, sadness or regret is also produced. Hence a tenth Indriya, grief or anxiety. But this grief, inasmuch as it is not the principal root of good, is not counted by the Yogasastra in the number of Indriyas that constitute the Anajnatam or 'the Root of the knowledge of the unknown'.

(3) The Anajnatam or power exists in the contemplations of the first three Arupyadhatus, because the superior Darsanamarga can include the accessory possession of these contemplations, or because the yogins of the two Vehicles who, through possession of the third fruit (Anagamins), turn their mind towards Mahabodhi, produce – with a view to realizing the *dharmasunyata* (Darsanamarga, first Land) and before entering into this Land – a pure knowledge of the *pudgalasunyata* included in the nine Lands (six Rupas and three Arupyas). Hence these Bodhisattvas possess the Anajnatam.

The Darsanabhaga of Bodhisattvas includes the Anajnatam, as we have noted; but the Yogasastra mentions it only in the period preceding the ten Lands, because the period of time of Darsanamarga in which it exists is very limited.

21. Ajnendriya, the power of having learned [the Four Noble Truths]; from the last moment of Darsanamarga (insight into Transcendent Truth), including it, up to Vajropamasamadhi (Diamond Samadhi), nine pure Indriyas: belief, etc., Manas, delight, joy, and indifference.

Yogins who have not detached themselves from desire, in their search of deliverance, experience sadness and regret; hence the grief-indriya is also included in the Ajnendriya; but this Indriya is not named, because, as mentioned above, it is not the principal root of good.

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[1] Cf. 'Prayogavastha' in Section on The Path, in Book IX.

諸無學位無漏九根一切皆是具知根性。

有頂雖有遊觀無漏，而不明利，非後三根。

二十二根自性如是，諸餘門義如論應知。

〔述記：此諸門義如五十七等說。〕

22. Ajnatavindriya, the power of perfect knowledge of the Four Noble Truths: nine pure Indriyas in the state of Asaiksa.

The Bhavagra does not include the last three Indriyas although discursive pure contemplation is present: the latter is, in fact, not clear and vivid.

Such is the essential nature (*svabhava*) of the twenty-two Indriyas. The explanation of the problems concerning them is found in the Yogasastra, 57.

章二第· 十因及二因

一· 十因及十五處

如是四緣依十五處義差別故，立爲十因。

〔十因：隨說因，觀待因，牽引因，生起因，攝受因，引發因，定異因，同事因，相違因，不相違因。〕

云何此依十五處立？

(一) 隨說因及語依處

一語依處，謂法名想所起語性。

〔述記：依處者，……語卽依處。〕

卽依此處立隨說因。

謂依此語，隨見聞等說諸義故。

〔述記：此釋依語立說因義，謂詮一切法起名，取其相狀方有言說起。卽依此語隨見聞覺知後或隨彼所見等事，說諸義故，依語立因。〕

此卽能說爲所說因。

有論說此是名想見，由如名字，取相，執着，隨起說故。

〔述記：以三法爲因，所生之說是其果也。〕

若依彼說便顯此因是語依處。

〔述記：名想見因是語之依處。〕

（二） 觀待因及領受依處

二領受依處，謂所觀待能所受性。

卽依此處立觀待因。

謂觀待此，令彼諸事或生或住或成或得，此是彼觀待因。

（三） 牽引因及習氣依處

三習氣依處，謂內外種未成熟位，卽依此處立牽引因，謂能牽引遠自果故。

§ II. THE TEN AND THE TWO HETUS

1. The Ten Hetus (causes) and the Fifteen Adhisthanas (supporting bases)

The four Pratyayas (conditioning factors) may be differentiated on the basis of fifteen Adhisthanas (supporting bases), and thus constitute ten Hetus, which are: *anuvyavahara, apeksa, aksepa, abhinirvrtti, parigraha, avahaka, pratiniyama, sahakara, virodha* and *avirodhahetu.*

How are the ten Hetus established on the basis of the fifteen Adhisthanas?

1. Anuvyavaharahetu and Vagadhisthana

The Vagadhisthana (i.e., speech as basis and support) has as its essential nature speech which is produced by *dharma* (thing), *naman* (name), and *samjna* (thought or conception). In other words, speech is produced by the combination of the thing named, the name itself, and the concept or idea.

The Anuvyavaharahetu (i.e., the 'conformity-speech' cause) is established on the basis of this Adhisthana.

By this is meant that it is by means of 'speech' and 'in conformity with' one's experiences that one speaks of all the things that one sees, hears, thinks of, and knows; that is to say, the speech that relates is the cause of what is related.

Alternatively, as taught in the Abhidharma, the term *vagadhisthana* means 'names, thought, and opinion'. The idea is that speech arises by reason of, and in conformity with, names which name objects, with thought which apprehends their characteristics, and with opinion which adheres to them. According to this explanation, these three dharmas, i.e., names, thought, and opinion, are the supporting basis (Adhisthana) for speech.

2. Apeksahetu and Anubhava-adhisthana

The Anubhava-adhisthana (i.e., sensation as basis) has as its essential nature the sensation that arises from the observation of, and the dependence upon, all dharmas.

On the basis of this Adhisthana is established the Apeksahetu (i.e., the 'observation-dependence cause'). If, through observation of, and in dependence upon, this, a thing is born or sustained or achieved or obtained, then this is the Apeksahetu of that thing.

3. Aksepahetu and Vasanadhisthana

Vasanadhisthana refers to the supporting basis that consists of 'perfuming influence', i.e., the internal Bijas (pure or impure) and external Bijas in the state of non-maturity. On the basis of this Adhisthana is established the Aksepahetu, 'the cause that projects', that is to say, the cause that is capable of projecting its fruit from afar.

（四） 生起因及有潤種子依處

四有潤種子依處，謂內外種已成熟位，卽依此處立生起因，謂能生起近自果故。

（五） 攝受因及無間滅依處

五無間滅依處，謂心心所等無間緣。

六境界依處，謂心心所所緣緣。

七根依處，謂心心所所依六根。

八作用依處，謂於所作業，作具，作用。卽除種子餘助現緣。
〔述記：如釿斧等有斫伐等用。〕

九士用依處，謂於所作業，作者，作用。卽除種子餘作現緣。

十眞實見依處，謂無漏見。除引自種，於無漏法，能助，引，證。

總依此六，立攝受因。謂攝受五辦有漏法，具攝受六辦無漏故。

〔述記：助成因緣名爲攝受。〕
〔述記：如田水糞等望穀生芽等。〕

（六） 引發因及隨順依處

十一隨順依處，謂無記染善現種諸行，能隨順同類勝品諸法，卽依此處立引發因。謂能引起同類勝行，及能引得無爲法故。

（七） 定異因及差別功能依處

十二差別功能依處，謂有爲法各於自果，有能起證差

4. Abhinirvrttihetu and Sasnehabijadhisthana

The Sasnehabijadhisthana is the supporting basis which consists of internal and external Bijas that have been moistened and fertilized, that is to say, in the state of maturity. On the basis of this Adhisthana is established the Abhinirvrttihetu, 'the cause that produces', that is to say, the cause that is capable of immediately producing its fruit.

5. Parigrahahetu and Adhisthanas 5–10

The Parigrahahetu, complementary cause, comprises six Adhisthanas, of which five produce impure dharmas and one alone produces pure dharmas.

(1) Anantaraniruddha-adhisthana: This is the Samanantarapratyaya (condition quâ antecedent) of Citta-caittas; the fruit is Citta-caittas.

(2) Visaya-adhisthana: This is the Alambanapratyaya (condition quâ perceived object) of Citta-caittas.

(3) Indriya-adhisthana: This refers to the six organs which are the supporting bases for the Citta-caittas.

(4) Karana-adhisthana: This refers to the activity of the instrument in the act to be done, [as the axe in the operation of chopping]. To the exclusion of Bijas, this Adhisthana comprises all actual, auxiliary conditioning factors (Pratyayas).

(5) Purusakara-adhisthana: This refers to the activity of the agent in actions. To the exclusion of Bijas, this Adhisthana comprises all actual, effective Pratyayas.

(6) Tattvadarsana-adhisthana: the pure and true view in so far as it brings about, and assists in the production of, pure dharmas. We are not considering here the operation whereby it produces the Bijas which reciprocally produce it anew.

On the basis of these six Adhisthanas is established the Parigrahahetu, the complementary cause. Among these Adhisthanas five produce impure dharmas and one alone produces pure dharmas. The Parigrahahetu is so named because it helps the Hetupratyaya, that is to say the Bijas. Rice is born from the seed of rice (Hetupratyaya) on condition that the seed is helped by water, earth, manure, etc.

6. Avahakahetu and Anupratipattyadhisthana

This eleventh Adhisthana refers to non-defined, defiled, or good mental activities (Samskaras), both actual and in Bija-state, which promote various dharmas of the same species and of a higher category. On the basis of this Adhisthana is setablished the Avahakahetu, which means the 'adductive' cause which leads to the production of activities of the same species and of a superior category, and which causes unconditioned supramundane dharmas (Asamskrtas) to be obtained.

7. Pratiniyamahetu and Karitra-visesa-adhisthana

This twelfth Adhisthana refers to active dharmas (Samskrtas) in so far as they possess a special potent force to produce their own fruit. On the basis of

別勢力。卽依此處立定異因。謂各能生自界等果，及各能得自乘果故。

（八） 同事因及和合依處

十三和合依處，謂從領受乃至差別功能依處，於所生住成得果中，有和合力。卽依此處立同事因，謂從觀待乃至定異，皆同生等一事業故。

（九） 相違因及障碍依處

十四障礙依處，謂於生住成得事中能障礙法，卽依此處立相違因，謂彼能違生等事故。

（十） 不相違因及不障碍依處

十五不障礙依處，謂於生住成得事中不障礙法，卽依此處立不相違因。謂彼不違生等事故。

二· 十因及二因

如是十因二因所攝，一能生二方便。

菩薩地說，牽引種子，生起種子，名能生因。所餘諸因方便因攝。

此說牽引，生起，引發，定異，同事，不相違中，諸因緣種，未成熟位名牽引種，已成熟位名生起種。

彼六因中諸因緣種，皆攝在此二位中故。

雖有現起，是能生因。如四因中生自種者而多間斷，此略不說。

this Adhisthana is established the Pratiniyamahetu, a special type of cause: each dharma being capable of engendering a fruit of its Dhatu, etc., each dharma resulting in the production of a fruit of its Vehicle.

8. Sahakarihetu and Samagri-adhisthana
This refers to all those dharmas included in Adhisthanas 2–12 which constitute the thirteenth Adhisthana, the *samagri*, a concourse or complex of the conditioning factors. They co-operate in engendering, sustaining, perfecting, and causing the fruit to be obtained. On the basis of this Adhisthana is established the Sahakarihetu, which combines Hetus 2–7, from Apeksahetu to Pratiniyamahetu, which are employed in the same tasks of engendering, etc.

9. Virodhahetu and Pratibandha-adhisthana
This fourteenth adhisthana refers to those dharmas which act as obstacles to the generation, sustainment, perfection, and attainment of fruits. On the basis of this Adhisthana is established the Virohahetu, the 'impeding or opposing cause'.

10. Avirodhahetu and Apratibandha-adisthana
This Adhisthana refers to those dharmas which do not act as obstacles to the generation, sustainment, perfection, and attainment of fruits. On the basis of this Adhisthana is established the Avirodhahetu, the 'non-impeding or non-opposing cause'.

2. The Ten Hetus and the Two Hetus

The ten causes (hetus) are comprised in two causes, the generative cause (*janakahetu*) and the secondary cause (*upayahetu*).

There are two masters who explain two texts of the Yogasastra.

1. First master

(1) Bodhisattvabhumi: 'The Bijas that project (*aksepaka*) and those that produce (*abhinirvartaka*) are given the name of "generative cause"; the other causes are comprised in the "secondary cause" '.

The meaning of this text is as follows:

With reference to the six causes, *aksepa* (projecting), *abhinirvrtti* (producing), *avahaka* (adductive), *pratiniyama* (special), *sahakarin* (combining), *avirodha* (non-opposing), all the non-mature Hetupratyaya Bijas present and included therein are called 'projecting Bijas' while all those which are ripe are called 'producing Bijas'. All Bijas comprised in the six causes are either non-mature or mature.

But we know that four of these causes (excluding the projecting and producing ones) contain actual dharmas which engender Bijas and which belong therefore to the 'generative cause' (*janakahetu*).

First opinion. – Although there are actual dharmas in the four causes which produce Bijas and belong to the 'generative cause', nevertheless the formula

或親辦果，亦立種名。如說現行，穀麥等種。

所餘因，謂初二五九，及六因中非因緣法，皆是生熟因緣種餘，故總說爲方便因攝。

非此二種唯屬彼二因，餘四因中有因緣種故。

非唯彼八名所餘因，彼二因亦有非因緣種故。

有尋等地說，生起因是能生因，餘方便攝。

〔述記：第五卷尋伺地文。〕

此文意說六因中現種是因緣者，皆名生起因，能親生起自類果故。

此所餘因，皆方便攝。

非此生起唯屬彼因，餘五因中有因緣故。

非唯彼九名所餘因，彼生起因中有非因緣故。

或菩薩地所說牽引生起種子，卽彼二因，所餘諸因卽彼餘八。

雖二因內有非能生因，而因緣種勝，顯故偏說。

雖餘因內有非方便因，而增上者多，顯故偏說。

of the Bodhisattvabhumi passes over them in silence, because they are subject to many interruptions.

Second opinion. – Inasmuch as those actual dharmas bring to birth their fruits immediately, the formula designates them as Bijas just as one speaks of Bijas of rice, wheat, etc.

As for the dharmas comprised in causes 1, 2, 5 and 9, and those comprised in the six above-mentioned causes which are not Hetupratyaya, being different from non-mature or mature Bijas: we can say, broardly speaking, that they are comprised in the 'secondary cause'.

It would not be correct to state that the two categories of Bijas in question, namely, projecting Bijas and producing Bijas, belong solely to the two causes of the same name, i.e., projecting cause and producing cause, because, in four other causes (*avahaka, pratiniyama, sahakarin* and *avirodhahetu*), we also find Bijas which are *hetupratyaya.*

The eight causes, to the exclusion of *aksepa* (projecting) and *abhinirvrttihetu* (producing), are not the only causes which are designated in the Bodhisattvabhumi as 'the other causes which are secondary (*upayahetu*)': because in the two exclused causes we also find Bijas which are not *hetupratyaya.*

(2) The Yogasastra, 5, (chapter on the Savitarkabhumi), says: 'The producing cause is the generative cause; all the others are comprised in the secondary cause.'

The meaning of this text is as follows:

This name of 'producing cause' (*abhinirvrttihetu*) is given to all those dharmas, whether actual or in Bija-state, which are comprised in the six above-mentioned causes (*aksepa, abhinirvrtti, avahaka, prattiniyama, sahakarin, avirodha*) and which are Hetupratyaya, for the reason that they realize their fruits immediately. The remaining causes are comprised in the 'secondary' category (*upayahetu*).

It would be incorrect to state that the 'producing cause' (*Abhinirvrttihetu*), which is regarded by the Yogasastra as the 'generative cause' (*janakahetu*), is entirely comprised in the *Abhinirvittihetu*, the fourth cause in the list of ten, because, in the five other causes which form with it a group of six in the list, there are also dharmas which are *hetupratyaya.*

Similarly, the nine causes (to the exclusion of the producing one) in the list of ten are not the only causes that are comprised in the secondary category, because the cause excluded also contains dharmas which are not *hetupratyaya.*

2. Second master

(1) The projecting and producing Bijas spoken of in the Bodhisattvabhumi are, in reality, the projecting and producing *causes*, while 'the other causes' refer to the eight other causes.

It is true that these two causes contain dharmas which are not generative; however, in these two, the Bijas which are *hetupratyaya* are capital and manifest. We can therefore, but incorrectly, designate them as 'generative causes'.

The four other causes which form with these two the group of six (*aksepa . . . avirodha*) contain, it is true, dharmas which are not secondary but generative. Nevertheless, the dharmas which are Adhipatipratyaya are numerous and

有尋等地說，生起因是能生因，餘方便者。生起卽是彼生起因，餘因應知卽彼餘九。

雖生起中有非因緣種，而去果近，親顯故偏說。

〔述記：生起之因雖有業種等，非因緣攝，以對牽引因已潤故，是近得果。就自因中名言種子與果同性，以是親顯，故偏說之。〕

雖牽引中亦有因緣種，而去果遠，親隱故不說。

〔述記：雖知菩薩地牽引因亦有因緣種是能生因，而望生起是遠，未被潤故。作惡不卽受故，疏遠故。卽業種顯親，名言種相貌隱，故遂不說其因緣種子，而說業種爲牽引。〕

餘方便攝，準上應知。

三·　四緣依十五處及攝十因二因

所說四緣依何處立？復如何攝十因二因？

論說因緣依種子立，依無間滅立等無間，依境界立所緣，依所餘立增上。

〔述記：此引瑜伽第五顯揚十八皆同。〕

此中種子卽是三，四，十一，十二，十三，十五，六依處中，因緣種攝。

雖現四處亦有因緣，而多間斷，此略不說。

〔述記：但言種子，不說現故。唯除第三四兩依處外，餘四依處亦有現行是因緣者，而多間斷。此略不說是因緣攝，但言種子是因緣故。〕

或彼亦能親辦自果，如外麥等亦立種名。

〔述記：四中現行能爲因緣者，亦是此中種子言攝，親辦自果故。〕

或種子言，唯屬第四。親疏隱顯，取捨如前。

〔述記：此種子言，唯屬十五依處之中第四有潤種子依處，以有種子言故。……不攝習氣中因緣種。〕

manifest. One can therefore, but incorrectly, designate these four as secondary causes.

(2) It is said in the chapter on the Savitarkabhumi of the Yogasastra that the producing cause is the generative cause and the other causes secondary causes. By this producing cause is certainly meant the fourth cause on the list of ten; and by the 'other causes' are meant the nine other causes on the list.

Although the producing cause in this list contains dharmas which are not *hetupratyayas* (for example, the *karmabijas*), nevertheless, one can, incorrectly, designate it as the generative cause, because, being different from the projecting cause, the Bijas in it are moistened and very close to bearing fruit; because the Bijas of 'names and precepts', which are the immediate or 'parent' Bijas, are manifest in it, being of the same species as their fruits.

No doubt the projecting cause contains Bijas that are Hetupratyaya; [and that is why the Bodhisattvabhumi regards this cause as a generative cause]. But all the Bijas it contains are far from giving fruit; the Bijas of names and precepts, which are the parent-Bijas, are hidden in it (while the *karmabijas* in it are manifest). That is why the Yogasastra does not designate the projecting cause as generative cause.

As regards the eight other causes ranged under the secondary category, the same explanation applies as in the above case.

3. The Relations between the Four Pratyayas, the Fifteen Adhisthanas, the Ten Hetus and the Two Hetus

On which Adhisthanas (supporting bases) are the Four Pratyayas established? And how do they comprise the Ten Causes and the Two Causes?

1. The Four Pratyayas and the Fifteen Adhisthanas

According to the Yogasastra, 5, Hetupratyaya (cause) is established on the basis of the Sasnehabijadhisthana, i.e., moistened Bijas; the Samantarapratyaya (antecedent) on the basis of the Anantaraniruddha-adhisthana (5), i.e., the uninterrupted annihilation of the preceding Citta-caittas; the Alambanapratyaya (object) on the basis of the Visya-adhisthana (6), i.e., the object of perception; the Adhipatipratyaya (contributing factor) on the basis of the remaining twelve Adhisthanas.

What is one to understand here by Bijas?

Two opinions on the subject are as follows:

(1) Everything which, in Adhisthanas 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, and 15, is Bija in its essential nature, *hetupratyaya*. No doubt some actual dharmas in Adhisthanas 11, 12, 13 and 15 are Hetupratyaya; but, being often interrupted, they are not relevant in this context; or else they are designated here as Bijas because they produce their fruit immediately, as one speaks of the Bijas of rice, wheat, etc.

(2) By Bijas we should understand only those moistened and fertilized Bijas of the fourth Adhisthana, discarding what is remote and hidden, as explained above.

言無間滅境界處者，應知總顯二緣依處，非唯五六。餘依處中亦有中間二緣義故。

或唯五六。餘處雖有，而少隱故，略不說之。

論說因緣，能生因攝。增上緣性，卽方便因。中間二緣攝受因攝。

〔述記：三十八說。〕

雖方便內具後三緣，而增上多，故此偏說。

餘因亦有中間二緣，然攝受中顯故偏說。

初能生攝，進退如前。

As for the terms *anantaraniruddha* and *visaya*, there are two opinions:

(1) They indicate in a general manner the Adhisthanas of the two Pratyayas in question; they do not designate only Adhisthanas 5 and 6, because the other Adhisthanas also contain dharmas that are Samanantara and Alambanapratyaya.

(2) They designate only Adhisthanas 5 and 6. The dharmas of the other Adhisthanas that are Samanantara and Alambanapratyaya, being scarce and hidden, are omitted.

2. The Four Pratyayas, the Ten and the Two Hetus

According to the Yogasastra, 38, Hetupratyaya is comprised in the 'generative' cause (*janakahetu*); the Adhipatipratyaya is the 'secondary' cause (*upayahetu*); the two other Pratyayas are comprised in the 'complementary' cause (*parigrahahetu*).

Although the secondary cause comprises the last three Pratyayas, nevertheless, in view of the conspicuous place occupied by Adhipatipratyaya, the text states, incorrectly, that it is Adhipatipratyaya.

The complementary cause is not the only cause that is Samanantara and Alambanapratyaya; the other causes also contain these two Pratyayas. But these two Pratyayas are manifest there: hence the incorrect definition in the text.

As regards the inclusion of Hetupratyaya in the generative cause (*janakahetu*), see above.

第三章· 五果

所說因緣必應有果，此果有幾？依何處得？

果有五種。一者異熟，謂有漏善及不善法所招自相續異熟生無記。

〔述記：自相續者簡他及非情。〕

二者等流，謂習善等所引同類，或似先業，後果隨轉。

三者離繫，謂無漏道斷障所證善無爲法。

四者士用，謂諸作者假諸作具所辦事業。

五者增上，謂除前四餘所得果。

果與依處

瑜伽等說，習氣依處得異熟果，隨順依處得等流果，眞見依處得離繫果，士用依處得士用果，所餘依處得增上果。

習氣處言，顯諸依處感異熟果一切功能。

〔述記：顯異熟果十五依處中五依處所得。謂習氣，有潤，差別功能，和合，不障礙，五依處得。……若法作用依處亦得此果，即六依處得也。〕

隨順處言，顯諸依處引等流果一切功能。

§ III. THE FIVE FRUITS

The ten Hetus and the four Pratyayas should have fruits. How many fruits are there and to which Adhisthanas do they refer?

There are five fruits.

1. *Vipakaphala*, the fruit of retribution. – This refers to the non-defined dharmas which are *vipakaja* (that is to say, the eighth consciousness which is really *vipaka* and the seven other consciousnesses when they are vipakaja) and those personal dharmas (as opposed to the dharmas of others and to things in general), which are brought about by impure-good and bad dharmas.

2. *Nisyandaphala*, the similar fruit, i.e., a fruit of the same order. – This refers to the similar dharmas which are brought about through the practice of good, non-defined, and bad deeds; hence a subsequent fruit developing in harmony with an earlier act.

3. *Visamyogaphala*, the fruit of disentanglement or detachment, or freedom from all bonds (Nirvanic fruit). – This refers to the good, 'non-conditioned' dharmas (*asamskrtas*) 'realized' or 'obtained' by the cutting off or removal of the two 'barriers' or obstacles (*avaranas*) as a result of treading the Pure Path.

4. *Purusakaraphala*, the fruit of virile activity or the rewards of moral merit in previous lives. – This refers to the operations (e.g., sowing and harvesting) carried out by various active agents with various kinds of implements.

5. *Adhipatiphala*, the fruits of contributory causes. – This refers to all fruits which can be obtained, pure, impure, etc., and which do not belong to any one of the four preceding categories.

The Fruits and the Adhisthanas

According to the Yogasastra, 5, and the Vikhyapana, 18, the Vipakaphala proceeds from the Vasanahhisthana; the Nisyandaphala, from Anupratipati; the Visamyogaphala, from Tattvadarsana; the Purusakaraphala, from Purusakara; the Adhipatipratyayaphala, from the other Adhisthanas.

There are two interpretations:–

1. According to the first masters:

(1) By Vasanadhisthana we mean all the powers or potentials from which Vipakaphala proceeds, whatever Adhisthanas they refer to: five Adhisthanas, 3, 4, 12, 13 and 15. If we include Purusakara, 9, (part of Parigrahahetu), in the sense of *dharmapurusakara*, we must add it: hence there are six Adhisthanas.

(2) By Anupratipattyadhisthana we mean all the potentials from which

〔述記：顯等流果，即依處中七依所得，謂習氣，有潤，眞實，隨順，差別功能，和合，不障碍，七也。〕

眞見處言，顯諸依處證離繫果一切功能。
〔述記：五依處謂眞見，隨順，差別功能，和合，不障礙。〕

士用處言，顯諸依處招士用果一切功能。
〔述記：即依處中有說五處得，謂領受，士用，作用，和合，不障碍。〕

所餘處言，顯諸依處得增上果一切功能。
〔述記：此即隨前所不攝法，並是此體。〕

不爾，便應太寬太狹。

或習氣者唯屬第三，雖異處因餘處亦有，此處亦有非異熟因。而異熟因去果相遠，習氣亦爾，故此偏說。

隨順唯屬第十一處，雖等流果餘處亦得，此處亦得非等流果，而此因招勝行相顯，隨順亦爾，故偏說之。

眞見處言唯詮第十，雖證離繫餘處亦能，此處亦能得非離繫。而此證離繫，相顯故偏說。

士用處言唯詮第九，雖士用果餘處亦招，此處亦能招增上等。而名相顯，是故偏說。

所餘唯屬餘十一處，雖十一處亦得餘果，招增上果餘

the Nisyandaphala proceeds, whatever Adhisthanas they refer to: seven Adhisthanas, 7, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15; if No. 9 is added, then there are eight.

(3) By Tattvadarsana we mean all the potentials from which the Visamyogaphala proceeds, whatever Adhisthanas they refer to: five Adhisthanas, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 15: if No. 9 is added, then there are six.

(4) By Purusakara are meant all the potentials that create the Purasakaraphala, whatever Adhisthanas they refer to: five Adhisthanas, 2, 8, 9, 13 and 15. If one includes Purusakara in the sense of Dharmapurusaka, then we must add Adhisthanas 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12.

(5) The 'other Adhisthanas' in the definition of Adhipatiphala are four Adhisthanas in their entirety, 1, 6, 7 and 15, and, in the others, all potentials that bring about the Adhipatiphala.

If the subject of the 'five fruits' and their relations with the 'fifteen Adhisthanas' were not treated in this manner, then there would be flaws in the analogies and correspondences, some of which would be too loose and others too restricted.

2. According to the second masters:

(1) The Vasanadhisthana of the Yogasastra is exclusively the third Adhisthana. Although in four other Adhisthanas (4, 12, 13 and 15) we find dharmas which are Vipakahetu, and although in this Adhisthana we find dharmas which are not Vipakahetu (the Bijas of consciousnesses that engender actual consciousnesses), nevertheless, like the Vipakahetu, the Vasanadhisthana is distant from its fruit: we may therefore say, but loosely, that the Vipakaphala is produced by this Adhisthana.

(2) The Anupratipattyadhisthana of the Yogasastra is exclusively the eleventh Adhisthana. Although in seven or eight other Adhisthanas we find dharmas which produce the Nisyandaphala and although in this Adhisthana there are present dharmas which are not Nisyandaphala, nevertheless, like the Nisyandahetu, the Anupratipattyadhisthana produces superior dharmas and its mode of activity is specially manifest. Hence the incorrect definition in the text that this Adhisthana produces the Nisyandaphala.

(3) The Tattvadarsanadhisthana of the Yogasastra is exclusively the tenth Adhisthana. Although we find the Visamyogaphala in other Adhisthanas, four or six of them, and, although in this tenth Adhisthana we find dharmas which are not Visamyogaphala, nevertheless its action in producing the Visamyogaphala is specially manifest. Hence the incorrect definition in the text that it is the cause of Visamyogaphala.

(4) The Purusakaradhisthana of the Yogasastra is exclusively the ninth Adhisthana. Although some other Adhisthanas, four or six of them, also create the purusakaraphala and although this ninth Adhisthana also creates the Adhipatiphala, nevertheless the name and mode of activity of this Adhisthana are clear and manifest. Hence the incorrect definition in the text that it is the cause of the Purusakaraphala.

(5) The 'other Adhisthanas' are exclusively the eleven remaining Adhisthanas. Undoubtedly, they also bear other fruits than the Adhipatiphala (four

處亦能。而此十一多招增上，餘已顯餘，故此偏說。

果因與緣

如是卽說此五果中若異熟果，牽引生起定異同事不相違因，增上緣得。

若等流果，牽引生起攝受引發定異同事不相違因，初後緣得。

若離繫果，攝受引發定異同事不相違因，增上緣得。

若士用果，有義觀待攝受同事不相違因，增上緣得。
〔述記：初師四因得，以士夫爲士用故。〕

有義，觀待牽引生起攝受引發定異同事不相違因，除所緣緣餘三緣得。
〔述記：第二師通法爲士夫，卽八因得。〕

若增上果，十因四緣，一切容得。

傍論已了，應辨正論。

other fruits) and although the four Ádhisthanas, which we have specified as bearing the first four fruits, also bear the Adhipatiphala, nevertheless these eleven bear specially the Adhipatiphala while the other four manifestly bear the first four fruits. Hence the eleven are incorrectly defined as creating Adhipatiphala.

THE FRUITS, HETUS AND PRATYAYAS

Of the five fruits, the Vipakaphala proceeds from five causes, namely, the projecting cause (*aksepa*), the producing cause (*abhinirvrtti*), the special cause (*pratiniyama*), the combining cause (*sahakarin*), and the non-opposing cause (*avirodha*), and also from Adhipatipratyaya.

The Nisyandaphala proceeds from seven causes, namely, the projecting, the producing, the complementary, the adducing, the special, the combining, and the non-opposing causes, and also from Hetupratyaya and Adhipatipratyaya.

The Visamyogaphala proceeds from five causes, namely, the complementary, the adducing, the special, the combining, and the non-opposing causes and also from Adhipatipratyaya.

The Purusakaraphala, for those masters who understand the fruit as the result of human activity, proceeds from four causes, namely, the observing-depending, the complementary, the combining, and the non-opposing causes, and also from Adhipatipratyaya. For those masters who have in mind the 'virile' activity of the dharmas, this fruit proceeds from eight causes, namely, the observing-depending, the projecting, the producing, the complementary, the adducing, the special, the combining and the non-opposing causes, and also from the three Pratyayas to the exclusion of Alambanapratyaya.

The Adhipatiphala proceeds from all the ten causes and all the four Pratyayas.

Now that we have finished the examination of this accessory question, we will return to our main subject.

第四章· 種生與現生

本識中種容作三緣生現分別，除等無間。

〔述記：分別之言通攝心心所若見相分，非唯自體也。〕

謂各親種是彼因緣。

〔述記：一切相見等法皆有此緣而生，無非識種生故。〕

爲所緣緣於能緣者。

〔述記：謂要能緣種心心所法，種子方爲彼所緣緣。除一切相分，相分不能緣故。及除自體分，不緣種故。然見分中除五七識，不緣種故，但與第八一切時見分，第六有時緣者，彼與爲緣。〕

若種於彼，有能助力或不障礙，是增上緣。

〔述記：謂有種子於現行法能助與力，如根種於識種，作意種於識等二。又雖無助力，但不爲障，如異識種子望異現行等。皆是增上緣。〕

生淨現行應知亦爾。

現起分別，展轉相望容作三緣，無因緣故。

謂有情類自他展轉容作二緣，除等無間。

〔述記：謂自他身分別展轉容作二緣,因緣有無前總門中已定除訖,下但於餘三緣中取捨。此除等無間,等無間法唯自一識故。〕

自八識聚展轉相望定有增上緣，必無等無間，所緣緣義或無或有。

〔述記：於四緣中二定無也，謂因緣等無間。〕

八於七有，七於八無，餘七非八所仗質故。

〔述記：此謂第八於餘七識有所緣緣義，七於第八無此緣義。〕

第七於六，五無一有。餘六於彼，一切皆無。

〔述記：第七於餘前之六識，於初五識無此緣義。與一意識爲所緣緣，意緣一切法故。五識無者，不緣七故。前之六識於第七識，並非彼所緣緣，彼不緣六故。〕

第六於五無，餘五於彼有，五識唯託第八相故。

〔述記：其第六識於前五識無此緣義。五識於六有此緣義，五識緣本識所變爲境，不待第六識所變色等爲自境故，有力生識者方爲此緣故。〕

§ IV. CAUSALITY OF BIJAS AND ACTUAL DHARMAS

The Bijas of the root consciousness (Mulavijnana), in the generation of actual 'forms of distinction' (Vikalpas),[1] i.e., all the impure Cittas-Caittas consist of three Pratyayas, to the exclusion of Samanantarapratyaya (antecedent).

1. In reality, every parent-Bija is the Hetupratyaya (cause) of that which proceeds from it. [All dharmas, *nimittabhaga, darsanabhaga,* etc., proceed from Heptupratyaya which is their parent-Bija.]

2. The Bijas are the Alambanapratyaya (object) of the Citta-Caittas which perceive them as their object. [They are always the object of the *darsanabhaga* of the eighth consciousness, sometimes of the *darsanabhaga* of the sixth; never of the *nimittabhaga* nor of the *svasamvittibhaga* of the eighth.]

3. They are the Adhipatipratyaya (contributory factor) of those dharmas in respect of which they are effective, contributory influences or which they do not impede. [The organ-bijas (*indriyabijas*) are effective helping factors in respect of the development of the consciousness-bijas (*vijnanabijas*); the 'attention-bijas' (*manasikarabijas*) are effective helping influences in respect of consciousnesses; the Bija of a certain consciousness does not represent an obstacle to a different consciousness, etc.]

Such is the causality of Bijas in relation to defiled actual Vikalpas (forms of distinction). Their causality in the generation of pure actual Vikalpas is similar.

The actual Vikalpas can, in relation to one another, be three kinds of Pratyaya, because they are never Hetupratyaya.

(1) With reference to various different sentient beings, their Vikalpas may, between themselves, be Alambana and Adhipatipratyaya, but not Samanantarapratyaya.

(2) With reference to a single person, the eight groups of consciousness are, between themselves, neither Hetupratyaya nor Samanantarapratyaya. They are Adhipatipratyaya to one another; they are or are not Alambanapratyaya.

The eighth is the Alambana of the seven others.

The seven are not the Alambana of the eighth, because they are not the archetype on which the eighth is based.

The seventh is not the Alambana of the Five; it is the Alambana of the sixth.

The first six are not the Alambana of the seventh.

The sixth is not the Alambana of the Five; because the Five are based solely on the *nimitta* of the eighth. [They do not take as their object the Rupa developed from the sixth.] The Five are the Alambana of the sixth.

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[1] See definition at the end of this Section.

自類前後，第六容三。餘除所緣，取現境故。

〔述記：餘之七識但有二緣，無因所緣，皆非種子，又不能自緣前念識聚故，唯緣現境故。〕

許五後見緣前相者，五七前後亦有三緣。

〔述記：依陳那觀所緣緣論中說，許五識後念見分緣前念相分。彼論言，或前爲後緣，引彼功能故。〕

前七於八所緣容有，能熏成彼相見種故。

同聚異體展轉相望唯有增上，諸相應法所仗質同，不相緣故。

〔述記：就如一眼識中俱時心心所一一別互相望，雖是同聚而是別體。〕

或依見分說不相緣，依相分說有相緣義，謂諸相分互爲質起，如識中種爲觸等相質。

〔述記：此依因位，佛則不然。〕

不爾，無色彼應無境故。

〔述記：若不爾者，無色界中五種心所應無境故。旣彼有境，故必以本識所變爲質也。〕

設許變色，亦定緣種，勿見分境不同質故。

〔述記：今此後師，設許無色界第八亦變下界之色，五所如本識亦定緣種，勿第八俱六箇見分境不同質故。〕

同體相分爲見二緣。

〔述記：爲見分二緣，謂所緣增上。〕

見分於彼但有增上。

〔述記：見分於境無所緣緣，但有增上。〕

見與自證相望亦爾。

〔述記：謂見與自證，如相與見能爲二緣。自證與見但爲一緣，如前說故。見與第四亦但一緣。此據親義，若疏所緣亦得有之。今約親說，不相違也。〕

(3) With reference to the successive moments of the same species, i.e., the successive moments of the same kind of consciousness, the earlier sixth consciousness, in relation to the later sixth, is Samanantara, Alambana, and Adhipatipratyaya; but the seven other earlier consciousnesses are not Alambana of the later seven, because the seven take only one present object. [Nevertheless Dinaga, in Alambanapariksa: 'or else the *nimitta* of the preceding consciousness is the Pratyaya of the subsequent consciousness . . . '.] There are therefore masters for whom the later *darsanabhaga* of the Five perceive the earlier *nimittabhaga.* For these masters, the earlier moments of the Five and the seventh are therefore three kinds of Pratyaya of the later moments, as is the case with the sixth. Further, according to the same Dignagian principle, the earlier moments of the Seven are Alambana of the eighth, because the Seven create (by perfuming) the Bijas of *nimittabhaga* and *darsanabhaga* of the eighth.

(4) In regard to dharmas of the same group but of different nature, for example, the eye-consciousness and its related mental activities (Caittas), there are two opinions:

a. They are, between themselves, exclusively Adhipatipratyaya. [There is no question of their being Hetupratyaya or Samanantarapratyaya; but are they not Alambanapratyaya? No,] because the associated dharmas do not take each other as their object and, if it is said that they have the same Alambana, it is because the same archetype serves as the supporting basis for their *nimittabhaga.*

b. [According to Dignaga, who is mistaken,] it is *darsanabhaga* regarding which it is stated: 'Citta and its Caittas do not take each other as their object [among the non-Buddhas]'. But Citta and Caittas do take, mutually, their *nimittabhagas* as their objects. The *nimittabhagas* of Citta and Caittas are born by taking each other as archetypes, just as the Bijas of the eighth consciousness are the archetype of the *nimittabhaga* of its five mental associates, mental contact, etc. In fact, if the dharma-Bijas of Mulavijnana were not the archetype for the *nimittabhagas* of the five mental associates, the five would find themselves without an object in the course of an Arupya existence.

Even if it is admitted, with the second masters, that the eighth consciousness of the Arupyadhatu develops into the Rupa of an inferior Dhatu, it is still necessary for the Caittas of this consciousness to have a bearing on the Bijas, because, as noted by the first masters, if it were otherwise the immediate object of the *darsanabhagas* of Citta and the Caittas would not depend on the same archetype.

(5) In regard to an individual consciousness

a. The *nimittabhaga* is Alambanapratyaya and Adhipatipratyaya of the *darsanabhaga.*

b. The *darsanabhaga* is exclusively Adhipatipratyaya of the *nimittabhaga.*

c. The same is true of the relations between the *darsanabhaga* and the *svasamvittibhaga*: the *darsanbhaga* is Alambanapratyaya and Adhipatipratyaya of the *svasamvittibhaga,* while the *svasamvittibhaga* is exclusively the Adhipatipratyaya of the darsanabhaga. [The *darsanabhaga* is only the Adhipratipratyaya of the *svasamvitti-samvittibhaga*; it is also its distant Alambanapratyaya.]

餘二展轉，俱作二緣。

此中不依種相分說，但說現起互爲緣故。

〔述記：然前相分與見爲二緣，不言種子亦爲相分得爲因緣者，此中不依種子爲相分說，以說現行互爲緣故。〕

淨八識聚自他展轉皆有所緣，能徧緣故。

唯除見分非相所緣，相分理無能緣用故。

既現分別緣種現生，種亦理應緣現種起，現種於種能作幾緣？

種必不由中二緣起，待心心所立彼二故。

〔述記：種子必無等無間緣所緣緣起。此之二緣，四緣之中位居中故。以此二緣待心心所爲果，方能生故。種非心等，故非二緣果。〕

現於親種具作二緣，與非親種但爲增上。

〔述記：今依因位。現行望自親所熏種能爲二緣，即因增上。除自種外，但一增上。〕

種望親種亦具二緣，於非親種亦但增上。

依斯內識互爲緣起，分別因果理教皆成。
所執外緣設有無用，況違理教何故執爲？

〔述記：謂依內識若種若現互爲緣起，一切分別若因若果能生所生皆悉成立。汝等小乘所執心外之緣設有無用，況違理教而固執何爲？〕

雖分別言總顯三界心及心所，而隨勝者諸聖教中多門顯示，或說爲二三四五等，如餘論中具廣分別。

〔述記：此言分別唯是有漏心心所，中邊論說虛妄分別謂是三界心心所故，此非執心。然隨勝者聖教多門顯示。〕

d. The last two Bhagas (the *svasamvittibhaga* and the *svasamvittisamvittibhaga*) are, between themselves, Alambanapratyaya and Adhipatipratyaya.

When we say that the *nimittabhaga* is only Alambanapratyaya and Adhipatipratyaya of the *darsanabhaga*, we do not forget that Bijas may form part of the *nimittabhaga* and that they are Hetupratyaya. But we are here concerned solely with the causal relations of the actual dharmas.

(6) The pure eight consciousnesses are Alambanapratyaya of one another, because they are all-perceiving. The same is true of the Bhagas of each of them. We must, however, exclude the *darsanabhaga*, which is not the Alambanapratyaya of the *nimittabhaga*, the latter being deprived of the function of taking an object.

Since the actual Vikalpas are born by reason of the Bijas and the actual Vikalpas, the Bijas should also be born by reason of the actual Vikalpas and the Bijas. What are the causal relations between the actual Vikalpas and the Bijas on the one hand and among the Bijas on the other?

Bijas are not born by reason of the two intermediate Pratyayas, Samanantarapratyaya (antecedent) and Alambanapratyaya (object), because these two Pratyayas are established in dependence upon Cittas and Caittas, which are actual dharmas.

Among non-Buddhas, the actual Vikalpa, in relation to the parent-Bija (or immediate Bija) [that is to say, in relation to the Bija which it creates and perfumes], discharges the function of Hetupratyaya and Adhipatipratyaya; and in relation to the non-immediate Bija, the function of Adhipatipratyaya only.

The Bija which is the anterior moment, in relation to the immediate Bija (i.e., the Bija which it engenders) discharges the function of Hetupratyaya and Adhispatipratyaya; and in relation to the non-immediate Bija, the function of Adhipatipratyaya only.

It is therefore established by both Scripture and Pure Reason that the causal succession of Cittas-Caittas is the result of the functioning of the reciprocal causality of internal dharmas, i.e., consciousnesses, either actual or in a Bija-state. If we suppose that the so-called external Pratyayas of the Lesser Vehicle really exist, then they will serve no purpose. Besides, they are at variance with Pure Reason and the texts. Why, then, do you affirm their existence in such an opinionated manner?

The term Vikalpa (form of distinction), broadly speaking, designates the Cittas-Caittas of the three Dhatus (that is to say, all the impure mental activities). Yet, on account of the importance of certain Vikalpas, the sacred teaching has established various lists: 2, 3, 4, 5 Vikalpas and more. These lists are explained in other treatises.

BOOK VII

SAMSARA AND THE THREE VASANAS

有情生死相續與諸業習氣

有情生死相續與諸業習氣

雖有內識而無外緣，由何有情生死相續？

頌曰：

由諸業習氣，　二取習氣俱，
前異熟旣盡，　復生餘異熟。

第一章・　釋本頌文

第一段釋本頌文

論曰：

諸業謂福非福不動，卽有漏善不善思業。
〔述記：不動者不可改轉義，其業多少住一境界不移動故。……不動者，謂色無色界業。〕
業之眷屬亦立業名。
〔述記：卽五蘊性善不善律儀實業眷屬故餘則可知。〕
同招引滿異熟果故。
此雖纔起無閒卽滅　無義能招當異熟果。
而熏本識起自功能，卽此功能說爲習氣。

是業氣分熏習所成。

簡曾現業，故名習氣。

SAMSARA AND THE THREE VASANAS

ALTHOUGH internal consciousness exists, how, in the absence of external Pratyayas, is one to explain the uninterrupted succession of births and deaths of sentient beings?

The Stanza says:

19

> Owing to the habit-energy (Bijas or vasana) of various previous deeds,
>
> Together with the habit-energy of the two 'Apprehensions' (Grahas),
>
> As previous retribution (karma of previous existences) is exhausted,
>
> Succeeding retribution (maturing in subsequent existences) is produced.

The Treatise says:

§ I. THREE EXPLANATIONS OF THE STANZA

1. First Explanation

1. Habit-energy (Bijas) of various previous deeds (*karmano vasana*):

'Various deeds' refer to those deeds which are meritorious, unmeritorious, and 'non-changing' [i.e., deeds which are performed in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu and which do not change in certain states or situations]. What is involved here are good but impure deeds and bad deeds proceeding from volition (*cetanakarman*).

The term 'deed' also designates the 'relatives' of deeds – that is to say, the five Skandhas simultaneous with them – because, with the deeds, these 'relatives' create or complete the fruit of retribution.

Although the deed perishes immediately after having come to birth and one may not therefore admit that it is capable, by itself, of creating the fruit, nevertheless, this deed impresses on the Mulavijnana the potentials or Bijas which will produce their own fruit. These potentials receive the name of habit-energy or 'perfuming energy' (*vasana*). They are in fact the vapours, the energy, the emanation of the deed; and they are produced by the perfuming or impregnating influence of the act.

The 'habit-energy' doctrine (*vasana*) is opposed to (1) the theory which conceives a past act as productive of the present fruit (Sarvastivadin) and (2)

〔述記：此習氣簡薩婆多等過去有體之曾業也，及簡順世外道說一切果唯現業所得作時卽受。〕

如是習氣展轉相續，至成熟時招異熟果。

此顯當果勝增上緣。

〔述記：此善不善業能感當來若別若總異熟之果，勝增上緣非同性故非親能辨果體生故。〕

相見名色心及心所本末彼取皆二取攝。

〔述記：本末，謂取現果第八識，是諸異熟之根本故名之爲本，餘識中異熟名之爲末是第八識之末果故，卽取二異熟也，謂愛樂執取緣取也。〕

彼所熏發親能生彼本識上功能，名二取習氣。

此顯來世異熟果心及彼相應諸因緣種。

〔述記：以心爲主但言生心，實通五蘊。〕

俱謂業種二取種俱，是疏親緣互相助義。

業招生顯，故頌先說。

前異熟者謂前前生業異熟果。餘異熟者，謂後後生業異熟果。

雖二取種受果無窮，而業習氣受果有盡。由異熟果性別難招，等流增上性同易感。

〔述記：異熟果難招業雖招得謂必異世果方熟也。〕

由感餘生業等種熟，前異熟果受用盡時，復別能生餘

the theory which states that the act produces its fruit at the moment when it is accomplished (Lokayatikas).

These potentials constitute a continuing series right up to the moment when they are ripe. At that moment, the final potential creates the fruit.

This shows that, in much the same way, the deed is the supreme Adhipati-pratyaya, or contributory condition, of the production of the fruit of retribution, whether general or particular; [not the Hetupratyaya, the condition quâ cause, because the fruit, non-defined, is not of the nature of the deed; because it is not immediately engendered by the deed.

2. 'Together with the Habit-energy of the two Apprehensions (Grahas)':

This refers to the two apprehensions or Grahas, i.e., 'concepts', 'conception as *pudgalas* or as *dharmas*'. These include the apprehensions of Nimitta and Darsana, Naman and Rupa, Citta and Caittas, Mula and Vipaka – that is to say, the apprehension of, or adherence to, the 'conceived' division (*grahya*, 'that which is apprehended', object of consciousness) and the 'conceiving' division (*grahaka*, 'that which apprehends', subject of consciousness).

By 'the Vasana (habit-energy) of the two Grahas (apprehensions)' are meant the potentials impressed on the Mulavijnana by the two Grahas and those which are capable of immediately engendering the same two Grahas. [The meaning of *vasana* is therefore double: the potential proceeding from the two Grahas and the potential producing the two Grahas].

This Vasana is the *hetupratyaya*, the causal condition, of the future Citta (the fruit of retribution) and its associates (: in reality, the five Skandhas).

The phrase 'together with' is to show that the Bijas derived from the deeds (*karmabijas*), or distant Pratyaya, and those derived from the two Grahas, or immediate Pratyayas, help each other to produce the future fruit of retribution, i.e., rebirth.

The power of deeds to bring about rebirth is very manifest; that is why Vasubandhu mentions 'various previous deeds' in the first place.

3. 'Previous retribution' and 'Succeeding retribution':

The expression 'previous retribution' refers to the fruit of retribution for deeds in former existences [which fruit must ripen in a certain existence and which, in reality, always includes the retribution of many acts]. The expression 'succeeding retribution' refers to the fruit of retribution for deeds which must ripen in subsequent existences [because the same act brings about retribution in many existences]. As the former is exhausted, the latter is produced.

The Bijas derived from the two Grahas undoubtedly produce fruits *ad infinitum*, fruits of *nisyanda* or efflux; but the habit-energy (*vasana*) derived from deeds exhausts itself by producing its fruit which is the fruit of *vipaka* or retribution. In fact, the fruit of retribution is not of the same nature as its cause; it is difficult to produce, because it is brought about in another existence. The fruit of efflux, on the contrary, is of the same nature as its cause; it is easy to produce.

By reason of the maturity of the Bijas of both categories which produce a

異熟果。

由斯生死輪轉無窮，何假外緣方得相續？

此頌意說，由業二取生死輪廻皆不離識，心心所法爲彼性故。

第二段釋本頌文

復次生死相續由諸習氣，然諸習氣總有三種。

一名言習氣，謂有爲法各別親種。

名言有二，一表義名言，卽能詮義音聲差別。
二顯境名言，卽能了境心心所法。
隨二名言所熏成種作有爲法各別因緣。

二我執習氣，謂虛妄執我我所種。我執有二。
一俱生我執，卽修所斷我我所執。

二分別我執，卽見所斷我我所執。

隨二我執所熏成種，令有情等自他差別。

三有支習氣，謂招三界異熟業種。有支有二，
一有漏善，卽是能招可愛果業，
二諸不善，卽是能招非愛果業。
隨二有支所熏成種，令異熟果善惡趣別。

future existence, when the enjoyment of the fruit of previous retribution is exhausted, a subsequent retributory fruit is engendered.

Consequently the wheel of Samsara, the revolving cycle of birth and death, turns round and round without end. Why, then, is it necessary to suppose the existence of external Pratyayas to explain the continuity of existences?

The meaning of the Stanza is therefore as follows:

'The wheel of Samsara turns by virtue of deeds and the two Grahas; there is nothing here that is separable from consciousness (Cittas-Caittas), because the cause and the effect are, in their essential nature, Cittas-Caittas.'

2. Second Explanation

The continuous procession of births and deaths (Samsara) is due to the operation of various Vasanas – in other words, the Bijas. Vasanas are of three different kinds:

1. *Ming-yen* Vasana, the perfuming energy created by 'names and concepts'. By this are meant the immediate Bijas of each of the conditioned dharmas (Samskrtas).

Names and concepts are of two kinds:

(1) That which expresses the meaning and makes it known to others; a certain kind of vocal sound that is capable of indicating the meaning.

(2) That which reveals or causes the object to be present, that is, the Cittas-Caittas which perceive the object.

The Bijas which, by reason of these two kinds of 'names and concepts', are imprinted on the Mulavijnana (*nimittabhaga*), are the causal condition (*hetupratyaya*) of each of the conditioned dharmas.

2. Vasana of Atman-adhesion (Atmagraha): the Bijas which proceed from the false concept of 'I-and-mine'. Atman-adhesion is of two kinds:

(1) Innate Atman-adhesion [belonging to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses], which is to be cut off by the 'path of meditation and self-cultivation' (*bhavanaheya*).

(2) Atman-adhesion of discrimination or speculation (*vikalpita*), [belonging to the sixth consciousness], which is abandoned or cut off by the 'path of insight into Transcendent Truth' (*darsanaheya*).

The Bijas created and perfumed by these two Atman-adhesions have as a result the distinction between the self and the non-self in relation to sentient beings, etc.

3. Vasana of Bhavanga: the Bijas which proceed from deeds, *karmabijas*, which bring about retribution in the three Dhatus. Bhavanga is of two kinds:

(1) Impure-good deeds which produce agreeable fruits.

(2) Bad deeds which produce disagreeable fruits.

The Bijas created and perfumed by these two Bhavangas have as a result the contrast between the fruits of retribution, i.e., between good and bad destinies.

應知我執有支習氣於差別果是增上緣。

此頌所言業習氣者，應知卽是有支習氣。

二取習氣應知卽是我執名言二種習氣，取我我所及取名言而熏成故皆說名取。

俱等餘文義如前釋。

第三段釋本頌文

復次生死相續由惑業苦。

發業潤生煩惱名惑，能感後有諸業名業，業所引生衆苦名苦。

惑業苦種皆名習氣。

前二習氣與生死苦爲增上緣，助生苦故。

第三習氣望生死苦能作因緣，親生苦故。

頌三習氣如應當知。
〔述記：惑苦種子名爲二取，業種可知。〕

惑苦名取能所取故。
〔述記：惑是能取，染著性故。苦是所取，染所著故。〕

取是著義，業不得名。

俱等餘文義如前釋。

此惑業苦應知總攝十二有支，謂從無明乃至老死，如論廣釋。

It should be understood that Atman-adhesion and Bhavanga Vasanas, in relation to the retributory fruit, are Adhipatipratyaya.

The expression 'habit-energy of deeds' (*Karmavasana*) in the Stanza should be understood as the *bhavangavasana*; the expression 'Vasana of the two adhesions' (Grahas), as the two vasanas of Atman-adhesion and Naman (names and concepts). The term *graha* (apprehension) is used because these two Vasanas are formed as a result of perfuming caused by the 'apprehension' of the 'I-and-mine' and Naman as objects.

The meaning of the rest of the Stanza [explanation of 'together with' (*saha*), etc.] is as explained by the first masters.

3. Third Explanation

The continuous procession of births and deaths (Samsara) is by reason of vexing passions (Klesa), deeds (Karman), and sorrow or suffering (Duhkha).

By vexing passions (Klesa) are meant those afflictions which give rise to deeds and which 'moisten birth'. By deeds (Karman) are meant those acts which bring about re-existence or reincarnation (as opposed to pure acts and non-defined acts). By sorrow or suffering (Duhkha) is meant all the suffering (all that the Aryas consider as painful) that is projected and engendered by deeds.

The Bijas of Klesa-karman-duhkha are all entitled *vasana.*

The *vasanas* of Klesa and Karman (i.e., the Bijas created by Klesa and Karman) are *adhipatipratyaya,* the contributory condition, of the 'suffering of birth and death', because they collaborate in the generation of this suffering. The *vasana* of Duhkha is the *hetupratyaya,* the causal condition, of that suffering, because it engenders it immediately.

The three Vasanas referred to in the Stanza should be understood in the sense explained above, that is to say, the *vasanas* of the two apprehensions (*Grahas*) correspond to those of passion and suffering (Klesa and Duhkha), and the *vasana* of deeds is as already explained.

The Stanza employs the expression 'apprehension' or 'adhesion' for Klesa and Duhkha: it gives the name of *graha* to Klesa because Klesa 'apprehends' (*grahaka*), and to Duhkha because Duhkha is 'apprehended' (*grahya*).

Since the term *graha* signifies apprehending, clinging, and grasping, it cannot be employed as the name for deeds. The Stanza therefore names Karmavasana or habit-energy of deeds in clear language.

The meaning of the rest of the Stanza is as explained above.

It should be understood that Klesa, Karman, and Duhkha (passion-deeds-suffering) are all comprised in the Twelve Angas (branches), which range from ignorance (Avidya) to old age and death as explained in the following section of this Treatise.

第二章· 十二有支

然十二支略攝爲四。

一能引支，謂無明行，能引識等五果種故。

此中無明，唯取能發正感後世善惡業者。

卽彼所發，乃名爲行。

由此一切順現受業別助當業皆非行支。

二所引支，謂本識內親生當來異熟果攝識等五種，是前二支所引發故。

此中識種，謂本識因。除後三因餘因皆是名色種攝，後之三因如名次第卽後三種。

或名色種總攝五因，於中隨勝立餘四種。六處與識總別亦然。

〔述記：於中隨勝立餘四種。執持識勝，生識處勝，觸境觸勝，領納受勝，故別立四。由此六處名爲總攝六識界故，識支是別意界攝。〕

§ II. THE TWELVE ANGAS

Twelve Branches or Links in the Chain of Existence

The twelve Angas or 'links' fall under four categories.[1]

(1) 'Angas that project' (Aksepaka)

These Angas refer to Avidya (ignorance) and the Samskaras (predispositions) which project the Bijas of the five fruits, namely, consciousness (Vijnana), names and forms (Namarupa), the six sense-organs (Sadayatana), contact (Sparsa), and sensation (Vedana).

By *Avidyanga* (ignorance as the first link in the chain of causation) is meant only the Avidya which gives rise to good and bad deeds which directly bring about reincarnation.

Predispositions which have their origin in this Avidya are the Samskaras, i.e., the *Samskaranga* (predisposition link).

It follows from this that neither those deeds which produce a part of the particular recompense of this life, nor those auxiliary and complementary deeds which produce a part of the particular recompense of the life or lives to come, constitute part of this *Samskaranga.*

(2) Angas that are projected (Aksipta)

These Angas refer to the five kinds of Bijas found in the Mulavijnana which, in contradistinction to the Bijas which issue from deeds (*kamabija*), immediately engender five elements of the future existence (the future Vipakaphala), namely, consciousness, names and forms, the sense-organs, contact, and sensation. These Bijas are the five Angas called *Aksipta*, (i.e., Angas that are projected), because they are projected by the Angas of Avidya and Samskaras.

We have therefore: (1) consciousness-bijas, that is to say, the causes of Mulavijnana; (2) Bijas of names and forms, i.e., the causes of the four non-material Skandhas and the Rupaskandhas; (3) Bijas of sense-organs, i.e., the causes of sense-organs; (4) contact-bijas, i.e., the causes of contacts; (5) sensation-bijas, i.e., the causes of sensations.

In other words, the Name-form-bijas include, broadly speaking, the Bijas of the five causes (consciousness, name-form, etc.); and the four other classes of Bijas are established separately to mark out Bijas of specially great importance: [Mulavijnana Bijas that hold and carry, Bijas of the sense-organs that engender sense-awareness, of touch that touches objects and of sensation that feels

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[1] The Twelve Angas (Dvadasangas) are also known as the Twelve Nidanas. They are the twelve links in the chain of causation: (1) Avidya, ignorance, or unenlightenment; (2) Samskara, activity, or predisposition; (3) Vijnana, consciousness; (4) Namarupa, name and form; (5) Sadayatana, the six sense-organs, i.e., eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; (6) Sparsa, contact, touch; (7) Vedana, sensation, feeling; (8) Trsna, craving-thirst, desire; (9) Upadana, laying hold of, grasping; (10) Bhava, being, existence; (11) Jati, birth; (12) Jaramarana, old age and death. The 'classical formula' reads: 'By reason of ignorance, predispositions; by reason of predispositions, consciousness', etc.

釋妨難

集論說識亦是能引，識中業種名識支故。異熟識種名色攝故。

經說識支通能所引，業種識種俱名識故。

〔述記：緣起經上卷說此識支通能所引。〕

識是名色依，非名色攝故。

識等五種由業熏發雖實同時，而依主伴，總別，勝劣，因果，相異，故諸聖教假說前後。

〔述記：謂本識爲主，異熟主故，餘四爲伴，非主異熟助伴生故。就彼四中名色是總，體性寬故，餘三是別，義用狹故。就後三中六處是勝，受等依故，餘二是劣，依處生故。就後二中觸是因勝，能生受故，受是果體，觸所生故。由此五支有如是等就各相異，故諸聖教假說前後體實同時。〕

或依當來現起分位有次第故說有前後。

由斯識等亦說現行，因時定無現行義故。

復由此說生引同時，潤未潤時必不俱故。

三能生支，謂愛取有，近生當來生老死故。

objects.] Similarly, the six sense-organs, in a general way include the six consciousness-Dhatus, while the 'consciousness Angas', in a special way, is the Manodhatu.

Five Remarks

1. According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, consciousness must also be listed among the projecting Angas, (*aksepakas*), partly because the Karmabijas in consciousness are given the name of *vijnananga* (consciousness Angas), and partly because the Vipakavijnana Bijas are comprised in Namarupa (name and form).

2. According to the Sutra (Pratityasamutpadasutra), the *vijnananga* is simultaneously projecting and projected, because the Karmabijas and the Vijnanabijas are both designated by the term 'Vijnana'.

Furthermore, the explanation of the Abhidharma is inadmissible, because Vijnana is the supporting basis for Namarupa, not comprised in Namarupa.

3. Although the creation and perfuming by the various deeds of the Bijas of Vijnana-Namarupa-Sadayatana-Sparsa-Vedana – which are the Angas of this name – are simultaneous, yet the sacred texts teach, incorrectly, that they are successive on account of the difference of their characteristics: Vijnana is the lord (eighth consciousness), the four other Angas are companions; Namarupa is general, the last three Angas are particular; Sadayatana is superior, Sparsa and Vedana are inferior; Sparsa is cause and Vedana is effect.

Alternatively, the Angas are enumerated as successive dharmas, despite the fact that they are Bijas and simultaneous, because, later on, in the state of actual manifestation, when the Bija produces fruit, there is succession between actual Vijnana, actual Namarupa, etc.

4. It is by accepting this last point of view that the texts (Dasabhumi, Abhidharma, Pratityasamutpadasutra) consider the five Angas, from Vijnana to Vedana, as actualities: during the period when they are in the state of cause (Bija), they are definitely not actualities.

5. Furthermore, it is by accepting this point of view that the Pratityasamutpadasutra indicates that projection (aksepa) and generation (*janana*) are simultaneous, for the time when the Bija is moistened and that at which it is not are not simultaneous.[1]

(3) Angas that engender (Janaka).

By this are meant the three Angas, Trsna (craving-thirst, desire), Upadana (grasping), and Bhava (being, existence), because they directly engender future birth, old age and death, i.e., future existence.

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[1] According to the Sutras, the Bija can remain 80,000 Kalpas without giving birth, and in order to give birth it must be moistened by Trsna (thirst, desire or craving). At the moment when it is moistened, an actual dharma is engendered and a future dharma is projected.

謂緣迷內異熟果愚發正能招後有諸業爲緣，引發親生當來生老死位五果種已。

復依迷外增上果愚緣境界受發起貪愛，緣愛復生欲等四取。

〔述記：四取者，謂欲取見取戒取我語取。〕

愛取合潤，能引業種及所引因轉名爲有，俱能近有後有果故。[1]

有處唯說業種名有，此能正感異熟果故。

〔述記：如瑜伽第十說。〕

復有唯說五種名有，親生當來識等種故。

四所生支，謂生老死，是愛取有近所生故。

謂從中有至本有中未衰變來皆生支攝，諸衰變位總名爲老，身壞命終乃名爲死。

老非定有，附死立支。

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[1] 〔述記：受內異熟時由不了內世俗苦故起非福行，苦相麤顯易可了知名世俗苦。不能了內勝義苦故起福不動，人天苦果相非麤顯勝者知苦名勝義苦。爲緣引發名言五種已，雖迷二苦不同總是迷內起業，後受境界時，由不能了所知境故起染受時愛等增長，合前六種轉名爲有，如水潤種種近果生。〕

As a result of the error and delusion respecting the fruit of retribution (the internal Mulavijnana, etc.), there are produced the deeds which will create, in the capacity of Adhipatipratyaya, the future existence, and there are projected the Bijas of the five Angas (Vijnana, etc.) which will produce, in the capacity of Hetupratyaya, 'Birth-Old-Age-Death' of the future existence.

Then, in consequence of the error and delusion respecting external objects (which are Adhipatiphala) and by the force of the sensation of external objects, Trsna or craving-thrist is produced, and, in consequence of Trsna, there are produced the four graspings or clingings (Upadanas), namely, clinging to desire (Kamopadana), clinging to ideas arising from the conception of Atman (Atmavadopadana), clinging to erroneous views (drstyupadana), and clinging to false moral precepts (silavratopadana).

When reunited, Trsna and Upadana 'moisten', on the one hand, the Bijas deriving from deeds which are *aksepaka*, and, on the other, the Bijas of the five Angas, Vijnana, etc., which are *aksipta*. Hence these six categories of Bijas take the name of Bhava (existence), because they are capable of directly producing a future Bhava, a future existence.[1]

According to one text (Yogasastra, 10), only the Bijas derived from deeds are given the name of Bhava, because they are capable of producing directly the fruit of retribution.

According to another text, the name of Bhava must be reserved for the Bijas of the five Angas, consciousness, etc., because these Bijas immediately engender future consciousness, etc.

(4) Angas that are engendered (*Janya*).

By this are meant Birth-Old-Age-Death, *Jati-jaramarana*, because they are directly engendered by the Angas of Thirst-Grasping-Existence (Trsna-Upadana-Bhava).

Birth extends from the commencement of the intermediate existence (*antarabhava*) up to the fundamental existence (Mulabhava, i.e., earthly life) as long as there is no decay. Old age comprises all the stages of decay. Death is the deterioration of the body and the end of life.

Seven Remarks

1. The other Angas are distinct things: why is old age linked with death?

Old age does not definitely and necessarily exist; therefore it is associated with death to form one Anga.

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[1] K'uei Chi – When one experiences the internal Vipaka, by reason of the ignorance of the internal *samvrtidukkha* (mundane suffering), one produces non-meritorious deeds. This *dukkha*, the character of which is crude and easy to understand, is named *samvrtidukkha*. When one is incapable of understanding the internal *paramarthadukkha* (supramundane suffering), one produces meritorious and non-exciting deeds. The nature of the *dukkha* of men and gods is not crude. The *paramas*, i.e., men of sterling excellence, understand this dukkha. Hence the name of *paramathadukkha*.

Subsequently, when one experiences objects, in view of the inability to understand their nature, one produces a defiled sensation; Trsna then increases.

In reality, the delusion respecting the internal mundane suffering also moistens birth. The delusion respecting the external objects also produces deeds.

病何非支？
不徧定故。
老雖不定，徧故立支。
諸界趣生除中夭者，將終皆有衰朽行故。

名色不徧，何故立支？
〔述記：謂色界全欲界化生六處頓起云何有名色？卽是不徧，何故立支？〕

定故立支，胎卵溼生者六處未滿定有名色故。

又名色支亦是徧有，有色化生初受生位雖具五根而未有用，爾時未名六處支故。

初生無色雖定有意根而不明了，未名意處故。

由斯論說十二有支一切一分上二界有。

愛非徧有寧別立支，生惡趣者不愛彼故。

定故別立，不求無有生善趣者定有愛故。

不還潤生愛雖不起，然如彼取定有種故。

又愛亦徧，生惡趣者於現我境亦有愛故。
〔述記：生惡趣者雖彼不愛當生處身，於現我身及現在境亦起愛故，故生惡趣有愛潤生。〕

依無希求惡趣身愛經說非有，非彼全無。
〔述記：緣起上卷依無希求當惡趣身之愛說生惡趣無有愛起，非生彼趣諸愛全無有現愛故。〕

何緣所生立生老死所引別立識等五支？

Why is illness not an Anga?

Because it is not necessary and because it is not universal.

But is old age not necessary?

Undoubtedly not, but it is universal:

Sentient beings of all Dhatus (including the two superior ones), of all destinies, and of all modes of birth, must all experience old age. Excepting the case of premature death, all beings, their organs and consciousness, decay and deteriorate on approaching the end.

2. Namarupa is not universal, [for in the two superior Dhatus (Rupa and Arupya) and in all those '*aupapaduka* beings' of Kamadhatu who are born by transformation, the six *ayatanas* (sense-organs) are produced instantaneously]. Why do you make an Anga of it?

Let us say first of all that it is necessary: because living beings born from wombs, from eggs, from moisture, have Namarupa as long as the six *ayatanas* are incomplete.

But the truth is that Namarupa is universal. The beings of the Rupadhatu and the *aupapadukas* of Kamadhatu, although they possess the five organs from the very beginning, have as yet no use in them (as yet they have no activity). Hence they are not immediately named *ayatana.*

As regards the beings of the Arupyadhatu, although they possess the mental organ (*mana-indriya*) from the very beginning, nevertheless, at first this organ does not perceive and discriminate with clarity. Hence at first it is not named *mana-ayatana.*

This is why the Yogasastra, 10, says, 'The twelve Angas exist at least partially in the two superior Dhatus.'

3. Trsna (desire or craving) is not universal: why do you make an Anga of it? In fact, beings with bad destinies have no ardent desire for their bad existence.

Let us say first of all that Trsna is necessary. To the exclusion of those who aspire to the annihilation of life (liberation from rebirth), the beings with good destinies must necessarily have Trsna. It is true that the Anagamins (non-returning arhats or saints)[1] do not produce Trsna that moistens their rebirth; yet, just as there are inherent in them Bijas of Upadana (grasping for self), there are inherent in them Bijas of Trsna.

But, in reality, Trsna is universal. Even beings with bad destinies have Trsna (love) for their own present bodies and objects. Owing to the fact that they have no Trsna that craves for their sorrowful personality, the Pratityasamatpadasutra says that Trsna is lacking in them, but it is not completely lacking in them.

4. Why is it that the fruit, in so far as it is the 'engendered', i.e., *janya*, is described summarily as two Angas, Birth and Old-Age-Death (*Jati* and *Jaramarana*), whereas there are five Angas (Vijnana, Namarupa, etc.) to designate the same fruit in so far as it is the 'projected', i.e., *aksipta*? Why this difference?

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[1] Anagamin: non-returning Arhat or saint, who will not be reborn in this world but in the Rupa and Arupa heavens, where he will attain to Nirvana.

因位難知差別相故，依當果位別立五支。

謂續生時因識相顯，
〔述記：卽初剎那或說一七日。〕

次根未滿名色相增，
〔述記：卽四七日以前。〕

次根滿時六處明盛，
〔述記：次前名色四七日後五根滿時六處明盛，根相利故。〕

依斯發觸，因觸起受，爾時乃名受果究竟，

依此果位立因爲五。
〔述記：依此當起果位次第立因支爲五，以因眠伏相難知。故此卽因支分五所以。〕

果位易了差別相故，總立二支以顯三苦。

然所生果若在未來爲生厭故說生老死，若至現在爲令了知分位相生說識等五。

何緣發業總立無明，潤業位中別立愛取。

雖諸煩惱皆能發潤而發業位無明力增，以具十一殊勝事故謂所緣等，廣如經說。
〔述記：如緣起說，十一勝者，所緣勝徧緣染淨故。〕

於潤業位愛力偏增，說愛如水能沃潤故。

要數溉灌方生有芽，且依初後分愛取二。

無重發義，立一無明。

雖取支中攝諸煩惱，而愛潤勝說是愛增。

(1) It is difficult to know the special characteristics of the five Angas, consciousness, etc., when they are in the state of Bija or seed. Hence the sacred texts establish five Angas to describe the fruit that is called into existence.

This means that, at the time of reincarnation, the consciousness which existed in a state of Bija or seed becomes manifest (the first moment or the first week). [In other words, consciousness in a state of fruit appears: the activity of the Bijas of consciousness is manifested.]

In the next place, as long as the five organs are not perfect (before the end of the fourth week), Namarupa appears in a state of fruit, growing with the development of the organs.

Later on (after the fourth week), when the organs are perfect, the Sadayatana (six *ayatanas* or organs), which was in a state of Bija, is clear and complete; [it has manifested itself completely as fruit].

By reason of the Sadayatana, Sparsa (contact) manifests itself; by reason of Sparsa, Vedana (sensation) manifests itself. At that time it is said that Vedana, cause, has attained complete maturity of its fruit.

It is by reason of this progressive development of the fruit-states that the five Anga-causes are established.

(2) On the other hand, it is not difficult to know the special characteristics of the fruits. They are all established as two Angas of Birth and Old-Age-Death to indicate the three kinds of suffering: [Birth, old age, and death].

In reality, when one envisages the fruit which will be engendered (*janya*) in future, one describes it in terms of Birth-Old-Age-Death to provoke disgust. When it is envisaged as having arrived at present, then, to facilitate understanding of the complicated birth of the different stages, it is described as the five Angas, i.e., consciousness, etc.

5. With reference to the creation of deeds, only Avidya (ignorance) is established, whereas in that which concerns the moistening of deeds, Trsna (craving) and Upadana (grasping) are established. Why this difference?

Although all klesas are capable of engendering and moistening deeds, nevertheless in what concerns the first operation (creation of deeds), the force of Avidya is dominant, because Avidya possesses eleven particularities. For instance, Avidya has as its object all pure and impure dharmas.

This and the other particularities are as set forth in the Pratityasamutpadasutra.

With reference to the second operation (the moistening of deeds), the force of Trsna is dominant, because it is said that Trsna is capable of fertilizing and moistening like water.

In order that the sprout that is Bhava (existence) can shoot up and grow, the deed-seeds must be watered many times. In order to mark the succession of moistenings, Trsna and Upadana are distinguished as two separate Angas.

As opposed to this, the creation of deeds does not necessitate repetitions: hence Avidya is named as the cause of deeds.

Although Upadana comprises all klesas, yet, Trsna being the principal factor in the moistening process, it is said that Upadana is Trsna on the increase (i.e., in intensified form).

諸緣起支皆依自地，有所發行依他無明，如下無明發上地行。

不爾，初伏下地染者所起上定應非行支，彼地無明猶未起故。

〔述記義演：意云，如身在欲界。初起初禪未至定行支，卽是欲界無明能發。又如初起第二禪中未至定行支，卽由初禪中無明發。〕

從上下地生下上者，彼緣何受而起愛支？

彼愛亦緣當生地受，若現若種，於理無違。

此十二支十因二果定不同世，因中前七與愛取有或異或同，若二三七各定同世。

如是十二一重因果足顯輪轉及離斷常，施設兩重實爲無用，或應過此便致無窮。

〔述記：十因二果但是一重因一果一故，非如小乘二世因二世果二重因果也。〕

諸門解釋

(一) 假實門

此十二支義門別者，九實三假。已潤六支合爲有故，卽識等五三相位別名生等故。

〔述記：假者謂有生老死也。謂爲愛取已所潤行，及識等五支，合前六支轉名有故。所潤六中識等五種至現起時，謂四相中

6. Generally speaking, all the twelve Angas depend on their own Land for manifestation. However, the Samskaras (predispositions or activities) of a superior Land can support themselves on the Avidya of an inferior Land. This is the case when the Avidya of Kamadhatu creates the Samskaras of the Anagamyasamadhi.[1] Otherwise, when one subdues for the first time the impurities of the inferior Land, the Anagamysamadhi obtained would not be *samskaranga*, because the Avidya of the first Dhyana (*muladhyana*) has not yet been produced.

When one changes the Land by being reborn either from a higher Land to a lower one or from a lower Land to a higher one, to which Land – the future Land or the Land which he is inhabiting – does the Vedana belong on the basis of which he produces the Trsna that moistens his birth? Is it necessary to admit that the Vedana of one Land produces the Trsna of another land as is the case with Avidya and the Samskaras?

The Trsna also takes as its object the Vedana of the future Land where he will be reborn – Vedana either actual or in the germinal state.

7. Epoch of different Angas

Among the twelve Angas, the ten that are cause and the two that are fruit are certainly not of the same epoch, i.e., not of the same incarnation.

Among the ten Angas that are causes, the first seven on the one hand and Trsna, Upadana, and Bhava on the other may be of the same epoch or of different epochs.

Between them the first seven, the intermediate three (Trsna, Upadana, Bhava), and the last two are, as far as each group is concerned, certainly of the same epoch.

In this way, the list of twelve Angas, which indicates the cause (i.e., the first ten Angas) in one incarnation and the fruit (i.e., the last two Angas) in the next, is sufficient to show how the wheel of rebirth turns without there being permanence or interruption. It is perfectly useless to suppose with the Lesser Vehicle that the twelve Angas twice indicate the cause (i.e., the cause in two incarnations: Avidya-Samskaras on the one hand and Trsna, etc., on the other), and twice the fruit (i.e., the fruit in two incarnations: Vijnana, etc., on the one hand and Jati, etc., on the other), Alternatively, if it were held that further repetition is necessary, the Angas would be extended, *ad infinitum*, to the past and to the future.

(5) Different Characteristics of the Twelve Angas

1. Realities or existence merely in name

Of the twelve Angas, nine are realities, and three – Bhava (existence), Jati (birth), Jaramarana (old-age-death) – are existent merely in name. In reality, Bhava is nothing else but the synthesis of Samskara and the five Angas, namely, Vijnana, Namarupa, Sadayatana, Sparsa and Vedana, in a moistened and

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[1] Anagamya is the 'meditation of illumination' of the first Dhyana. This meditation is necessarily the effect of the Avidya of Kamadhatu.

顯生異滅三相位別名生老死，體卽識等。故有生老死三是假也。〕

（二） 一事非一事門

五是一事，謂無明識觸受愛五。餘非一事。

〔述記：餘非一事者，行通色心故。〕

（三） 染不染門

三唯是染煩惱性故，七唯不染異熟果故。

〔述記：三唯染，謂無明愛取煩惱性故。七唯不染，謂識等五及生老死異熟性故。〕

七分位中容起染故，假說通二。餘通二種。

〔述記：問，若爾，何故瑜伽第十云三染，餘通二種？容起染故假說通染，非體染故名爲染也。餘通二種者，謂行及有，行通善染有亦通無記故。〕

（四） 獨雜分別門

無明愛取說名獨相，不與餘支相交雜故，餘是雜相。

〔述記：餘是雜相，謂行及識等五轉名有及生等故。〕

（五） 色非色門

六唯非色，謂無明識觸受愛取，餘通二種。

（六，七） 有漏有爲無漏無爲門

皆是有漏唯有爲攝，無漏無爲非有支故。

〔述記：皆有漏有爲，無漏逆生死斷生死，無爲非是緣起義故彼非起故。〕

（八） 三性分別門

無明愛取唯通不善有覆無記。

〔述記：無明欲界唯是不善。愛取欲界亦通不善無記二性，上界此三皆唯無記。〕

行唯善惡，〔述記：行支唯通善惡不通無記，無記不感果故。〕

有通善惡無覆無記，〔述記：有通三性，行等六支合爲有故。〕

餘七唯是無覆無記，〔述記：異熟性故。〕

七分位中亦起善染。

〔述記：大論第十云，四唯雜染餘通染淨，謂無明愛取老死四唯染。〕

fertilized state [moistened by Trsna and Upadana]. Jati and Jaramarana are in reality the five Angas, Vijnana, etc., in the three successive states of birth, change, and annihilation.

2. Single and composite entities

Five of the Angas are, each of them, single entities: Avidya, Vijnana, Sparsa, Vedana and Trsna. The others are non-single composite things: for example, *Samskaranga* comprises Rupa and Citta, and so forth.

3. Defiled and non-defiled Angas

Three of the Angas are defiled, being klesa by nature: Avidya, Trsna, Upadana. Seven are non-defiled, being the fruit of retribution: the five (i.e., consciousness, name and form, the six sense-organs, mental contact, and sensation) and the two (i.e., birth and old-age-death).

Nevertheless, the Yogasastra, 10, teaches that these seven can be defiled or non-defiled, because, in the course of these seven states, defiled dharmas may be produced. This teaching is incorrect. The remaining two Angas, Samskara and Bhava, are defiled and non-defiled.

4. Solitary and combined Angas

Three Angas – Avidya, Trsna, and Upadana – are termed 'solitary' Angas, because they are not combined with the others. The others are 'combined' Angas because they are combined with others. [For example, *Samskaranga* and the five, Vijnana, etc., when assembled, take the name of Bhava and Jati.]

5. Material and non-material Angas

Six Angas are non-material: Avidya, Vijnana, Sparsa, Vedana, Trsna, Upadana. The others are both material and non-material.

6–7. Pure or impure Angas

All the Angas are impure and conditioned, because pure and non-conditioned dharmas are not Bhavanga, the cause of existence.

8. Good, bad, and non-defined Angas

Avidya-Trsna-Upadana are either bad or defiled-non-defined. [Avidya of Kamadhatu, arising from discrimination and speculation, is exclusively bad; Trsna and Upadana may be of two kinds. In the superior Dhatus, the three are non-defined.]

The Samskaras are good or bad. [not non-defined, because the non-defined does not produce fruit].

Bhava is good, bad, or non-defiled-non-defined, [because it comprises the five, Vijnana, etc., and the Samskaras].

The seven other Angas are non-defiled-non-defined, [because they are retribution]. [However, the Yogasastra teaches that, except for Avidya-Trsna-Upandana-Jaramarana, the other Angas are defiled or non-defiled, because] during the seven states, good or defiled dharmas may be produced.

（九） 三界門

雖皆通三界，而有分有全。

〔述記:欲界攝十二全,色無色界攝十二少分。色無色界中無三受等。〕

（十） 能治所治門

上地行支能伏下地，卽麤苦等六種行相，有求上生而起彼故。

〔述記：謂觀下界十二支爲麤苦障，觀上界一切爲靜妙離。〕

（十一） 學等分別門

一切皆唯非學無學，聖者所起有漏善業明爲緣故違有支故非有支攝。

〔述記：有學無學者流轉相違故。〕

由此應知聖必不造感後有業，於後苦果不迷求故。

〔述記：不共無明種已斷故。〕

雜修靜慮，資下故業生淨居等，於理無違。

〔述記：不還果等雜修第四靜慮。資下無雲等三天故業，生淨居等，於理無違。〕

（十二） 三斷門

有義無明唯見所斷，要迷諦理能發行故，聖必不造後有業故。

〔述記：初師，一切發業無明唯見所斷。〕

愛取二支唯修所斷，貪求當有而潤生故，九種命終心

9. Angas in the three Dhatus

All the twelve Angas are found in the three Dhatus, either completely or partially. [Completely in Kamadhatu, partially in the two superior Dhatus, where the three Vedanas, etc., are not manifest.]

10. Six modes of activity

The Samskaranga of a superior Land can 'subdue' that of an inferior Land, because one produces it in aspiring to a superior incarnation. It is a question of the six 'modes of activity', coarseness, suffering, etc., i.e., a question of transcending the lower modes of coarseness, suffering, and obstruction and attaining the higher modes of tranquillity, excellence, and detachment. [In other words, in the course of his meditation the aspirant to Kamadhatu considers the twelve Angas of the inferior Dhatu as coarse, sorrowful and obstructive, and the twelve Angas of the superior Dhatu as calm, excellent and detached.]

11. Saiksa and Asaiksa

The twelve Angas are related neither to the Saiksa nor to the Asaiksa.

[In fact, the dharmas of Saiksa and Asaiksa are opposed to Samsara. They are therefore not *bhavangas*, the causes of existence.]

The good-impure deeds of the Saints, having as they do their creative basis in Wisdom, and being in opposition to the Bavangas, are not comprised in the Bavangas.

It should therefore be understood that the Saints definitely refrain from doing deeds that will bring about reincarnation, because they are neither bewitched by, nor desirous of, the future fruit of suffering. [They have cut off the Bijas of the Avidya *aveniki*.]

But, one asks, are not the deeds which produce birth as an Anagamin[1] in the Suddhavasik Heaven *samskaranga*?

The Anagamins do not do any new deeds. It is by practising the mixed fourth Dhyana and thus utilizing their previous deeds that would lead to incarnation in the three inferior heavens of Rupadhatu that they are born into the Suddhavasikas and the Mahesvarabhuvana.

12. Abandonment

Two opinions

(1) Avidya [, to be exact, *avidyanga* which creates deeds, which in turn create Samskaras,] is exclusively 'abandoned or cut off by insight into Transcendent Truth (*darsanaheya*), because, in order to produce Samskaras, ignorance or erroneous understanding of the Noble Truths is necessary [and this ignorance is cut off by insight into Truth], and because Saints do not indulge in deeds that bring about a future existence.

The two Angas, Trsna and Upadana, are exclusively 'abandoned or cut off by meditation' (*bhavanaheya*), because Trsna that aspires to a future existence

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[1] Anagamin: a non-returning Arhat or saint, who will not be reborn in this world but in the Rupa and Arupa heavens, where he will attain to Nirvana.

俱生愛俱故。餘九皆通見修所斷。

〔述記：對法第五說九種命終心三界三界生，各潤生心各有三故。〕

有義一切皆通二斷，論說預流果已斷一切一分有支無全斷者故。

〔述記：瑜伽第十說。〕

若無明支唯見所斷，寧說預流無全斷者？
若愛取支唯修所斷，寧說彼已斷一切支一分？

又說全界一切煩惱皆能結生。往惡趣行唯分別起煩惱能發。

〔述記：五十九等復說全界一切煩惱皆能結生，結生之言顯潤生惑。復說往惡趣行唯分別起煩惱能發，以見斷煩惱不唯發往惡趣行故。〕

〔述記義演：由愛取潤五果種已令續後生不絕，故名結生。〕

不言潤生唯修所斷，諸感後有行皆見所斷發。

由此故知無明愛取三支亦通見修所斷。

然無明支正發行者唯見所斷助者不定。

〔述記：正發行者唯見所斷，以麤猛故……助者不定，以助發人天總報之業亦通修道故。〕

愛取二支正潤生者唯修所斷，助者不定。

〔述記：正潤生者唯修所斷，以其微細數現行故。〕

又染汙法自性應斷，對治起時彼永斷故。

〔述記：此闇法種與彼無漏明法相違，無漏起時闇種便斷。〕

一切有漏不染汙法非性應斷，不違道故。

〔述記：不染汙法謂善及無覆無記。〕

and moistens rebirth is evidently not cut off by insight into Truth (*darsanaheya*); because the Abhidharma, 5, says that the nine species of 'mind at the moment of death' are all accompanied by innate Trsna. The nine other Angas are *darsanaheya* and *bhavanaheya*, i.e., cut off both by insight into Truth and by meditation.

(2) All Angas are *darsanaheya* and *bhavanaheya*.

Why is Avidya also *bhavanaheya*, and why are Trsna-Upadana also *darsanaheya*?

In reality, according to the Yogasastra, 10; 'The Srotaapanna (disciple who has entered the stream of holy living) has abandoned all Angas partially, not completely.' If Avidya is entirely *darsanaheya*, why is it said that the Srotaapanna has not completely abandoned it? If Trsna-Upadana are abandoned only by the *Bhavana*, not partially abandoned by the *Darsana*, why is it said that the Srotaapanna has partially abandoned them?

Further, according to the Yogasastra, 59: 'Klesas of all Dhatus "tie" or "bind" rebirth (that is to say: moisten rebirth).' [The word 'all' signifies that klesas which moisten rebirth include those that are *darsanaheya* as well as those that are *bhavanaheya*.] Again: 'Samskaras which produce evil destinies can only be provoked by klesas of discrimination and speculation.' [The conclusion from this is that it is the innate klesas that provoke deeds which produce human and divine destinies. Now, while 'speculation' klesas are *darsanaheya*, innate klesas are *bhavanaheya*.] To sum up, the Sastra does not say that klesas moistening birth are only *bhavanaheya*; nor does it say that Samskaras creating re-existence originate only from *darsanaheya klesas*.

From this it should be understood that the three Angas in question – Avidya, Trsna, and Upadana – are both *darsanaheya* and *bhavanaheya*, that is to say, they are cut off both by insight into Truth and by meditation.

In reality, Avidya is exclusively *darsanaheya* [being gross and violent] insofar as, in its principal role, it provokes Samskaras [which are deeds producing evil destinies]. But it is also *bhavanaheya* insofar as, in its secondary and contributory role, it provokes Samskaras [which are considered to be deeds producing human and divine existence].

Conversely, Trsna and Upadana are exclusively *bhavanaheya* [being subtle and fine] insofar as they moisten, as a principal factor, incarnation; they are also *darsanaheya* insofar as they are contributory.

Note on Prahana, 'Cutting off', 'Abandonment', 'Elimination'

One must distinguish defiled dharmas from impure but non-defiled dharmas.

Defiled dharmas must be cut off or abandoned by the attainment of Self-realization when the pure consciousness manifests itself. They are completely cut off when their antithesis is produced, i.e., pure Vidya or transcendental Wisdom.

No impure non-defiled dharmas, i.e., good and non-defiled-non-defined dharmas, are to be cut off by the Path of Self-realization, because they do not contradict the Path and are not contradicted by it.

然有二義說之爲斷，一離縛故，謂斷緣彼雜彼煩惱。二不生故，謂斷彼依令永不起。

依離縛斷，說有漏善無覆無記唯修所斷。

依不生斷，說諸惡趣無想定等唯見所斷。

說十二支通二斷者，於前諸斷如應當知。

〔述記：瑜伽等說。〕

(十三)　三受俱門

十樂捨俱，受不與受共相應故，老死位中多分無樂及客捨故。十一苦俱，非受俱故。

〔述記：非謂第八主捨亦無。〕

(十四)　三苦分別門

十一少分壞苦所攝，老死位中多無樂受，依樂立壞故不說之。

十二少分苦苦所攝，一切支中有苦受故。

十二全分行苦所攝，諸有漏法皆行苦故。依捨受說十一少分，除老死支如壞苦說。

〔述記：約捨受說行苦卽十一少分除老死支，多分無捨故，如壞苦說，前捨受俱行與樂受同故。〕

實義如是，諸聖教中隨彼相增所說不定。

(十五)　四諦門

皆苦諦攝，取蘊性故。五亦集諦攝，業煩惱性故。

Nevertheless, they are the object of a double abandonment: a. abandonment by 'separation of the ties', and b. abandonment by non-production.

a. Abandonment of these dharmas by the separation of ties refers to the cutting off of those klesas which take them as their object or which are connected with them.

b. Abandonment of these dharmas by non-production refers to the cutting off of their supporting basis, as a result of which these dharmas will never be produced.

'Abandonment by separation of ties' signifies that the impure-good and non-defiled-non-defined dharmas are abandoned only by meditation (*bhava*).

'Abandonment by non-production' signifies that the various bad destinies, the Asamjnisamapatti, etc., are abandoned only by insight into Truth (*darsana*).

The Yogasastra teaches that the twelve Angas are cut off by *darsana* and *bhavana*. One should decide, according to the case involved, which kind of cutting is involved.

13. Sensation

Ten Angas can be accompanied by joy and indifference; not the 'sensation Anga' (*vedananga*) which cannot be associated with sensation; and not old-age-death which, as a general rule, is not associated with joy or 'adventitious' indifference, an indifference associated with the first seven consciousnesses as opposed to the non-adventitious indifference which is always associated with the Alayavijnana. Only eleven can be accompanied by sorrow. Vedananga is excluded.

14. The three Sorrows

Eleven Angas are, partially, 'sorrow from deterioration or transformation' – (*viparinamaduhkhata*). Old-age-death is excluded, because it is on the basis of joy that sorrow from deterioration is distinguished, and joy is generally lacking in old-age-death (Jaramaranga).

All the twelve Angas are, partially, 'sorrow sorrow', i.e., 'sorrow consisting of sorrow' (*duhkhaduhkhata*), because, in all of them, there can be painful sensation.

All the twelve are, completely, 'metaphysical sorrow' or 'sorrow of predisposition' (*samskaraduhkhata*), because all impure dharmas belong to this category of sorrow. Of else, if the 'sorrow from deterioration' is established on the basis of agreeable sensation, the 'sorrow-sorrow' on the basis of painful sensation, and 'metaphysical sorrow' on the basis of the sensation of indifference, then it may be said that eleven Angas are, partially, metaphysical sorrow, excluding the 'old-age-death-Anga' as in the preceding case of 'sorrow from deterioration'.

Such is the correct theory. The definitions of the sacred texts differ in accordance with the apparent and predominant characteristics of the various Angas.

15. The Four Noble Truths

All the twelve Angas, being in their essential nature *upadanaskandhas* (skandhas which give rise to grasping or desire), are comprised in the *duhkhasatya*, the

〔述記：行有是業，癡愛取三煩惱性故。〕

（十六）　四緣門

諸支相望增上定有，餘之三緣有無不定。契經依定唯說有一。

〔述記：緣起經唯說有一增上之緣，非遮餘也。〕

愛望於取，有望於生，有因緣義。

〔述記：愛增名取，愛種能生取故。識等五種轉名爲有，所生現行名爲生故，有因緣也。〕

若說識支是業種者，行望於識，亦作因緣。

餘支相望無因緣義。

而集論說無明望行有因緣者，依無明時業習氣說。無明俱故，假說無明，實是行種。

〔述記：集論第四無明望行。有因緣者，依於無明俱時之思業習氣說。〕

瑜伽論說諸支相望無因緣者，依現愛取唯業有說。

〔述記：依現行愛取不依種愛取故，依業種爲有不依識等種有說故。不說有因緣，非相違也。〕

無明望行，愛望於取。生望老死，有餘二緣。

〔述記：增上緣定有，此中更不說，無明望行愛望於取生望老死，此之三支有餘二緣，謂等無閒及所緣緣。〕

有望於生，受望於愛，無等無閒，有所緣緣。

餘支相望，二俱非有。

此中且依鄰近順次不相雜亂實緣起說，異此相望爲緣不定，諸聰慧者如理應思。

〔述記：此中所說前望次後鄰近，非隔越超一超二多等。此依順次非逆次第，依因果前後不相雜亂，各各尅體實緣起而論。不如對法無明望行相雜亂非實緣起說。〕

'Truth of Suffering' (all that the sages recognize as suffering). Five of them, Avidya, Samskaras, Trsna, Upadana, and Bhava, being in their essential nature karman or klesa, are comprised in the *samudayasatya*, the 'Truth of the Production of Suffering'.

16. Causal Relations between the Angas

All Angas are, between themselves, Adhipatipratyaya; they are or are not, between themselves, Hetupratyaya, etc. The Pratityasamutpadasutra, considering the kind of Pratyaya that they necessarily are, only says that they are Adhipatipratyaya; nevertheless it does not for that reason deny that they are Hetupratyaya, etc.

(1) Trsna is Hetupratyaya in relation to Upadana: the same is true of Bhava in relation to Jati. [In reality, Upadara is the intensification of Trsna; the Bijas of Trsna engender Upadana. In reality, the Bijas of the five Angas, Vijnana, etc., change their name to Bhava when they are moistened and fertilized; and, when they have reached the actual state, they are called Jati.]

If, according to the Abhidharma, one thinks that the *vijnananga* carries the Bijas that proceed from deeds, then it may be said that the *samskaranga* (actual deeds) is also Hetupratyaya of the *vijnananga*.

The other Angas are not Hetupratyaya between themselves.

However the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 4, says that Avidya is Hetupratyaya in relation to the Samskaras. In reality, the author intends to speak of the habit-energy (Bijas) of the deed (*cetanakarma-vasana*) which exists at the moment of Avidya; it is designated, incorrectly, by the term 'Avidya' because it is inherent in Avidya. It is in reality the seed (Bija) of *samskaranga*.

On the other hand, according to the Yogasastra, the Angas are not Hetupratyaya between themselves, but only the three other Pratyayas. Here the author is considering the actual Trsna and Upadana (and not Trsna and Upadana as Bijas); he is considering Bhava as being only the Bijas of deeds (and not as being also the Bijas of the five Angas, Vijnana, etc. [This is why he does not explain Trsna as Hetupratyaya of Upadana, and Bhava as Hetupratyaya of Jati.]

(2) Avidya is Samanantara and Alambanapratyaya in relation to the Samskaras. So is Trsna in relation to Upadana, and Jati in relation to Jaramarana. Needless to say, they are also Adhipatipratyaya.

Bhava is not Samanantara but Alambanapratyaya in relation to Jati. So is Vedana in relation to Trsna.

The other Angas are, between themselves, neither Samanantara nor Alambanapratyaya.

(3) We have expounded above the relations between the Angas in considering the real Pratityasamutpada 'Conditioned Genesis' or 'Arising from conditional causation')[1] in the immediate succession of the Angas (without skipping any of them), in their natural order (without going back), and by taking them separately (without mixing them up). When we consider the

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[1] According to the doctrine of Pratityasamutpada, everything arises from conditions, and, not being spontaneous and self-contained, has no separate and independent nature.

（十七） 惑業苦攝支門

惑業苦三攝十二者，無明愛取是惑所攝，行有一分是業所攝，七有一分是苦所攝。

〔述記：行全有一分除識等種是業所攝，識等五生等二七全及有一分中已潤識等五種是苦所攝。〕

有處說業全攝有者，應知彼依業有說故。

〔述記：瑜伽十地等說。〕

有處說識業所攝者，彼說業種爲識支故。

〔述記：對法第四。〕

惑業所招獨名苦者，唯苦諦攝，爲生厭故。

〔述記：彼唯苦諦，非如惑業亦集諦故。〕

〔述記：又爲生厭不起惑業。〕

〔述記義演：非如惑業亦集諦者，意云，此惑業亦通苦諦，亦通集諦攝。〕

由惑業苦卽十二支，故此能令生死相續。

第四段釋本頌文

復次生死相續由內因緣，不待外緣，故唯有識。

因謂有漏無漏二業，正感生死故說爲因。

緣謂煩惱所知二障，助感生死，故說爲緣。

所以者何？

生死有二。

一分段生死，謂諸有漏善不善業，由煩惱障緣助勢力，所感三界麤異熟果。

〔述記：易可見故，易了知故，二乘世間共知有故，名之爲麤。〕

Pratityasamutpada otherwise (as is done in the Tsa-tsi, 4), the causal relations are complex and varied. The wise should ponder upon them in the light of reason.

17. Inclusion of the twelve Angas in *Klesa – Karman – Duhkha*

The three dharmas – Klesa, Karman, and Duhkha – include all the twelve Angas. Klesa includes Avidya-trsna-upadana; Karman includes the Samskaras and a part of Bhava (Bhava to the exclusion of the Bijas which produce the five, from Vijnana to Vedana); Duhkha includes the seven other Angas plus a part of Bhava (that part which consists of the moistened Bijas that produce the five, from Vijnana to Vedana).

Some texts (Yogasastra, Dasabhumi-sutra) say that all of Bhava is included in Karman: they understand by Bhava *karmabhava* only.

The Abhidharma, 4, says that Vijnana is to be classified under Karman: this is because it defines the *vijnananga* as the *Karmabijas* which it contains.

By *duhkha* (suffering) one must understand only those Angas that are created by Klesa-karman, partly because they are included in the Truth of Suffering alone, not in the Truth of Origination, and partly because the object is to provoke disgust so that Klesa-karman may not be produced. [In reality, Klesa-karman themselves are also *duhkha*, but they are at the same time *samudaya* (origination, cause).]

Klesa-karman-duhkha, inasmuch as they are essentially the twelve Angas, are capable of causing the continuity of existence (the recurring cycle of birth and death).

4. The Two Modes of Existence and Fourth Explanation

The continuing process of existence (*samsara*, birth and death) is explained by internal causes and conditions; it does not depend on external conditions. It is therefore Mere-Consciousness (*vijnaptimatra*).

By cause (*hetu*) are meant impure deeds and pure deeds. These two kinds of deeds are called *hetu* because they are the principal factors in the creation of existence.

By condition (*pratyaya*) are meant the two *avaranas* or 'barriers', *klesavarana*, the barrier of vexing passions, and *jneyavarana*, the barrier that obstructs Absolute Knowledge: they help the two kinds of deeds to create existence, and are therefore called *pratyaya*.

How is this possible?

Existence (birth and death) is of two kinds, existence in fragments (i.e., limited existence) and existence by transformation.

1. Limited or fragmentary existence is the coarse[1] fruit of retribution of the three Dhatus (*vipakaphala*: five skandhas), which is created by impure good and bad deeds, which are Hetu, thanks to the auxiliary force of *klesavarana*, which is Pratyaya.

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[1] 'coarse' here means 'easy to perceive', 'easy to know', i.e., visible to worldly beings and the saints of the two Vehicles. (*K'uei Chi*)

身命短長隨因緣力有定齊限，故名分段。

〔述記：以此異熟身命短長或一歲或一日乃至八萬劫等。〕

二不思議變易生死，謂諸無漏有分別業，由所知障緣助勢力，所感殊勝細異熟果。

由悲願力改轉身命無定齊限，故名變易。

無漏定願正所資感妙用難測，名不思議。

或名意成身，隨意願成故。

如契經說，如取爲緣有漏業因續後有者而生三有。如是無明習地爲緣，無漏業因有阿羅漢獨覺已得自在菩薩生三種意成身。

〔述記：意成身名，如勝鬘經說。〕

亦名變化身，無漏定力轉令異本，如變化故。如有論說，聲聞無學永盡後有云何能證無上菩提？依變化身證無上覺非業報身，故不違理。

〔述記：變化身……清淨微妙廣大光潔……此顯揚論第十六說〕

解諸妨難

若所知障助無漏業能感生死，二乘定姓應不永入無餘涅槃。

如諸異生拘煩惱故。

It is called limited or fragmentary existence because it is of short or long duration (a day or 80,000 kalpas) by reason of the force of the Hetu and the Pratyaya; because it includes definite limitations and determinations, such as dimensions of the bodies and the periods of residence in the Dhatus, etc.

2. The second kind of existence, which is called existence by incomprehensible transformation, is the distinguished and subtle fruit of retribution (invisible to worldly beings, the saints of the two Vehicles, etc.), which is created by pure but discriminating deeds which are Hetu, thanks to the auxiliary force of the *jneyavarana*, which is Pratyaya.

(1) It is called existence by transformation because, by the force of compassion (*karuna*: whence the desire of existence for the salvation of sentient creatures) and the vow (*pranidhana*, aspiration for Bodhi or transcendental wisdom), the bodies and the life of the Bodhisattva are transformed: from commonplace they become distinguished; from crude they become subtle; from limited they become unlimited.

This transformation is described as incomprehensible or inconceivable, because it proceeds directly from, and is conditioned by, pure meditation and pure vows, and the transformed body functions in a mysterious, marvellous manner, impenetrable to common people.

(2) Such a body of the Bodhisattva is also called 'spiritual body', *manomayakaya*, because it is constituted in conformity with the vows of Manas.

Manomayakaya is the term employed by the Srimalikasutra: 'Just as, with Upadana (that is to say, with klesa, *klesavarana*) as their condition quâ cause impure deeds bind rebirth and produce existences of the three Dhatus, so, with Avidya-bhumi (i.e., *jneyavarana*) as their condition and pure deeds as their cause, the Arhat, the Pratyekabuddha, and the Bodhisattva who has attained Self-realization and Self-mastery (eighth Bhumi) produce three kinds of *manomayakaya*.'

(3) It is also called transformation-body (*nirmanakaya*), because the power of pure meditation renders the body different from the original body (i.e., the 'limited' body) as if it has undergone a total transformation. As the Sastra (Vikhyapana, 16) says, 'The Sravakas of the *asaiksa* class have completely exhausted rebirth. How can they turn towards Sambodhi and, after long exercises, realize Sambodhi? – They attain supreme enlightenment certainly not with the body which is the retribution of their deeds (*karmavipakakaya*) but with a transformation-body.'

(1) Objections and Difficulties

1. First question. – If Jneyavarana, assisting the pure deeds, produces existence (i.e., birth and death), the saints of the two Vehicles of the 'fixed' class (who cannot become Bodhisattvas) will never enter Nirupadhisesanirvana (Nirvana-without-residue).[1] The same is true of the Prthagjanas who are fettered by their vexing passions (Klesavarana).

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[1] Anupadhisesa is the nirvana state in which there exists no vestige of the karma of suffering.

如何道諦實能感苦？

誰言實感？

不爾如何？

無漏定願資有漏業，令所得果相續長時展轉增勝假說名感。如是感時由所知障爲緣助力，非獨能感。

> 述記：實有漏業感但由無漏資力勝故假得感名，非無漏業實能感苦者。此無漏業如是感時，由所知障爲緣，助此無漏之力，非無漏業獨能感果，明所知障不同煩惱，故次論言。〕

然所知障不障解脫，無能發業潤生用故。

何用資感生死苦爲？

自證菩提，利樂他故。

謂不定姓獨覺聲聞及得自在大願菩薩，已永斷伏煩惱障故無容復受當分段身，恐廢長時修菩薩行，遂以無漏勝定願力如延壽法資現身因令彼長時與果不絕，數數如是定願資助乃至證得無上菩提。

彼復何須所知障助？

既未圓證無相大悲，不執菩提有情實有，無由發起猛利悲願。

Second question. – How can you attribute to pure dharmas (included in the *margasatya*, the Noble Truth of the Way of Deliverance) the real production of suffering, *duhkha*, that is to say, existence which is, by definition, *duhkha-satya?*

Reply to the second question. – Who says that pure dharmas really produce *duhkha?*

Question. – If they do not really produce suffering, why do you use the word 'produce'?

Reply. – The vow or resolution formed in the pure meditation (of the fourth Dhyana) assists the impure deeds in such a way that the series of fruits obtained continues for a long period of time without being cut asunder, increasing and perfecting itself as it progresses. It is in this sense that the word 'produce' is used. It is therefore the impure deeds that produce existence thanks to the co-operating force of pure dharmas. It is only in the metaphorical sense that one attributes production to pure dharmas: it does not mean that pure deeds alone can produce suffering. The truth is that the operation of pure deeds depends on Jneyavarana as a conditioning factor which assists them and heightens their potent force. This does not mean that pure deeds alone can produce fruits.

Reply to the first question. – The Jneyavarana does not constitute an obstacle to deliverance, because it is not in its power to provoke deeds and 'moisten' reincarnation.

2. Why do the saints assist in the production of the suffering of birth and death?

To attain Bodhi for themselves and to work for the benefit and happiness of others.

Neither the Sravakas and Pratyaka-buddhas who change their 'seed nature' or inherited nature (Gotra) to become Bodhisattvas nor the Bodhisattvas who have attained Self-mastery and are inspired by great vows and resolutions need take upon themselves a new limited existence, because they have eternally cut off and subdued their Klesavarana. However, being afraid of wasting the long aeons of time which could be employed in practising the spiritual discipline of Bodhisattvas, they put into operation the force of those great resolutions which have been formed in their 'pure and powerful meditation', and, just as the Arhats conserve their vital energies and so prolong their life on earth, they condition the cause which produces their actual bodies (i.e., their long-past deeds) in such a manner that that cause continues to bear fruit for long periods of time. And thus, over and over again, their samadhi-vows exert their helpful influence right up to the moment when they attain Supreme Enlightenment.

3. Since the long duration of the fruit of past deeds is obtained by the 'conditioning', by pure vows, of the said deeds, why is it necessary for those saints to depend on the assistance of their Jneyavarana?

(1) Since the saints in question have not yet perfectly realized the Animitta (i.e., the Bhutatathata) and attained great compassion (*mahakaruna*), if they did not conceive the Bodhi to be attained and the sentient beings to be

〔述記：旣未成佛圓證無相大悲一味平等之解，若不執菩提可求有情可度爲實有者，無有因由可能發起猛利大悲及猛利願。以所知障可求可度執爲先故。方能發起無漏業故。〕

又所知障障大菩提，爲永斷除留身久住。

又所知障爲有漏依，此障若無彼定非有，故於身住有大助力。

〔述記：問，且如決定姓阿羅漢等留諸壽行，捨衣鉢等入邊際定以修福力資現命業亦得延壽，變易生死有何別耶？〕

若所留身有漏定願所資助者分段身攝，二乘異生所知境故。無漏定願所資助者變易身攝，非彼境故。

〔述記：變易生死非天眼境……設定姓聲聞及不定姓未廻心者，雖有天眼亦不能見。……然廻心以去設預流等亦能見之。〕

由此應知變易生死性是有漏異熟果攝，於無漏業是增上果。

有聖教中說爲無漏出三界者，隨助因說。

〔述記：卽十地云有妙淨土出過三界，十地菩薩當生其中。〕

頌中所言諸業習氣卽前所說二業種子，二取習氣卽前所說二障種子，俱執著故，俱等餘文義如前釋。

變易生死雖無分段前後異熟別盡別生，而數資助前後改轉，亦有前盡餘復生義。

雖亦由現生死相續，而種定有，頌偏說之。

〔述記：頌不說現行所以。雖實亦由諸法現行生死相續，而種子相續一切時有，非如現行多間斷故，頌中偏說種子云由業習氣等。〕

saved as real entities, that is to say, if they were not possessed of Dharmagraha and Jneyavarana, they would not be capable of producing ardent and powerful compassion and resolution.

(2) Furthermore, Jneyavarana represents an obstacle to Mahabodhi. If the saints preserve their bodies for long periods, it is in order to have sufficient time to cut off and annihilate this obstacle for ever and ever.

(3) Furthermore, Jneyavarana is the supporting basis for all impure dharmas. If this *varana* were lacking, the supporting basis would no longer exist. It is therefore a great auxiliary factor in the 'conservation' of the body.

4. [Arhats of the 'fixed' class (who cannot become Bodhisattvas), by virtue of their 'final meditation' (*prantakotika* Dhyana), conserve their vital energies and so prolong their lives. What is the difference between the existence thus conserved and the existence of transformation?]

The body conserved by virtue of impure meditation and impure vows belongs to the 'limited existence', because it is perceived and known by the saints of the two Vehicles and by the Prthagjanas. The body which proceeds from pure meditation and pure vows belongs to the 'existence by transformation', because it is beyond the domain of those saints and the Prthagjanas [even though they possess the divine eye, *divyacaksus*]. (It is visible to the Srotaspannas who have 'turned their mind' towards the Mahayana).

It should therefore be understood that 'existence by transformation' is the fruit of retribution (*vipakaphala*) of impure dharmas and *adhipatiphala* of pure deeds. Certain sacred texts (Dasa-bhumisastra) say that it is pure and transcends the three Dhatus, because they envisage, not its generative cause, but its auxiliary condition.

(2) Fourth Explanation

The expression 'habit-energy of various deeds', *karmavasana*, in the Stanza, refers to the Bijas proceeding from the two categories of deeds, pure and impure, explained in a previous section. As regards the 'habit-energy of the two graspings' (*grahas*), it is the Bijas of the two *avaranas*. These two are given the name of *graha* because they grasp and take. The other words, 'together with' (*saha*), have been explained in a preceding section.

Although in the existence by transformation there is no division into fragments, yet the fragments of retribution succeed each other, and the second is born when the first ends. [There are no successive births as in Samsara.] Nevertheless, there is an end and rebirth since there is progress, i.e., change from earlier to later by reason of the repetition of pure deeds which assist and transform former deeds.

1. The Stanza does not speak of actual dharmas: it speaks of Bijas arising from deeds (*karmavasana*), not of deeds themselves. In fact, although the continuation of the existences is also due to the activity of actual dharmas, yet the latter are frequently interrupted, whereas the Bijas are definitely and always present.

或爲顯示眞異熟因果皆不離本識，故不說現。

現異熟因不卽與果。

轉識間斷，非異熟故。

前中後際生死輪廻，不待外緣旣由內識。

淨法相續應知亦然。
謂無始來依附本識有無漏種，由轉識等數數熏發漸漸增勝，乃至究竟得成佛時，轉捨本來雜染識種轉得始起清淨種識，任持一切功德種子，由本願力盡未來際起諸妙用相續無窮。

由此應知唯有內識。

In other words, if the Stanza does not mention actual dharmas, it is meant to teach that the real cause of Vipaka (i.e., *karmabija*) and the real fruit of Vipaka (*mulavijnana*) are not separate from the Mulavijnana: the actual dharmas are the cause of Vipaka, but are not 'with' the fruit immediately. [It is only later, through the action of the Bijas, that they will have a fruit.] The Pravrttivijnanas, being interrupted, are not really Vipaka (they are *vipakaja*).

Such is the turning of the wheel of Samsara through previous incarnations, the present incarnation, and future incarnations. It does not depend on external conditions. It is all by reason of internal consciousness.

2. The same holds true of the uninterrupted procession of pure dharmas.

By this is meant that, since before the beginning of time, there have existed pure Bijas inherent in the Mulavijnana. Perfumed and developed on innumerable occasions by the actual consciousnesses (*pravrtti-vijnanas*), they gradually increase and become predominant up to the ultimate moment when Buddhahood is attained. Transformed by the abandonment of the original impure Bijas, transformed by the acquisition of newly-developed pure Bijas and pure actual consciousnesses, and supporting and holding the Bijas of all spiritual merits, the Mulavijnana of the Buddha, thanks to the force of his great vows and resolutions, continues its endless manifestation unto eternity: it produces the two bodies of beatitude and continues without ever coming to an end.

Hence there is nothing but internal consciousness manifesting itself in the continuous procession of pure and impure dharmas.

BOOK VIII

THE THREE SVABHAVAS

(THE THREE NATURES)

三 性

三 性

第一章· 釋頌文

若唯有識，何故世尊處處經中說有三性？
應知三性亦不離識。
所以者何？

頌曰：

由彼彼徧計，徧計種種物，
此徧計所執，自性無所有。
依他起自性，分別緣所生，
圓成實於彼，常遠離前性。
故此與依他，非異非不異，
如無常等性，非不見此彼。

THE THREE NATURES

The Three Natures (Svabhavas) of Existence

§ I. DEFINITION OF THE THREE NATURES

How can the doctrine of Mere-Consciousness be reconciled with the doctrine of 'Three Natures' which Bhagavat teaches in many passages of the Sutras?

It should be understood that these three natures are all inseparable from consciousness.

The Stanza says:

20

Because of such and such imaginations,

Such and such things are imagined, [i.e., conceived by the imagination].

What is conceived by this imagination (*parikalpitasvabhava*)

Has no nature of its own.

21

The self-nature which results from dependence on others (*paratantra*)

Consists of discriminations produced by causes and conditions.

The difference between the nature of Ultimate Reality (*parinispanna*) and the nature of dependence on others (*paratantra*)

Is that the former is eternally free from the parikalpita-nature (conception by the imagination) of the latter, that is, the Paratantra (dependence on others for manifestation).

22

Thus, the nature of Ultimate Reality and the nature of dependence on others

Are neither different nor non-different,

Just as impermanence is neither different nor non-different from impermanent dharmas.

One does not perceive the nature of dependence on others (*paratantra*) as long as one has not perceived that of Ultimate Reality (*parinispanna*).

[Translator's Note:

To facilitate understanding of this section of the Treatise, it may be well to quote here what Dr. Daisetz T. Suzuki has written on the Three Svabhavas in his *Introduction to the Lankavatara Sutra:*

'There are three aspects or natures of existence or being, under which all things may be regarded, depending upon the degree of true understanding which we ourselves possess of these things. They are called: (1) nature of imagination-only (*parikalpitasvabhava*), (2) nature of dependence on others for manifestation (*paratantrasvabhava*), (3) nature of Ultimate Reality (*parinispannasvabhava*). These three aspects are generally known as the "Three Natures" or the "Three Svabhavas".

The Three Svabhavas

'Another way of classifying knowledge is known as three Svabhavas in the Lanka. This is a generally recognized classification in all the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. Svabhava means "self-nature" or "self-reality" or "self-substance", the existence of which in some form is popularly accepted. The first form of knowledge by which the reality of things is assumed is called Parikalpita, "imagined", that is, imagination in its ordinary sense. This is an illusion, for things are imagined to exist really where in fact there are none. It is like seeing a mirage which vanishes as one approaches. Imagined (*parikalpita*) objects have, therefore, no objective reality.

'The second form of knowledge by which we examine existence is Paratantra, "depending upon another". This is a kind of scientific knowledge based on analysis. Buddhists make use of this knowledge to disprove the substantiality of individual objects, that is, the *svabhavatva* of things. According to them, there is nothing self-existing in the world, everything depends for its existence on something else, things are universally mutually conditioned, endlessly related to one another. Dissect an object considered final, and it dissolves itself into airy nothingness. Modern scientists declare that existence is no more than mathematical formulae. The Mahayanists would say that there is no Svabhava in anything appealing as such to the Vijnanas when it is examined from the Paratantra point of view.

'The imagined view (*parikalpita*) of reality does not give us a true knowledge of it, and the relativity view (*paratantra*) reduces it into nothingness: if so, where does our boat of enlightenment get anchored? The *Lanka* tells us that there is a third way of viewing existence, called Parinishpana, "perfected", which allows us to become truly acquainted with reality as it is. It is this "perfected" knowledge whereby we are enabled to see really into the nature of existence, to perceive rightly what is meant by Svabhava, and to declare that there is no Svabhava as is imagined by the ignorant and that all is empty (*sunya*).

'Perfect or "perfected" knowledge issues from Prajna, or Aryajnana, or sometimes simply Jnana, seeing into the suchness of things. It perceives things as they are, because going beyond the realm of being and non-being which

一・　徧計所執性

論曰：
周徧計度故名徧計。

品類衆多說爲彼彼，謂能徧計虛妄分別。
卽由彼彼虛妄分別，徧計種種所徧計物。
謂所妄執蘊處界等若法若我自性差別。

此所妄執自性差別總名徧計所執自性。
如是自性都無所有，理教推徵不可得故。

或初句顯能徧計識。
第二句示所徧計境。

belongs to discrimination, the principle of dichotomisation, it dives into the abyss where there are no shadows (*anabhasa*). This is called self-realisation (*svasiddhi*). So the *Lanka* states that, as the wise see reality with their eye of Prajna, they ascertain definitely what it is, i.e., in its self-nature (*bhavasvabhava*) and not as is seen by the ignorant whose eye is never raised beyond the horizon of relativity.

'This is again called seeing into the emptiness of things. Emptiness (*sunyata*), however, does not mean "relativity", as is thought by some scholars. Relativity-emptiness is on the lower plane of knowledge and does not reveal the real view of existence as it is. Emptiness taught in the Mahayana texts goes far deeper into the matter. It is the object of transcendental knowledge. As long as one stays in the world of relativity where logic rules supreme, one cannot have even the remotest idea of true emptiness or what is designated in the *Prajnaparamita* as Mahasunyata. The *Lanka* has also this kind of Sunyata mentioned as one of the seven Emptinesses. Relativity-emptiness so called corresponds to the first of the seven Emptinesses, while the Mahayana Sunyata is Paramarthaaryajnana-mahasunyata, that is, the great void of noble wisdom which is the highest reality.']

The Treatise says:

1. PARIKALPITASVABHAVA

Nature of Mere-Imagination

1. Explanation by Nanda

The first Svabhava is called *p'ien-chi* in Chinese (*parikalpa*), because it is the 'self-nature' of objects that is grasped by *chou-p'ien-chi-tu*, i.e., false imagination in a general manner.

The Parikalpas or false imaginations being of numerous kinds, the text says: 'such and such imaginations'. It signifies that there are a number of false imaginations (*hsu-wang-fen-pi*) which imagine and discriminate falsely. What is imagined (*p'ien-chi*) by these false imaginations is a great variety of imagined objects (*suo-p'ien-chi*), that is to say, the numerous *svabhavas* ['self-natures' or entities], Skandhas, Ayatanas, Dhatus, etc., are falsely conceived (*wang-chi*) as Atman or dharmas.

These multiple entities falsely conceived are designated by one single name: 'nature of mere-imagination', Parikalpitasvabhava. This Svabhava absolutely does not exist, for, on examining it according to the Scriptures and logical reason, one realizes that it does not exist at all.

2. Explanation by Dharmapala

The first pada or line [of Stanza 20] describes the consciousness that imagines (*neng-p'ien-chi*). The second pada describes the object which is imagined by the imaginative consciousness (*suo-p'ien-chi*).

The last two padas say that the self-nature of Atman or dharmas conceived

後半方申徧計所執若我若法自性非有，已廣顯彼不可得故。

初能徧計自性云何？

有義，八識及諸心所有漏攝者皆能徧計。

虛妄分別爲自性故。

皆似所取能取現故。

說阿賴耶以徧計所執自性妄執種爲所緣故。
〔述記：瑜伽第五十一及顯揚等說。〕

有義第六第七心品執我法者是能徧計。

唯說意識能徧計故。
〔述記：攝論第四唯說意識。〕

意及意識名意識故。

計度分別能徧計故。

執我法者必是慧故。
〔述記：非五八識恒與慧俱，寧容有執？〕

二執必與無明俱故。
不說無明有善性故。
〔述記：瑜伽等論皆不說故。〕
癡無癡等不相應故。
不見有執導空智故。
執有執無不俱起故。
〔述記：作我法空觀名曰達無，既有法執名爲執有。如何執有心與達無之智而俱起也。〕
曾無有執非能熏故。
有漏心等不證實故，一切皆名虛妄分別。

or grasped by the imaginative consciousness absolutely does not exist, because we have already sufficiently demonstrated the non-existence, as such, of the Atman and dharmas.

[We shall now examine (1) which consciousnesses can imagine, (2) on which objects the imagination exercises itself, and (3) the opinions of Sthiramati and Dharmapala on the two Bhagas.]

(1) 'Such and such imaginations'

What is the nature of those consciousnesses that can imagine?

There are two opinions:

a. According to Sthiramati, all the eight consciousnesses and their associated attributes (Caittas), as long as they are impure, can imagine. The reasons are as follows:

(a) False imagination and discrimination is the self-nature of all impure consciousnesses.

(b) All impure consciousnesses manifest themselves in the semblance of perceived object and perceiving subject (Grahya and Grahaka).

(c) The Yogasastra, 51, the Vikhyapana, 16, etc., say that the Alayavijnana takes as its object the Bijas of false attachment belonging to the 'nature of mere-imagination'.

b. According to Dharmapala, it is wrong to say that all impure consciousnesses imagine. The ones capable of imagining are the sixth and seventh consciousnesses which conceive or grasp the Atman and dharmas as real existences. The reasons are as follows:

(a) The Samgraha says that the Manovijnana is the only consciousness that imagines.

(b) By Manovijnana are meant both Manovijnana and Manas.

(c) Only Manovijnana with its powers of speculation and discrimination is capable of imagining. [Such powers are lacking in the Alayavijnana and the first five consciousnesses.]

(d) Atman-adhesion (*atmagraha*) and Dharma-adhesion (dharmagraha) presuppose discernment (Prajna), and discernment is lacking in the Alayavijnana and the first Five.

(e) The two clingings or attachments are necessarily accompanied by Avidya (ignorance).

(f) It is said that Avidya cannot be good (Yogasastra).

(g) Moha (delusion) is not associated with Amoha (freedom from delusion) and other good Caittas.

(h) One cannot see that a mind engrossed by attachments and clingings can have as a result the transcendental knowledge of Emptiness (*Sunyatajnana*).

(i) Clinging to existence and realization of Emptiness (non-existence) are not simultaneous.

(j) The eighth consciousness does not perfume; hence it is not involved in clingings to dharmas (*dharmagraha*). [Literally: There is no clinging consciousness which is not capable of perfuming.]

Inasmuch as an impure mind does not directly attain Ultimate Reality, all consciousnesses of the three Dhatus are given the name of 'false imagination

雖似所取能取相現，而非一切能偏計攝。勿無漏心亦有執故。

〔述記：若似二取皆是執者，勿無漏心亦有執故，一切菩薩二乘後得無漏之智有二取相應皆有執。〕

如來後得應有執故。

經說佛智現身土等種種影像如鏡等故。

〔述記：佛地經。〕

若無緣用，應非智等。

雖說藏識緣偏計種，而不說唯，故非誠證。

由斯理趣，唯於第六第七心品有能偏計。

識品雖二，而有二三四五六七八九十等偏計不同，故言彼彼。

〔述記：對法第十二二十八見六十二見等，故此論中言十等也。〕

次所偏計自性云何？

攝大乘說，是依他起，偏計心等所緣緣故。

圓成實性寧非彼境？

眞非妄執所緣境故，依展轉說亦所偏計。

〔述記：彼爲疏所緣緣，非是相分。〕

〔述記義演：謂眞如是依他起之性，依他起旣是所偏計，依展轉說眞如亦是所偏計。〕

偏計所執雖是彼境，而非所緣緣，故非所偏計。

偏計所執其相云何？與依他起復有何別？

有義，三界心及心所由無始來虛妄熏習，雖各體一而似二生，謂見相分，卽能所取。如是二分情有理無，此相說爲偏計所執。

〔述記：諸心心所雖各體是一自證分，而似依他二分而生謂見相分。諸經論中說二取者，是此二也。中邊等說爲計所執

and discrimination'. However, although the impure mind manifests itself as Grahya and Grahaka (seeming perceived object and perceiving subject), it does not follow that all minds that appear as such are capable of falsely imagining the Atman or dharmas. Neither must it be held that a pure or non-defined mind is engrossed by such attachments. [In fact, in this hypothesis, certain pure minds – the minds of the Bodhisattvas and the saints of the two Vehicles – would be tinged with such attachments, because they appear as Grahya and Grahaka.] Then the Subsequent Wisdom of the Tathagata itself would be engrossed by such attachments, because the Buddhabhumi Sutra says that the transcendental wisdom of the Buddha, the Adarsajnana, manifests itself in diverse images of bodies, lands, etc., like images in a mirror. Furthermore, this wisdom would not be wisdom at all if it were not possessed of the faculty of taking objects. [It must have *darsanabhaga* and *nimittabhaga.*]

Although it is definitely said that the Alayavijnana has as its object the Bijas of imaginations, nevertheless, it is not said that this consciousness takes those seeds alone as its object of perception. Therefore, the text is not conclusive.

Conclusion. – Only the sixth and seventh consciousnesses are possessed of the faculty of imagination.

Although there are only two such imaginative consciousnesses, nevertheless imaginations are diversified, so much so that one can count 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and more of them [up to 62 erroneous views]. Hence the Treatise says: 'such and such false imaginations'.

(2) 'Such and such things are imagined.'

What are the things on which imagination exercises itself?

According to the Samgraha, this thing is the Paratantra, or more exactly the *nimittabhaga*, i.e., the image-division of the mind, because this Bhaga is the 'condition quâ object' (*alambanapratyaya*) of the mind that imagines.

But one asks if the Parinispanna is not also in the realm of that mind?

Let us reply that Reality (*tattva*) or Parinispanna is not an object of false conceptions. One can, however, say that Reality is 'the thing on which imagination or false conception exercises itself'; but imagination does not exercise itself directly on Reality. [Reality is the remote Alambanapratyaya of the imagining mind, being the 'true nature' of its direct Alambanapratyaya, i.e., of the Paratantra which is the *nimittabhaga.*]

As regards the Parikalpitasvabhava, although this is the object of imagination or false conception, it is not the direct Alambanapratyaya, 'condition quâ object'.

(3) Difference between Parakalpita and Paratantra

What are the characteristics of Parikalpitasvabhava? What is the difference between this Svabhava and Paratantrasvabhava? There are two opinions.

a. According to Sthiramati: The Citta-caittas of the three Dhatus by reason of false perfuming since before the beginning of time (that is to say, by reason of the Bijas of *pudgalagraha* and *dharmagraha*, etc.) – whatever may be their **unique nature** – manifest themselves in the form of a duality, under two aspects, as (a) *darsanabhaga* or *grahaka*, the perceiving division or subject of perception, and (b) *nimittabhaga* or *grahya*, the perceived division or object

二所依體實託緣生，此性非無名依他起，虛妄分別緣所生故。

云何知然？

諸聖教說，虛妄分別是依他起，二取名爲偏計所執。

有義，一切心及心所由熏習力所變二分從緣生故，亦依他起。偏計依斯妄執定實有無一異俱不俱等，此二方名偏計所執。

〔述記：見相二分因緣生者亦依他起。依此二分妄執定實爲有爲無亦有亦無非有非無，爲一爲異爲俱不俱等。〕
〔述記：安慧等多師並說此義。護法等菩薩方更分別。〕

諸聖教說，唯量，唯二，種種，皆名依他起故。

〔述記：攝大乘論云……唯量者無境故，唯二者有見相故，種種者種種行相而生起故。由有相見得成二種，故見相分是依他起。〕

又相等四法，十一識等，論皆說爲依他起攝故。

〔述記：五法中相等前四，唯除眞如。〕

不爾，無漏後得智品二分應名偏計所執。

〔述記：若諸相分非依他者，佛等無漏後得智品所變二分應名所執。〕

許應聖智不緣彼生，緣彼智品應非道諦。不許應知有漏亦爾。

又若二分是偏計所執，應如兔角等非所緣緣，偏計所執體非有故。

又應二分不熏成種，後識等生應無二分。

又諸習氣是相分攝，豈非有法能作因緣？

若緣所生內相見分非依他起，二所依體例亦應然，無異因故。

由斯理趣，衆緣所生心心所體及相見分有漏無漏皆依他起。依他衆緣而得起故。

of perception. These two Bhagas exist only as a matter of opinion, but do not exist in reason. The Madhyanta declares that they are imaginary (*parikalpita*).

The entity which is their supporting basis, the Svasamvittibhaga, is really born of causes and conditions (*pratyaya*). This *svabhava* is not non-existent. To it is given the name of Paratantra, for it is produced by the Bijas of false imaginations.

How can one assure oneself of the non-existence of the two Bhagas?

By the Scriptures, which teach that false imaginations are Paratantra and that the two conceptions (*grahaka* and *grahya*) are Parikalpita.

b. According to Dharmapala: All Citta-caittas manifest themselves in two Bhagas by the force of perfuming. These two Bhagas, thus manifested, are born of causes and conditions and are Paratantra to the same extent as the Svasamvittibhaga. But imagination conceives false notions of real existence, non-existence, identity, difference, existence plus non-existence, identity plus difference, neither existence nor non-existence, neither identity nor difference: the two Bhagas, conceived under these diverse forms, take the name of Parikalpita.

In fact, the Scripture says that one calls Paratantra: (a) the *pramanamatra* [Only 'that which measures', i.e., 'that which perceives', exists; there is no *prameya*, the measurable or perceivable; (b) the *dvayamatra* [Only the two Bhagas exist; and (c) the diversity (of the two Bhagas).

The Sastras also say that four of the five dharmas, to the exclusion of the fifth (Tathata), the eleven consciousnesses, etc., are comprised in the Paratantra.

(a) If the *nimittabhaga* is not Paratantra, the two Bhagas which are the manifestation of the pure Subsequent Wisdom (*prsthalabdha*) of the Buddha, etc. should be called Parikalpita. If you maintain that these two Bhagas are, in fact Parikalpita, then the pure Subsequent Wisdom should be born without having any bearing on the *nimittabhaga*, because, if it has, it will not be a part of the Noble Path (*aryamarga*). If you admit that the Bhagas of the pure Subsequent Wisdom are not Parikalpita, we can say that the same is the case with the Bhagas of an impure mind.

(b) If the two Bhagas are Parikalpita, then, like the horns of a rabbit, they should not be the condition quâ object (*alambanapratyaya*), since Parikalpita does not exist.

(c) These two Bhagas will not be capable of perfuming to create Bijas, with the result that subsequent consciousnesses, when born, will not have two Bhagas.

(d) The various kinds of habit-energy or Bijas are part of the *nimittabhaga*. They are thus non-existent. How, then, could they be the 'conditions quâ cause' (*hetupratyaya*)?

(e) If the two Bhagas, integrated in the mind, which are born of Bijas, were not Paratantra, then the entity which you recognize as Paratantra, the *samvittibhaga* which is the supporting basis for the two Bhagas, would not be Paratantra either, for there is no reason for this entity to be Paratantra if the two Bhagas are not.

It follows from this that mind with its attributes, including its perceived and

二· 依他起性

頌言分別緣所生者，應知且說染分依他，淨分依他亦圓成故。

〔述記：淨依他不名分別。〕

或諸染淨心心所法皆名分別，能緣慮故，是則一切染淨依他皆是此中依他起攝。

三· 圓成實性

二空所顯圓滿成就諸法實性名圓成實。

顯此偏，常，體非虛謬。

〔述記：由此眞如一者體偏，無處無故，卽是圓滿義。二者體常，非生滅故，卽是成就義。三者體非虛謬，諸法眞理，法實性故。〕

簡自共相虛空我等。

〔述記：偏簡自相，諸法自相局法體故不通於餘，常簡共相諸法無常空無我等。〕

perceiving divisions (the two Bhagas) and its tainted and untainted Bijas, is engendered through numerous conditioning factors, so that it is entirely activated in dependence on other things. The reason is that it becomes activated only in dependence on other multiple factors.

[Translator's Note:
Thus, mind itself, like all things which are a product of mind, becomes activated only in dependence on other factors. Such is the true nature of mind and things alike. By failing to comprehend this true nature, and by clinging to the false belief that these things have a true existence of their own, we fall into the erroneous position of contemplating them with our imagination only. By understanding their true nature, however, we can achieve insight into their 'nature of ultimate reality'. This achievement implies more than mere intellectual understanding, for even when the Vijnaptimatratata of all things is intellectually admitted, it all too often happens that in actual fact we still cling emotionally to the belief that they possess real existence. That is to say, because the dual belief in a subjective Atman or ego and in objective things has been so strongly implanted in our minds, special efforts are required of us emotionally, as well as intellectually, to 'awaken to and enter Vijnaptimatrata.' How should such self-cultivation proceed? According to the present Treatise, it embodies five steps or stages, which will be described in the following section.]

2. PARATANTRASVABHAVA

Nature of Dependence on Others

It should be understood that the definition given in the Stanza whereby 'Paratantra consists of discriminations produced by causes and conditions', refers only to the defiled Paratantra, i.e., the Vikalpa. Pure Paratantra is not, in fact, termed Vikalpa; it is as much Parinispanna as Paratantra.

The second opinion is that all minds and their attributes, whether defiled or pure, are designated in the Stanza by the term *vikalpa,* because they are all capable of apprehending and perceiving objects. Thus, the definition given in the Stanza includes all Paratantras, pure as well as defiled.

3. PARINISPANNASVABHAVA

Ultimate Reality

Parinispanna or Ultimate Reality is the complete and perfect 'real nature' of all dharmas which is revealed by the two 'Voids' (*sunyas*).

The expression *pari-nis-panna* indicates: (1) universality, i.e., the omnipresence ('nowhere is it lacking') of this nature; (2) eternity, i.e., its non-birth-non-destruction; (3) its reality, i.e., its non-falseness. It is different from the 'individual character' of dharmas, which is not universal; from the 'common character', which is not eternal; and from space and the Atman, which are not real.

無漏有爲離倒，究竟，勝用周偏，亦得此名。

然今頌中說初非後。

（述記：淨分依他一非所證，二非法性）

此卽於彼依他起上常遠離前偏計所執二空所顯眞如爲性。

說於彼言，顯圓成實與依他起不卽不離。

常遠離言，顯妄所執能所取性理恆非有。

前言義顯不空依他。

性顯二空非圓成實，眞如離有離無性故。

由前理故，此圓成實與彼依他起非異非不異，異應眞如非彼實性，不異此性應是無常。

彼此俱應淨非淨境，則本後智用應無別。

云何二性非異非一？

如彼無常無我等性。

述記：頌言如無常等性，等取無我及空等

無常等性與行等法異，應彼法非無常等。不異，此應非彼共相。

（述記：若定異者，應彼行法非無常等，如青非黃以是異故　不全異者，無常等此應非彼行等之共相，如色非色共相與色不異故）

由斯喻顯此圓成實與彼依他非一非異，法與法性理必應然，勝義世俗相待有故。

The name Parinispanna is also given to the 'pure conditioned', that is to say, the pure mind, which is Paratantra: this mind in fact is true and real, being free from erroneous understanding; it is perfect and ultimate; it is complete, because its eminent activity is universal. [Because of these three characteristics it is confused with the 'unconditioned' Parinispanna or Tathata.] But the Stanza considers only the first Parinispanna, not the second. [The second, i.e., the 'pure conditioned' is not to be realized and is not the nature of dharmas.]

(1) Parinispanna is eternal freedom from the Parikalpita-nature (first nature) of the Paratantra (second nature). It consists in the Bhutatathata which is revealed through the two *sunyas* (Voids).

The Stanza says: '. . . freedom from the Parikalpita-nature *of* the Paratantra'. The genitive case establishes a relationship between Parinispanna (i.e., freedom from Parikalpita) and Paratantra. It indicates that Parinispanna is neither identical with nor different from Paratantra.

The words 'eternal freedom from Parikalpita' show that the falsely conceived nature of subject and object (*grahaka, grahya*) never exists.

The words 'freedom from Parikalpita, first nature' show that Parinispanna is not empty of (or free from) Paratantra.

The word 'Tathata' shows that the two *sunyas* (Voids) themselves are not Parinispanna. Bhutatathata is that which is *revealed* by the two *sunyas*, not the two *sunyas* themselves. In fact, Tathata is separate from existence and non-existence.

(2) It follows from this that Parinispanna is neither different nor non-different from Paratantra. If it were different, Tathata would not be the real nature of Paratantra. If it were not different, Tathata would not be eternal; Paratantra and Tathata would both be equally pure or impure [: Paratantra would be as pure as Tathata]; there would not be any difference between the fundamental Jnana the object of which is Tathata and the subsequent Jnana the object of which is Paratantra.

(3) How is one to understand that Parinispannasvabhava and Paratantrasvabhava are neither different nor identical?

They are neither different nor identical just as impermanence, emptiness, and egolessness are neither different from nor identical with impermanent, empty, and egoless dharmas. If impermanence were different from the Samskaras (activities),[1] the Samskaras would not be impermanent (as blue is not yellow, because it is different from yellow). On the other hand, if non-different, impermanence would not be the common characteristic of the Samskaras (as *rupa*, colour, is not the common characteristic of *rupas*, because it is not different from *rupas*). This example shows that Parinispanna is neither identical with Paratantra nor different from it. Such is, in fact, the relation of Dharmata, 'nature of dharmas', or Tathata, with dharmas, which are Paratantra: for the Paramartha (the Absolute) and the Samvrti (the relative) mutually support each other.

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[1] Activity implies impermanence.

非不證見此圓成實，而能見彼依他起性。

未達徧計所執性空，不如實知依他有故。

無分別智證眞如已，後得智中方能了達依他起性如幻事等。

〔述記：第五地後及佛能爾。〕

雖無始來心心所法已能緣自相見分等，而我法執恆俱行故，不如實知衆緣所引自心心所虛妄變現。

猶如幻事，陽餤，夢境，鏡像，光影，谷響，水月，變化所成，非有似有。

依如是義故有頌言，非不見眞如，而能了諸行，皆如幻事等，雖有而非眞。

〔述記：此是厚嚴經頌〕

此中意說三種自性皆不遠離心心所法。

謂心心所及所變現衆緣生故，如幻事等非有似有誑惑愚夫，一切皆名依他起性。

愚夫於此橫執我法有無一異俱不俱等，如空華等性相都無，一切皆名徧計所執。

依他起上彼所妄執我法俱空，此空所顯識等眞性名圓成實。

是故此三不離心等。

(4) The Treatise says: 'One does not see the Paratantra as long as one has not seen the Parinispanna.'

When one has not perceived and realized Parinispanna (by a Prajna that discerns immediately), one cannot discern the 'nature of Paratantra', for, not having yet understood that Parikalpita is void (non-existent), one cannot in reality know the manner of existence of Paratantra.

It is only when the non-discriminating wisdom of pure intuition (*nirvikalpakajnana*) has realized Bhutatathata that the Subsequent Wisdom (*prsthalabdhajnana*) is capable [from the fifth Bhumi] of 'penetrating' Paratantra and recognizing it as an illusion.

Although, since before the beginning of time, Citta and Caittas, in their diverse Bhagas, have been capable of perceiving each other, – that is to say, Paratantra, being the mind that perceives, has, since before the beginning of time, been the object of its own perception – , nevertheless, being always accompanied by the conception of Atman and dharmas (*pudgaladharmagraha*), the Citta and Caittas do not in reality know that all things are manifestations falsely evolved by the mind and its attributes under the inducement of numerous conditioning factors. Like the tricks of a conjurer, heat, mirages, the objects of a dream, images in a mirror, reflections of light, echoes in a valley, the moon's reflection in water, or transformations of magical beings, they are not real existences, although they appear to be so. That is what a stanza of the Ghanavyuha says: 'As long as one has not perceived Bhutatathata, one does not know the Samskaras. Like the tricks of a magician, the Samskaras are not real although they seem to exist.

We may conclude that these three 'Natures' (*svabhava*) are all inseparable from the mind and its attributes (Citta-Caittas). That is to say:

a. The mind and its attributes, together with the manifestations produced by it (*darsana* and *nimittabhaga*), are engendered through numerous conditioning factors, and are thus like the phenomena produced by a magician's tricks, which, not really existing though they seem to exist, deceive the ignorant. All this is called the 'nature of dependence on others' (Paratantra).

b. The ignorant thereupon perversely believe in them as Atman and as dharmas, which exist or do not exist, are identical or different, are inclusive or exclusive, etc. But, like 'flowers in the sky', etc., they are non-existent both in inner nature and external aspect. All this is called the 'nature of mere-imagination' (Parikalpita).

c. These things, which are thus dependent on others and are wrongly regarded as Atman and as dharmas, are, in reality, all void (*sunya*). The genuine nature of consciousness thus revealed by this 'voidness' is called the 'nature of ultimate reality' (Parinispanna).

Thus, these three natures are all inseparable from mind, etc.

第二章· 諸門解釋

一· 大無爲相攝門

虛空擇滅非擇滅等，何性攝耶？
三皆容攝。

心等變似虛空等相，隨心生故依他起攝。
愚夫於中妄執實有，此卽徧計所執性攝，
若於眞如假施設有虛空等義，圓成實攝。

有漏心等定屬依他，無漏心等容二性攝，
衆緣生故攝屬依他，無顚倒故圓成實攝。

二· 七眞如相攝門

如是三性與七眞如，云何相攝？

七眞如者，一流轉眞如，謂有爲法流轉實性。

二實相眞如，謂二無我所顯實性。

三唯識眞如，謂染淨法唯識實性。

四安立眞如，謂苦實性。

五邪行眞如，謂集實性。

六清淨眞如，謂滅實性。

§ II. RELATION OF THE THREE NATURES AND THE ASAMSKRTAS, ETC.

1. THE ASAMSKRTAS (UNCONDITIONED NON-ACTIVE DHARMAS) AND THE THREE NATURES[1]

In which Svabhavas are Akasa (space), Pratisamkhyanirodha (discrimination-annihilation), Apratisamkhyanirodha (non-discrimination-annihilation), and the other Asamskrtas comprised?

They are comprised in all the three Svabhavas.

In fact, the mind develops into what seem to be Akasa, etc. Akasa is thus comprised in Paratantra, since it is the *nimitta* of the mind, [a mental image, an idea]. But idiots falsely conceive this *nimitta* as a real entity (*dravysat*): thus conceived, Akasa is Parikalpita. However, if Akasa is regarded as a name for Bhutatathata, then it is Parinispanna. This is also true of the other Asamskrtas.

The impure mind, with these *nimittas*, e.g., Akasa, belongs to Paratantra. The pure mind, with these *nimittas*, belongs simultaneously to Paratantra and Parinispanna: to Paratantra in so far as it is produced by causes and conditions; to Parinispanna in so far as it is free from errors and contrary ideas.

2. THE SEVEN ASPECTS OF BHUTATATHATA AND THE THREE NATURES

What are the relations between the three natures and the seven aspects of Bhutatathata?

The seven aspects of Bhutatathata are as follows:

(1) Pravrttitathata, the Bhutatathata of the flow of transmigration. This means the real nature of the phenomenal dharmas in their transmigratory flow.

(2) Laksanatathata, the Bhutatathata of the two realities. This means the real nature as revealed in the two non-Atmans.

(3) Vijnaptimatratathata, the Bhutatathata of 'Mere-Consciousness'. This means the real nature of the pure and impure dharmas which belong to Mere-Consciousness.

(4) Samnivesatathata, the Bhutatathata of steadfastness. This means the real nature of suffering.

(5) Mithyapratipattitathata, the Bhutatathata of wrong conduct. This means the real nature of origination.

(6) Visuddhitathata, the Bhutatathata of untainted purity. This means the real nature of annihilation (i.e., Nirvana).

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[1] The Hinayana philosophers divide existence into two main groups, Samskrta and Asamskrta. The Samskrta comprises such dharmas as are tied to chains of causation and capable of producing effects, while the Asamskrta exists unconditioned, non-active, free from passions or senses, not subject to cause or dependence, out of time, eternal, supra-mundane. The three dharmas under this head as enumerated by the Sarvastivadins are: *akasa*, space or vacuity; *pratisamkhya-nirodha*, annihilation purposely effected by intellect and will, i.e., Nirvana-Dhatu; *apratisamkhya-nirodha*, annihilation effected without premeditated efforts, a state of pure nothingness due to the want of proper conditions.

七正行眞如，謂道實性。

此七實性圓成實攝，根本後得二智境故。

隨相攝者，流轉苦集三前二性攝，妄執雜染故。餘四皆是圓成實攝。

三· 三性六法相攝門

三性六法，相攝云何？

彼六法中皆具三性，色受想行識及無爲皆有妄執緣生理故。

四· 五事相攝門

三性五事，相攝云何？

五法

諸聖教說相攝不定。

謂或有處說依他起攝彼相名分別正智，圓成實性攝彼眞如，偏計所執不攝五事。
〔述記：初是瑜伽七十四，顯揚第六及第十六說，前四依他，後一圓成實。〕

彼說有漏心心所法變似所詮說名爲相，似能詮現施設爲名，能變心等立爲分別，無漏心等離戲論故但總名正智，不說能所詮，四從緣生，皆依他攝。

或復有處說依他起攝相分別，偏計所執唯攝彼名，正智眞如圓成實攝。
〔述記：舊中邊上卷，新第二說。〕

彼說有漏心及心所相分名相，餘名分別，偏計所執都

(7) Samyakpratipattitathata, the Bhutatathata of right conduct. This means the real nature of the Path [to enlightenment or Nirvana].

These seven true natures are included in Parinispanna, being the object of the two pure wisdoms, the Fundamental Wisdom and the Subsequent Wisdom. But, taking into account their distinctive features or 'characteristics' (*laksana*), the first, the fourth, and the fifth are comprised in the first two natures, because it is a question of imaginary dharmas (Parikalpita) and dharmas that defile (*samklesa*) (Paratantra). The remaining four are Parinispanna.

3. THE SIX DHARMAS AND THE THREE NATURES

What are the relations between the three natures and the 'six dharmas'?

The six dharmas are Rupa (form, matter), Vedana (sensation), Samjna (conception), Samskara (predisposition), Vijnana (consciousness), and Asamskrtas (unconditioned non-active dharmas). All of them belong to the three natures, because, if one understands by Asamskrtas the mind manifesting itself in images of Asamskrtas, they can all be falsely conceived; they are all born of causes and conditions; they all have Tathata as their true nature.

4. THE FIVE OBJECTS AND THE THREE NATURES

What are the relations between the three natures and the 'five objects'?

It is necessary to distinguish two lists of five objects: the five dharmas and the five Laksanas.

(1) The five dharmas or categories: *nimitta* (appearance), *naman* (name). *vikalpa* (discrimination), *samyakjnana* (right knowledge) and *Tathata* (state of Suchness).

The sacred texts do not present a very concerted system and do not attribute the same meaning to many of these terms.

a. According to the Yogasastra, 74, and the Vikhyapana, 6 and 16, none of the five dharmas are Parikalpita; the Nimitta, Naman, Vikalpa and Samyakjnana are Paratantra; Tathata is Parinispanna.

From the above thesis it will be understood that impure Cittas and Caittas manifest themselves in the form of 'expressed things', which take the name of Nimitta (appearance). They also manifest themselves as the 'act of expression', which is designated as Naman (name). On the other hand, the Cittas and Caittas which thus manifest themselves are Vikalpa (discrimination). Finally, the pure Cittas and Caittas are, broadly speaking, termed Samyakjnana (right knowledge), because they are free from all frivolous or unreal discourses: they are, in fact, neither things expressed nor the act of expression. These four dharmas (i.e., the Nimitta, Naman, Vikalpa, and Samyakjnana), born of causes and conditions, are Paratantra.

b. According to the Madhyantavibbaga, Nimitta and Vikalpa are Paratantra; Naman is Parikalpita; the Samyakjnana and Tathata are Parinispanna.

What is here understood by Nimitta is the nimittabhaga of the impure Cittas-caittas. The other three Bhagas of the Cittas-caittas are Vikalpa. These two – Nimitta and Vikalpa – are Paratantra. As regards the Parikalpita, it has

無體故，爲顯非有假設爲名，二無倒故圓成實攝。

或有處說依他起性唯攝分別，偏計所執攝彼相名，正智眞如圓成實攝。

〔述記：十卷楞伽第七，五法品說　〕

彼說有漏心及心所相見分等總名分別，虛妄分別爲自性故，偏計所執能詮所詮隨情立爲名相二事。

〔述記：偏計所執相名二事者，卽隨能計依他之心假立所執而爲相名。〕

復有處說名屬依他起性，義屬偏計所執。

〔述記：世親攝論第五卷文。〕

彼說有漏心心所法相見分等由名勢力成所偏計，故說爲名。

〔述記：此是依他起性心心所法，由名能詮勢分力故，隨能詮名緣之起執成所偏計，故說依他是名所攝。〕

偏計所執隨名橫計，體實非有，假立義名。

諸聖教中所說五事文雖有異，而義無違。

然初所說不相離亂，如瑜伽論廣說應知。

五相

又聖教中說有五相，此與三性相攝云何？

〔述記：五相者一所詮，二能詮，三相屬，四執著，五不執著

所詮能詮各具三性，謂妄所計屬初性攝。

相名分別隨其所應所詮能詮屬依他起。

〔述記：前五事中相名分別三事之中，取分別全相名少分是所詮相，由名亦所詮故　相名少分是能詮相，由名亦相故。今此三法隨其所應所詮能詮屬依他起，唯說染分依他起故

眞如正智隨其所應所詮能詮屬圓成實，後得變似能詮相故。

〔述記：眞如全正智少分是所詮相，正智少分是能詮相　〕

二相屬相唯初性攝，妄執義名定相屬故。

〔述記：第三能詮所詮二相屬相唯計所執，妄計名之與義定相屬故。〕

no reality; to indicate its unreality, it is metaphorically designated as Naman. The last two dharmas are comprised in Parinispanna, for they are free from errors and contrary ideas.

c. According to the Lankavatara, only Vikalpa is comprised in Paratantra; Nimitta and Naman are comprised in Parikalpita, and Samyakjnana and Tathata are comprised in Parinispanna.

In this system, all the Bhagas (nimitta, darsana, etc.) of the impure Cittas-caittas are generally named Vikalpa, because false imagination is the self-nature of these Cittas-caittas; and these Cittas-caittas are Paratantra. The 'act of expression' and the 'things expressed' which are Parikalpita, are named Naman and Nimitta respectively.

d. According to the Samgraha, Naman belongs to Paratantra while the thing expressed belongs to Parikalpita.

The name Naman is here given to the Bhagas (*nimitta, darsana*, etc.) of the impure Cittas-caittas, because it is by the force of Naman that these Cittas-caittas create Parikalpita. These Bhagas are evidently Paratantra.

The name of 'things expressed' is metaphorically given to Parikalpita. It is a question of things which, in harmony with their names, are falsely imagined as being real while they are not.

Let us note that, although the definitions of the five dharmas are different, there is nevertheless no contradiction between the theses. The characteristics of the five dharmas described in the first explanation are clearly distinct, as the Yogasastra explains at length.

(2) The five Laksanas (characteristic features)

It is taught in the holy Scriptures that there are five Laksanas or characteristic features. How are these related with the three Svabhavas?

The five Laksanas are: a. things expressed; b. the act of expression; c. the relation falsely conceived between the things expressed and the act of expression; d. grasping and attachment; e. non-grasping and non-attachment.

a and b. The things expressed and the act of expression are of three natures. The dharmas expressed and the names which express, when falsely conceived as Atman and real dharmas, are Parikalpita.

The first three dharmas in the list of five – Nimitta, Naman, and Vikalpa – are either 'things expressed' or 'the act of expression'. [All Vikalpa, a part of Nimitta, and a part of Naman are things expressed, because Naman is also a thing expressed. A part of Nimitta and a part of Naman belong to the act of expression, because Naman is also Nimitta . . . K'uei Chi]. These three dharmas are Paratantra. (Here what is envisaged is the defiled Paratantra).

Bhutatathata and Samyakjnana, the fourth and fifth dharmas in the list of five, are either the things expressed or the act of expression. [Bhutatathata in its entirety and a part of Samyakjnana are 'things expressed'. A part of Samyakjnana is 'the act of expression'], because the 'subsequent' Samyakjnana manifests itself as the semblance of an 'expression' Laksana. These two dharmas are Parinispanna.

c. The third Laksana, namely, the relation falsely conceived between the thing and the name, is Parikalpita, because here the thing and the name are falsely conceived as being related with each other.

彼執著相唯依他起，虛妄分別爲自性故。

不執著相唯圓成實，無漏智等爲自性故。

〔述記：無漏二智及俱行品相見分等及無爲法圓成性故，不執著相是此性攝。〕

五· 四眞實相攝門

又聖教中說四眞實，與此三性相攝云何？

世閒道理所成眞實依他起攝，三事攝故。

二障淨智所行眞實圓成實攝，二事攝故。

〔述記：顯揚六說，謂諸世間於諸事中由串習所得悟入智見，共施設世俗性。乃至略說者，謂此是此地等非彼水等。〕

辯中邊論說初眞實唯初性攝，共所執故，第二眞實通屬三性，理通執無執雜染清淨故，後二眞實唯屬第三。

〔述記：第二眞實卽道理，是三性所攝。道理之法通執無執，執中有所能執，所執是初性，能執是染依他。無執中通雜染及清淨，雜染是依他，清淨是成實。〕

六· 四諦相攝門

三性四諦，相攝云何？

四中一一皆具三性。

且苦諦中無常等四各有三性。無常三者，一無性無常，性常無故。二起盡無常，有生滅故。三垢淨無常，位轉變故。

〔述記：無性無常以體性常無，卽初性也。垢淨無常實是後性。〕

d. The fourth Laksana, grasping and attachment in Paratantra, is a matter of false imaginations which cling to things and names.

e. The fifth Laksana, non-grasping and non-attachment, is Parinispanna. It consists of pure wisdom, etc., [that is to say, the Fundamental Wisdom and the Subsequent Wisdom with their Bhagas and unconditioned non-active dharmas].

5. THE FOUR TATTVAS (REALITIES) AND THE THREE NATURES

Again, the holy Scriptures teach the four realities (*tattvas*). How are these related to the three natures?

The four realities are as follows:

(1) The reality recognized by the world in general [i.e., empirical truth, or traditional names: 'This is land, not water', for instance];

(2) The reality established on the basis of evidence or by logical reason.

These two are included in Paratantra, because they are comprised in the first three of the five dharmas, namely, Nimitta, Naman, and Vikalpa.

(3) The reality discerned by the pure wisdom freed from Klesavarana [i.e., the Four Noble Truths];

(4) The reality discerned by the pure wisdom freed from both Klesavarana and Jneyavarana [i.e., Bhutatathata].

These two are comprised in Parinispanna, because they are comprised in the last two of the five dharmas, namely, Samyakjnana and Bhutatathata.

According to the Madhyanta, the first reality, [although Paratantra by nature], is comprised in the first Svabhava, i.e., Parikalpita, because the world, in general, adheres to it as it does to Atman and dharmas.

As regards the second reality, it belongs to all the three Svabhavas, because the dharmas which constitute this reality are either adhesive or non-adhesive. Being adhesive, they are either 'objects of adhesion', and therefore Parikalpita, or 'that which adheres', and therefore defiled Paratantra. Being non-adhesive, they are either defiled and therefore Paratantra, or pure, and therefore Parinispanna.

As for the last two realities, they are exclusively Parinispanna.

6. THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS (SATYRS) AND THE THREE NATURES

What are the relations between the three natures and the four Noble Truths?

The three natures are related to all the four Noble Truths.

(1) The Noble Truth of Suffering (*duhkhasatyr*) can be examined under four aspects, impermanence, etc., and each aspect is related to all the three natures.

a. Impermanence (*anityata*) is of three kinds:

(a) Impermanence by non-existence, because its self-nature is always non-existent: this is Parikalpita.

(b) Impermanence of its beginning and ending, because it is born and perishes: this is Paratantra.

(c) Impermanence of its states of purity and impurity, because of the modification of its state: this is Parinispanna.

b. Suffering (*duhkhata*) is of three kinds:

苦有三者，一所取苦，我法二執所依取故。二事相苦，三苦相故。三和合苦，苦相合故。

〔述記：一所取苦，爲我及法二能執心之所取故。二事相苦，三苦爲相故。（義演：有爲有漏實是苦諦。）三和合苦，苦相合故，謂卽眞如與一切有漏有爲苦相合故名苦。〕

空有三者，一無性空，性非有故。二異性空，與妄所執自性異故。三自性空，二空所顯爲自性故。

無我三者，一無相無我，我相無故。二異相無我，與妄所執我相異故。三自相無我，無我所顯爲自相故。

集諦三者，一習氣集，謂偏計所執自性執習氣，執彼習氣假立彼名。

〔述記：執彼我法之習氣體是依他，從所因爲名假立偏計所執〕

二等起集，謂業煩惱。

〔述記：平等而起故，煩惱起業業起果故。〕

三未離繫集，謂未離障眞如。

滅諦三者，一自性滅，自性不生故。二二取滅，謂擇滅二取不生故。三本性滅，謂眞如故。

(a) Suffering in so far as it is conceived, because, then, it is the object of the mind that adheres to Atman and dharmas. This is Parikalpita.

(b) Suffering in so far as it is related to conditioned and impure dharmas, because its 'characteristic feature' is triple pain. This is Paratantra.

(c) Suffering in so far as it is the result of association, because Bhutatathata is associated with all that is impure and conditioned and therefore characterized by suffering. This is Parinispanna.

c. Emptiness (*sunyata*) is of three kinds:

(a) Emptiness through non-existence: Parikalpita, which does not exist in any circumstance.

(b) Emptiness by the fact of being different in nature: Paratantra, because it is different from that which it is imagined to be.

(c) Emptiness in itself: Parinispanna, because its self-nature is revealed by the two Voids.

d. Non-existence of the Atman (*nairatmya*) is of three kinds.

(a) Non-existence of Atman without characteristics: Parikalpita, because the characteristics of Atman are non-existent.

(b) Non-existence of the Atman with different characteristics: Paratantra, because it is different from the characteristics of Atman which are falsely imputed to it.

(c) Non-existence of the Atman with self-characteristics: Parinispanna, because its own character is revealed by the two *nairatmyas* of Pudgala and Dharmas.

(2) The Noble Truth of the Cause of Suffering (*samudayasatyr*)

The three natures corresponding to the Noble Truth of the Cause of Suffering can be examined under three aspects:

a. Bijas as cause. This refers to the habit-energy (Vasana, Bijas) which proceeds from adherence to Parikalpitasvabhava. This Vasana is Paratantra. It may however be considered as Parikalpita: (a) by reason of its cause, which is the imaginary Atman and dharmas; (b) by reason of its fruit, which is the mind that adheres to the imaginary Atman and dharmas.

b. Equal and mutual generation as cause. This refers to Karman (deeds) and Klesa (vexing passions), which are Paratantra. Klesa and Karman arise together on the basis of equality and in dependence upon each other. Klesa gives rise to Karman, and Karman gives rise to fruit.

c. Non-separation from the trammels of the Avaranas as the cause. This means that Tathata, as long as it is not separated from the Avaranas, can be regarded as cause. This is Parinispanna.

(3) The Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering (*nirodhasatyr*)

The three natures corresponding to the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering can be examined under three aspects:

a. Cessation or annihilation of self-nature: Parikalpita, because, in its essential nature, it does not come into being.

b. Annihilation of the two 'Graspings' or apprehensions, This refers to the Pratisamkhyanirodha (Nivana as a result of the annihilation of discrimination), because the two Grahas of subject and object are not born. This is Paratantra.

道諦三者，一徧知道，能知徧計所執故。二永斷道，能斷依他起故。三作證道，能證圓成實故。

然徧知道，亦通後二。

七三三性，如次配釋。今於此中所配三性或假或實，如理應知。

七· 三解脱相攝門

三解脱門所行境界，與此三性相攝云何？

理實皆通，隨相各一，空無願相如次應知。

緣此復生三無生忍，一本性無生忍，二自然無生忍，三惑苦無生忍，如次此三是彼境故。

〔述記：徧計所執本體無生，依他緣起無自然生，證圓成時惑苦不起，是名三種無生忍別。〕

八· 二法相攝門

此三云何攝彼二諦？

應知世俗具此三種，勝義唯是圓成實性。

世俗有三，一假世俗，二行世俗，三顯了世俗，如次應知卽此三性。

〔述記義演：有漏遷流名行。〕

〔述記：顯了世俗謂二空爲門顯眞如。〕

c. Annihilation of the Root-nature: Parinispanna, because it is Tathata.

(4) The Noble Truth of The Path to the Cessation of Suffering (*margasatya*)

The three natures corresponding to the Noble Truth of the Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering can, likewise, be examined under three aspects:

a. The 'all-knowing Path'. This path is Parikalpita because it is capable of knowing or recognizing Parikalpita.

b. The Path that cuts off eternally: Paratantra, because it is capable of cutting off Paratantra.

c. The Self-realization Path: Parinispanna, because it is capable of realizing the Parinispanna.

In truth, the 'all-knowing Path' also corresponds to the last two natures.

The four Noble Truths have been considered under the aspect of these seven triads (four triads for the Truth of suffering and one for each of the three other Truths), and their correspondences with the three natures have been explained. These correspondences are real or fictitious according to the case in question.

7. THE OBJECTS OF THE THREE LIBERATIONS AND THE THREE NATURES

What are the relations between the objects of the three liberations and the three natures?

The three liberations are: (1) liberation through emptiness, (2) liberation through the absence of desires and aspirations, and (3) liberation through the absence of characteristics. These three liberations correspond, in reality, to all the three natures. However, according to the principal characteristic of each of them, they correspond respectively to the three natures.

It is in relation to the three natures that the three 'realizations of the absence of birth' (Anutpattikaksantis), are produced. The first is the realization of the non-birth of the self-nature: Parikalpita, because Parikalpita is absolutely not born; the second is that of the non-birth of the root-nature: Paratantra, because Paratantra is not born by itself; the third is that of the non-birth of klesa and suffering: Parinispanna, because, when Parinispanna is realized, Klesa and suffering are no longer born. These three natures are respectively the objects of the three realizations.

8. THE TWO TRUTHS AND THE THREE NATURES

How do the Two Truths, Samvrtisatyr and Paramarthasatyr, correspond to the three natures?

The meaning is that Samvrtisatyr (mundane truth) is Parikalpita, Paratantra, and Parinispanna, while Paramarthasatyr (ultimate supramundane truth) is exclusively Parinispanna.

(1) Samvrti is of three kinds: a. Prajnaptisamvrti, i.e., fictitious or conventional mundane truth; b. Prattipatisamvrti, i.e., impure, mutable mundane truth; c. Udbhavanasamvrti, i.e., mundane truth that reveals Tathata through the two Voids. These three kinds correspond, in the right order, to the three natures, Parikalpitasvabhava etc.

勝義有三，一義勝義，謂眞如，勝之義故。二得勝義，謂涅槃，勝即義故。三行勝義，謂聖道，勝爲義故。無變無倒，隨其所應，故皆攝在圓成實性。

〔述記：前二無變不生滅故，第三無倒，隨其所應皆圓成實。〕

九・　凡聖智境門

如是三性，何智所行？

偏計所執都非智所行，以無自體，非所緣緣故。愚夫執有，聖者達無，亦得說爲凡聖智境。依他起性二智所行，圓成實性唯聖智境。

十・　假實門

此三性中幾假幾實？偏計所執妄安立故可說爲假，無體相故非假非實。

依他起性有實有假，聚集相續分位性故說爲假有，心心所色從緣生故說爲實有。若無實法，假法亦無，假依實因而施設故。

〔述記：此第二性有實有假。假有三種，一聚集假，如瓶盆有情等是聚集法，多法一時所集成故，能集成雖實，所成是假　二相續假者，如過未等世，唯有因果是相續性，多法多時上立一假法。如佛說言昔者鹿王今我身是。所依五蘊刹那滅者雖體是實，於此多法相續假立一有情至今猶在故。三分位假者，如不相應行是分位性故皆是假。〕

圓成實性唯是實有，不依他緣而施設故。

(2) Paramartha is also of three kinds:

a. Arthaparamartha, which is Tathata, because the latter is the *artha* of *parama*, i.e., the object of supreme wisdom; b. Praptiparamartha, which is Nirvana, because the latter is the *parama artha*, i.e., the supreme thing; c. Pratipattiparamartha, which is the Noble Path, because the latter has *parama* as artha (object), i.e., the supreme Dharma, Nirvana. All these three kinds are included in Parinispanna: the first two, because they are immutable; the third because it is non-erroneous.

9. THE TWO WISDOMS AND THE THREE NATURES

To what knowledge or wisdom (*jnana*) do the three natures correspond?

Parikalpitasvabhava does not belong to the realm of any branch of knowledge, neither of the knowledge of the Prthagjanas nor of that of the Aryas, because it has no reality (*svabhava*) and cannot therefore be a 'condition quâ object' (*alambanapratyaya*). Nevertheless, idiots believe that it exists, while saints understand that it does not: it may therefore be said that it is the object of the knowledge of Prthagjanas and Aryas.

Paratantrasvabhava belongs to the realm of both branches of knowledge (Prthagjanas and Aryas).

As regards Parinispannasvabhava, it is the object of the wisdom of Aryas alone.

10. THE THREE NATURES AND THE TWO MODES OF EXISTENCE: EXISTENCE AS DESIGNATION AND REAL EXISTENCE

Of the three natures, how many exist as designation, i.e., in name only, and how many really exist?

Parikalpitasvabhava, being established by false opinions, can be said to exist as designation only. But, since it has no substance, one can say that it exists neither as designation nor as reality ('neither false nor real').

Paratantrasvabhava exists both as reality and as designation. It exists as designation for three reasons:

(1) Complexes or combinations, e.g., pitchers, plates, etc., which consist in the union of numerous real dharmas, do not exist in themselves and are not real;

(2) Continuous series, which consist of numerous dharmas which were real in the past and which will be real for all time, are only conventionally established as a unity;

(3) Viprayuktasamskaras are only states of certain realities, e.g., the visibility of Rupa, etc.

But Cittas-Caittas-Rupas are born of causes (*pratyayas*); it is therefore said of them that they have real existence. If no real dharmas exist, dharmas of designation will not exist either. There can only be designation in relation to a reality which is the cause thereof.

Parinispannasvabhava alone has a real existence, because it does not depend on causes.

十一· 三性對辨異不異門

此三爲異，爲不異耶？

應說俱非，無別體故，妄執緣起眞義別故。

〔述記：若言異者，無別體故，謂妄所執名初，非離依他別有初性體，若彼有體，可說異故。圓成實性是依他之實性。不可說三性異也。非不異者，妄執是初性，緣起是第二性，眞義是第三性，旣此三別，不可言非不異。〕

如是三性義類無邊，恐厭繁文，略示綱要。

11. DIFFERENCE OR NON-DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE THREE NATURES

Are the three natures different or non-different?

What we can say is that they are neither different nor non-different. They are not different, [because Parikalpita is not separate from Paratantra and because Parinispanna is the real substance of Paratantra. In a word,] because they have no separate selves. They are not non-different because false conceptions, which are born from causes and conditions (i.e., the contingent), and the real thing are distinct.

The three natures can be examined from many other points of view. Fearing that this dissertation may be too lengthy and elaborate, we have pointed out just a few general principles.

第三章· 三無性

若有三性，如何世尊說一切法皆無自性？

頌曰：

卽依此三性，　立彼三無性，
故佛密意說，　一切法無性。
初卽相無性，　次無自然性，
後由遠離前，　所執我法性。
此諸法勝義，　亦卽是眞如，
常如其性故，　卽唯識實性。

§ III. THE THREE NATURES AND THE THREE NIHSVABHAVATAS

If there are three natures, why does Bhagavat teach that 'all dharmas are without self-nature?' In other words, if dharmas exist in three ways, as Parikalpita, Paratantra, and Parinispanna, why does Bhagavat teach that they are empty, that they do not exist, that they are *sunya, nihsvabhava*?

The Stanza says:

23

On the basis of the three natures of existence

Are established the three natures of non-existence (*nihsvabhava*).

For this reason the Buddha preached, with a secret intention,

That all dharmas have no nature of their own.

24

The first is non-existence as regards characteristics (*laksana nihsvabhava*) [since they are but products of the imagination].

The second is non-existence as regards innate nature or origination (*utpatti-nihsvabhava*) [since it is the result of discrimination].

The last is [non-existence as regards the supreme truth about all dharmas (*paramarthanihsvabhava*)] which is far removed from the first 'nature of mere-imagination'.

In which things are believed to be a real Atman and real dharmas.

25

This supreme truth about all dharmas (*dharmaparamartha*).

Is also Bhutatathata (*chen-ju*, genuine thusness, absolute reality),

Because it is immutable, remaining constantly thus in its nature.

This is the true nature of mere-consciousness (*vijnaptimatrata*).

論曰：
即依此前所說三性立彼後說三種無性，謂即相生勝義無性，故佛密意說一切法皆無自性，非性全無。

說密意言顯非了義。謂後二性雖體非無，而有愚夫於彼增益妄執實有我法自性，此即名爲徧計所執，爲除此執故佛世尊於有及無總說無性。

云何依此而立彼三？

謂依此初徧計所執立相無性，由此體相畢竟非有如空華故。依次依他立生無性，此如幻事託衆緣生。無如妄執自然性故假說無性，非性全無，依後圓成實立勝義無性，謂即勝義由遠離前徧計所執我法性故假說無性，非性全無。如太虛空雖徧衆色，而是衆色無性所顯。

The Treatise says:

> It is on the basis of the above-mentioned three natures of Existence that the three natures of Non-Existence are established, that is to say, non-existence as regards characteristics, non-existence as regards origination, and non-existence as regards Supreme Truth. For this reason, the Buddha preaches, with a secret intention, that all dharmas are without self-nature (*svabhava*), without reality. This, however, does not mean that self-nature is absolutely lacking.

This employment of the expression *mi i*, 'with a secret intention', indicates that the Buddha's declaration is not the absolute truth. How is that? The latter two Svabhavas, i.e., Paratantrasvabhava and Parinispannasvabhava, are, in fact, not natures of non-existence. Ignorant people, however, impose upon things their own false belief that these really have a nature of their own as Atman or as dharmas, and this is called belief in their 'nature of mere-imagination' (Parikalpitasvabhava). In order to eradicate this belief, therefore, the World-Honoured One (Bhagavat) has applied the term 'non-existence' both to what (really) exists (the so-called second and third forms of non-existence), and to what does not exist (the first form).

How are the three Nihsvabhavas established on the basis of the three Svabhavas?

> 1. In connection with the first Svabhava, i.e., Parikalpitasvabhava, the nature of mere-imagination, the laksananihsvabhava is established, i.e., the fact that things are 'non-existent as regards characteristics', because, viewed in this way, they are absolutely non-existent, both in essence and appearance, like 'flowers in the sky'.
>
> 2. In connection with the second 'nature of dependence on others' (Paratantra), the *utpattinihsvabhava* is established, i.e., the fact that things are 'non-existent as regards origination', because, viewed in this way, they are like a magician's tricks, which owe their origination to various unseen causes and conditions. They do not, as is falsely supposed, have a nature (i.e., independent existence) of their own. We may therefore allege that they are non-existent; but, in fact, they are not absolutely without self-nature.
>
> 3. In connection with the final 'nature of ultimate reality' (Parinispanna), the *paramarthanihsvabhava* is established, i.e., the fact that things are non-existent as regards the highest truth. The highest truth is far removed from the first 'nature of mere-imagination', in which things are believed to be a real Atman and real dharmas. Therefore we conventionally allege that it is non-existent, but it is not wholly without self-nature. Just as great space (*mahakasa*), although it envelops and penetrates all Rupas, is revealed by the absence of self-nature of Rupas, so the highest truth is revealed by the voidness or non-existence of Atman and dharmas, and can therefore be qualified as having no nature of its own.

雖依他起非勝義故亦得說爲勝義無性，而濫第二，故此不說。

此性卽是諸法勝義，是一切法勝義諦故。

然勝義諦略有四種。一世間勝義，謂蘊處界等。二道理勝義，謂苦等四諦。三證得勝義，謂二空眞如。四勝義勝義，謂一眞法界。

此中勝義依最後說，是最勝道所行義故。爲簡前三故作是說。此諸法勝義亦卽是眞如。眞謂眞實，顯非虛妄。如謂如常，表無變易。謂此眞實於一切位常如其性故曰眞如，卽是湛然不虛妄義。

〔述記：眞簡有漏，有漏妄故。如簡無漏有爲，彼體雖眞，有生滅故，〕

亦言顯此復有多名，謂名法界及實際等，如餘論中隨義廣釋。

此性卽是唯識實性。謂唯識性略有二種，一者虛妄，謂徧計所執。二者眞實謂圓成實性，爲簡虛妄說實性言。

復有二性，一者世俗謂依他起，二者勝義謂圓成實，爲簡世俗故說實性。

Paratantra is not Paramartha, but [since it is real] it can also be called *paramarthanihsvabhava*. However, in order to avoid confusion, the Stanza reserves for Parinispanna alone the definition of *Paramarthanihsvabhava*.

1. Parinispanna is the *paramartha* of all dharmas, because it is their *paramarthasatyr*.

Paramarthasatyr is of four species:

(1) *lokaparamartha*, which refers to mundane realities, that is to say, Skandhas, Ayatanas, Dhatus, etc.;

(2) *yuktiparamartha*, which refers to supramundane realities, that is to say, the four Noble Truths, Duhkha, etc.;

(3) *adhigamaparamartha*, which refers to spiritual attainments, that is to say, the attainment of the Bhutatathata which is revealed by the realization of the two Voids;

(4) *paramarthaparamartha*, which refers to ultimate truth, that is to say, the *eka-bhutadharmadhatu*, i.e., the One Real Dharmadhatu (Absolute Reality).

The Parinispanna is the fourth Paramartha, because it is the object that is attained by the *parama* Marga (that is to say, the Mulajnana (root-wisdom) or Nivikalpakajnana (the knowledge of the fundamental identity of all things).

2. In order to indicate that the Parinispanna is the fourth Paramartha, the Stanza, after having said that the Parinispanna is the Paramartha, adds, 'this *paramartha* of all dharmas is also the Bhutatathata' (*chen* ju).[1] (The first three Paramarthas are Paramartha, but not Bhutatathata).

Chen (genuine) means genuine and real. It indicates that Parinispanna is not baseless and false. *Ju* (thusness) means being constantly thus. It indicates that Parinispanna does not evolve or change. The meaning is that this Reality remains, under all conditions, constantly thus in its nature. Therefore it is called *Chen-ju* (Bhutatathata), which conveys the idea that it is profoundly immovable, not baseless, and not false.

The word 'also' in the Stanza indicates that Parinispanna also has many other names, such as Dharmadhatu[2], Bhutakoti, etc., as will be seen and is explained in other treatises.

3. Parinispanna is the 'real nature of Vijnaptimatrata'. In fact, Vijnaptimatrata is of two kinds: (1) false, i.e., Parikalpita; (2) real, i.e., Parinispanna. To indicate this difference, it is said that Parinispanna is the real Vijnaptimatrata.

On the other hand, the nature (*svabhava*) of things is twofold: (1) *samvrta*, relative: this refers to Paratantrasvabhava; (2) *paramarthika*, absolute: this refers to Parinispannasvabhava. This is why it is said that Parinispanna is the real Vijnaptimatrata, to distinguish it from Paratantra and *samvrta*.

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[1] *Chen-ju*, lit., 'Genuine Thusness'. It is the Absolute Reality or Absolute Truth of Buddhism.

[2] *Fa-chieh* or 'dharma-element', the unifying underlying Reality which is the ground or cause of all dharmas or things.

三頌總顯諸契經中說無性言非極了義，諸有智者不應依之總撥諸法都無自性。

Conclusion:– The three Stanzas 23–25 show that the statement in the sutras about the three natures of non-existence is not the revelation of ultimate truth, and those who are wise should not rely on it; they should be careful not to understand it in its literal sense, i.e., that, broadly speaking, dharmas have no self-nature (Svabhava).

BOOK IX

THE HOLY PATH OF ATTAINMENT

(THE FIVE STAGES)

聖　　道

聖道

五位

如是所成唯識相性。

誰於幾位如何悟入？
謂具大乘二種姓者略於五位漸次悟入。

何謂大乘二種種姓？

一本性住種姓。謂無始來依附本識法爾所得無漏法因。

二習所成種姓。謂聞法界等流法已聞所成等熏習所成。
〔述記：聞十二分教法界等流平等而流故。……聞所成等卽是三慧所成。〕

要具大乘此二種姓方能漸次悟入唯識。

何謂悟入唯識五位？

一資糧位，謂修大乘順解脫分。
〔述記：此在四十心及已前位，從初發心乃至十廻向終皆名順解脫分。〕

二加行位，謂修大乘順決擇分。
〔述記：卽在煖等四善根中，此在初劫，下文等言勝解行地攝故。〕

三通達位，謂諸菩薩所住見道。
〔述記：卽在初地初入地心。〕

四修習位，謂諸菩薩所住修道。
〔述記：卽從初地住及出心乃至金剛無間心位名爲修道。〕

五究竟位，謂住無上正等菩提。

THE HOLY PATH OF ATTAINMENT

The Five Stages

WE have established what Vijnaptimatrata is. Let us now say who awakens to and enters it, through how many stages, and by what means.

Only those enter it who are possessed of the two Bija-natures (Gotras) of the Mahayana. They enter by gradual progression through five stages.

1. What are the two Bija-natures of the Mahayana?

They are:

(1) The natural or innate Bija-nature, that is to say, the Bijas or causes of pure dharmas which exist naturally and which, since before the beginning of time, have dwelt and found support in the eighth consciousness;

(2) The Bija-nature which results from perfuming. Depending on the hearing of the Doctrine (Scripture on the twelve Angas) which 'flows out in equal currents' from the Dharmadhatu, this Bija-nature consists of the Bijas of the triple wisdom (i.e., wisdom from reading, hearing, instruction; wisdom from reflection; and wisdom from the practice of abstract meditation).

To awaken to and enter Vijnaptimatrata by gradual progression, one must possess these two Mahayana Bija-natures.

2. What are the five stages for awakening to and entering Vijnaptimatrata?

They are:

(1) The stage of 'moral provisioning' (*sambharavastha*). This means cultivation of the Moksabhagiyas of the Mahayana, i.e., the spiritual qualities leading to liberation from delusion. This period extends from the first 'production of the mind and heart of Mahabodhi (*bodhicittotpada*)' up to the production of the ten dedications (*usmagata*).

(2) The stage of intensified effort (*prayogavastha*). This means cultivation of the Nirvedhabhagiyas of the Mahayana, i.e., the decision and selection between the true and the false. This period extends from the cultivation of the four 'good roots' (*kusalamulas*), the ten dedications, etc., to the end of the first kalpa, i.e., the end of the Adhimukticaryabhumi (the Bhumi of Mental Resolution).

(3) The stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding (*prativedhavastha*). This means the position of insight into Transcendent Truth (Darsanamarga) held by the Bodhisattvas and refers to the 'thought of entrance into the first Bhumi'.

(4) The stage of exercising cultivation (*bhavanavastha*). This means the stage of exercising cultivation (Bhavanamarga) held by the Bodhisattvas. This period extends from the 'thought of residence in the first Bhumi' up to the Diamond Samadhi (Vajropamasamadhi).

(5) The stage of final attainment or ultimate realization (*nisthavastha*).

〔述記：金剛心後解脫道中盡未來際。〕

云何漸次悟入唯識？

謂諸菩薩於識相性資糧位中能深信解。

在加行位能漸伏除所取能取引發眞見。

在通達位如實通達。
〔述記：方起無漏現行二智證實相性故。〕

修習位中如所見理數數修習伏斷餘障。
〔述記：伏餘煩惱斷餘智障。〕

至究竟位出障圓明，能盡未來化有情類復令悟入唯識相性。
〔述記：全出二障功德智慧無不周備，不同小聖故名爲圓，無闕少故，簡二乘也。其福智二清淨極勝無有能過，不迷不闇故名爲明，此簡菩薩。〕

This means abiding in the Anuttara Samyaksambodhi (Supreme Enlightenment).

3. It may be asked what is the gradual way of progression for thus awakening to and entering Vijnaptimatrata.

It means that:

(1) In the stage of 'moral provisioning' (i.e., acquisition and accumulation of right knowledge) pertaining to the nature and characteristics of consciousness, the Bodhisattva is able to acquire deep faith and understanding.

(2) In the stage of intensified effort, he is gradually able to suppress and eliminate the belief in 'what is grasped' and 'what grasps' (i.e., in an object and a subject – Grahya and Grahaka), and to develop a genuine view of things, [thus leading to the revelation of Tattvadarsana, insight into Ultimate Reality].

(3) In the stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding, he penetrates and comprehends Reality. [He manifests the two pure wisdoms, the Fundamental Wisdom (*Mulajnana*) and the Subsequent Wisdom (*Prsthalabdhajnana*)].

(4) In the stage of exercising cultivation, he continually cultivates himself in accordance with the principles of insight which he has acquired, suppressing what remains of Klesavarana and cutting off what remains of Jneyavarana.

(5) Having reached the stage of final attainment or ultimate realization, he emerges from the two barriers (Avaranas) into complete enlightenment [in contradistinction to the yogins of the two Vehicles] and is able, until the end of time, to strive for the conversion of all sentient beings, thus causing them too to awaken to and enter Vijnaptimatrata (Mere-Consciousness).

第一章· 資糧位

初資糧位其相云何？

頌曰：

乃至未起識， 求住唯識性。
於二取隨眠， 猶未能伏滅。

論曰：

從發深固大菩提心乃至未起順決擇識，求住唯識眞勝義性，齊此皆是資糧位攝。

爲趣無上正等菩提修習種種勝資糧故。

爲有情故勤求解脫由此亦名順解脫分。

此位菩薩依因善友作意資糧四勝力故，於唯識義雖深信解，而未能了能所取空，多住外門修菩薩行。

故於二取所引隨眠，猶未有能伏滅功力令彼不起二取現行。

§ I. SAMBHARAVASTHA

The Stage of Moral Provisioning

What are the characteristics of the stage of moral provisioning?

The Stanza says:

26

As long as the consciousness (of wisdom) has not arisen

To seek to abide in the state of Vijnaptimatrata.

The 'attachment' and 'drowsiness' (*anusayas*) arising from
the two 'apprehensions' (*grahas*)

Cannot, as yet, be suppressed and obliterated.

The Treatise says:

Starting from the production of the profound and firm 'mind and heart of Mahabodhi' up to the production of the Nirvedhabhagiyas[1] and the effort to abide in the truly transcendental principle of Vijnaptimatrata: all this is comprised in the stage of moral provisioning.

This stage is called *sambhara*, 'provision', 'equipment', because, with a view to attaining Anuttarasamyaksambodhi (Supreme Enlightenment), the Bodhisattva accumulates diverse and excellent 'moral provisions'. [This is for himself.]

This stage is also called Moksabhagiya, the stage of 'liberation' or 'deliverance', because the Bodhisattva makes constant efforts to seek the deliverance of sentient beings. [This is for others.]

In this stage, the Bodhisattva relies on four excellent forces, namely, Hetu (cause, i.e., his Bija-nature, which is double), his spiritual friends (to meet and serve Buddhas), his act of concentrated attention, and his provisions of merit and wisdom. He has therefore, with reference to the concept of Vijnaptimatrata, deep faith and understanding. He is, however, incapable of comprehending the voidness of the two apprehensions, Grahaka and Grahya: he generally 'resides near the external portals of the Citadel of Truth' (where there is much distracted thought, little Samadhi), and cultivates the practice of Bodhisattvas within those portals.

He has as yet not acquired the power to suppress the Anusayas (i.e., Bijas) produced by the two Grahas in such a manner that these Anusayas no longer produce the two actual Grahas.

The expression 'the two Grahas' signifies the grasping of, or attachment to,

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[1] That is, the realization of the truth which decides and sifts the true from the false.

此二取言顯二取取，執取能取所取性故。

二取習氣名彼隨眠，隨逐有情眠伏藏識，或隨增過故名隨眠。卽是所知煩惱障種。

二 障

煩惱障者，謂執徧計所執實我薩迦耶見而爲上首，百二十八根本煩惱及彼等流諸隨煩惱。此皆擾惱有情身心能障涅槃，名煩惱障。

所知障者，謂執徧計所執實法薩迦耶見而爲上首，見疑無明愛恚慢等。

覆所知境無顚倒性能障菩提，名所知障。

此所知障決定不與異熟識俱，彼微劣故。

不與無明慧相應故。

〔述記：法執必慧及無明俱，慧能計度無明迷故〕

法空智品與俱起故。

七轉識內隨其所應或少或多如煩惱說。

〔述記：七識之中根本有四隨惑有八及別境慧有十三法，第六識有一切。〕

the two Grahas, that is to say, the attachment to Grahaka and Grahya ('what takes or grasps' and 'what is taken or grasped', i.e., a subjective Atman and an objective universe).

The habit-influences (i.e., perfumings or *vasana*) arising from the two Grahas are called 'attachment' and 'drowsiness' or 'torpor'. They are so called because they attach themselves to sentient beings and remain torpidly concealed in the storehouse consciousness (Alayavijnana); or, through their attachment, they increase the faults (of sentient beings). They are the same as the Bijas of the two barriers: the barrier that hinders Absolute Knowledge (*jneyavarana*) and the barrier of vexing passions (*klesavarana*).

THE TWO BARRIERS

1. Avaranas

The barrier of vexing passions (Klesavarana) means the belief in what is wholly imaginary as being a real Atman; it gives precedence to the view that there is real individuality (Satkayadrsti). Its 128 primary vexing passions (*mulaklesas*), with the other accompanying secondary passions (*upaklesas*), all perturb and torment the bodies and minds of sentient beings and act as a barrier to Nirvana. That is why they are all termed the barrier of vexing passions.

The barrier that hinders Absolute Knowledge (Jneyavarana) means the belief in what is wholly imaginary as being real dharmas; it, too, gives precedence to the view that there is reality of individuality. Its false view, together with doubt, ignorance, desire, hate, conceit, etc., obscures the true nature of the known world and acts as a barrier to perfect Wisdom (Bodhi). That is why these are all termed the barrier that hinders Absolute Knowledge or Mahabodhi.

[Thus, the two barriers spring from the two 'graspings': 'what grasps' and 'what is grasped'. Belief in the former, i.e., in what grasps, as being a real Atman, results in the barrier of vexing passions; belief in the latter, i.e., in what is grasped as being real dharmas, results in the barrier that hinders Absolute Knowledge.]

2. ASSOCIATION OF JNEYAVARANA AND THE CONSCIOUSNESSES

The eighth consciousness: – Jneyavarana is certainly not associated with Vipakavijnana (eighth consciousness), because the latter is weak and not associated with ignorance (Avidya) and discernment (Prajna), because the Dharmasunyatajnana (the knowledge of the emptiness of dharmas, which belongs to the sixth consciousness) is produced simultaneously with the eighth consciousness.

The seven Pravrttivijnanas. – According to the case, the seven Pravrttivijnanas are associated with a small number or a large number of dharmas relating to Jneyavarana; as in that which concerns dharmas relating to Klesavarana.

眼等五識無分別故，法見疑等定不相應，餘有意力皆容引起。

此障但與不善無記二心相應，論說無明唯通不善，無記性故。

〔述記：瑜伽第五十九卷，說欲界煩惱一分是不善及餘上二界是無記卽是無明。唯通不善無記性故不言通善。〕

〔述記：對法第四亦言。〕

癡無癡等不相應故。

煩惱障中此障必有，彼定用此爲所依故。

體雖無異而用有別。

〔述記：體不相違可唯一體，用義分故可說有別。〕

故二隨眠隨聖道用，有勝有劣，斷或前後。

〔述記：此中二障隨三乘聖道有勝有劣斷或前後。〕

此於無覆無記性中是異熟生，非餘三種，彼威儀等勢用薄弱非覆所知障菩提故。

此名無覆望二乘說，若望菩薩，亦是有覆。

若所知障有見疑等，如何此種契經說爲無明住地？

無明增故，總名無明，非無見等。

如煩惱種立見一處欲色有愛四住地名，豈彼更無慢無明等？

如是二障分別起者見所斷攝，任運起者修所斷攝。

[Manas is associated with four primary klesas, eight secondary klesas, and Prajna of the Special Caittas: thirteen dharmas in all. – Manovijnana is associated with all dharmas.]

The five consciousnesses are certainly not associated with erroneous dharma-views (Dharmadrsti), dharma-doubts (Dharmavicikitsa), etc., because these consciousnesses are 'exempt from *vikalpa*', i.e., non-discriminative. As to Trsna, etc., they can be associated with the Five by the force of Manovijnana, not by the force of the five consciousnesses themselves.

3. MORAL SPECIES OF JNEYAVARANA

Jneyavarana is associated solely with bad thoughts (a part of Kamadhatu) and non-defined thoughts (superior Dhatus). In fact, the texts (Yogasastra, 59, and the Abhidharma-Kosa, 4) say that Avidya (*jneyavarana*) includes only bad and non-defined dharmas; delusion (*jneyavarana*: Dharmagraha) and non-delusion (essential to good thoughts) cannot be associates.

Where there is Klesavarana, there is necessarily Jneyavarana but not vice versa. For the former necessarily takes the latter as its supporting basis. It may be said that the two Avaranas (i.e., the two Grahas of *pudgala* and *dharma*) are not of different natures (their natures do not contradict each other); but their functions (perceptions of diverse objects) are different.

Consequently, the two Avaranas are either important or not important according to the Holy Path (of the three Vehicles) envisaged. Klesavarana will be cut off before or after Jneyavarana.

Jneyavarana is listed in the category of non-defiled-non-defined. In this category, it belongs to the *vipakaja* class, not the three other classes, because the activities and forms of deportment of these three classes are slight: they do not act as obscuring veils or hindrances to wisdom (Jneya); nor are they barriers to Bodhi.

If Jneyavarana is defined 'non-defiled', it is from the point of view of the two Vehicles. From the point of view of the Bodhisattvas, it is defiled.

4. AVIDYA AND JNEYAVARANA

If Jneyavarana comprises false views (Drsti), doubt (Vicikitsa), etc., why is it that the Sutra designates the Bijas of Jneyavarana under the name of *avidyabhumi* (land of ignorance)?

The general name of Avidya is given because Avidya is preponderant and on the increase. This does not mean that Jneyavarana does not comprise false views, etc. Similarly for the klesas: their Bijas are designated as 'the land of erroneous views' (*drstyekadesabhumi*), 'the land of desire and covetousness' (*kamaragabhumi*), 'the land of form and covetousness' (*ruparagabhumi*), 'the land of existence and covetousness' (*bhavaragabhumi*): how can this be taken to mean that they do not comprise conceit and ignorance also?

(1') The two Avaranas, when they arise as a result of speculation and discrimination (*parikalpa*), belong to the *darsanaheya* category (that is to say, they are cut off by insight into Truth). When they are born spontaneously

二乘但能斷煩惱障，菩薩俱斷。

永斷二種唯聖道能，伏二現行通有漏道。

菩薩住此資糧位中，二麤現行雖有伏者，而於細者及二隨眠止觀力微未能伏滅。

此位未證唯識眞如，依勝解力修諸勝行，應知亦是解行地攝。

〔述記：論言亦者，亦順決擇分，彼是解行地，此亦是故。〕

所修勝行，其相云何？

略有二種，謂福及智，諸勝行中慧爲性者皆名爲智，餘名爲福。

〔述記：唯是智非福謂十力一切智一切種妙智等。〕

且依六種波羅密多。通相皆二。
別相，前五說爲福德，第六智慧。
或復前三唯福德攝，後一唯智，餘通二種。

復有二種，謂利自他所修勝行隨意樂力，一切皆通自他利行。

依別相說，六到彼岸菩提分等自利行攝四種攝事四無量等，一切皆是利他行攝。

〔述記：菩提分等，等取禪支十八不共法諸相隨好等自利行攝。然四十三說六度唯自利四攝利他故，四種攝事四無量等，等取神通大悲不護三念住皆利他行攝。〕

(*sahaja*), they belong to the *bhavanaheya* category (that is to say, they are cut off by meditation and self-cultivation).

(2) Saints of the two Vehicles cut off only Klesavarana; Bodhisattvas cut off both Avaranas.

(3) Only the Holy Path (Aryamarga) is capable of cutting off absolutely the Bijas of the two Avaranas. But the impure path, like the Aryamarga, can prevent the actual manifestation of the two Avaranas.

(4) Conclusion – In the stage of moral provisioning, the Bodhisattva prevents the actual manifestation of the two crude Avaranas; but, as far as the subtle Avaranas and the Bijas (or Anusayas) of the gross or subtle Avaranas are concerned, the power of his Samatha and Vipasyana (meditation and contemplation) is too weak to enable him to subdue the former and destroy the latter.

In the stage of moral provisioning, the Bodhisattva has not yet realized the *vijnaptimatrata-tathata*; relying on the force of aspiration and resolution, he cultivates the excellent practices (the six Paramitas, for instance). This stage, with that of the Nirvedhabhargiyas (decision and selection), is part of the Adhimukticaryabhumi (Bhumi of 'aspiration and resolution' and diligent application).

What are the characteristics of the excellent practices cultivated by the Bodhisattva?

Generally speaking, they are of two kinds, namely, merit (*punya*) and wisdom (*jnana*). Among the practices, that which is Prajna by nature (that which has as effect the acquisition of the 'ten powers', omniscience, etc.) is termed wisdom; the rest is termed merit.

The six Paramitas,[1] examined in the complexity of their relations, are all wisdom and merit. Examined in their individual characteristics, the first five are merit, the sixth is wisdom. Alternatively, the first three are comprised in merit, the last in wisdom, the fourth and the fifth (zeal and Samadhi) in both.

One must also distinguish, among the excellent practices, those which are useful to the yogin himself and those which are useful to others. In truth, all the excellent practices, by reason of the force of the dispositions and aspirations of the Bodhisattva, are useful both to himself and to others. But, considered in their own individual characteristics, the six Paramitas, the Bodhyangas, the Dhyanangas (the thirty-seven elements of bodhi-illumination), the eighteen Avenikadharmas (different characteristics of a Buddha), the Laksanas (physical marks of a Buddha), etc., belong to the category of 'useful to oneself', while the four Samgrahavastus (all-embracing Bodhisattva virtues), the four Apramanas (immeasurables, or infinite Buddha-states of mind), the Abhijnas (ubiquitous supernatural powers), Mahakaruna (great compassion), the

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[1] The six Paramitas are the six spiritual practices that ferry one across the sea of mortality to Nirvana: (1) *dana*, charity, or giving, including the bestowing of the Dharma on others; (2) *sila*, keeping the commandments; (3) *ksanti*, patience under insult; (4) *virya*, zeal and progress; (5) *dhyana*, meditation or contemplation; (6) *prajna*, the power to discern reality or truth. It is the last which carries the believer across the *samsara* (sea of incarnate life) to the shores of Nirvana. See 'The Ten Paramitas' in Section on Bavanavastha in Book IX.

如是等行差別無邊，皆是此中所修勝行。

此位二障雖未伏除，修勝行時有三退屈而能三事練磨其心，於所證修勇猛不退。

一聞無上正等菩提廣大深遠心便退屈，引他已證大菩提者練磨自心勇猛不退。

二聞施等波羅密多甚難可修心便退屈，省己意樂能修施等練磨自心勇猛不退。

三聞諸佛圓滿轉依極難可證心便退屈，引他麤善況己妙因練磨自心勇猛不退。

由斯三事練磨其心堅固熾然修諸勝行。

Smrtyupasthanas (recollections or contemplations by memory), etc., belong to the category of 'useful to others'.

The diversity of these practices is infinite; all of them are cultivated at this stage.

At this stage, the two barriers (Avaranas) have not yet been suppressed and eliminated, and the Bodhisattva, in his cultivation of the excellent practices, is susceptible of three retrogressions or withdrawals; however, he can, in three points, train and fortify his mind. A brave hero, he does not withdraw from what he has already attained.

His mind recoils when he learns that Anuttarasamyaksambodhi (Supreme Enlightenment) is vast, grand, profound and remote (long in attaining). But he recalls that 'others have already attained Mahabodhi.' Thus, he fortifies his mind and, summoning up his courage as a brave hero, he does not withdraw.

His mind recoils when he learns that charitable bestowal of wealth and truth on others and the other Paramitas are very difficult to practise. But he realizes that he is already possessed of the disposition and aspiration to practise the giving of charities, etc. Thus, he fortifies his mind and, summoning up courage as a brave hero, he does not withdraw.

His mind recoils when he learns that the complete transformation which constitutes Buddhahood is most difficult to realize. But he recalls that others have only coarse qualities of excellence, whereas he himself possesses the wonderful causes of Bodhi. Thus, he fortifies his mind and, summoning up his courage as a brave hero, he does not withdraw.

In this triple manner the Bodhisattva fortifies his mind; with firm determination and all the ardour of a hero he cultivates the excellent practices.

第二章· 加行位

次加行位，其相云何？

頌曰：

現前立少物，　謂是唯識性，
以有所得故，　非實住唯識。

論曰：

菩薩先於初無數刼善備福德智慧資糧，順解脫分既圓滿已。爲入見道住唯識性，復修加行伏除二取，謂煖頂忍世第一法。

此四總名順決擇分，順趣眞實決擇分故。

近見道故立加行名，非前資糧無加行義。

煖等四法，依四尋思四如實智初後位立。
〔述記：初二位尋思觀，後二位實智觀。〕

四尋思者，尋思名義自性差別，假有實無。

§ II. PRAYOGAVASTHA

The Stage of Intensified Effort

What are the characteristics of Prayogavastha, the stage of intensified effort?

The Stanza says:

27

As long as one places something before himself and, taking
it as an object,

Declares that it is the nature of Mere-consciousness,

He is really not residing in the state of Mere-consciousness,

Because he is in possession of something.

The Treatise says:

1. The Bodhisattva, in the course of the first Asamkhyeyakalpa (innumerable kalpas, i.e., countless aeons), has equipped himself well with the spiritual provisions (*sambhara*) of merits-virtues and transcendental wisdom (*jnanaprajna*). The dharmas of deliverance (*moksabhagiya*) are now complete. With a view to entering the Darsanamarga, the path of spiritual discernment, and installing himself thus in Vijnaptimatrata, he practises the Prayoga, the preliminary exercise; he suppresses and eradicates the two Grahas, i.e., the conceptions of object and subject (*grahyagraha* and *grahakagraha*): that is to say, he cultivates Usmagata, the Murdhanas, Ksanti, and the Laukikagradharmas.

2. These four attributes receive the general name of Nirvedhabhagiyas, for they lead to true and pure intelligence (*nirvedha*).
Inasmuch as they are near the Darsanamarga, they are given the special name of *prayoga*, i.e., the preliminary or preparatory stage of intensified effort. This does not mean that the preceding stage of Sambhara is not also preliminary and characterized by intensified efforts.

3. The four Nirvedhabhagiyas (Usmagata, etc.) are composed of four reflections, *paryesana*, and four 'exact realizations'. The first two Nirvedhabhagiyas are reflections while the last two are exact realizations.
The four reflections (*paryesanas*) consist in the examination or study of the 'names' (*naman*) and 'essences' (*vastu*) of things, together with their self-natures (*svabhava*) and differences (visesa). In this way, the novice discovers that all these are only supposed to exist and that they do not exist as realities.

如實徧知此四離識及識非有，名如實智。

名義相異故別尋求，二二相同故合思察。

〔述記：謂名義二種，一自性同二差別同，故合名義二種自性及二差別爲合觀也。前二是名義，後二是自性差別。〕

依明得定發下尋思觀無所取，立爲煖位，謂此位中創觀所取名等四法，皆自心變假施設有實不可得。初獲慧日前行相故立明得名，即此所獲道火前相故亦名煖。

依明增定發上尋思觀無所取立爲頂位，謂此位中重觀所取名等四法皆自心變假施設有實不可得，明相轉盛故名明增。尋思位極，故復名頂。

依印順定發下如實智，於無所取決定印持，無能取中亦順樂忍。

既無實境離能取識，寧有實識離所取境？所取能取相待立故。

印順忍時總立爲忍。

〔述記：忍通二處謂印忍順忍，故合爲論。〕

The four 'exact realizations' consist in the recognition with absolute certainty that these four dharmas do not exist apart from consciousness and that the consciousness that knows them does not exist either. These realizations are called 'exact knowledge in accordance with real truth'.

Four Reflections:

The special characteristics of Naman and Vastu are distinct; hence Naman and Vastu are objects of special inquiry: two reflections. The *svabhava* (self-nature) or the profound reality of Naman and Vastu is the same (both being Bhutatathata): hence the third reflection. Similarly, the *visesas* or common characteristics (impermanence, etc.) of Naman and Vastu are the same: hence the fourth reflection. Hence we have the combined reflection of Naman and Vastu from the stand-point of Svabhava and Visesa.

4. The four Samadhis and the Nirvedhabhagiyas

(1) By virtue of the meditation called illumination-attainment (Alokalabdha), the yogin practises the 'inferior reflection'. He perceives the non-existence of objects, Grahya. This is the state of 'heat' or 'warmth' (*usmagatavastha*). In this stage he perceives, for the first time, that the four dharmas (names, etc.) which are 'grasped' as objects all evolve from the mind and thereby are supposed to exist, but as realities do not exist.

This meditation is called illumination-attainment because it is the forerunner of the 'sun of Prajna'. The state which it enables one to attain is called Usmagata (warmth) because it is the forerunner of the fire which illumines and warms the pure Path.

(2) By virtue of the meditation entitled 'increasing illumination' (Alokavrddhi), the yogin practises the 'superior reflection'. He realizes that 'what is grasped' does not exist. This is the capital state, the state of culmination. In this state, he repeats the perception that the four dharmas (Naman, etc.) which are 'grasped' as objects are nothing but the manifestation of his own mind, that they exist merely as figurative designations or mental constructions, and that they are not real existences. This meditation takes its name from the fact that the prognostic of illumination continues to increase. This is the highest state of Paryesana, the acme of reflection: hence it is called the state of culmination (*murdhavastha*).

(3) By virtue of the meditation called *yin-shun* (spontaneous recognition), the yogin manifests the inferior form of exact knowledge. He recognizes definitely and confirms the non-existence of all perceived objects (Grahya), and also spontaneously and gladly recognizes the non-existence of the perceiving subject (Grahaka).

Since no real objects exist apart from the consciousness which takes them, how can real consciousness itself exist apart from the objects which are taken by it? For what is taken and what takes are in mutual dependence, one on the other.

This period of recognition or admission of the voidness of object and subject is given the general name of *ksanti* (*jin*), i.e., recognition or admission.

Inasmuch as it signifies the confirmation of the non-existence of the

印前順後立印順名，忍境識空故亦名忍。

依無間定發上如實智印二取空立世第一法。謂前上忍唯印能取空，今世第一法二空相印，從此無間必入見道故，立無間名。異生法中，此最勝故，名世第一法。

如是煖頂依能取識觀所取空，下忍起時印境空相，中忍轉位於能取識如境是空順樂忍可，上忍起位印能取空，世第一法雙印空相。

皆帶相故未能證實。故說菩薩此四位中猶於現前安立少物。謂是唯識眞勝義性，以彼空有二相未除帶相觀心有所得故，非實安住眞唯識理。彼相滅已方實安住。
〔述記：相者卽是空所執相有依他相名空有相。〕

依如是義，故有頌言，菩薩於定位，觀影唯是心，義相旣滅除，審觀唯自想，如是住內心，知所取非有，次能取亦無，後觸無所得。

preceding division, i.e., what is grasped, and the spontaneous recognition of the non-existence of the succeeding division, i.e., what grasps, it is given the name of *yin-shun*. As it signifies the recognition of the voidness of object and consciousness, it is also called *jin* (*ksanti*).

(4) By virtue of the meditation of uninterrupted continuity (Anantaryasamadhi), the yogin begins to manifest the superior knowledge of Reality, by which the emptiness of the two graspings is confirmed and the 'first worldly truth' (Laukikagradharma) is established. This means that in the preceding state of superior Ksanti, only the voidness of what grasps (Grahaka) was confirmed, whereas at present, the first worldly truth gives confirmation to both voidnesses, i.e., of Grahya and Grahaka. From this stage the yogin immediately and necessarily enters the Darsanamarga (path of insight into Truth): whence the name of Anantarya (i.e., without intermission). This is the most sublime of the dharmas of Prthagjanas: hence it is called the first worldly truth.

5. In the first two states of Usmagata (warmth) and Murdhan (culmination), relying on the consciousness considered as what grasps, the yogin considers the voidness of what is grasped. When the inferior Ksanti manifests itself, he confirms the voidness of the object. In the middle Ksanti, he spontaneously and gladly recognizes that the perceiving consciousness, too, is, like the perceived object, void. In the superior Ksanti, he confirms the voidness of what grasps. Finally, the first worldly truth gives confirmation to the double voidness [of the perceived object and the perceiving subject (Grahya and Grahaka)].

Throughout the stage of intensified effort, the thought of the novice remains attached to the dual aspects of seeming being and non-being, and so is as yet unable to experience Reality (*tattva*). That is why it is said that the Bodhisattva, during the four phases of this stage, still places something before him and considers it to be the genuine and transcendent nature of Vijnaptimatrata, the Bhutatathata. This is because, the dual aspects of voidness and being having not yet been eliminated for him, his contemplating mind still remains attached to them and does not really peacefully abide in the genuine principle of Vijnaptimatrata. Only with the obliteration of these aspects can he peacefully abide in Reality.

On this subject there are two stanzas which read:
'The Bodhisattva, in the state of Samadhi,
Perceives that images are merely his mind;
The aspects of emptiness and being having already been eliminated,
He realizes that only his thoughts exist.
Abiding thus in his interior mind,
He knows that what is grasped (Grahya) does not exist.
He then realizes that what grasps (Grahaka) does not exist either;
Later he "touches" the state of "having gained nothing" (*anupalambha*).'

此加行位未遣相縛，於麤重縛亦未能斷。

唯能伏除分別二取，違見道故。於俱生者及二隨眠有漏觀心有所得故，有分別故，未全伏除全未能滅。

此位菩薩於安立諦非安立諦俱學觀察，爲引當來二種見故及伏分別二種障故，非安立諦是正所觀，非如二乘唯觀安立。

〔述記：此位菩薩於安立諦非安立諦皆亦學緣，或總作一實眞如或別作二空……不唯作四諦差別觀。……有差別名言者名安立，無差別離名言者非安立也。〕

菩薩起此煖等善根，雖方便時通諸靜慮，而依第四方得成滿託最勝依入見道故。

唯依欲界善趣身起，餘慧厭心非殊勝故。

此位亦是解行地攝，未證唯識眞勝義故。

6. Sundering of the fetters of Nimitta and Bijas

In this stage of intensified effort (the Prayogavastha) the yogin has not yet discarded the fetters of Nimitta, i.e., the *nimittabandhana*. Nor is he as yet able to cut off the heavy fetters of the Bijas (the *dausthulyabandhana*).

He is only able to suppress and eliminate the two Grahas of speculation and discrimination because these are opposed to insight into Truth (Darsanamarga). But he is not yet capable of completely suppressing and eliminating the two innate Grahas; nor is he capable of completely obliterating their Bijas, because his mind of impure contemplation is not without an object, that is to say, it is as yet not free from discrimination (Vikalpa).

7. Object of the Meditation

What is the object of the meditation of Prayogavastha?

In this particular stage, the Bodhisattva studies and meditates both on the *vyavasthitasatya* (i.e., the Four Noble Truths) and on the *avyavasthitasatya* (i.e., Ultimate Reality either in itself or as a function of the two Sunyatas) to prepare himself for the Darsanamarga in its two forms and to suppress the two kinds of speculative Avaranas which will be cut off at the Darsana. Principally, unlike yogins of the two Vehicles who meditate only on the *vyavasthitasatya*, he applies himself to the *avyavasthitasatya*.

8. To produce the four 'good roots' (kusalamulas) of the preparatory stage (that is to say, Usmagata, Murdhagata and the first two Ksantis), the Bodhisattva can find himself in any one of the Dhyanas. Nevertheless, he cannot accomplish them perfectly (the third Ksanti and Laukikagra) except in the fourth Dhyana, because it is by relying on this Dhyana that he can find the most excellent supporting basis for his entrance into the Darsanamarga.

9. The yogin who practises the four good roots must be of Kamadhatu and of good destiny. In other Dhatus discernment and disgust are insufficient.

10. These four good roots also belong (as does the Sambharavastha) to the *Adhimukticaryabhumi*, because they are prior to the 'realization' of Vijnaptimatrata.

第三章· 通達位

次通達位其相云何？

頌曰：

若時於所緣，　智都無所得，
爾時住唯識，　離二取相故。

論曰：

若時菩薩於所緣境無分別智都無所得，不取種種戲論相故。爾時乃名實住唯識眞勝義性卽證眞如，智與眞如平等平等俱離能取所取相故，能所取相俱是分別有所得心戲論現故。

一· 無分別智

有義此智二分俱無，說無所取能取相故。

〔述記：如攝論第六所引莊嚴論頌，智者了達二皆無等住二無眞法界等，此頌說離二取相等。〕

§ III. DARSANAMARGA

or Prativedhavastha

The Stage of Unimpeded Penetrating Understanding

What are the characteristics of Prativedhavastha, the stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding?

The Stanza says:

28

If, in perceiving the sphere of objects,

Wisdom (*jnana*) no longer conceives any idea of the object,

Then that wisdom is in the state of Vijnaptimatrata,

Because both the object to be apprehended and the act of apprehending by consciousness are absent.

The Treatise says:

NON-DISCRIMINATING WISDOM

[In this stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding], the Bodhisattva attains, with reference to an object, the non-discriminating transcendental wisdom called Nirvikalpakajnana, which does not cling to the objective world, and accepts no kind of sophistry about its seeming appearance (*prapancanimitta*). He is now said really to abide in the genuine and transcendent nature of Vijnaptimatrata, that is to say, he experiences the Bhutatathata (Absolute Reality). His wisdom and the Bhutatathata are on the same plane, both being equally divorced from the aspects of subject and object (*grahaka* and *grahya*). Both aspects constitute discrimination, being the sophistic manifestations of that mind which clings to something as its object.

[In this stage, then, there is an 'abiding' in Mere-Consciousness; for now at last the novice 'experiences the Bhutatathata'. The path of self-cultivation has virtually reached its goal; all that is needed is further practice.]

1. THREE OPINIONS ON NIRVIKALPAKAJNANA

Sthiramati, Nanda and Dharmapala

1. According to one opinion, this Jnana contains neither the perceived division (*nimittabhaga*) nor the perceiving division (*darsanabhaga*), because, according to the Samgraha Sastra, the modalities of Grahya and Grahaka are lacking.

有義此智相見俱有，帶彼相起名緣彼故。若無彼相名緣彼者，應色智等名聲等智。

若無見分，應不能緣，寧可說爲緣眞如智？勿眞如性亦名能緣，故應許此定有見分。

有義此智見有相無，說無相取不取相故。
〔述記：七十三說也。〕

雖有見分而無分別，說非能取，非取全無。

雖無相分，而可說此帶如相起，不離如故。
如自證分緣見分時不變而緣，此亦應爾。
變而緣者便非親證，如後得智應有分別。
故應許此有見無相。

加行無間此智生時體會眞如，名通達位。
初照理故，亦名見道。

二· 見道二種

然此見道略說有二。

2. According to another opinion, this Jnana has both the perceiving and the perceived divisions. It contains the latter because it carries the image which arises and is called the 'image-perceiving' Jnana. Only that consciousness can be called 'image-perceiving' which has an image to perceive. If one admits that a consciousness can be called image-perceiving without having an image to perceive, then one can also give to the *caksurvijnana*, visual consciousness, the name of *srotravijnana*, auditory consciousness.

Furthermore, if this Jnana has no perceiving division (*darsanabhaga*), it should not be able to perceive. How, then, can it be called the Jnana that perceives Bhutatathata? One might as well say that Bhutatathata is capable of perceiving although it lacks the *darsanabhaga*. It should therefore be admitted that this Nirvikalpakajnana definitely has the perceiving division (*darsanabhaga*).

3. According to a third opinion, this Jnana has the *darsanabhaga*, but not the *nimittabhaga*. It is said in the Yogasastra, 73: 'It has no images to apprehend. It does not apprehend images.'

Although it has the perceiving division (*darsanabhaga*), it is *nirvikalpaka*, that is to say, it does not discriminate between different objects of perception. It is said of it that it is not a 'perceiver' of images, but this does not mean that its perceiving division that apprehends images is entirely lacking.

Although it has no perceived division (*nimittabhaga*), it can be said that it is born by adhering to Tathata, because it is not separate from Tathata. Just as the *samvittibhaga*, when it perceives the *darsanabhaga*, does not develop itself into an image (*nimitta*) of the *darsanabhaga*, so it is the same with the Nirvikalpakajnana. If it develops into an image of the Tathata which it perceives, then it will not be the immediate realization of Tathata. It will know Tathata as the Subsequent Jnana (*prsthalabdha*) knows it and, like the Subsequent Jnana, it will be *savikalpaka* (discriminating). It should therefore be admitted that it has *darsanabhaga*, but no *nimittabhaga*.

Name of the Third Stage of the Path

When the Nirvikalpakajnana (Non-discriminating Wisdom) is born as a result of uninterrupted endeavours to advance in the preliminary stage of intensified effort (*prayogavastha*), it represents the realization of Bhutatathata. This stage is named *prativedha-avastha* (i.e., the stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding). It is also named Darsanamarga, because it is the first intuitive insight into Transcendent Truth.

2. Varieties of Darsanamarga

Darsanmarga is of two kinds:

1. *Tattvadarsanamarga*

2. *Laksanadarsanamarga* (the laksana or objective way of Darsana) which is of two kinds:

（一） 眞見道

一眞見道，謂卽所說無分別智。

實證二空所顯眞理，實斷二障分別隨眠，雖多剎那事方究竟，而相等故總說一心。

有義此中二空二障漸證漸斷，以有淺深麤細異故。

有義此中二空二障頓證頓斷，由意樂力有堪能故。

（二） 相見道

二相見道，此復有二。

a. 非安立諦

一觀非安立諦，有三品心。

一內遣有情假緣智能除輭品分別隨眠，

二內遣諸法假緣智能除中品分別隨眠，

三徧遣一切有情諸法假緣智能除一切分別隨眠。

前二名法智，各別緣故。第三名類智，總合緣故。

法眞見道二空見分自所斷障無閒解脫別總建立，名相見道。

〔述記：就無閒道中人法二見分各別法故有初二心，解脫道中人法二見總法有第三心。〕

(a) The way of three minds.
(b) The way of sixteen minds, which again is of two kinds.

(1). TATTVADARSANAMARGA

The first Darsanamarga is Tattvadarsanamarga, which refers to what is called the non-discriminating transcendental wisdom (Nirvikalpakajnana).

This Jnana, in fact, attains Reality (Tattva) which is revealed by the two Sunyatas (*pudgalasunyata* and *dharmasunyata*). It cuts off the Bijas of speculation (*anusayas*) of the two Avaranas (*klesa* and *jneya*). Although many moments (*ksanas*) are required for the ultimate achievement of this, nevertheless the moments being of the same kind, it is generally said that this particular way of realization leads to the One Universal Mind.

According to one opinion, the two Sunyatas (*pudgalasunyata* and *dharmasunyata*) are realized by gradual and successive stages, being superficial and profound respectively; likewise, the two Avaranas (*klesavarana* and *jneyavarana*) are abandoned gradually and successively, being crude and subtle respectively.

According to another opinion [which is ours], the two Sunyatas are realized and the two Avaranas abandoned instantaneously, because the force of disposition and predilection acquired in the preparatory stage is very effective.

(2). LAKSANADARSANAMARGA

The second Darsanamarga is the Laksanadarsanamarga, i.e., the *laksana* or objective way of realization. This Darsanamarga is of two kinds: one is the 'synthetic' view in which the inner truths are not distinguished, *avyavasthitasatyr*, and the other is the 'analytic' view in which the verities are distinguished, *vyavasthitasatya*.

a. The Synthetic View (Avysavasthitasatyr)

This view, which leads to the attainment of Reality without distinguishing the truths, contains the following three groups of mental associates.

(1) 'Active' or 'image-perceiving' Jnana which, operating from within, expels the concept or *sattva* or real Pudgala: it dispels the Bijas of speculation (*Anusayas*) of the 'weak' or inferior category.

(2) Active Jnana which, operating from within, expels the concepts of *dharma*: it dispels the Bijas of speculation of the medium category.

(3) Active Jnana which, in a general way, expels all concepts of *sattva* and *dharma*: it dispels all Anusayas (Bijas) of speculation.

The first two Jnanas are called *dharmajnanas* because they have special objects of perception. The third is called *anvayajnana*, i.e., relating to the whole species, because it perceives the totality.

This Darsanamarga is established in imitation of the perceiving division (*darsanabhaga*) of the two Sunyatas of the Tattvadarsanamarga. It consists of two stages, Anantarya and Vimukti, abandonment and attainment – abandonment of the two Avaranas (Anusayas relating to *sattvas* and *dharmas*)

有義此三是眞見道，以相見道緣四諦故。

有義此三是相見道，以眞見道不別緣故。

b. 安立諦

二緣安立諦有十六心，此復有二。

一者依觀所取能取，別立法類十六種心。

謂於苦諦有四種心。一苦法智忍，謂觀三界苦諦眞如，正斷三界見苦所斷二十八種分別隨眠。二苦法智，謂忍無閒觀前眞如，證前所斷煩惱解脫。三苦類智忍，謂智無閒無漏慧生，於法忍智各別內證，言後聖法皆是此類。四苦類智，謂此無閒無漏智生，審定印可苦類智忍。如於苦諦有四種心，集滅道諦應知亦爾。

此十六心八觀眞如，八觀正智。
〔述記：法品緣如，類品緣智。〕

法眞見道無閒解脫見自證分，差別建立，名相見道。

二者依觀下上諦境別立法類十六種心。謂觀現前不現

and attainment of liberation. There are therefore two Anantaryas but only one Vimukti. Hence three minds in all. These Jnanas are termed Laksanadarsanamarga.

According to one opinion, these three Jnanas are Tattvadarsanamarga, because the Laksanadarsanamarga is the Jnana that perceives the Four Noble Truths.

According to another opinion, which is correct, these three Jnanas are Laksanadarsanamarga, because Tattvadarsanamarga perceives Absolute Reality and not diverse objects.

b. The Analytic View (Vyavasthitasatya)

This is the view that takes the inner truths separately. It invovles sixteen minds. This Marga is of two species.

(1) Sixteen separate varieties of mind are established on the basis of the views bearing on Grahya (the truths perceived) and those bearing on Grahaka (the Jnana which perceives the truths), views which are Dharmajnanas and Anvayajnanas respectively.

The Truth of Suffering (Duhkha):

As regards the Truth of Suffering, four varieties of mind arc established:

a. *Duhkhe dharmajnanaksantih*: By this is meant the view of the Tathata of the Truth of Suffering (Duhkhastyr) of the three Dhatus, which eliminates the twenty-eight Anusayas of speculation which are cut off by insight into the Truth of Suffering.

b. *Duhkhe dharmajnanam*: By this is meant the view of the same Tathata succeeding Ksanti, whereby there is made manifest the deliverance resulting from the cutting off of the klesas or Anusayas.

c. *Duhkhe 'nvayajnanaksantih*: By this is meant that, immediately after this Jnana, a pure Prajna is born which bears on the two preceding views of mind. The term 'Anvaya' (species) signifies that all the sacred dharmas which follow the Saiksa and the Asaiksa are of the same species, that is *duhkhe dharmajnananvaya.*

d. *Duhkhe 'nvayajnanam*: By this is meant that, immediately after that Ksanti, a pure Jnana is born which considers and gives testimony on that Ksanti.

If there are four varieties of mind associated with the Truth of Suffering, then the same is true of the three other Noble Truths, namely, the Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Path leading to the Cessation of Suffering.

Of these sixteen varieties, eight are views bearing on Tathata and eight are views bearing on *samyakjnana*, i.e. right transcendental wisdom, which discerns Tathata.

The four varieties of mind relating to each Noble Truth are separately established in imitation respectively of the *darsanabhaga* and *svasamvittibhaga* of the Anantaryamarga and the Vimuktimarga of the Tattvadarsanamarga. For this reason, it is named Laksanadarsanamarga.

(2) On the basis of the views of suffering connected with Kamadhatu

前界苦等四諦各有二心，一現觀忍，二現觀智。

如其所應，法眞見道無閒解脫見分觀諦。

〔述記：其現觀忍法眞見道無閒道見分，現觀智法眞見道解脫道見分。〕

斷見所斷百一十二分別隨眠，名相見道。

三· 九種心

若依廣布聖教道理，說相見道有九種心。

此卽依前緣安立諦二十六種止觀別立。

謂法類品忍智合說各有四觀卽爲八心，八相應止總說爲一。

雖見道中止觀雙運，而於見義觀順非止，故此觀止開合不同，由此九心名相見道。

諸相見道依眞假說世第一法無閒而生及斷隨眠，非實如是。眞見道後方得生故，非安立後起安立故，分別隨眠眞已斷故。

〔述記義演：此相見道依世第一法無閒而生者，但是假說實非斷義也。〕

前眞見道證唯識性，後相見道證唯識相，二中初勝，故頌偏說。

and with the two superior Dhatus, and the same for the three other Noble Truths, there are separately established sixteen *dharmajnana* and *anvayajnana* varieties of mind. By this is meant that there are two varieties of mind, namely, present-view-*ksanti* and present-view-*jnana*, relating to suffering connected with the present Dhatu, i.e., Kamadhatu, and the invisible Dhatus: hence four views or mental varieties for suffering. The same with the three other Noble Truths.

Ksanti is in imitation of the *darsanabhaga* of the Anantaryamarga of the Tattvadarsana; Jnana is in imitation of the *darsanabhaga* of the Vimuktimarga of the Tattvadarsana.

This analytic way of Vyavasthitasatyr views the four Noble Truths and cuts off all those 112 Anusayas of speculation which can be cut off by this insight into the Noble Truths.

Such are the varieties of Laksanadarsanamarga.

3. Ninefold Mind

According to the method of dissemination of the Sacred Teachings, it is said that the Laksanadarsanamarga is a mind of nine varieties. These nine varieties are separately established on the basis of the sixteen mental varieties of each of the two ways of Vyavasthitastyr, a consideration of which makes it possible to distinguish between Samatha (meditation) and Vipasyana (contemplation). There are eight mental varieties for the latter and one variety for the former. Hence a total of nine.

In fact, the Ksantis and the Jnanas of the *dharma* category and the *anvaya* category are two groups of four mental varieties. And it may, in a 'synthetic' view, be said that Samatha associated with these two times four mental varieties is unique.

Although, in the Darsanamarga, Samatha and Vipasyana function in pairs, nevertheless it is Vipasyana which constitutes the 'view', *darsana*, not Samatha. There is therefore this difference that Vipasyanas are divided and distinguished while Samathas are brought back to a unity.

Hence there are nine mental varieties which receive the name of Laksanadarsanamarga.

1. Attributing to the Laksanadarsanamarga the characteristics of the Tattvadarsanamarga, certain texts say that 'the former is born immediately after the realization of the 'first worldly truth' (Laukikagradharmas), and that it cuts off the Anusayas'. This is only a manner of speech; the truth is really not so; because the Laksanadarsanamarga is not born until after the Tattvadarsanamarga; because it is after the *avyavasthita* that the *vyavasthita* is produced; because the Anusayas of speculation are already cut off by the Tattvadarsanamarga before the appearance of the Laksanadarsanamarga.

2. This treatise speaks only of the first Darsanamarga. The reasons are as follows:

前眞見道根本智攝，後相見道後得智攝。

四· 後得智

諸後得智有二分耶？

有義俱無，離二取故。

有義此智見有相無，說此智品有分別故。聖智皆能親照境故。不執著故說離二取。

〔述記：諸聖教說此智有分別故有見分，五十五等說也〕

〔述記義演：聖智皆能親照境故者。此師意說後得智親取心外本質法不變而緣，故無相分。〕

〔述記：經論中言離二取者，不執著二取故，非全無見分〕

有義此智二分俱有，說此思惟似眞如相，不見眞實眞如性故。

〔述記：七十三說思惟明有見分，似眞如相不見眞實眞如性故成有相分。〕

又說此智分別諸法自共相等，觀諸有情根性差別而爲說故。

〔述記：佛地經攝論等。〕

又說此智現身土等爲諸有情說正法故，若不變現似色聲等，寧有現身說法等事？

轉色蘊依不現色者，轉四蘊依應無受等。

又若此智不變似境，離自體法應非所緣，緣色等時應緣聲等。

又緣無法等應無所緣緣，彼體非實無緣用故。

The Tattvadarsanamarga realizes Vijnaptimatrata in itself (the *hsing* of Vijnaptimatrata) [because it perceives immediately, it illumines Tathata or Parinispanna]. The Laksanadarsanamarga, which follows, realizes Vijnaptimatrata in its characteristics (the *hsiang* of Vijnaptimatrata).

The first Darsanamarga is superior to the second.

The first is included in the Mulajnana, the Principal or Root Wisdom, which is exempt from images or ideas, and the second is included in the Subsequent Wisdom (Prsthalabdhajnana), which is not exempt from images.

4. SUBSEQUENT WISDOM

Prsthalabdhajnana

3. The question is raised whether the Subsequent Wisdom includes the two Bhagas, *darsana* and *nimitta*. There are three opinions:

(1) According to Sthiramati, this wisdom has neither *darsana* nor *nimitta*, because, according to Sutras and Sastras, it is exempt from the two 'apprehensions' (*grahas*), from concepts of subject and object, [since it is pure].

(2) According to another opinion, this wisdom has *darsana* but no *nimitta*. In fact, according to the Yogasastra, 55, a. this wisdom is 'with *vikalpa*'; now it cannot have *vikalpa* if it does not have *darsana*; b. all wisdom of the saints is capable of discerning immediately its object: thus this wisdom does not perceive the object in the *nimitta* or image, which it would form for itself; c. without doubt 'this wisdom is exempt from the two *grahas*'; but this formula specifies that it does not attach itself to notions of Grahaka and Grahya; it does not say that this wisdom has no Grahaka: therefore it includes *darsana*.

(3) According to Dharmapala, correct opinion, this wisdom has both *darsana* and *nimitta*. The texts and reasoning guarantee this theory. According to the Yogasastra, 73, this wisdom 'reflects upon' the seeming characteristics of Bhutatathata [so it has *darsana*]; it does not perceive the true nature of Bhutatathata, [so it has *nimitta*, seeing only the mental image of Bhutatathata].

According to Buddhabhumisastra, 'this wisdom takes an analytical view of the special and common characteristics of all dharmas; it observes the diverse natures of sentient beings and gives them the right teachings.'

Again, 'this wisdom manifests itself as bodies and lands and preaches the Right Dharma to sentient beings.' If it does not manifest itself in images of colour, sound, etc., how can this manifestation of bodies and this teaching of the Dharma take place? [Therefore this wisdom has *darsana* and *nimitta*. Reasoning leads to the same conclusion.]

If, in the manifestation of *rupaskandha*, there is no appearance of Rupa (i.e., no *nimitta*), then, in the manifestation of the remaining four skandhas, there should be no Vedana, Samjna, etc.

Again, if this wisdom does not evolve images of objects, the dharmas distinct from it cannot be its 'condition quâ object'. In that case, when it bears on colour, it will also bear on sound (since it bears on colour without having an image of colour); again, bearing on non-existent things, it will not have a 'condition quâ object', since these unreal things cannot function as a 'condition'.

由斯後智二分俱有。

五· 六現觀與二見道

此二見道與六現觀相攝云何？

六現觀者。一思現觀，謂最上品喜受相應思所成慧。

此能觀察諸法共相，引生煗等，加行道中觀察諸法，此用最猛，偏立現觀。

〔述記：思能生修故。此觀一切行無常等一切法眞如等，故是最勝，名觀共相。〕

煗等不能廣分別法，又未證理，故非現觀。

〔述記：在二乘位唯觀四諦別別行相不及於思，謂種種思惟種種觀察名廣分別，煗等無此能不如於思不立現觀。〕

二信現觀，謂緣三寶世出世間決定淨信，此助現觀令不退轉立現觀名。

三戒現觀，謂無漏戒，除破戒垢令觀增明亦名現觀。

四現觀智諦現觀，謂一切種，緣非安立，根本後得無分別智。

〔述記：三心見道等是此現觀故，卽一切見修道二智也。不取無學等二智，與究竟現觀不殊故。〕

五現觀邊智諦現觀，謂現觀智諦現觀後諸緣安立世出世智。

六究竟現觀，謂盡智等究竟位智。

〔述記：卽盡智等究竟位中所有諸智，卽通十智，然皆無漏〕

The conclusion is that the Subsequent Wisdom (Prsthalabdhajnana) possesses the two Bhagas.

5. THE SIX ABHISAMAYAS OR 'COMPREHENSIONS' AND THE TWO DARSANAMARGAS

What is the relation between these two Darsanamargas and the six Abhisamayas or 'comprehensions'?

The six Abhisamayas are as follows:

1. *Cintabhisamaya*, comprehension of reflection: this is the superior category of Prajna of reflection associated with the sensation of delight.

This Prajna is capable of contemplating the common characteristics of dharmas. It produces the Nirvedhabhagiyas (Usmagata, etc.) [because reflection (*cinta*) brings about moral cultivation (*bhavana*)]. In the Path of Intensified Effort (Prayoga), its activity in regard to the contemplation of dharmas is most intense. To it is therefore given, inaccurately, the name of Abhisamaya.

With regard to the Nirvedhabhagiyas, they are not capable of analysing dharmas in a general manner [as *cinta* is]: on the other hand, they have as yet not realized the Truth [as Darsanamarga has]. Hence they are not Abhisamaya.

2. *Sraddhabhisamaya*, comprehension of faith or belief: this is the unwavering pure faith, mundane or supramundane, which is pinned on the ' Three Jewels' (i.e., the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha). This faith assists the Abhisamaya (that is to say, the Prajna) and causes it not to 'withdraw' from the Path. To it is therefore given the name of Abhisamaya.

3. *Silabhisamaya*, comprehension of morality (observance of commandments). This means that pure morality expels the impurity of immorality and causes the Abhisamaya to increase and be clear. To morality therefore is also given the name of Abhisamaya.

4. *Abhisamayajnana-satyabhisamaya*, comprehension of truths in the Jnana of Abhisamaya. – This refers to Tattva which is the Bija of all dharmas. It comprises the two *nirvikalpakajnanas*, principal and subsequent (*mula* and *prsthalabdha*), which bear on the *avyavasthita* and which belong to the Darsanamarga and the Bhavanamarga to the exclusion of the Arhat, etc.

5. *Abhisamayantikajnana-satyabhisamaya*: comprehension of truths in the Jnana of Abhisamayantika. – This is, after the fourth Abhisamaya, the mundane and supramundane Jnanas which bear on the *vyavasthitasatyr*, and which know the truths analytically.

6. *Nisthabhisamaya*, the final comprehension. This refers to the Jnanas of the perfect stage (*nisthavastha*), *ksayajnana*, *anutpadajnana*, etc.

此眞見道攝彼第四現觀少分，此相見道攝彼第四第五少分。彼第二三雖此俱起，而非自性，故不相攝。

菩薩得此二見道時生如來家。住極喜地，善達法界，得諸平等。常生諸佛大集會中。於多百門已得自在。自知不久證大菩提，能盡未來利樂一切。

The Tattvadarsanamarga includes a part of the fourth Abhisamaya; the Laksanadarsanamarga includes a part of the fourth and the fifth. The second and third Abhisamayas arise together with the Path (Marga), but do not partake of its essential nature. Hence they are not related to the two Darsanamargas.

When the Bodhisattva attains these two Darsanamargas, he is born in the family of the Tathagatas; resides in the Land of Supreme Bliss (Pramudita Bhumi); penetrates and achieves communion with the Dharmadhatu; obtains the *samatas* (that is, identification with all sentient beings, all Bodhisattvas, and all Buddhas); is always born in the great assemblies of Buddhas; attains self-mastery in hundreds of varieties of Samadhi; and knows for himself that before long he will realize Mahabodhi and be able to bless and give joy to all sentient beings till the end of all ages.

第四章· 修習位

次修習位，其相云何？

頌曰：

無得不思議，　是出世間智，
捨二麤重故，　便證得轉依。

論曰：
菩薩從前見道起已。爲斷餘障證得轉依，復數修習無分別智。

此智遠離所取能取，故說無得及不思議。

或離戲論說爲無得，妙用難測名不思議。

是出世間無分別智。斷世間故名出世間。二取隨眠是世間本，唯此能斷獨得出名。或出世名依二義立，謂體無漏及證眞如。此智具斯二種義故獨名出世，餘智不然。卽十地中無分別智。

§ IV. BHAVANAMARGA

or Bhavanavastha

The Stage of Exercising Cultivation

What are the characteristics of Bhavanavastha, the stage of exercising cultivation?

The Stanza says:

29

Without perception, inconceivable and incomprehensible,

This is transcendental supramundane wisdom (*jnana*).

Because of the abandonment of the crude dross of the two barriers (*avaranas*),

Inner transformation (*asrayaparavrtti*) into perfect wisdom is achieved.

The Treatise says:

The Bodhisattva, from the time when he has achieved the preceding stage of insight into Truth, now constantly cultivates the Non-discriminating Wisdom, in order to clear away the remaining barriers and gain the experience of the 'revolution' or 'inner transformation' (*asrayaparavrtti*). This Wisdom, far removed from all sophistry, is said to grasp nothing; and, being marvellous in its functioning and difficult to fathom, it is termed inconceivable.

Alternatively, it is described as being 'without perception', because it is exempt from all frivolous discussions or false appearances (*prapanca*), and as being 'inconceivable and incomprehensible', because its mysterious activity is unfathomable.

This Nirvikalpakajnana is called 'supramundane' non-discriminating wisdom, because it 'cuts off' the world. The Anusayas or Bijas of the two 'apprehensions' (Grahaka and Grahya) are the root of the world [that is to say, the underlying cause of worldliness]. Only this Jnana cuts them off; so only this Jnana is called 'supramundane'.

Alternatively, the term 'supramundane' has two meanings: 1. 'of absolutely pure nature'; 2. 'rendering possible the attainment of Bhutatathata (Absolute Reality)'. This Nirvikalpakajnana is the only Jnana that possesses these two distinctive characteristics; therefore, it alone is called 'supramundane'. The other three Jnanas are by no means so. Such is the Jnana which the Bodhisattva practises in the ten Bhumis.

By practising this Jnana as frequently as possible, the Bodhisattva expels

數修此故，捨二麤重。二障種子立麤重名，性無堪任違細輕故。令彼永滅，故說爲捨。

此能捨彼二麤重故，便能證得廣大轉依。

依謂所依，即依他起，與染淨法爲所依故。染謂虛妄偏計所執。淨謂眞實圓成實性。轉謂二分，轉捨，轉得。由數修習無分別智斷本識中二障麤重，故能轉捨依他起上偏計所執，及能轉得依他起中圓成實性。由轉煩惱得大涅槃，轉所知障證無上覺。成立唯識意爲有情證得如斯二轉依果。

或依即是唯識眞如，生死涅槃之所依故。

or abandons the two *dausthulyas*. [The term *dausthulya* signifies something crude and heavy, i.e., inaptitude, incapacity, infirmity.] This name of *dausthulya* is given to the Bijas of the two Avaranas (barriers), because these Bijas, compared with those of the unconditioned non-discriminative Jnana, are crude and heavy and therefore 'incapable' of serving as one of the causes for the attainment of Reality. The Jnana expels them, because, being subtle and light, it is in direct opposition to their crude and heavy nature – in other words, in direct contradiction to their incapacity. It causes them to be destroyed for ever. Hence, the use of the expression 'expulsion' or 'abandonment' in the Stanza.

Inasmuch as it is capable of abandoning this double *dausthulya*, i.e., the crude and heavy Bijas of the two Avaranas (Klesavarana, the barrier of vexing passions which impedes Nirvana, and Jneyavarana, the barrier which impedes Mahabodhi), this transcendental wisdom is capable of attaining and realizing the great inner transformation which is Nirvana.

What is the meaning of *asrayaparvrtti* (revolution or inner transformation)? There are two opinions.

1. The word *asraya* (basis or infrastructure), in a passive sense, means 'that on which something depends' or 'at which serves as a basis.' That is, it is the basis on which other things rest, because it is that on which both the pure and impure dharmas are dependent.

[The eighth consciousness, Alayavijnana, which is never interrupted, is the basis and support (*asraya*) for all pure and impure dharmas.]

'Impure' refers to what is falsely imagined to be true (Parikalpita). 'Pure' refers to what truly pertains to Ultimate Reality (Parinispanna).

Paravrtti, 'turning over', refers to the 'turning over' process whereby these two groups (the impure and pure dharmas) are respectively discarded and acquired.

By the repeated cultivation of the Non-discriminating Wisdom, the two 'heavy' barriers within the primary consciousness (Alayavijnana) are cleared away. Thus, through the process of 'turning over' (i.e., inner transformation), it is possible to discard the product of the false imagination (Parikalpita) which lies upon the surface of the principle of 'dependence on others' (Paratantra), and to acquire the 'nature of Ultimate Reality' (Parinispanna) which abides underneath this principle. By rolling away the vexing passions (klesas), the Mahaparinirvana (true and ultimate emancipation) is gained; by rolling away the barrier that impedes Absolute Knowledge, Mahabodhi or Supreme Enlightenment is experienced. The doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata is established in order to enable sentient beings to experience these two fruits resulting from this process of 'revolution' or 'inner transformation' (*asrayaparavrtti*).

2. Or perhaps by *asraya* (base) should be understood the Bhutatathata of Mere-Consciousness (Vijnaptimatratathata),[1] for this is the point of support both for transmigration (*samsara*) and Nirvana.

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[1] The third of the seven aspects of Bhutatathata. See end of preceding section.

愚夫顚倒迷此眞如，故無始來受生死苦。聖者離倒悟此眞如，便得涅槃畢竟安樂。由數修習無分別智斷本識中二障麤重，故能轉滅依如生死及能轉證依如涅槃。此卽眞如離雜染性。如雖性淨而相雜染。故離染時假說新淨。卽此新淨說爲轉依。

修習位中斷障證得。

〔述記：此位斷障，金剛心後證得，非此位卽證。〕

雖於此位亦得菩提，而非此中頌意所顯。頌意但顯轉唯識性。二乘滿位名解脫身，在大牟尼名法身故。

云何證得二種轉依？
謂十地中修十勝行，斷十重障，證十眞如，二種轉依由斯證得。

I. 十地

言十地者，一極喜地，初獲聖性，具證二空，能益自他，生大喜故。

二離垢地，具淨尸羅，遠離能起微細毀犯煩惱垢故。

三發光地，成就勝定大法總持，能發無邊妙慧光故。

The ignorant, being deluded by their errors about Bhutatathata, have therefore, since before the beginning of time, been subject to the sufferings of transmigration; but the holy ones (Aryas), by divorcing themselves from error, awaken to this Bhutatathata, thus achieving Nirvana and final felicity.

By the repeated cultivation of the Wisdom of Non-discrimination, the two heavy barriers within the primary consciousness (Mulavijnana) are cleared away. Thus, this Wisdom transforms the basis (*asraya*) by obliterating transmigration which depends on the Tathata, and experiences Nirvana which also depends on it. In truth, Nirvana is nothing but Bhatatathata in itself removed from all impure dharmas (*samklesa*). Although Tathata is pure in itself, (*svabhava*), yet its 'character' (*laksana*) is defiled. However, when it is divorced from impurity, one can say, conventionally, that it has become pure. This new purity is revolution or inner transformation (*asrayaparavrtti*).

In the stage of exercising cultivation (Bhavanavastha), the Bodhisattva clears away the two barriers. After Vajropamasamadhi, Bhutatathata is experienced.

Although Bodhi (enlightenment) is also acquired in this stage, yet this is not the intention expressed by the Stanza. [The fruit of Bodhi will be examined later on.] The intention of the present Stanza is only to indicate the transformation (*paravrtti*) of the nature of Vijnaptimatrata. [Bodhi is not Vijnaptimatrata.] In fact, for the yogins of the two Vehicles, the perfect stage is called Vimuktikaya (liberated body); for the Mahamuni (great sage), it is Dharmakaya (Dharma-body).

How are the two kinds of 'revolution' (*asrayaparavrtti*) to be obtained?

In the ten Bhumis, by practising the ten excellent moral exercises (Paramitas), by clearing away the ten barriers (*avaranas*), by experiencing and attaining the ten Tathatas. In this way will the two kinds of Asrayaparavrtti be obtained.

I. THE TEN BHUMIS

A. Names of the Bhumis or Lands

1. Pramudita Bhumi. – The Land of Great Joy, so called because, for the first time, the Bodhisattva enters into possession of the nature of an Arya, realizes the two Sunyatas, and is in a position to benefit himself and others, thus engendering great joy.

2. Vimala Bhumi. – The Immaculate Land or Land of Perfect Purity, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva is already possessed of a very pure morality. As a result of his strict observance of the commandments, he has already got rid of the impurity of coarse immorality. He has also discarded the 'impurity of the klesas' which can produce minor faults, such as a slight violation of the commandments and so forth.

3. Prabhakari Bhumi. – The Luminous Land or the Land of Further Enlightenment, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva has succeeded

四餤慧地，安住最勝菩提分法，燒煩惱薪，慧餤增故。

〔述記：世親云，能燒一切根本煩惱及隨煩惱皆爲灰燼。〕

五極難勝地，眞俗两智行相互違，合令相應，極難勝故。

六現前地，住緣起智，引無分別最勝般若令現前故。

七遠行地，至無相住功用後邊出過世閒二乘道故。

八不動地，無分別智任運相續，相用煩惱不能動故。

九善慧地，成就微妙四無礙解，能徧十方善說法故。

十法雲地，大法智雲，含衆德水蔭蔽一切，如空麤重，充滿法身故。

in providing himself with the excellent meditation (*samadhi* and *samapattis*) of the Mahadharmadharani, and is therefore capable of producing the infinite light of the wonderful transcendental wisdom (Prajna).

4. Arcismati Bhumi. – The Land of Glowing Wisdom, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva, well installed in the most excellent Dharmas of Bodhi (bodhipaksyadharma), burns up the firewood of klesas and upaklesas (the innate *satkayadrsti* of the sixth consciousness, etc.) thanks to the increase of the glowing flame of Prajna.

5. *Sudurjaya Bhumi.* – The Land of Mastery of Utmost Difficulties, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva accomplishes a most difficult task, that of synthesizing the two wisdoms, namely, the *tattvajnana* or metaphysical wisdom and the *samvrtijnana* or worldly wisdom, whose characteristics are by nature mutually contradictory. Because of the necessity of causing these two Jnanas to be born at the same time and to bear on the same object, this stage is extremely difficult to conquer.

6. Abhimukhi Bhumi. – The Land of Eternal Presence, so called because, at this stage, the wisdom which bears on Pratityasamutpada (origination dependent on causes and conditions) brings about and gives rise to the supreme Prajna which is free from discrimination and speculation.

7. Duramgama Bhumi. – The Land of Long Journeys, i.e., the Land whence one goes far, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva's meritorious activities reach great heights and remote regions. He arrives at *nirnimittavihara* (that is to say, he dwells in a state of mind which is void and is therefore free from Nimitta). This Land marks the end of *abhoga* (function or effort) [for the next Land is exempt from Abhoga (effort), that is to say, the Bodhisattva's activities in the eighth Bhumi are all spontaneous and effortless]. This Land is beyond all worldly paths and the paths of the two Vehicles.

8. Acala Bhumi. – The Land of Non-agitation or Calm Unperturbedness, so called because, at this stage, the Wisdom of non-discrimination (*nirvikalpakajnana*) proceeds spontaneously in a continuous series without the klesas, which include Nimitta and Abhoga, being able to agitate it.

9. Sadhumati Bhumi. – The Land of Finest Discriminating Wisdom, so called because, at this stage, the Bodhisattva has successfully acquired the mysterious four unhindered powers of interpretation and reasoning, with which he can penetrate the ten regions, preaching the Dharma perfectly.

10. Dharmamegha Bhumi. – The Land of Dharma-Clouds, so called because, in this final stage, the clouds of Mahadharmajnana, bearing 'waters of all virtues', conceal the *dausthulya* (crude dross, i.e., inaptitudes or infirmities) of the two Avaranas (just as clouds conceal space) and fill the Dharmakaya.

如是十地總攝有爲無爲功德以爲自性。

與所修行爲勝依持，令得生長，故名爲地。

II. 十波羅蜜多

一· 總舉十行門

十勝行者，卽是十種波羅蜜多。

施有三種，謂財施，無畏施，法施。
〔述記：財是身任持，無畏是心任持，法施是善法任持。〕

戒有三種，謂律儀戒，攝善法戒，饒益有情戒。

忍有三種，謂耐怨害忍，安受苦忍，諦察法忍。

精進有三種，謂被甲精進，攝善精進，利樂精進。

靜慮有三種，謂安住靜慮，引發靜慮，辦事靜慮。

般若有三種，謂生空無分別慧，法空無分別慧，俱空無分別慧。

B. Nature of the Bhumis

Thus the Ten Bhumis comprise and have as their self-nature all the 'meritorious virtues', both conditioned (*samskrta*) and unconditioned (*asamskrta*).

C. Why are the ten stages called Bhumis or Lands?

Because they are the supreme supporting basis for all moral qualities that have to be cultivated. They cause them to come into being and grow up. Therefore they are called Bhumis or Lands.

II. THE TEN PARAMITAS

1. Definition and Varieties

The ten excellent moral exercises are the ten Paramitas.

1. Dana. – Gifts or charity.

Gifts are of three kinds: (1) material gifts, sustaining the body; (2) gifts of security or freedom from fear, sustaining the mind; and (3) gifts of Dharma, sustaining the good Dharma.

2. Sila. – Morality or observance of commandments.

Commandments are of three kinds: (1) Commandments governing personal conduct; (2) commandments for the acquisition of good Dharma; and (3) commandments for the bestowal of benefits and advantages on sentient beings.

3. Ksanti. – Patient endurance.

Patient endurance is of three kinds: (1) to endure patiently resentment and injury; (2) to accept quietly sorrow and suffering; and (3) to examine patiently and adhere to the Dharma.

4. Virya. – Zeal in making progress.

Zeal in making progress is of three kinds: (1) zeal in producing great resolutions; (2) zeal in acquiring good spiritual dharmas; and (3) zeal in promoting the well-being and happiness of sentient beings.

5. Dhyana. – Meditation and contemplation.

Meditation is of three kinds: (1) meditation leading to Samadhi; (2) meditation leading to the unfoldment of supernatural powers; and (3) meditation leading to the successful accomplishment of great tasks.

6. Prajna. – Discernment

Prajna is of three kinds: (1) Pudgalasunyata-non-discriminating Prajna (intuitive discernment of the voidness of the Atman); (2) Dharmasunyata-non-discriminating-Prajna (intuitive discernment of the voidness of all dharmas); (3) Pudgalasunyata-dharmasunyata-non-discriminating-Prajna (intuitive discernment of the voidness of Atman and all dharmas).

方便善巧有二種，謂迴向方便善巧，拔濟方便善巧。

願有二種，謂求菩提願，利樂他願。

力有二種，謂思擇力，修習力。
〔述記：攝論說，由思擇修習二力令前六度無閒現行。〕

智有二種，謂受用法樂智，成熟有情智。
〔述記：攝論云，謂由前六成立妙智受用法樂成熟有情。〕

二· 自性出體門

此十性者，施以無貪及彼所起三業爲性。

戒以受學菩薩戒時三業爲性。

忍以無瞋精進審慧及彼所起三業爲性。

精進以勤及彼所起三業爲性。

靜慮但以等持爲性。

後五皆以擇法爲性，說是根本後得智故。

7. Upayakausala. – Skill in resorting to appropriate expedients.
Skill in resorting to appropriate expedients is of two kinds: (1) Skill in turning the mind towards Mahabodhi (Supreme Enlightenment); and (2) skill in delivering sentient beings from suffering.

8. Pranidhana. – Pious vows.
Pious vows are of two kinds: (1) pious vows for attaining Bodhi; and (2) vows for promoting the well-being and happiness of sentient beings.

9. Bala. – Power of fulfilment.
Power of fulfilment is of two kinds: (1) the power of cogitation; and (2) the power of self-cultivation. These powers are exercised in order that the first six Paramitas may never be interrupted.

10. Jnana. – Transcendental wisdom.
[According to the Samgraha Sastra, this Jnana is evolved as a result of the practice of the first six Paramitas.] It is of two kinds: (1) wisdom with which the Bodhisattva enjoys the 'felicity of Dharma'; and (2) wisdom with which he enables sentient beings to reach 'spiritual maturity'.

2. What do the ten Paramitas consist of?

What is their essential nature?

1. Dana, charity, consists of *alobha*, non-covetousness, and the three deeds (mind, body, and voice) which proceed from Alobha.

2. Sila, morality, consists of the three deeds learned by the Bodhisattva at his ordination ceremony, during which he receives instructions on the commandments to be observed by him.

3. Ksanti, patient endurance, consists of *advesa* (non-anger, i.e., pardon for injuries), *virya* (zeal), investigative Prajna, and the three deeds proceeding from *advesa*.

4. Virya, zeal in making progress, consists of diligent effort and the three deeds proceeding therefrom.

5. Dhyana, meditation and contemplation, consists only of Samadhi. [It does not include states of dispersed mind.]

6–10. The last five Paramitas consist of criticism or discernment of the dharmas (that is to say, *prajna*), for the Samgraha teaches that the sixth Paramita (Prajna) is Mulajnana (Root or Fundamental Wisdom) and the last four are Prsthalabdhajnana (Subsequent Wisdom, i.e., wisdom succeeding upon or arising from Primary Wisdom).
According to certain scholars, the eighth, Pranidhanaparamita (pious vows),

有義第八以欲勝解及信爲性，願以此三爲自性故。

〔述記：餘義無諍，唯願不以慧爲自性……說是後得智者，唯後得智中起故。〕

此說自性，若幷眷屬，一一皆以一切俱行功德爲性。

三· 明相門（七最勝）

此十相者，要七最勝之所攝受方可建立波羅蜜多。

一安住最勝，謂要安住菩薩種姓。二依止最勝，謂要依止大菩提心。三意樂最勝，謂要悲愍一切有情。四事業最勝，謂要具行一切事勝。五巧便最勝，謂要無相智所攝受。六廻向最勝，謂要廻向無上菩提。七清淨最勝，謂要不爲二障閒雜。

〔述記：無相智所攝受者，卽第六不執三輪清淨等。〕

若非此七所攝受者，所行施等非到彼岸。

由斯施等十對波羅蜜多一一皆應四句分別。

〔述記義演：四句者，一有施非度，如人行施不與七最勝相應。二有度非施，謂隨喜他施與七最勝相應。三有亦施亦度，謂自行施與七最勝相應。四有非施非度，謂二乘等所修五度。〕

consists of desire (Chanda), decision or resolve (Adhimoksa) and belief (Sraddha), for every vow is by its own nature a desire or wish, etc. [No dispute on the subject of the other Paramitas: these scholars say only that Pranidhana is not by its own nature Prajna. If the Samgraha says that Pranidhanaparamita is Subsequent Wisdom, it is because the Bodhisattva produces Pranidhana in the course of the unfolding of this wisdom.]

We have examined what the Paramitas consist of, that is to say, their self-nature (*svabhava*). If we consider them with their 'relatives or family-members', we shall say that each of them consists also of all the merits or good qualities that accompany it.

3. The Seven Excellences

For these virtues to receive the name of Paramitas, they must be comprised and embodied in the seven excellences:

1. Excellence of establishment, which means that the yogin must be well established in the Gotra (seed-nature) of the Bodhisattvas.

2. Excellence of the 'supporting basis' (*asraya*), which means that the virtues must have their supporting basis in the mind and heart of Mahabodhi.

3. Excellence of desire and aspiration, which means that the yogin must have compassion and benevolence towards all sentient beings.

4. Excellence of profession, which means that the virtues must be accompanied by all deeds that conform to their spirit.

5. Excellence of expedients, which means that the Paramitas must be comprised in the wisdom that is free from *nimitta*, in such a way that, in performing deeds of charity, the Manovijnana does not 'cling' to the giver, the receiver, or the gifts received or given.

6. Excellence of dedication, which means that the yogin must dedicate himself and turn his Paramita-virtues to Anuttarasamyaksambodhi (Supreme Enlightenment).

7. Excellence of purity, which means that the virtues must not be tainted by, or mixed with, the two Avaranas.

If the Paramita-virtues are not comprised and embodied in these seven excellences, the charitable deeds, etc., performed by the yogin will not enable him to reach the other shore.

It follows from this that, with regard to the relations between the ten virtues, charity, etc., and Paramita, i.e., 'reaching the other shore', one can establish four alternatives: (1) charity which is Paramita; (2) charity which is not Paramita; (3) Paramita which is not charity, (4) neither charity nor Paramita, and so forth.

四· 不增減門

此但有十不增減者，謂十地中對治十障證十眞如無增減故。

復次前六不增減者，爲除六種相違障故。漸次修行諸佛法故。漸次成熟諸有情故。此如餘論廣說應知。

〔述記：慳悋，犯戒，瞋恚，懈怠，散亂，惡慧。〕

又施等三增上生道，感大財體及眷屬故。精進等三決定勝道，能伏煩惱成熟有情及佛法故。諸菩薩道唯有此二。

又前三種饒益有情，施彼資財，不損惱彼，堪忍彼惱而饒益故。精進等三，對治煩惱。雖未伏滅，而能精勤修對治彼諸善加行永伏永滅諸煩惱故。

又由施等不住涅槃，及由後三不住生死，爲無住處涅槃資糧，由此前六不增不減。

後唯四者，爲助前六令修滿足不增減故。方便善巧助施等三。願助精進。力助靜慮。智助般若令修滿故。如解深密廣說應知。

五· 次第門

十次第者，謂由前前引發後後，及由後後持淨前前。

4. Number of Paramitas

The Paramitas are ten in number, neither more nor less, because the Bodhisattvas must, in all the ten Bhumis, oppose ten Avaranas, and realize ten Bhutatathatas.

1. First, the first six Paramitas are six, neither more nor less, because they are intended to expel six obstacles which contradict them (miserliness, immorality, hostility, laziness, distraction, and false views), in order to acquire progressively the Buddhadharmas (the ten powers, etc.), and to develop sentient beings progressively to the fullest extent. These three points are explained in other treatises.

2. Again, the first three Paramitas, charity, etc., are 'the path of increase and promotion', because they produce riches, an excellent body, and good companions respectively; the last three, zeal, etc., are 'the path of decisive victory', because, respectively, they suppress klesas and cause sentient beings and Buddhadharmas to grow and develop to the fullest extent. The paths of all Bodhisattvas fall into these two categories.

3. Further, by virtue of the first three Paramitas, the Bodhisattva renders service to sentient beings by giving them money and other good things for their benefit, avoiding injuring or tormenting them, and patiently enduring their outrages, thus doing good to them. The last three, zeal, etc., oppose the klesas; although Viryaparamita neither suppresses nor cuts off the klesas, nevertheless it invigorates all good preparatory exercises (*prayaga*) which oppose the klesas; Dhyanaparamita suppresses the klesas and Prajnaparamita eliminates them.

4. Furthermore, by virtue of the first three Paramitas, the Bodhisattva does not establish himself in Nirvana permanently; by virtue of the last three, he does not establish himself in Saṃsara (rounds of birth and death, i.e., transmigration): the six are therefore the preparation, i.e., the *sambhara*, for Apratisthitanirvana (attainment of Nirvana without abiding in it).

Therefore the first six Paramitas are six, neither more nor less.

5. Finally, the last four of the ten Paramitas must be four, because their function is to ensure the perfection of the first six.

Skilful expedients aid the first three Paramitas, charity, etc.; pious vows aid the fourth, zeal; the power of fulfilment aids the fifth, meditation and contemplation; transcendental wisdom aids the sixth, Prajnaparamita.

These points have been explained in detail in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra.

5. Order of the Paramitas

The ten Paramitas are set forth in the present order because the preceding one produces the following one; the one following confirms and purifies the one preceding.

又前前麤，後後細故，易難修習，次第如是。

六· 釋名門

釋總別名，如餘處說。

〔述記：六釋名者，七十八，解深密等，解總名。云何緣此等名波羅蜜多？由五緣故。……對法十一說，由十二最勝相應故……又波羅是所知彼岸義，蜜多是到義。〕

七· 修門

此十修者，有五種修。一依止任持修，二依止作意修，三依止意樂修，四依止方便修，五依止自在修。依此五修修習十種波羅蜜多皆得圓滿，如集論等廣說其相。

八· 攝門

此十攝者，謂十一一皆攝一切波羅蜜多，互相順故。依修前行而引後者，前攝於後，必待前故。後不攝前，不待後故。

依修後行持淨前者，後攝於前，持淨前故。前不攝後，非持淨故。

若依純雜而修習者，展轉相望應作四句。

〔述記義演：有施非波羅蜜多，行施不廻向菩提。有波羅蜜多非施，謂於波羅蜜多能勸勵讚美隨喜慶悅等。有亦施亦波羅蜜多，謂諸行施廻向菩提。第四句可知。〕

Further, the preceding ones are crude compared with the following ones; the practice of the preceding ones is comparatively easier.

6. Names of the Paramitas

Why are these virtues called Paramitas? And why are they called Danaparamita, etc.?

These general and special names have been explained in other treatises. [According to K'uei Chi, five explanations are given in the Yogasastra, 78, and the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, and twelve in the Abhidharma. At the same time, etymologically, 'para' means 'the other shore' and 'mita' means 'reaching'; 'paramita' therefore means 'reaching the other shore'; that is to say, the six paramita-virtues ferry the ascetic across the sea of mortality to Nirvana.]

7. Cultivation of the Paramitas

As explained in detail in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and other texts, the cultivation of the ten Paramitas enables the Bodhisattva to attain perfection by reason of a quintuple culture, i.e., five methods of cultivation, namely, (1) cultivation dependent on firm adherance to the Paramitas; (2) cultivation dependent on constant attention to the Paramitas; (3) cultivation dependent on keen aspiration after the Paramitas; (4) cultivation dependent on skilful expedients; and (5) cultivation dependent on self-realization with a mind free from obstacles and perverted views.

8. Reciprocal Inclusion

One may say that each of the ten Paramitas comprises the nine others, because they are interrelated.

The practice of the Paramita that precedes leads to the Paramita that follows. From this point of view, the preceding one comprises the following one, which depends on it; the one following does not comprise the one preceding, which does not depend on it.

But the practice of the subsequent Paramita confirms and purifies the preceding one. From this point of view, the succeeding one comprises the one preceding, but not vice versa.

In considering mixed or non-mixed practices of the Paramitas, there are four alternatives: [e.g., (1) Charity which is not Paramita, as in the case of a person who gives in charity for selfish purposes and not for the realization of Bodhi; (2) Paramita which is not Charity, as in the case of a person who has no money to give in charity, but who encourages others to do so and rejoices with them; (3) acts that are both Charity and Paramita, as in the case of a person who gives in charity and dedicates the merits to Anuttarasamyaksambodhi; and (4) deeds that appear to be charitable and are, in reality, neither Charity nor Paramita . . . K'uei Chi.]

九· 開合門

此實有十而說六者，應知後四第六所攝。開爲十者，第六唯攝無分別智，後四皆是後得智攝，緣世俗故。

十· 五果門

此十果者，有漏有四，除離繫果。無漏有四，除異熟果。

而有處說具五果者，或互相資，或二合說。
〔述記：對法十二說。〕

十一· 三學相攝門

十與三學互相攝者，戒學有三。一律儀戒，謂正遠離所應離法。二攝善法戒，謂正修證應修證法。三饒益有情戒，謂正利樂一切有情。

此與二乘有共不共，甚深廣大，如餘處說。

定學有四。一大乘光明定，謂此能發照了大乘理教行果智光明故。二集福王定，謂此自在集無邊福如王勢力無等雙故。三賢守定，謂此能守世出世閒賢善法故。

9. Ten and Six

In fact, there are ten Paramitas. If a list of six is drawn up, it is because the last four are comprised in the sixth, Prajnaparamita. The reason why the Paramitas are divided into ten in number is that the sixth, Prajnaparamita, proceeds from Nirvikalpakajnana (Fundamental, Non-discriminating Wisdom), while the last four proceed from Prsthalabdhajnana (Subsequent Wisdom, i.e., wisdom that follows or arises out of Fundamental Wisdom), for they are related to ordinary or worldly wisdom (Samvrti).

10. Fruits of the Ten Paramitas

Among the fruits of the ten Paramitas, there are four that are impure, excluding the Visamyogaphala, which is always pure, and four that are pure, excluding the Vipakaphala.

One text, Abhidharma, 12, says that the Paramitas have five fruits. This is because it either considers the mutual assistance which the fruits lend to one another, or considers, together, the pure and impure fruits which the Paramitas can bear.

11. The Paramitas and the Three Branches of Learning (Siksas)

The ten Paramitas and the three branches of learning (*Siksa*), Sila, Samadhi and Prajna, are mutually inclusive.

1. Learning in respect of Sila (i.e., Adhisilam Siksa or moral commandments to be observed by a Bodhisattva) is of three kinds:

(1) Commandments in the the form of rules and regulations, the observance of which signifies total abstention from dharmas wherefrom one should totally abstain;

(2) Commandments relating to the acquisition of good dharmas, which signifies cultivation and realization of dharmas which should be cultivated and realized; and

(3) Commandments relating to the bastowal of benefits on sentient beings, which signifies the procurement of happiness and well-being for all sentient beings.

Between these three branches of learning and the two Vehicles there are certain identities and certain differences.

As regards the profundity and comprehensiveness of the moral commandments to be observed by Bodhisattvas, this has been explained in other treatises.

2. Learning in respect of Samadhi (Adhicittam Siksa) is of four kinds:

(1) Mahayana-illuminating Samadhi, so called because this meditation can produce the light of wisdom which illuminates the principles, teachings, practices, and fruits of the Greater Vehicle.

(2) Merit-accumulating Royal Samadhi, so called because this meditation

四健行定，謂佛菩薩大健有情之所行故。

此四所緣，對治，堪能，引發，作業，如餘處說。

慧學有三。一加行無分別慧，二根本無分別慧。三後得無分別慧。

此三自性，所依，因緣，所緣，行等，如餘處說。

如是三慧，初二位中種具有三，現唯加行。於通達位現二，種三。見道位中無加行故。於修習位，七地已前若種若現俱通三種，八地以去現二種三，無功用道違加行故，所有進趣皆用後得無漏觀中任運起故。究竟位中現種俱二，加行現種俱已捨故。

can spontaneously accumulate merits which are as boundless as the power of a king is unequalled.

(3) Virtue-maintaining Samadhi, so called because this meditation can guard and maintain good mundane and supramundane dharmas.

(4) All-powerful Samadhi, so called because this Samadhi is practised by great heroes, that is, Buddhas and Boddhisattvas.

These four Samadhis are characterized and distinguished by their objects, their antitheses, their capacities, their fruits, and their activities.

3. The learning in respect of Prajna (Adhiprajnam Siksa) is of three kinds:

(1) Prayogika-nirvikalpika Prajna, i.e., non-discriminating transcendental wisdom which stresses the importance of intensified effort for moral advancement.

(2) Mula-nirvikalpika Prajna, i.e., the fundamental non-discriminating wisdom.

(3) Prsthalabdha-nirvikalpika Prajna, i.e., the non-discriminating wisdom that follows or arises out of the fundamental wisdom.

a. The explanation of these three wisdoms (*jnanas*) in respect of their nature (*svabhava*), their supporting basis (*asraya*), their cause (*hetupratyaya*), their object (*alambana*), their mode of activity (*akara*), etc., may be found in other treatises (e.g., in the Samgraha Sastra).

b. The five stages of the Path and the three Prajnas

In the first two stages (Sambhara and Prayoga), the three Prajnas exist in the state of Bija while the first of them, i.e., the Prayogika-nirvikalpika Prajna, is in actual manifestation.

In the Prativedha stage (the third stage, that of unimpeded penetrating understanding), the second and third Prajnas (i.e., the Mula-nirvikalpika Prajna and the Prsthalabdha-nirvikalpika prajna) are in actual manifestation while all the three Prajnas are in the state of Bija. The reason why the first Prajna (Prayoga) is not in manifestation is that it is not present during the Darsanamarga period (the third stage).

In the Bhavana stage (i.e., the fourth) it is necessary to distinguish: up to and including the seventh Bhumi, the three Prajnas are both in the state of Bija and in actual manifestation; from the eighth Bhumi, the three Prajnas are in the state of Bija, while the last two are in manifestation. The reason why the first is not active is that the Anabhogamarga (the stage in which pure intuition proceeds spontaneously and effortlessly) is incompatible with the first Prajna (which concerns 'intensified effort'). On the other hand, the reason why the third Prajna is active is that all progressive activities in the eighth Bhumi, and in the higher Bhumis, whatever they may be, proceed from the Subsequent Wisdom (Prsthalabdhajnana) which, in the course of pure contemplation, arises spontaneously.

Among the Buddhas in the final or Nistha stage (that of ultimate realization), the last two Prajnas are both in the state of Bija and in actual manifestation. The reason why the first is absent is that, in this final stage, everything that is from Prayoga (the first Prajna) has, in fact, been abandoned.

若自性攝，戒唯攝戒，定攝靜慮，慧攝後五。若幷助伴，皆具相攝。

若隨用攝，戒攝前三，資糧，自體眷屬性故。定攝靜慮。慧攝後五。精進三攝，偏策三故。

若隨顯攝，戒攝前四，前三如前，及守護故。定攝靜慮，慧攝後五。

十二· 五位現種相攝門

此十位者，五位皆具，修習位中其相最顯。然初二位頓悟菩薩種通二種，現唯有漏，漸悟菩薩若種若現俱通二種，已得生空無漏觀故。通達位中種通二種，現唯無漏。於修習位，七地已前種現俱通有漏無漏，八地以去種通二種，現唯無漏。究竟位中若現若種俱唯無漏。

十三· 分位分別門

此十因位有三種名。一名遠波羅蜜多，謂初無數劫，爾時施等勢力尚微，被煩惱伏未能伏彼，由斯煩惱不覺現行。二名近波羅蜜多，謂第二無數刼，爾時施等

On examining the Paramitas and the Siksas from the point of view of their self-nature (*svabhava*), it will be found that Adhisilam Siksa (commandments) comprises Silaparamita; Adhicittam Siksa comprises the Dhyanaparamita; and Adhiprajnam Siksa comprises the last five Paramitas. But, taking into account the 'escorts', that is to say, the dharmas which accompany both the Paramitas and the Siksas, there is reciprocal inclusion of the ten and the three.

On examining the functions of the Paramitas and the Siksas, it will be perceived that (a) Adhisila comprises: (i) the Danaparamita, because Dana is the 'preparatory provision' for Sila; (ii) the Silaparamita, which is Sila by nature; (iii) the Ksantiparamita, because Ksanti is the escort of Sila [In order not to violate the commandments, one must be patient]; (b) Adhicitta comprises the Dhyanaparamita; (c) Adhiprajna comprises the last five Paramitas; and (d) Viryaparamita comprises all the three Siksas, because it helps all of them.

From another point of view, Adhisila comprises the first four Paramitas, the three enumerated above, and the Viryaparamita which protects it; Adhicitta comprises the Dhyanaparamita; and Adhiprajna comprises the last five Paramitas.

12. The Paramitas and the Five Stages

The ten Paramitas exist in all the five stages; but it is in the stage of Bhavana that their characteristics are most clearly manifested.

In the course of the first two stages, for Bodhisattvas of instantaneous realization, the Bijas of the Paramitas are pure and impure, but the Paramitas in actual manifestation are exclusively impure. As for Bodhisattvas who progress by gradual realization, both the Bijas of the Paramitas and the Paramitas in actual manifestation are pure and impure, because these Bodhisattvas have already obtained the pure contemplation of *Pudgalasunyata*.

In the stage of Prativedha (that of unimpeded penetrating understanding), the Bijas are pure and impure, while the actual Paramitas are pure.

In the stage of Bhavana, up to and including the seventh Bhumi, the Paramitas, whether in the state of Bija or in actual manifestation, are pure and impure. From the eighth Bhumi, the Bijas are pure and impure, while the actual Paramitas are exclusively pure.

Among the Buddhas in the final stage of Nistha, the Bijas and actual Paramitas are all exclusively pure.

13. Different Designations for the Paramitas

The ten Paramita-virtues, among non-Buddhas, take successively three names.

1. 'Remote Paramita', in the course of the first Asamkhyeya (innumerable kalpas, i.e., countless aeons). – During this epoch, the force of charity (Dana) and of the other virtues is so weak that, far from suppressing the klesas, the virtues are suppressed by the klesas. Klesas enter into manifestation spontaneously without prior reflection.

勢力漸增非煩惱伏而能伏彼，由斯煩惱故意方行。三名大波羅蜜多，謂第三無數刼，爾時施等勢力轉增能畢竟伏一切煩惱，由斯煩惱永不現行，猶有所知微細現種及煩惱種故未究竟。

此十義類差別無邊，恐厭繁文略示綱要。

十於十地雖實皆修，而隨相增地地修一。

雖十地行有無量門，而皆攝在十到彼岸。

III. 十重障

一・ 異生性障

十重障者，一異生性障，謂二障中分別起者，依彼種立異生性故。

二乘見道現在前時唯斷一種名得聖性，菩薩見道現在前時具斷二種名得聖性。

二眞見道現在前時，彼二障種必不成就。

猶明與闇定不俱生，如秤兩頭低昂時等，諸相違法理必應然，是故二性無俱成失。

2. 'Proximate Paramita', in the course of the second Asamkhyeya. – During this epoch, the force of charity and of the other virtues increases gradually: the virtues are not suppressed by the klesas. On the contrary, they suppress the klesas. The klesas no longer enter into manifestation unless voluntarily.

3. 'Mahaparamita', in the course of the third Asamkhyeya. – During this epoch, the force of charity and of the other virtues has become very strong: the virtues are capable of absolutely suppressing all klesas, which, from then onwards, can never again enter into activity. However, there still remains the subtle Jneyavarana, either in actual manifestation or in the state of Bija; there remain also the Bijas of Klesavarana. The Paramitas are therefore not yet perfect.

Distinctions to be established among the Paramitas are without number. In order not to be too elaborate and tedious, we shall limit ourselves to this summary.

In fact, the ten Paramitas are practised in all the ten Bhumis; nevertheless, one may attribute to each of the Bhumis the Paramita which is dominant in it.

Innumerable are the moral practices of the ten Bhumis; however, they are all comprised in the ten Paramitas.

III. THE TEN AVARANAS

The Ten Avaranas (barriers) are:

1. Prthagjanatvavarana, the barrier constituted by the nature of Prthagjana (ordinary person unenlightened by Buddhism).

(1) This barrier is formed by those constituent parts of the two Avaranas, *klesavarana* and *jneyavarana*, which arise 'by speculation and discrimination': their Bijas are the basis on which the nature of Prthagjana is established.

(2) The adepts of the two Vehicles, when they attain Darsanamarga (insight into Truth), cut off only the Bijas of *klesavarana*: they become from that moment Aryas (saints or sages): they are said to have obtained the Arya-nature (Aryagotra). The Bodhisattvas, when they attain Darsanamarga, cut off the Bijas of both Avaranas: thenceforth they become Aryas, and are said to have acquired the Arya-nature.

(3) When true Darsanamarga is attained, whether by adepts of the two Vehicles or by Bodhisattvas, the Bijas of the Avaranas which the Arya-path has destroyed will definitely not continue to manifest themselves, the reason being that the Arya-nature and the Prthagjana-nature cannot exist simultaneously, just as light and darkness cannot co-exist, and just as, in the case of a balance, when one side of the bar rises, the other side automatically falls. Such is the law governing contradictory dharmas. Therefore our system does not present the erroneous idea that the nature of Prthagjana and that of Arya should be simultaneous.

(4) [Objection by the Sarvastivadin: For us, on the Anantaryamarga (the uninterrupted path), there is still some klesa that may arise: hence the

無間道時已無惑種，何用復起解脫道爲？

斷惑證滅期心別故。

爲捨彼品麤重性故。
無閒道時雖無惑種，而未捨彼無堪任性，爲捨此故起解脫道，及證此品擇滅無爲。

雖見道生亦斷惡趣諸業果等，而今且說能起煩惱，是根本故。

由斯初地說斷二愚及彼麤重。一執著我法愚，卽是此中異生性障。二惡趣雜染愚，卽是惡趣諸業果等。

〔述記：解深密，七十八等說。〕

應知愚品總說爲愚，後準此釋。
或彼唯說利鈍障品俱起二愚。
彼麤重言顯彼二種，或二所起無堪任性。

〔述記：彼言麤重麤重者何顯？卽是彼二愚之種。前二是現行，麤重是種故。〕

如入二定說斷苦根，所斷苦根雖非現種而名麤重，此亦應然。後麤重言例此應釋。

〔述記：瑜伽論第十一說，第二定斷苦根，苦根種子初定已斷，今者斷彼苦根麤重，說第二禪斷彼苦根故。後諸地麤重準此爲二解。〕

雖初地所斷實通二障，而異生性障意取所知，說十無明非染汙故，無明卽是十障品愚。

〔述記：世親攝論第七卷說。〕

necessity of the Vimuktimarga (the path of liberation), which counteracts klesas]; but, for you, at the moment of Anantaryamarga, the Bijas of klesa have disappeared. What, then, is the use of Vimuktimarga?

First explanation. – One requires the two paths by reason of the duality of aspiration in the preparatory stage. The Anantaryamarga is required when the aspiration is for the cutting of klesas, while the Vimuktimarga is required when the aspiration is for the destruction of klesas.

Second explanation, which is better. – One produces the Vimuktimarga to reject to *dausthulya* or the 'crude-heavy nature'. Although at the moment of Anantaryamarga there are no more Bijas of klesa, the yogin has not yet abandoned the quality of inaptitude which proceeds from klesas. It is to abandon this inaptitude that one produces the Vimuktimarga and realizes that unconditioned non-active unity which is the 'discrimination-annihilation' (Pratisamkhyanirodha) of such a category of klesas.

(5) Although the Darsanamarga, on being born, also cuts off 'the deeds and the fruits of bad destinies, etc.', nevertheless the definition which has just been given [that 'the Darsanamarga destroys the nature of Prthagjana'] aims only at the klesas [of Klesavarana and Jneyavarana] which produce these deeds and fruits, because they are the root.

In fact, as taught in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, the Bodhisattva cuts off in the first Bhumi two delusions (Mohas) and their *dausthulya.* These two delusions are: a. the delusion of clinging to the Atman and to dharmas as real entities; that which, properly speaking, is the self-nature of Prthagjana; b. the delusion which comprises the impurity or defilement of bad destinies, that is to say, 'deeds and fruits of bad destiny', etc.

Here, as further on, delusion means the entire category of delusion.

Or else, the two delusions refer solely to those two, one 'sharp' or intense and the other 'dull' or weak, arising simultaneously with the two Avaranas.

What is one to understand by the *dausthulya* (crude and heavy elements) of the two delusions?

It means the Bijas of the two delusions [The two delusions are actual; their *dausthulya* is their Bijas], or perhaps the inaptitude produced by the two delusions. In a similar sense it is said that entrance into the second Dhyana cuts off the root of suffering of Kamadhatu. In truth, the root of suffering which is cut off in the second Dhyana is neither actual nor in the state of Bija; it has already ceased to exist, its Bijas having already been cut off in the first Dhyana. In the second Dhyana there remains only the 'inaptitude' named *dausthulya.* It is the same here.

These remarks are valid for the *dausthulyas* of other Bhumis.

(6) Although the first Bhumi cuts off the two Avaranas, nevertheless, according to the intention of the text which says that the first Bhumi cuts off the nature of Prthagjana, etc., it is merely a question of Jneyavarana, not of Klesavarana.

Vasubandhu in his Samgraha, 7, says in effect: 'The ten Avidyas (ignorance) are not defiled [from the point of view of the two Vehicles]'. These ten Avidyas are the ten pairs of delusions which are being studied here.

二乘亦能斷煩惱障，彼是共故，非此所說。

又十無明不染汙者，唯依十地修所斷說。

雖此位中亦伏煩惱斷彼麤重，而非正意，不斷隨眠，故此不說。

理實初地修道位中亦斷俱生所知一分，然今且說最初斷者，後九地斷準此應知。

住滿地中時既淹久，理應進斷所應斷障，不爾，三時道應無別。

〔述記：住滿地中時既淹久，謂二僧祇，理更應斷。〕

故說菩薩得現觀已，復於十地修道位中唯修永滅所知障道，留煩惱障助願受生，非如二乘速趣圓寂，故修道位不斷煩惱，將故佛時方頓斷故。

〔述記：引對法十四文爲證。〕

二· 邪行障

二邪行障，謂所知障中俱生一分及彼所起悞犯三業。

彼障二地極淨尸羅。入二地時便能永斷。由斯二地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一微細誤犯愚即是此中俱生一分，二種種業趣愚即彼所起悞犯三業。

或唯起業不了業愚。

三· 闇鈍障

三闇鈍障，謂所知障中俱生一分，令所聞思修法忘失。

Why are these Avidyas considered as non-defiled, that is to say, as corresponding to Jneyavarana? – Because the two Vehicles are also capable of cutting off Klesavarana. The cutting off of Klesavarana is therefore common to the two Vehicles and to Bodhisattvas. Now our text is concerned with that which belongs especially to Bodhisattvas.

Further, this formula: 'The ten Avidyas are not defiled' refers to the Avidyas which are cut off by meditation and moral cultivation in the course of the ten Bhumis. It is true that, in this stage, the Bodhisattva also suppresses his klesas and cuts off the *dausthulya* which they provoke; but the text has not that in view, because a Bodhisattva does not cut off the *anusayas* (or Bijas) of klesas.

(7) In fact, in the Bhavanamarga of the first Bhumi (that is to say, after the initial stage which is Darsanamarga), the Bodhisattva cuts off a part of innate Jneyavarana; but our text mentions only that which is cut off right at the beginning of the Bhumi, [that is to say, the nature of Prthagjana which is Jneyavarana of speculation]. Similarly, this applies to the 'cutting off' effected in the nine other Bhumis: it is always a question of that which is cut off at the beginning of the Bhumi. During the very long period (two Asamkhyeyas) spent in the Land of Residence and the Land of Achievement of each Bhumi, the Bodhisattva should cut off progressively that part of his innate Jneyavarana which must be cut off in each Bhumi. On the contrary hypothesis, there would be no difference between the Path and the Lands of Entry, Residence, and Achievement.

The Abhidharma, 14, says, therefore, that the Bodhisattva, after having obtained the Abhisamaya (path of insight), and in the course of the Bhavanamarga of the ten Bhumis, cultivates only the path which destroys for ever his Jneyavarana and preserves the Klesavarana that sustains his pious vow to return to birth again. Unlike the adept of the two Vehicles 'who rushes with all speed to his goal of Eternal Rest', he does not cut off Klesavarana in the course of Bhavanamarga. It is only at the moment of attaining Buddhahood that he cuts it off instantaneously.

2. Mithyapratipattyavarana, the barrier of bad or perverse conduct

This refers to a part of innate Jneyavarana with the three offensive deeds (of body, speech, and thought) which produce this part.

This barrier impedes the three pure moralities (sila) of the second Bhumi. It is absolutely cut off in the 'stage of entry' of this Bhumi. That is why the Yogasastra teaches that the second Bhumi cuts off two delusions with their *dausthulya* (Bijas): (1) the delusion of committing slight offences, that is to say, a part of innate Jneyavarana; (2) the delusion of performing various kinds of wrong or offensive deeds, that is to say, the three offensive deeds which produce the first delusion.

Or else, according to another theory, the two delusions are: (1) the delusion that gives rise to bad acts; (2) the delusion that is ignorant of the nature of deeds.

3. Dhandhatvavarana, the barrier of unintelligence and failure of memory.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which causes failure of memory of the dharmas of audition, of reflection, and of meditation.

彼障三地勝定總持及彼所發殊勝三慧，入三地時便能永斷。

由斯三地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一欲貪愚即是此中能障勝定及修慧者。

彼昔多與欲貪俱故名欲貪愚，今得勝定及修所成，彼既永斷欲貪隨伏，此無始來依彼轉故。

二圓滿聞持陀羅尼愚，即是此中能障總持聞思慧者。

四· 微細煩惱現行障

四微細煩惱現行障，謂所知障中俱生一分，第六識俱身見等攝，最下品故，不作意緣故，遠隨現行故，說名微細。

〔述記：不作意緣故名下品，即是任運生故名下品，非如見斷強思等方生故。〕

〔述記：又遠隨現行故，即無始來隨逐於身不捨於身名下品。〕

彼障四地菩提分法，入四地時便能永斷。

彼昔多與第六識中任運而生執我見等同體起故，說煩惱名，今四地中既得無漏菩提分法，彼便永滅，此我見等亦永不行。

〔述記：問，何故初二三地不斷我見等耶？答，非障法故。〕

初二三地行施戒修相同世間，四地修得菩提分法方名出世，故能永害二身見等。

〔述記：初地行施，二地行戒，三地行修，相同世間，世間有情多此作三福業事故，未能修證菩提分法。〕

〔述記：二身見者，謂初見道已離第六識中分別身見，今此後離第六識中俱生身見盡處，總說名二身見。〕

This barrier impedes the Samadhi-Dharani of the third Bhumi and the three excellent Prajnas which they produce. It is absolutely cut off in the stage of entry of this Bhumi.

Therefore the third Bhumi cuts off two delusions with their *dausthulya*:

(1) Kamaragamoha, the delusion of desire-covetousness which impedes Samadhi and Prajna-of-meditation. It is given the name of Kamaragamoha because, formerly, it was habitually associated with the klesa called *Kamaraga* (desire of the five objects of enjoyment). In the third Bhumi, where the yogin obtains Samadhi and the Prajna-of-meditation, this delusion is absolutely cut off, and, at the same time, the Kamaraga klesa is suppressed, for, since before the beginning of time, this klesa has taken as supporting basis that delusion of desire-covetousness which is a part of Jneyavarana.

(2) Dharanisrutaparipurimoha, the delusion of ignoring or disregarding the perfect Dharanis of audition and moral cultivation. This delusion impedes the Dharanis and the Prajnas of audition and of reflection, [and also the Prajna of meditation].

4. Suksmaklesasamudacaravarana, the barrier which consists in the manifestation of subtle klesas.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which comprises the erroneous 'I-and-mine' view (*satkayadrsti*), etc., of the sixth consciousness. It is said of this klesa that it is very subtle. This is because it belongs to the lowest category; because it does not proceed from an act of attention, being born spontaneously; and because it has been in manifestation since before the beginning of time.

This barrier impedes the *bodhipaksika* (conditions leading to Bodhi or Buddhahood) of the fourth Bhumi. It is absolutely cut off at the moment of entrance into that Bhumi.

It is given the name of klesa, because, formerly, it was spontaneously born of the same nature as the klesa of Atmagrahadrsti (self-clinging-and-belief), etc., which arise spontaneously in the sixth consciousness. – Now, since the Yogin has, in the fourth Bhumi, obtained the pure *bodhipaksika* dharmas, this barrier is absolutely cut off; and it follows that the klesa of *atmadrsti* (self-belief), etc., will never again grow into manifestation.

Why is Atmadrsti not cut off in the first, second and third Bhumis?

This Avarana is not cut off in the first three Bhumis because it does not constitute any barrier to their own dharmas.

In the course of the first three Bhumis, the Bodhisattva practises charity, morality, and meditation: These practices are similar to those of the external world, where sentient beings practise them also. [In these three Bhumis the Bodhisattva is not yet capable of cultivating the dharmas of Bodhi.] Now, in the fourth Bhumi, he practises the *bodhipaksika* dharmas, and it is because of this that the fourth Bhumi is called the 'supramundane' Bhumi. In consequence of this, he destroys absolutely the two *satkayadrstis*, etc. [The Bodhisattva destroys the *satkayadrsti* of 'speculation' of the sixth consciousness upon entry into the first Bhumi; he destroys the innate *satkayadrsti* upon entry into the fourth.]

寧知此與第六識俱？

第七識俱執我見等與無漏道性相違故，八地以去方永不行，七地已來猶得現起，與餘煩惱爲依持故。
此麤彼細，伏有前後，故此但與第六相應。

身見等言亦攝無始所知障攝定愛法愛，彼定法愛三地尚增，入四地時方能永斷，菩提分法特違彼故。

由斯四地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一等至愛愚即是此中定愛俱者，二法愛愚即是此中法愛俱者，所知障攝二愚斷故煩惱二愛亦永不行。

五・　於下乘般涅槃障

五於下乘般涅槃障，謂所知障中俱生一分，令厭生死樂趣涅槃，同下二乘厭苦欣滅，彼障五地無差別道，入五地時便能永斷。由斯五地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一純作意背生死愚即是此中厭生死者，二純作意向涅槃愚即是此中樂涅槃者。

〔述記：生死涅槃旣無差別，何得有厭復有欣耶？〕

六・　麤相現行障

六麤相現行障，謂所知障中俱生一分，執有染淨麤相

How do we know that the *satkayadrsti* destroyed here is the *satkayadrsti* associated with the sixth consciousness.?

The *satkayadrsti* associated with the seventh consciousness is in contradiction to the nature of the pure path; it ceases to appear in the eighth Bhumi, but continues to appear in the seventh, serving as the supporting basis for the other klesas (anger, covetousness, etc.). The *satkayadrsti* of the sixth consciousness is crude and is therefore suppressed first; that of the seventh is subtle and is therefore suppressed later. Hence the *satkayadrsti* destroyed here in the fourth Bhumi is associated only with the sixth consciousness.

By the expression 'satkayadrsti, etc.', one must understand [not only the *atmadrsti*, *atmiyadrsti*, *antagrahadrsti*, *atmamana*, *atmasneha* and the Upaklesas,[1] but] also the *samadhisneha*, 'attachment to meditation', and the *dharmasneha*, 'attachment to Dharma', which are part of the eternal Jneyavarana, and which have been increasing, as they should be, in the course of the first three Bhumis. They are absolutely cut off upon entry into the fourth Bhumi [where the Bodhisattva acquires pure meditation and pure Dharma, and consequently mastery of them], because they are in contradiction to the *bodhipaksika dharmas.*

Consequently the fourth Bhumi cuts off two delusions and their *dausthulya* (inaptitudes):

(1) The delusion of attachment to meditation (*samapatti*), accompanied by *samadhisneha.*

(2) The delusion of attachment to Dharma, accompanied by *dharmasneha.*

In fact, by the abandonment of these two delusions which are part of Jneyavarana, the two *snehas* or attachments, which are klesas, will never again enter into operation since their supporting basis no longer exists.

5. Hinayanaparinirvanavarana, the barrier that consists in attachment to the Parinirvana of the Hinayana School.

It is a part of innate Jneyavarana, which causes the Bodhisattva to have a horror of Samsara (rounds of birth and death) and aspire after Nirvana, just as people of the two lower Vehicles have a horror of suffering and rejoice in its destruction.

This barrier impedes the path of non-differentiation of the fifth Bhumi (which path recognizes the identity and equality of Samsara and Nirvana). When one enters the fifth Bhumi, it is absolutely cut off.

Therefore the fifth Bhumi cuts off two delusions with their *dausthulya* (inaptitudes): (1) the delusion of conceiving ideas for the sole purpose of turning away from birth and death; this is the delusion of horror of Samsara; (2) the delusion of conceiving ideas for the sole purposes of turning towards Nirvana; this is the delusion of predilection for Nirvana.

6. Sthulanimittasamudacaravarana, the barrier which consists in the presence of crude characteristics.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana and consists in the erroneous belief

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[1] See Sections on Klesas and Upaklesas of the sixth Consciousness in Book IV.

現行。彼障六地無染淨道，入六地時便能永斷。

〔述記：世親及此論望後七地說爲麤相，亦不相違。由前地觀四諦故有二染二淨。〕

由斯六地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一現觀察行流轉愚卽是此中執有染者諸行流轉染分攝故。二相多現行愚卽是此中執有淨者。取淨相故，相觀多行，未能多時住無相觀。

〔述記：卽後得智作有相淨觀也。〕

七· 細相現行障

七細相現行障，謂所知障中俱生一分，執有生滅細相現行。彼障七地妙無相道，入七地時便能永斷。

由斯七地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一細相現行愚卽是此中執有生者猶取流轉細生相故。二純作意求無相愚卽是此中執有滅者尙取還滅細滅相故。

純於無相作意勤求，未能空中起有勝行。

〔述記：所言空者，無相空理，於空中作有行，卽眞觀中起於有觀。〕

八· 無相中作加行障

八無相中作加行障，謂所知障中俱生一分，令無相觀不任運起。

that there are in manifestation crude characteristics of impurity and purity. [One believes that Reality or Tathata also presents the characteristics of impurity and purity, because, in the previous Bhumis, one has considered four Noble Truths, two impurities and two purities].

This Avarana impedes the 'path of neither-impurity-nor-purity' of the sixth Bhumi and is absolutely cut off upon entry into this Bhumi.

Therefore the sixth Bhumi cuts off two delusions with their *dausthulya* (inaptitudes):

(1) The delusion of perceiving and examining the evolution of the Samskaras, that is to say, the functioning of mind in its processes regarding like and dislike, good and evil, etc. This delusion admits that *samklesa* (impurity) is present, for the evolution of the Samskaras is comprised in the 'impurity' category.

(2) The delusion of believing in the manifestation of numerous characteristics. This delusion admits that *vyavadana* (purity) is present, because one adheres to the notion of purity. The contemplation accompanied by *nimitta* (or notion), [by the Prsthalabdhajnana which cherishes the notion of purity], is too frequently practised with the result that the yogin cannot reside for any length of time in *nirnimitta* contemplation, that is to say, contemplation accompanied by no concepts of purity.

7. Suksmaninimittasamudacaravarana, the barrier which consists of the presence of subtle characteristics.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana and consists in the erroneous belief that there are in manifestation subtle characteristics of birth and destruction.

This barrier impedes the 'wonderful path free from characteristics' of the seventh Bhumi, and is absolutely cut off upon entry into this Bhumi.

It follows from this that the seventh Bhumi cuts off two delusions with their *dausthulya*:

(1) The delusion of believing in the presence and manifestation of subtle characteristics. This delusion admits that there is birth, because one continues to admit the manifestation of subtle characteristics of birth.

(2) The delusion of conceiving ideas for the sole purpose of seeking freedom from characteristics. This delusion admits that there is destruction because, admitting the existence of birth, one continues to cherish with stronger reasons the subtle notion of destruction; one seeks, with intense mental activity and exclusive, assiduous application, freedom from characteristics of all kinds (*animitta*); one is still incapable of introducing the contemplation of existence in the contemplation of the Void or Reality.

8. Nirnimittabhisamskaravarana, the barrier which consists in indulging in mental functions in a contemplation that should be free from concepts or characteristics.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana, which prevents *nirnimitta* contemplation (i.e., contemplation free from concepts) from proceeding spontaneously.

In the first five Bhumis, contemplation with notions (*sanimitta*) is normal;

前之五地有相觀多無相觀少，於第六地有相觀少無相觀多，第七地中純無相觀，雖恆相續而有加行。

由無相中有加行故，未能任運現相及土，如是加行障八地中無功用道，故若得入第八地時便能永斷，彼永斷故得二自在。

〔述記：言現相者，卽是隨欲現何相者卽能現之，如現金銀等相珠寶等相皆能現故。……土自在者，隨欲現於大小土等現金銀等色卽能現故。〕

由斯八地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一於無相作功用愚，二於相自在愚，令於相中不自在故，此亦攝土相一分故。

八地以上純無漏道任運起故，三界煩惱永不現行。第七識中細所知障猶可現起，生空智果不違彼故。

九· 利他中不欲行障

九利他中不欲行障，謂所知障中俱生一分，令於利樂有情事中不欲勤行樂修己利。彼障九地四無礙解，入九地時便能永斷。

由斯九地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一於無量所說法無量名句字後後慧辯陀羅尼自在愚。於無量所說法陀羅尼自在者謂義無礙解，卽於所詮總持自在於一義中現一切

contemplation without notions is rare. In the sixth Bhumi, contemplation with notions is rare while contemplation without notions is normal. In the seventh Bhumi, [as one has cut off the subtle *nimittas* of birth and destruction], contemplation is exclusively *nirnimitta*, that is to say, entirely free from notions, and makes a continuous series: however, at this stage, preparatory efforts are still required [because the Bodhisattva has not yet mastered this contemplation].

Inasmuch as preparatory efforts are still necessary in this *nirnimitta* contemplation, the Bodhisattva is incapable of manifesting spontaneously different kinds of phenomena [e.g., forms of gold, silver, jewels, etc.], and various 'lands' [of different sizes, colours, etc.], according to his desires.

These preparatory efforts impede the *anabhoga* path (the path of effortlessness) of the eighth Bhumi; it is absolutely cut off upon entry into this Bhumi. At the same time, the Bodhisatta obtains two masteries (mastery of phenomena and mastery of lands).

It follows from this that the eighth Bhumi cuts off two delusions with their *dausthulya* (inaptitudes):

(1) The delusion of making mental efforts in a contemplation that is, in its essential nature, free from notions.

(2) The delusion of not achieving mastery with reference to phenomena (gold, silver, etc.) In other words, this delusion prevents one from achieving mastery of phenomena: this expression includes lands which are a part of phenomena.

From the eighth Bhumi and above, the exclusively pure path appears spontaneously with the result that the klesas of the three Dhatus will never again enter into activity. However, the subtle Jneyavarana of the seventh consciousness (dharma-grasping Manas) can still manifest itself, for the non-discriminative wisdom of Pudgalasunyata and its fruit (*prsthalabdhajnana*) are compatible with this Jneyavarana.

9. Parahita-carya-akamana-avarana, the barrier which consists in an absence of desire to do anything for the benefit of others.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which causes the Bodhisattva to have no desire to apply himself diligently to the service of sentient beings and to take pleasure only in cultivating his own good.

This barrier impedes the four Pratisamvids (the four unhindered or unlimited Bodhisattva powers of interpretation or reasoning) of the ninth Bhumi; it is absolutely cut off upon entry into this Bhumi.

It follows from this that the ninth Bhumi cuts off, with their *dausthulya*, two delusions:

(1) A triple *dharanivasitamoha* (delusion of impeding the first three Pratisamvids: (a) of *artha* (meaning, i.e., unhindered power of interpreting the meaning of the Dharma, the Law); (b) of *dharma* (the letter of the Law, i.e., unhindered power of interpreting the letter of the Law); and (c) of *nirukti* (language or form of expression, i.e., unlimited power of interpreting or understanding the language).

義故。於無量名句字陀羅尼自在者謂法無礙解，即於能詮總持自在於一名句字中現一切名句字故。於後後慧辯陀羅尼自在者謂詞無礙解，即於言音展轉訓釋總持自在於一音聲中現一切音聲故。

二辯才自在愚，辯才自在者謂辯無礙解善達機宜巧爲說故。

愚能障此四種自在，皆是此中第九障攝。

十· 於諸法中未得自在障

十於諸法中未得自在障，謂所知障中俱生一分，令於諸法不得自在。彼障十地大法智雲，及所含藏所起事業。入十地時便能永斷。

〔述記：大法者，是眞如緣如之智，譬如大雲，故名大法智雲。及所含藏者，即陀羅尼門三摩地門諸功德等。大法智雲含衆德水充滿法身，故所含藏即諸功德所起事業，諸智所起諸大神通。〕

由斯十地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一大神通愚即是此中障所起事業者，二悟入微細秘密愚即是此中障大法智雲及所含藏者。

此地於法雖得自在，而有餘障未名最極，謂有俱生微所知障及有任運煩惱障種。金剛喻定現在前時彼皆頓斷入如來地。

a. By 'mastery of the innumerable dharmas preached by the Buddha' is meant the Arthapratisamvid (unhindered power of interpretation with reference to the meaning of the Dharma). In other words, it is the 'mastery of all that can be explained', which makes it possible for all meanings to appear in one Meaning.

b. By 'mastery of the innumerable names, sentences, clauses, phrases and words' is meant the Dharmapratisamvid (unhindered power of interpretation with reference to the letter of the Law). In other words, it is the 'mastery of all that can explain or express meanings', which makes it possible for all names-phrases-syllables to appear in one name-phrase-syllable.

c. By 'mastery of all methods of repeated and continuous explanation and exposition' is meant the Niruktipratisamvid (unhindered power of explaining and understanding languages and forms of expression). In other words, it is the 'mastery of all methods of repeated and continuous exposition and elucidation of verbal expressions and vocal sounds', which renders it possible for all sounds-notes to appear in one sound-note, thus enabling one to understand in the language of one country the languages of all countries.

(2) The *pratibhanavasitamoha* (delusion impeding the mastery of the power of argumentation) which impedes the Pratisamvid of *pratibhana* (argument, i.e., unhindered power of argumentation). By Pratibhanavasita (mastery of the power of argumentation) is meant the Pratibhanapratisamvid (unhindered power of argumentation), skilfulness in discourse which proceeds from a thorough knowledge of the natural qualifications of the sentient beings to be converted.

All delusion that impedes these four kinds of mastery is comprised in the barrier of the ninth Bhumi.

10. Dharmesuvasitapratilambhavarana, the barrier which consists in lack of completeness in respect of the mastery of all dharmas.

This is a part of innate Jneyavarana which hinders the achievement of complete mastery of the various dharmas (that is to say, the Dharanis, Samadhis, meritorious activities, etc.)

This barrier impedes the Mahadharmajnanamegha (cloud of great-dharma-wisdom) of the tenth Bhumi, – that is to say, the cloud which represents the wisdom that envisages Tathata – together with that which the cloud contains and stores (Dharanis and Samadhis) and the activities which it produces. This barrier is absolutely cut off upon entry into the tenth Bhumi.

It follows from this that the tenth Bhumi cuts off, with their *dausthulya*, two delusions:

(1) The delusion which prevents the unfoldment of great supernatural powers (*mahabhijnamoha*). In other words, this delusion impedes the activities arising from Dharmamegha (Dharma-wisdom cloud).

(2) The delusion that hinders the realization of profound and subtle mysteries and secrets. In other words, it impedes the great Dharma-wisdom-cloud and all that is contained and stored therein.

11. Although this tenth Bhumi is possessed of the mastery of all dharmas,

由斯佛地說斷二愚及彼麤重，一於一切所知境極微細著愚卽是此中微所知障，二極微細礙愚卽是此中一切任運煩惱障種。

故集論說，得菩提時頓斷煩惱及所知障成阿羅漢及成如來證大涅槃大菩提故。

此十一障二障所攝。

煩惱障中見所斷種於極喜地見道初斷。彼障現起地前已伏。修所斷種金剛喩定現在前時一切頓斷。彼障現起地前漸伏，初地以上能頓伏盡令永不行如阿羅漢，由故意力前七地中雖暫現起而不爲失，八地以上畢竟不行。

所知障中見所斷種，於極喜地見道初斷，彼障現起地前已伏。

修所斷種於十地中漸次斷滅，金剛喩定現在前時方永斷盡。彼障現起地前漸伏，乃至十地方永伏盡。

八地以上六識俱者不復現行。無漏觀心及果相續能違彼故。

nevertheless, one cannot say that it is perfect in all perfections, because there still remain some traces of Avarana: a subtle innate Jneyavarana and some Bijas of spontaneous Klesavarana. At the moment of Vajropamasamadhi (the Diamond Samadhi), these Avaranas are cut off and the Bodhisattva enters the Land of Tathagatas.

It follows from this that the Bhumi of Buddhas cuts off, with their *dausthulya*, two delusions:

(1) The delusion that consists in certain extremely subtle attachments to all known objects. This is the 'subtle Jneyavarana' referred to above.

(2) The delusion that assumes the form of an extremely subtle and infinitely small barrier. This barrier consists of all the 'Bijas of spontaneous Klesavarana' mentioned above.

This is why the Abhidharma teaches: 'When the Bodhisattva attains Bodhi, he cuts off instantaneously Klesavarana and Jneyavarana; then he becomes Arhat and Tathagata, for he realizes Mahanirvana and Mohabodhi.'

These eleven Avaranas are comprised in the two Avaranas, Klesavarana and Jneyavarana.

With reference to Klesavarana:

(1) The Bijas of those klesas which are to be abandoned by Darsanamarga, the path of insight, are cut off first on entry into the Pramuditabhumi, the Land of Supreme Joy, (i.e., the first Land or Bhumi), when insight into Truth is attained. The manifestation of the klesas of this category has already been suppressed before this Bhumi.

(2) The Bijas of those klesas which are to be abandoned by the path of meditation (*bhavanaheya*) are all cut off instantanteously by the Vajropamasamadhi. [It is a question of *bijas*, not of *dausthulya* (inaptitude) which produces klesas; this *dausthulya* is cut off gradually on entry into the various Lands.] The manifestation of the klesas of this category has been suppressed before the Bhumis. From the first Bhumi, the Bodhisattva can suppress it completely, as an Arhat does, causing it never to be active again. However, in the first seven Bhumis, the klesas may appear voluntarily for short periods from time to time: there is no harm in that; so it should not be regarded as a fault. In the eighth Bhumi and above, the klesas never become active.

With reference to Jneyavarana:

(1) The Bijas of this Avarana which are to be abandoned by Darsanamarga are cut off first by Darsanamarga on entry into the Bhumi of Supreme Joy (i.e., the first Bhumi); their manifestation has already been suppressed before this Bhumi.

(2) The *bhavanaheya* Bijas (i.e., those to be abandoned by the path of meditation) are progressively cut off and destroyed on entry into the ten Bhumis; at the moment of Vajropamasamadhi, they are completely exhausted. As to their manifestation, they are partially and gradually suppressed before the Bhumis. When the tenth Bhumi is reached, they are completely suppressed.

In the eighth Bhumi and above: (1) the Avarana associated with the sixth consciousness is no longer in operation, because the pure contemplation (Nirvikalpakajnana, fundamental non-discriminative wisdom, bearing on the

〔述記：六識俱者八地不行，以二空無漏無分別智心及此果滅定後得智等相續不斷，能違第六識二執故不行。〕

第七俱者猶可現行。法空智果起位方伏。

前五轉識設未轉依，無漏伏故障不現起。

雖於修道十地位中皆不斷滅煩惱障種，而彼麤重亦漸斷滅，由斯故說二障麤重一一皆有三住斷義。

〔述記：於極喜住一切惡趣諸煩惱品所有麤重皆悉永斷，一切上中煩惱品皆不現行，於無加行無功用無相住中一切能障無生法忍諸煩惱品所有麤重皆悉永斷。一切煩惱皆不現前，於最上成滿菩薩住中當知一切煩惱習氣隨眠障礙皆悉永斷。〕

〔述記：由斯故說即四十八說也。〕

雖諸位中皆斷麤重，而三位顯是故偏說。

斷二障種漸頓云何？

第七識俱煩惱障種三乘將得無學果時一剎那中三界頓斷，所知障種將成佛時一剎那中一切頓斷，任運內起無麤細故。

餘六識俱煩惱障種見所斷者三乘見位眞見道中一切頓斷。修所斷者隨其所應，一類二乘三界九地一一漸次九品別斷，一類二乘三界九地合爲一聚九品別斷。菩薩要起金剛喻定一剎那中三界頓斷。

所知障種，初地初心頓斷一切見所斷者。修所斷者後於十地修道位中漸次而斷，乃至正起金剛喻定一剎那中

two Sunyatas) and its fruits (Nirodhasamapatti and Prsthalabdhajnana) functioning in a continuous series, are contradictory to the two graspings (*grahas*) of *pudgala* and *dharma* of the sixth consciousness; (2) the Avarana associated with the seventh consciousness may still enter into activity, but it will be completely suppressed when the Dharmasunyatajnana (the transcendental wisdom that arises from the realization of the voidness of all dharmas) and its fruits take place; (3) As regards the first five consciousnesses, even though it is admitted that they have not yet been transformed (*paravrti*) into pure wisdom in the course of the Bhumis, they cannot revive the activity of the two Avaranas which have been suppressed by the pure contemplation of the sixth consciousness.

Although, in the Bhavanamarga and on his entry into the ten Bhumis, the Bodhisattva does not cut off the Bijas of Klesavarana, nevertheless he gradually cuts off the *dausthulya*. This is why the Yogasastra says that the *dausthulya* of the two Avaranas is cut off in three Viharas [three stages of abandonment, namely, the Pramuditavihara (first Bhumi), the Anabhoganirnimittavihara (eighth Bhumi), and the Paramavihara or Tathagatavihara (Bhumi of Buddhas).] Although this *dausthulya* is gradually cut off in all these Viharas, three stages are characteristic and particularly outstanding. Hence the inadequate expression of the Yogasastra.

Are the Bijas of the two Avaranas cut off gradually or instantaneously?

(1) Seventh consciousness

The Bijas of Klesavarana of the seventh consciousness, whatever the sphere of existence (Dhatu) the klesa refers to, are cut off in a single instant at the moment when the saint of the three Vehicles is about to obtain the fruit of Asaiksa. Similarly, the Bijas of Jneyavarana of the seventh consciousness are all cut off instantaneously at the moment when the Bodhisattva is about to become Buddha. For these klesas are produced spontaneously and internally (not aiming at the external), and there is no question of distinguishing between crude Bijas and subtle Bijas.

(2) The six consciousnesses

As to the Bijas of the two Avaranas of the six consciousnesses, it is necessary to distinguish:

a. Klesavarana. – The Bijas which are to be cut off by Darsanamarga are cut off all at once by Tattva-darsanamarga. This, for the three Vehicles.

The *bhavanaheya* Bijas (those to be cut off by Bhavanamarga): (a) A first class of saints of the two Vehicles cuts off, one by one, the nine categories of each of the nine Bhumis which constitute the three Dhatus [Hence 81 cutting operations altogether: these are the saints that take all the fruits one after the other]; (b) a second class of saints, out of the klesas of the nine Bhumis of the three Dhatus, makes blocks of nine categories which are cut off separately; (c) the Bodhisattvas, at Vajropamasamadhi, cuts off all Bijas of the three Dhatus in one stroke.

b. Jneyavarana. – The Bijas to be cut off by Darsanamarga are cut off all in one stroke upon entry into the first Bhumi. The *bhavanaheya* Bijas are successively cut off in the Bhavanamarga in the course of the ten Bhumis;

方皆斷盡，通緣內外麤細境生，品類差別有衆多故。

二乘根鈍，漸斷障時，必各別起無間解脫加行勝進，或別或總。

菩薩利根漸斷障位非要別起無間解脫，剎那剎那能斷證故，加行等四剎那剎那前後相望皆容具有。

IV. 十眞如

十眞如者，一徧行眞如，謂此眞如二空所顯，無有一法而不在故。

〔述記：謂此法界徧一切行，以無少法非無我故。無性云，此即法空，無有少法而非空故。〕

〔述記：無有一法非二空故。〕

二最勝眞如，謂此眞如具無邊德於一切法最爲勝故。

三勝流眞如，謂此眞如所流教法於餘教法極爲勝故。

四無攝受眞如，謂此眞如無所繫屬，非我執等所依取故。

五類無別眞如，謂此眞如類無差別，非如眼等類有異故。

〔述記：由生死涅槃二皆平等故無差別。〕

六無染淨眞如，謂此眞如本性無染，亦不可說後方淨故。

finally, at the moment of Vajropamasamadhi, they are annihilated in a single stroke. Inasmuch as they bear on the interior (the five internal *indriyas*) as well as on the exterior (external objects), crude and subtle objects of perception arise; they therefore present a great variety of natures.

The faculties of the saints of the two Vehicles are weak. In the gradual cutting off of the two Avaranas, these saints must produce separately for each category the path of expulsion and that of liberation, the path of intensified effort and that of steady progress, whether for each category or for the whole.

On the contrary, the Bodhisattvas possess sharp and lively faculties. In the gradual cutting off of the Avaranas, they do not have to produce separately a path of expulsion and a path of liberation, for, from one moment to another, they cut off their Bijas and attain their goals. The four paths, path of intensified effort etc., are from moment to moment mutually inclusive, that is to say, each of them includes the three others.

IV. The Ten Tathatas

or the Ten Aspects of Bhutatathata

The Ten Tathatas are:

1. The universal Tathata, which is revealed by the two Sunyatas or Nairatmyas. There is not one single dharma which is not void from these two points of view. [Tathata realized in the first Bhumi].

2. The most sublime Tathata, so called because it is provided with infinite sublime qualities, and is the most sublime of all dharmas. [Tathata realized in the second Bhumi].

3. The 'excellent-efflux' Tathata, so called because the teachings flowing out from this Tathata are the most excellent of all teachings. [Tathata realized in third Bhumi].

4. The independent and self-contained Tathata, so called because it is not susceptible of being 'appropriated'. This Tathata has no 'relations and dependents', because it is not a supporting basis for concepts of the 'I' (*atmagraha,* etc.), and because it is not 'taken' by these concepts. [Tathata realized in the fourth Bhumi].

5. The Tathata of subjective non-differentiation, so called because it does not present any difference of species, because it does not diversify like the eye, etc. [It constitutes a single substance (*dravya*); Samsara and Nirvana are one, i.e., identical with each other]. [Tathata of the fifth Bhumi].

6. The Tathata that is above differences of impurity and purity. The truth is that this Tathata is essentially non-defiled, and it cannot be said of it that it is defiled first and pure afterwards. [Tathata of the sixth Bhumi].

七法無別眞如，謂此眞如雖多教法，種種安立，而無異故。
〔述記：謂教安立爲勝義法界善不善等此無別也。〕

八不增減眞如，謂此眞如離增減執不隨淨染有增減故，卽此亦名相土自在所依眞如，謂若證得此眞如已現相現土俱自在故。

九智自在所依眞如，謂若證得此眞如已於無礙解得自在故。

十業自在等所依眞如，謂若證得此眞如已普於一切神通作業總持定門皆自在故。

雖眞如性實無差別而隨勝德假立十種。

雖初地中已達一切而能證行猶未圓滿，爲令圓滿後後建立。

V. 轉依與所證果

如是菩薩於十地中勇猛修行十種勝行，斷十重障，證十眞如，於二轉依便能證得。
〔述記：二轉依者菩提涅槃。〕

轉依位別畧有六種。

一損力益能轉，謂初二位，由習勝解及慚愧故損本識

7. The Tathàta of objective non-differentiation, so called because this Tathata is without differences although it may be diversely defined. [The texts define it as Paramartha, Dharmadhatu, *Kusala*, *Akusala*, etc.]. [Tathata of the seventh Bhumi].

8. The Tathata that transcends all notions of increase or decrease (that is to say, it is invariable, i.e., can be neither added to nor taken from). It does not increase through purity or diminish through defilement. Whether good or bad dharmas increase or diminish, it rests eternally as it is.

This Tathata is also designated as the Tathata that is the supporting basis for the mastery which permits the creation or modification of phenomena (gold, silver, etc.) and of lands (*ksetras*); mastery obtained in the eighth Bhumi. This signifies that when the Bodhisattva has attained this Tathata, he becomes an adept in the manifestation of phenomena or lands of all descriptions. [Tathata of the eighth Bhumi].

9. The Tathata that is the supporting basis for the mastery of transcendental wisdom, that is to say, of the Pratisamvids (unhindered powers) (ninth Bhumi). It signifies that the Bodhisattva, when he has attained this Tathata, obtains mastery of the 'unhindered power of interpreting the Dharma'.

10. The Tathata that is the supporting basis for the mastery of all supernatural activities. The truth is that when the Bodhisattva has attained this Tathata, he becomes the master of physical-vocal-mental activities, supernatural powers, Dharanimukhas and Samadhimukhas (tenth Bhumi).

Although Tathata, in itself, is free from varieties and differences, nevertheless these ten species are distinguished by reason of their excellent qualities.

Although from the first Bhumi the Bodhisattva understands the ten Tathatas, nevertheless he has not yet experienced and practised them in a perfect manner. The Tathatas are therefore established in order that, progressively, in the course of the ten stages of the Path, they may be perfectly understood and practised.

V. Asrayaparavrtti and its Fruits

Revolution or Inner Transformation and its Results

Thus, in the course of the ten Bhumis, the Bodhisattva has energetically practised the ten excellent Paramita-virtues, cut off the ten barriers (*avaranas*), and realized the ten Tathatas. As a result of this, he becomes capable of achieving the two inner transformations (*asrayaparavrttis*), that is to say, he can attain Nirvana and Mahabodhi.

Generally speaking, there are six kinds of Asrayaparavrtti (transformation):

1. Transformation by reducing or smashing the force of impure Bijas and increasing the power of pure Bijas. – During the first two periods, i.e., in the

中染種勢力益本識內淨種功能，雖未斷障種實證轉依，而漸伏現行亦名爲轉。

二通達轉，謂通達位，由見道力通達眞如斷分別生二障麤重證得一分眞實轉依。

三修習轉，謂修習位，由數修習十地行故漸斷俱生二障麤重漸次證得眞實轉依。

攝大乘中說通達轉在前六地，有無相觀通達眞俗閒雜現前，令眞非眞現不現故。

說修習轉在後四地，純無相觀長時現前，勇猛修習斷餘麤重，多令非眞不顯現故。

四果圓滿轉，謂究竟位。由三大劫阿僧企耶修集無邊難行勝行，金剛喻定現在前時永斷本來一切麤重頓證佛果圓滿轉依窮未來際利樂無盡。

五下劣轉，謂二乘位，專求自利厭苦欣寂唯能通達生空眞如斷煩惱種證眞擇滅無勝堪能名下劣轉。

first two stages of the Path (*sambhara* and *prayoya*), through the practice of resolution and judgment (*adhimoksa*), the sense of shame and integrity (*hri* and *apatrapa*), the Bodhisattva reduces the force of the defiled Bijas which are found in the Mulavijnana and increases the power of the pure Bijas which are stored in it. Although he has not yet cut off the Bijas of the Avaranas and achieved Asrayaparavrtti, nevertheless, since he gradually suppresses the actual manifestation of the Avaranas, it can be said that he has achieved Asrayaparavrtti.

2. Prativedhaparavrtti, inner transformation through unimpeded penetrating understanding. – In the course of the third stage, through insight into Truth (Darsanamarga), the Bodhisattva realizes Bhutatathata, thereby cutting off the crude dross (*dausthulya*) of the two Avaranas arising from discrimination and speculation. Thereupon he realizes and achieves, partially, real Asrayaparavrtti.

3. Bhavanaparavrtti, transformation through meditation and constant practice of the highest virtues. – In the course of the period of Bhavana, by repeated practice of the Paramita-deeds of the ten Bhumis, the Bodhisattva progressively cuts off the crude dross of the two innate Avaranas. Thus, gradually, he realizes and attains real Asrayaparavrtti.

According to the Samgraha, the Prativedhaparavrtti belongs to the first six Bhumis: in these Bhumis, in the course of meditation, the two contemplations, namely, that 'accompanied by notions' (*sanimitta*) and that 'exempt from notions' (*animitta*) – which penetrate respectively the 'non-real' and the real – enter into operation one after the other in such a manner that the real sometimes does not appear and sometimes does. The Sastra says further that the Bhavanaparavrtti belongs to the last four Bhumis, because the nimittaless contemplation, i.e., contemplation exempt from notions, remains there for long periods of time without mixing, with the result that this energetic self-cultivation (Bhavana) cuts off what remains of the crude dross of the two Avaranas, thus causing the non-real, in a general way, not to appear any more.

4. Phalaparipuriparavrtti or transformation through perfection of the fruit in the final stage of the Path (*nisthavastha*). – By virtue of the accumulation, in the course of the three Mahakalpas (Asamkhyeyas), of an infinite number of difficult practices and excellent practices, the Bodhisattva, at the moment of Vajropamasamadhi, cuts off absolutely all the innate *dausthulyas* (crude dross) of the Avaranas and realizes at one stroke the perfect Asrayaparavrtti, that is, the 'Buddha fruit', which will last until the end of the ages for the welfare and happiness of all sentient beings.

5. Hinaparavrtti or inferior transformation achieved by the two Vehicles, namely, the Sravakas and the Pratyekabuddhas. – These yogins (1) have in view only their personal advantage; (2) are disgusted with suffering and pleased with mental quietude; (3) are capable of penetrating Bhutatathata only in

〔述記：無勝堪能者無一切智等故。〕

六廣大轉，謂大乘位。爲利他故趣大菩提，生死涅槃俱無欣厭，具能通達二空眞如，雙斷所知煩惱障種，頓證無上菩提涅槃，有勝堪能名廣大轉。此中意說廣大轉依捨二麤重而證得故。

轉依義別，畧有四種。
一能轉道。此復有二，一能伏道，謂伏二障隨眠勢力令不引起二障現行，此通有漏無漏二道，加行根本後得三智，隨其所應漸頓伏彼。

二能斷道。謂能永斷二障隨眠，此道定非有漏加行，有漏曾習相執所引未泯相故，加行趣求所證所引未成辦故。

〔述記：加行智是能趣求所證眞如，趣求所引無分別智，未成辦故不能斷惑，由無分別智是加行所引，眞如是加行所趣求證，卽由所引無分別智能證所證眞如成辦故能斷二障非加行智。〕

有義根本無分別智親證二空所顯眞理無境相故能斷隨眠，後得不然故非斷道。

the measure wherein that is manifested by the *pudgalasunyata*, for they do not know the *dharmasunyata*. Consequently, they cut off only the Bijas of *klesavarana*, the cause of rebirth, and fail to cut off the Bijas of *jneyavarana* which obstructs Mahabodhi. Thus, they realize Bhutatathata only in so far as it is Pratisamkhyanirodha (Nirvana); they do not realize Mahabodhi (the Dharmakaya, the perfect Asrayaparavrtti). They have no eminent faculties and are foreign to the excellent qualities of omniscience, etc. Hence the name 'hinaparavrtti' or 'inferior transformation'.

6. Vipulaparavrtti, the great transformation which is achieved by the abandonment of the crude dross of the two Avaranas, and of which the present Trimsika of Vasubandhu speaks. – The Mahayana Bodhisattvas hasten to Mahabodhi for the well-being of others, have neither disgust for existence nor relish for Nirvana, penetrate the Bhutatathata revealed by the two Sunyatas, cut off absolutely the Bijas of Jneyavarana and Klesavarana, realize instantaneously supreme Bodhi and Nirvana, and possess eminent faculties. Hence the name 'Vipulaparavrtti' or 'great transformation'.

Paravrtti (inner transformation) must be considered under four aspects: 1. The path that operates Paravrtti; 2. the Asraya (base) which is Paravrtti (to be transformed); 3. that which is 'rejected' by Paravrtti; and 4. that which is acquired by means of Paravrtti, that is to say, Nirvana and Mahabodhi.

1. The path that operates Paravrtti is of two kinds: (1) that which suppresses and (2) that which cuts off.

The first suppresses the force of the *anusayas* (Bijas) of the two Avaranas, rendering them incapable of leading the two Avaranas into actual manifestation. It is of two kinds: impure and pure. It is also of three kinds: Preparatory Wisdom, Primary Wisdom, and Subsequent Wisdom (*prayoya, mula, prsthalabdhajnana*). According to the case in question, it accomplishes it sact of suppression either gradually or all at once.

The second Path cuts off absolutely the *anusayas* (Bijas) of the two Avaranas. This path cannot be impure; nor can it be the preparatory wisdom or the 'wisdom of intensified effort' (Prayogajnana). In fact, the impure path has already been trodden at a former stage; it is brought into operation by the 'grasping' of a certain concept (a certain *nimittagraha*) and, consequently, it is incapable of obliterating this concept. On the other hand, the wisdom of intensified effort has as its object the attainment of Bhutatathata which it aspires to realize and the Non-discriminating Wisdom (Nirvikalpakajnana) which it aspires to lead into manifestation; but, as this object has not yet been achieved, it can only serve as a preparation for that achievement.

As to the 'Subsequent Wisdom' (*prsthalabdhajnana*), i.e., the wisdom following or arising out of Primary Wisdom, there are two opinions.

(1) One conceives that the Primary Non-discriminating Wisdom, Mulanirvikalpakajnana, can cut off the *anusayas*, because this wisdom immediately realizes the Bhutatathata that is revealed by the two Voids (Sunyatas) (*pudgalasunyata* and *dharmasunyata*) and does not involve any kind of concept

有義後得無分別智雖不親證二空眞理無力能斷迷理隨眠，而於安立非安立相明了現前無倒證故亦能永斷迷事隨眠。

〔述記：後得無力能斷迷理見疑等隨眠，而於安立非安立諦相明了現前無倒證故亦能永斷迷事隨眠。迷理隨眠行相深遠要證彼理方能斷之，迷事隨眠行相淺近雖實有相觀亦能斷之。〕

故瑜伽說修道位中有出世斷道世出世斷道，無純世間道能永害隨眠是曾習故相執引故。

〔述記：第五十五說修道位中有二道種。初即無分別智後即後得智，後得智名世出世。〕

由斯理趣諸見所斷及修所斷迷理隨眠唯有根本無分別智親證理故能正斷彼，餘修所斷迷事隨眠根本後得俱能正斷。

〔述記：諸見所斷雖有迷事忿等十法見斷頓斷，故迷事之隨眠隨理觀一品斷，此及修所斷無明二見及此俱根本及隨迷理隨眠無分別智斷，餘有貪恚慢無明及此俱隨惑迷事者後得智亦能斷，行相淺近故。〕

二所轉依。此復有二，一持種依。謂根本識，由此能持染淨法種與染淨法俱爲所依，聖道轉令捨染得淨，餘依他起性雖亦是依而不能持種故此不說。

二迷悟依。謂眞如，由此能作迷悟根本諸染淨法依之得生，聖道轉令捨染得淨，餘雖亦作迷悟法依而非根本故此不說。

or *nimitta*. But such is not the nature of the Subsequent Wisdom. Hence it does not belong to the path that cuts off the *anusayas*.

(2) Although the Subsequent Wisdom does not immediately realize the Bhutatathata revealed by the two Sunyatas and therefore has not the power to cut off the two *anusayas* of errors which involve 'confusion about principles' (e.g., doubt, false views, etc.), nevertheless, inasmuch as it realizes clearly, as if face to face, and also exactly, the *vyavasthitalaksana* (the 'analytic' view of things in which the verities are distinguished) and the *avyvasthitalaksana* (the 'synthetic' view of things in which the truths are not distinguished)[1], it is capable of cutting off absolutely the *anusayas* of errors which involve 'confusion about things'. That is why the Yogasastra, 55, teaches: 'In the stage of Bhavana, one practises the supramundane path that cuts off the anusayas [i.e., the Primary Wisdom] and also a mundane and supramundane path that cuts them off [i.e., the Subsequent Wisdom], for an exclusively mundane path cannot destroy absolutely the *anusayas* which have already been practised before and brought into operation by the examination of concepts (*nimittagraha*).'

From this process of reasoning, one is led to the conclusion that, whether the cutting is effected by insight into Truth (Darsanamarga) or by meditation and self-cultivation (Bhavanamarga), the *anusayas* which involve 'confusion about principles' [that is to say, ignorance (Avidya), 'I-and-mine' views (Kayadrsti), false views (Mithyadrsti), and one-sided extreme views (Antagrahadrsti), with the klesas and upaklesas which accompany them] can only be cut off by the Primary Wisdom of Non-discrimination, Mulajnana, which immediately realizes Bhutatathata, while the remaining *anusayas* which involve 'confusion about things' [that is to say, covetousness (Raga), anger (Pratigha), conceit (Mana) and ignorance (Avidya) with the upaklesas], which correspond to Bhavanamarga, are cut off by the Primary Wisdom and the Subsequent Wisdom.

2. The Asraya which is *paravrtti* (the basis to be transformed). This, too, is of two kinds.

(1) On the one hand, the *asraya* which bears the Bijas, i.e., the Mulavijnana or the eighth consciousness, because it bears the Bijas of defiled and pure dharmas and because, being always present, it is the supporting basis for defiled and pure dharmas.

The Holy Path (*aryamarga* or pure wisdom) transforms it in such a manner that it rejects the defiled Bijas and acquires pure ones. The other *paratantras*, that is to say, the other consciousnesses, are also 'supports', but, as they do not bear Bijas, they are not covered by the expression *asrayaparavrtti*.

(2) On the other hand, the *asraya* of confusion (delusion) and intelligence (awakening), i.e., the Bhutatathata. It serves as the root of confusion and intelligence; it is by depending thereon that defiled and pure dharmas are born. The Holy Path transforms it in such a manner that it rejects the defiled and acquires the pure. The Paratantra also serves as a support of dharmas of confusion and intelligence, but it is not the root. Therefore there is no question of this here.

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[1] See Section on Darsanamarga (Laksanadarsanamarga), third stage of the Path.

三所轉捨。此復有二，一所斷捨，謂二障種，眞無間道現在前時障治相違彼便斷滅永不成就說之爲捨，彼種斷故不復現行妄執我法。

〔述記：障治相違如明與闇。〕

所執我法不對妄情亦說爲捨，由此名捨徧計所執。

〔述記：實我實法自性本無但對妄情妄似於有，今妄情斷無境對心假說此境亦名爲斷。〕

二所棄捨，謂餘有漏劣無漏種，金剛喻定現在前時引極圓明純淨本識非彼依故皆永棄捨。

〔述記：謂餘有漏者卽二障餘，謂有漏善三無記法全，異熟生少分除法執一分故。劣無漏種卽十地中所生現行及此種類中下品種。〕

彼種捨已現有漏法及劣無漏畢竟不生，旣永不生亦說爲捨，由此名捨生死劣法。

有義所餘有漏法種及劣無漏金剛喻定現在前時皆已棄捨，與二障種俱時捨故。

有義爾時猶未捨彼，與無間道不相違故，菩薩應無生死法故，此位應無所熏識故，住無閉道應名佛故，後解脫道應無用故。

由此應知餘有漏等解脫道起方棄捨之，第八淨識非彼

3. That which is rejected by Paravrtti. This, too, is of two kinds: (1) that which is rejected by being cut off, and (2) that which is rejected by being abandoned.

(1) The Bijas of the two Avaranas are rejected because they are 'cut off' [They belong to the categories of *darsanaheya* and *bhavanaheya*]. At the moment of the appearance of the true path of expulsion, [that is to say, of pure Mulajnana as opposed to all impure Jnana and to 'Subsequent Wisdom'], the Avaranas are contradicted by their antithesis (pure wisdom), just as darkness is countered by light; they are therefore cut off and destroyed. As the saint will never again be possessed of their Bijas, they are described as having been 'rejected'. The Bijas having been cut off, one no longer has in manifestation erroneous notions of Pudgala or Dharma. As these notions no longer present themselves to a mind which is no longer confused by errors and misconceptions, we say that they have been 'rejected'. Thus, Paravrtti is the rejection of the Parikalpita.

(2) The remaining Bijas of the two Avaranas are not to be cut off (*heya*), but are rejected because they are abandoned or discarded. These are a. the dharmas that are impure without being Avarana [that is to say, the good-impure, *kusalasasrava*; a part of the non-defined born of retribution; three categories of non-defined]; b. the inferior pure dharmas [i.e., the pure dharmas of the ten Bhumis] with their inferior Bijas.

In fact, at the moment of the appearance of the Vajropamasamadhi, there is brought into manifestation an extremely perfect, clear, and immaculate Mulavijnana which can no longer serve as a point of support for the impure or for the inferior pure: all that is therefore discarded and rejected for ever and ever.

The Bijas having been rejected, the impure and the inferior pure can no longer actually be born: this absolute incapacity for birth or manifestation is also named 'rejection'. Paravrtti is therefore the rejection of the impure dharmas of Samsara and the inferior pure dharmas.

With regard to the dharmas or Bijas that are to be abandoned or discarded, at what moment does this abandonment take place?

According to one opinion, the abandonment of the remaining impure dharma-Bijas and the inferior pure ones takes place at the very moment of Vajropamasamadhi, because they are in effect rejected at the same time as the Bijas of the two Avaranas.

According to another opinion, which is correct, they cannot be rejected at this moment, because the path of expulsion (*anantaryamarga*, Vajropamasamadhi) is not in contradiction to them; on the other hand, to admit the first opinion, the Bodhisattva, at the moment of Vajropamasamadhi, would no longer have dharmas of Samsara; his consciousness would no longer be susceptible to perfuming; he would be a Buddha from the moment of his residence in the path of expulsion (*anantaryamarga*); and the 'path of deliverance' (*vimuktimarga*) would therefore be useless.

It should be understood from this that the remaining impure dharmas which do not constitute Avarana and the inferior pure dharmas are abandoned and

依故。

四所轉得。此復有二。

一· 大涅槃

一所顯得，謂大涅槃，此雖本來自性清淨而由客障覆令不顯，眞聖道生斷彼障故令其相顯名得涅槃，此依眞如離障施設故體卽是清淨法界。

涅槃義別畧有四種。

一本來自性清淨涅槃，謂一切法相眞如理，雖有客染而本性淨，具無數量微妙功德，無生無滅湛若虛空，一切有情平等共有，與一切法不一不異，離一切相一切分別，尋思路絕名言道斷，唯眞聖者自內所證，其性本寂故名涅槃。

〔述記：卽七眞如中實相眞如理。〕

二有餘依涅槃，謂卽眞如出煩惱障，雖有微苦所依未滅而障永寂故名涅槃。

〔述記：顯其因盡苦依未盡，異熟猶在名有餘依。依者身也。〕

rejected at the moment of appearance of the path of deliverance, following upon the Vajropamasamadhi, because the eighth consciousness, once immaculate, can no longer serve as a supporting basis for them.

4. That which is acquired by means of Paravrtti. This, too, is of two kinds: that which is acquired because of its revelation, and that which is acquired because of its birth as a product; in other words, that which is revealed by Paravrtti, and that which is born by reason of Paravrtti; on the one hand Mahaparinirvana, on the other Mahabodhi.

I. MAHAPARINIRVANA

That which the Bodhisattva acquires as a result of revelation by Paravrtti is Mahaparinirvana.

In fact, from all times, Nirvana is pure by nature; but it is 'covered' by adventitious barriers or veils which cause it to remain unmanifested. The true Holy Path, in being born, [like a strong wind], clears away the barriers, [like clouds], and causes the character of Nirvana, [like the moon], to manifest itself. That is what is called the attainment of Nirvana.

1. The word Nirvana means the Bhutatathata which has been disentangled from the barriers. Hence the substance of Nirvana is the pure Dharmadhatu.

However, one has to distinguish four different meanings of Nirvana:

(1) The Anadikalika-prakrtisuddha-nirvana, i.e., the Nirvana that is pure in its essential nature:

This is the Bhutatathata, the ultimate principle or essential nature of all dharmas. Despite adventitious contamination, it is: (a) pure in itself; (b) possessed of innumerable and measureless excellent qualities; (c) free from birth and destruction, being absolutely tranquil and placid, like space; (d) equal and common for all sentient beings; (e) neither identical with all dharmas nor different from them (for it is the Dharmata); (f) free from all nimitta (because it is not apprehensible: the *grahyanimitta* is lacking in it); (g) free from all *vikalpa* (mental discrimination) (because it does not apprehend; the *grahakavikalpa* is lacking in it); (h) beyond the path of the intellect (that is to say, it is 'realized' internally; it transcends ideation and ratiocination); (i) beyond the path of names and words; and (j) realized internally by true Aryas (saints and sages).

This Tathata – which is the second of the seven Tathatas – being 'essentially peaceful', receives the name of Nirvana.

(2) The Sopadhisesanirvana, i.e., Nirvana possessed of some remaining *upadi* (supporting basis):

This is the Bhutatathata that has emerged from the barrier of vexing passions. There still remains some *upadi*: although the dharmas of retribution, which are the supporting basis for some subtle suffering, have not yet been destroyed, nevertheless the klesas have been completely and forever tranquillized. Hence Nirvana.

三無餘依涅槃，謂卽眞如出生死苦，煩惱既盡餘依亦滅衆苦永寂故名涅槃。

四無住處涅槃，謂卽眞如出所知障，大悲般若常所輔翼，由斯不住生死涅槃，利樂有情窮未來際，用而常寂故名涅槃。

一切有情皆有初一，二乘無學容有前三，唯我世尊可言具四。

如何善逝有有餘依？

雖無實依而現似有。

〔述記：雖無眞實苦依未盡之有餘涅槃，而現爲苦諦等似有有餘涅槃。〕

或苦依盡說無餘依，非苦依在說有餘依，是故世尊可言具四。

〔述記：約苦依盡故名佛無餘依，有非苦所依身在故名有餘依，以佛世尊具有無漏所依蘊在，是故世尊可言具四。〕

若聲聞等有無餘依，如何有處說彼非有？

〔述記：卽勝鬘經說無無餘依故。〕

有處說彼都無涅槃，豈有餘依彼亦非有？

然聲聞等身智在時有所知障苦依未盡圓寂義隱說無涅

(3) The Nirupadhisesanirvana, i.e., Nirvana without any remaining *upadhi*:

This is the Bhutatathata which has emerged from the suffering of birth and death (Samsara). On the one hand, the klesas have been exhausted; on the other, all remaining *upadhi*, which can serve as a supporting basis for suffering, has equally been destroyed. All sufferings have come to an end. Hence Nirvana.

(4) The Apratisthitanirvana, i.e., Nirvana in which the Bodhisattva does not stay or reside:

This is the Bhutatathata that has emerged from Jneyavarana, 'the barrier which obstructs Supreme Enlightenment (i.e., Bhutatathata)'. [This Tathata is consequently manifested in its integrity and perfection] and is always assisted by Mahakaruna (great compassion) and Mahaprajna (great transcendental wisdom). From this it follows that the Bodhisattva who has realized this Tathata, by reason of his Mahaprajna, does not reside in Samsara; nor does he, by reason of his Mahakaruna, any longer reside in Nirvana. He dedicates himself, with his compassion and wisdom, to service for the well-being and happiness of all sentient beings until the end of all ages. Though fully occupied in such activities, he is always perfectly peaceful. Hence Nirvana.

2. The Tathatas and the different categories of sentient beings: To whom do the various Tathatas belong?

All sentient beings possess the first Tathata. The Asaiksas of the two Vehicles may possess the first three. Only of our World-honoured Bhagavat Buddha can it be said that He possesses all four Tathatas.

Here various problems arise.

(1) How can we attribute the 'possession of remaining *upadhi*' to the Sugata (the Buddha)? Although the Sugata does not possess any real *upadhi*, i.e., dharmas which can serve as supporting bases for suffering, yet He manifests Himself as if He had *upadhi*. [He manifests in His bodies suffering and the cause of suffering].

Alternatively, one may say that the Sugata possesses the Nirupadhisesa ('without remaining *upadhi*') because all *upadhi* which is support for suffering (*duhkhasraya, duhkhopadhi*) is exhausted; we may also say that He possesses the Sopadhisesa (possession of *upadhi*) because there are present *upadhis* which are not support for suffering, that is to say, the pure Skandhas. Thus, it can be said of Bhagavat Buddha that He possesses all four Tathatas.

(2) The Sravakas and the Pratyekabuddhas, you say, are in possession of the Nirupadhisesa. Is there not a Sutra which teaches that they are not in possession of Nirupadhisesa? If they are in possession, why is it said that they are not?

But the same Sutra [the Srimala Sutra] teaches that they do not in any way possess Nirvana. Is one going to maintain that *Sopadhisesa* is also lacking in them?

In fact, as long as their 'body and intelligence' (i.e., their body and their mind) remain, the Sravakas and other saints of the two Vehicles – that is to

槃，非彼實無煩惱障盡所顯眞理有餘涅槃，爾時未證無餘圓寂故亦說彼無無餘依，非彼後時滅身智已無苦依盡無餘涅槃。或說二乘無涅槃者依無住處不依前三。

又說彼無無餘依者依不定性二乘而說，彼纔證得有餘涅槃決定廻心求無上覺，由定願力畱身久住非如一類入無餘依，謂有二乘深樂圓寂得生空觀親證眞如永滅感生煩惱障盡顯依眞理有餘涅槃，彼能感生煩惱盡故後有異熟無由更生，現苦所依任運滅位餘有爲法旣無所依與彼苦依同時頓捨，顯依眞理無餘涅槃，爾時雖無二乘身智而由彼證可說彼有，此位唯有清淨眞如離相湛然寂滅安樂，依斯說彼與佛無差，但無菩提利樂他業故復說彼與佛有異。

say, the *niyatagotras* (saints of indeterminate nature) – have Jneyavarana. The *duhkhopadhi* (that is to say, 'that which serves as support for suffering') not having been exhausted, the principle of Parinirvana remains latent. It may therefore be said that they are not possessed of Nirvana.

This does not mean that they are really devoid of Sopadhisesa Nirvana, that is to say, the 'Reality' or Tathata revealed by the exhaustion of Klesavarana.

But, since they have not yet realized the complete Parinirvana, one says that they have not the Nirupadhisesa: this does not mean that, later, when their body and intelligence have been destroyed, they will not suffer the exhaustion of *duhkhopadhi* and the resultant Nirupadhisesa Nirvana.

In other words, if the Srimalasutra teaches that the saints of the two Vehicles are not possessed of Nirvana, one should understand that this refers to the fourth Nirvana, i.e., the Apratisthitanirvana, in which the Bodhisattva does not stay or reside, not the first three.

Furthermore, this declaration that the saints of the two Vehicles have not the Nirupadhisesa refers only to the *aniyatagotras* (saints of indeterminate nature): these Arhats, at the very moment of their attainment of Sopadhisesa Nirvana, determine to turn their mind towards the supreme Bodhi. By the power of their pure meditation and contemplation and of their pious vows and resolutions, which proceed from compassion, they 'conserve' their bodies and continue their residence for long periods of time in Samsara instead of entering into the Nirupadhisesa as do the *niyatagrota* saints of the two Vehicles.

The latter, i.e., the *niyatagrota* saints whose mind is fixed on arhatship, and not on Buddhahood, have a great predilection for Parinirvana. They obtain the contemplation of *pudgalasunyata*, thus realizing immediately the Bhutatathata which results from this sunyata; they completely destroy the Klesavarana, the cause of rebirth, thereby attaining the Ṣopadhisesa Nirvana which is revealed on the basis of 'Reality'. The klesas which produce rebirth for these saints having been exhausted, there is no reason for a new existence to be produced, especially when the actual *duhkhopadhi* (the physical body) comes to perish spontaneously. The other *samskrtadharmas* (active, functioning dharmas), since they no longer serve as a supporting basis (*upadhi*), are abandoned at the same time as the *duhkhopadhi*. As a result of this, the Nirupadhisesa Nirvana which supports itself on Reality will be manifested. Although at this moment (when the *duhkhopadhi* has come to an end) the body and intelligence of the two Vehicles no longer exist, nevertheless, as these saints have previously effected the destruction of this *duhkhopadhi*, one can attribute Nirupadhisesa to them.

At this moment, [in view of the complete disappearance of all *cittanimitta*,] there remains only the pure Tathata (the first of the ten Tathatas set out at the beginning of this section), exempt from the ten *nimittas*, placid, tranquil, non active, beatified.

From the point of view of Tathata, it is said that the saints of the two Vehicles are not different from the Buddhas; but since they are not possessed of Bodhi and those activities that are directed to the salvation of others, it is said that they are different from the Buddhas.

諸所知障既不感生，如何斷彼得無住處？

〔述記：涅槃者體解脫縛，其所知障既不能發業潤生如何斷彼得無住處？〕

彼能隱覆法空眞如令不發生大悲般若，窮未來際利樂有情，故斷彼時顯法空理，此理卽是無住涅槃，令於二邊俱不住故。

若所知障亦障涅槃，如何斷彼不得擇滅？

擇滅離縛彼非縛故。

〔述記：由慧簡擇縛斷得滅名擇滅故，由所知障不縛有情招生死苦，故斷彼已不得擇滅。〕

既爾斷彼寧得涅槃？

〔述記：涅槃亦是解脫縛故。〕

非諸涅槃皆擇滅攝，不爾性淨應非涅槃。能縛有情住生死者斷此說得擇滅無爲，諸所知障不感生死非如煩惱能縛有情，故斷彼時不得擇滅，然斷彼故法空理顯，此理相寂說爲涅槃，非此涅槃擇滅爲性，故四圓寂諸無爲中初後卽眞如中二擇滅攝。

若唯斷縛得擇滅者不動等二四中誰攝？

〔述記：不動無爲想受滅無爲。〕

〔述記：四無爲者五蘊論說：一虛空，二擇滅，三非擇滅，四眞如。〕

非擇滅攝說暫離故，擇滅無爲唯究竟滅，有非擇滅非永滅故。

或無住處亦擇滅攝，由眞擇力滅障得故。擇滅有二，一滅縛得，謂斷感生煩惱得者，二滅障得，謂斷餘障而證得者，故四圓寂諸無爲中初一卽眞如，後三皆擇滅。不動等二暫伏滅者非擇滅攝，究竟滅者擇滅所攝。

3. Since Jneyavarana does not produce rebirth, how does one obtain Apratisthitanirvana ('Non-residing Nirvana') by cutting it off?

Jneyavarana veils and obscures Bhutatathata in so far as it is revealed by *dharmasunyata*; it prevents the manifestation of great compassion and transcendental wisdom (*mahakaruna* and *mahaprajna*) by which a Buddha, till the end of the ages, renders service for the well-being and happiness of sentient beings. Hence, when it is cut off, the principle of *dharmasunyata* is manifested, and this principle is the Apratisthitanirvana, which causes the Bodhisattva to 'reside' neither in Samsara nor in Nirvana.

(1) If Jneyavarana also represents a barrier to Nirvana, why does one not obtain *pratisamkhyanirodha* (discrimination-annihilation) when one cuts it off?

Pratisamkhyanirodha means disconnection or disentanglement from bonds: now Jneyavarana neither connects nor binds.

This being the case, how does one obtain Nirvana by cutting off Jneyavarana [since Nirvana, too, is emancipation from bonds]?

Not all Nirvanas are comprised in *pratisamkhyanirodha*: otherwise, if all were comprised, the first Nirvana, which is pure by nature, would not be Nirvana. It follows from this that one obtains *pratisamkhyanirodha asamskrta* (unconditioned non-active state) when one cuts off that which binds sentient beings and causes them to reside in Samsara: that is to say, when one cuts off the klesas. Now, Jneyavarana is not the cause of Samsara: it does not bind sentient beings as the klesas do. Hence, when one cuts it off, one does not obtain *pratisamkhyanirodha*. However, by the fact that this barrier is destroyed, the principle of *dharmasunyata* is manifested; inasmuch as this principle is the cessation of *nimittas*, one says that it is Nirvana, not that this Nirvana is of the nature of *pratisamkhyanirodha*. Hence, among the four Parinirvanas, *asamskrtas* (unconditioned non-active dharmas), the first and the last are Bhutatathata; the two others are comprised in *pratisamkhyanirodha*.

If it is only by the sundering of bonds that one obtains *pratisamkhyanirodha*, in which of the four Asamskrtas (*akasa*, *pratisamkhyanirodha*, *apratisamkhyanirodha* and *tathata*) are aninjya[1] and *samjnaveditanirodha*[2] included?

These two are comprised in *apratisamkhyanirodha*, (non-discrimination-annihilation), because it is said that they are temporary cessations; now *pratisamkhyanirodha* is exclusively total destruction, whereas there is *apratisamkhyanirodha* which is not total destruction.

(2) Or perhaps Apratisthitanirvana is comprised in *pratisamkhyanirodha*, for it is obtained when the barriers (Avaranas) have been destroyed by the power of true *pratisamkhya*.

Pratisamkhyanirodha is of two kinds: a. obtained by the destruction of bonds, that is to say, obtained when on has cut off the klesas that cause rebirth; b. obtained by the destruction of barriers, that is to say, realized when all remaining barriers have been cleared away.

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[1] One of the six kinds of inaction, the state of being unmoved by pleasure or pain.

[2] Inaction due to cessation of conception and sensation.

旣所知障亦障涅槃，如何但說是菩提障？

說煩惱障但障涅槃，豈彼不能爲菩提障？應知聖教依勝用說，理實俱能通障二果。

如是所說四涅槃中唯後三種名所顯得。

二· 大菩提

二所生得，謂大菩提。此雖本來有能生種，而所知障礙故不生，由聖道力斷彼障故令從種起名得菩提。起已相續窮未來際，此卽四智相應心品。

（一） 四智差別門

云何四智相應心品？

一大圓鏡智相應心品，謂此心品離諸分別，所緣行相微細難知，不忘不愚一切境相，性相清淨離諸雜染，純淨圓德現種依持，能現能生身土智影，無間無斷窮未來際，如大圓鏡現衆色像。

〔述記：佛地云離我我所執一切所取能取分別。〕

〔述記：境及行相二俱叵測名爲微細。謂不愚者不迷闇義，由此如來名一切種智及一切智。若不忘者恆現前義，由此如來成不忘失法者。自性明善名爲清淨，有漏永亡離諸雜染。〕

〔述記：純簡因無漏，淨簡一切有漏，圓簡二乘無學功德。〕

Hence, among the four Parinirvanas, the first is Bhutatathata; the other three are *pratisamkhyanirodha*. As to *aninjya* and *samjnaveditanirodha*, when they are temporarily 'suppressed and destroyed', they are comprised in *apratisamkhyanirodha*; when they are absolutely and eternally destroyed, they are comprised in *pratisamkhyanirodha*.

(3) Since Jneyavarana also represents a barrier to Nirvana, why is it said that it is solely *bodhy-avarana*, barrier to Bodhi?

It is well said that Klesavarana is exclusively a barrier to Nirvana: does this mean that it cannot be a barrier to Bodhi as well? In fact, the sacred teachings concerning this problem are given from the point of view of the principal effects of the two barriers; in reality, both of them represent barriers to the two 'fruits' (Nirvana and Mahabodhi).

Among the four Nirvanas explained above, only the last three are called 'that which is obtained as a result of revelation by Paravrtti [caused by the destruction of the two Avaranas]'.

2. MAHABODHI

What the Bodhisattva acquires 'by birth or production' is Mahabodhi.

From all times, [among people who are possessed of the Gotra of Bodhisattvas], there exist Bijas that can produce Mahabodhi; but these Bijas do not produce it as long as Jneyavarana represents a barrier to them. When this barrier is cleared away by the force of the Holy Path, Mahabodhi is born from its Bijas; that is what is called the attainment of Mahabodhi. Once born, it continues without interruption until the end of all ages.

1. What is Mahabodhi? It is the various classes of mental attributes associated with the four transcendental wisdoms (Jnanas), namely, the Great Mirror Wisdom (*mahadarsajnana*), the Universal Equality Wisdom (*samatajnana*), the Profound Contemplation Wisdom (*pratyaveksanajnana*), and the Perfect Achievement Wisdom (*krtyanusthanajnana*).

(1) The mental attributes associated with the Great Mirror Wisdom (Mahadarsajnana):

The mind associated with this Wisdom is entirely dissociated from all mental discriminations (*vikalpa*). [According to the Buddhabhumisastra, in this mind there is neither discrimination between *atmagraha* and *atmiyagraha* nor discrimination between *grahyagraha* and *grahakagraha*.] Its objects of perception and modes of activity are subtle and 'difficult to comprehend'. It carries all objects without failure of memory (because its objects are eternally present)[1] and without error (because it is never troubled or obscured).[2] In its essential nature and characteristics it is pure (i.e., clear and good), being free from all impurities and confused states (*samklesa*). It is the supporting basis for absolute qualities (superior to the pure qualities of non-Buddhas) which are pure (i.e., superior to impure qualities) and perfect (i.e., superior to the qualities

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[1] This is why the Tathagata is named *amusitasmrti* (he who never fails in his memory of dharmas).

[2] This is why the Tathagata is named *sarvajna* and *sarvakarajna* ('All-Wisdom' and 'All-Bija-Wisdom').

二平等性智相應心品，謂此心品觀一切法自他有情悉皆平等，大慈悲等恆共相應，隨諸有情所樂示現受用身土影像差別，妙觀察智不共所依，無住涅槃之所建立，一味相續窮未來際。

〔述記：更無轉易名爲一味，無間斷故名爲相續。〕

三妙觀察智相應心品，謂此心品善觀諸法自相共相無礙而轉，攝觀無量總持定門，及所發生功德珍寶，於大衆會能現無邊作用差別皆得自在，雨大法雨斷一切疑，令諸有情皆獲利樂。

〔述記：總持門者陀羅尼門，定門者三摩地門。功德珍寶者，謂六度道品十力等法。〕

四成所作智相應心品，謂此心品爲欲利樂諸有情故，普於十方示現種種變化三業，成本願力所應作事。

如是四智相應心品雖各定有二十二法，能變所變種現俱生，而智用增以智名顯。

〔述記：二十二法者徧行別境善法幷取心故。〕

〔述記：此二十二者體能變者是見分，所變者是相分，或識自體名能變，相見二分名所變，或能變是種因能變故，所變謂現果能變故。〕

of the two Vehicles); it is the receptacle of the Bijas of these qualities. It manifests the images of other Jnanas (which themselves are born of their Bijas); it gives birth to bodies and lands. Without interruption, universally and eternally, like a great mirror, it manifests the images of all Rupas.

(2) The mental attributes associated with the Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana):

The mind associated with this Wisdom sees the identity of all dharmas (*by dharmasunyata*), and the complete equality between its own self and other sentient beings (by *pudgalasunyata*); it is always united with great benevolence, great compassion, etc.; it manifests itself, in conformity with the dispositions and predilections of sentient beings (Bodhisattvas of the ten Bhumis), in a variety of forms of Parasambhogakayas[1] and their Lands; it is the special supporting basis for the Profound Contemplation Wisdom (Pratyaveksanajnana); it constitutes the Non-abiding Nirvana (Apratisthitanirvana); being always itself, it continues, without interruption, till the end of all ages.

(3) The mental attributes associated with the Profound Contemplation Wisdom (Pratyaveksanajnana):

The mind associated with this Wisdom discerns in excellent ways the peculiar and common characteristics of all dharmas. It manifests itself without any hindrance. It comprises the observation of innumerable Dharanimukhas and Samadhimukhas, as well as jewels of meritorious virtues, including those which are realized and those which are produced (the six Paramitas, the ten powers, etc.). In Dharma assemblies, it can manifest itself in infinite activities, in all of which it possesses self-mastery. It rains the 'rain of the great Dharma'; it cuts away all doubts; it enables all sentient beings to obtain blessings and joys.

(4) The mental attributes associated with the Perfect Achievement Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana):

The mind associated with this Wisdom, through its desire to promote the welfare and happiness of all sentient beings, manifests itself, throughout the ten regions, in a diversity of fictitious actions of the body, of the voice, and of the mind. In this manner it achieves, by the force of its pious vows, all that is to be done.

Thus, the mind associated with the four Wisdoms (Jnanas) forms in each case a simultaneous group of at least twenty-two dharmas (the mind itself, five universal Caittas, five special ones, and eleven good ones). It comprises, like its Caittas, the Bhagas (that which manifests itself and that which is manifested), as well as Bijas and mental attributes in action. But the attribute of wisdom (Jnana) (which is the Prajna caitta) is particularly active. This mind is therefore indicated by the name of wisdom (Jnana).

THE BHAGAS

[That which manifests itself – *darsanabhaga*;
that which is manifested – *nimittabhaga*.

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[1] Bodies endowed with subtle and pure qualities for enjoyment by Bodhisattvas of the ten Bhumis.

故此四品總攝佛地一切有爲功德皆盡。

（二） 轉何識得何智門

此轉有漏八七六五識相應品如次而得，智雖非識而依識轉，識爲主故說轉識得。

又有漏位智劣識強，無漏位中智強識劣，爲勸有情依智捨識，故說轉八識而得此四智。

〔述記：智爲決斷。〕

（三） 轉識得智位次門

大圓鏡智相應心品，有義菩薩金剛喻定現在前時即初現起，異熟識種與極微細所知障種俱時捨故，若圓鏡智爾時未起便無能持淨種識故。

有義此品解脫道時初成佛故乃得初起，異熟識種金剛喻定現在前時猶未頓捨，與無閒道不相違故。

〔述記：無間道與異熟識等俱滅故，旣非障法故不相違。〕

非障有漏劣無漏法，但與佛果定相違故，金剛喻定無

or

That which manifests itself – *svasamvittibhaga*;
that which is manifested – *darsanabhaga* and *nimittabhaga*.

or

That which manifests itself – Bijas;
that which is manifested – the actual mental activities.]

It may therefore be said that these four Wisdoms comprise as a whole all the conditioned qualities (*samskrtas*) of the Bhumi of the Buddhas.

2. What are the consciousnesses the transformation (*paravrti*) of which causes the four Wisdoms to be attained?

The four Wisdoms are attained by the transformation of the mental attributes of the eighth, the seventh, the sixth, and the first five consciousnesses respectively while they are still in the impure state, the first Wisdom corresponding to the impure Alayavijnana, the second to the impure Manas, and so forth.

Jnana (which is a *caitta*) is not consciousness, but it depends on consciousness for its evolution or birth. It has consciousness as its 'lord', being related to it just as a minister is releated to his ruler or a servant to his master. It is therefore said that Wisdom is attained by the transformation (*paravrti*) of consciousness.

The second explanation is that Wisdom (which is decision, judgment) is feeble in the impure state while consciousness (which is perception) is strong. The reverse is true in the pure state. In order to encourage sentient beings to depend on and cleave to Wisdom and reject or relinquish consciousness, we say that one attains the four Wisdoms by virtue of the transformation of the eight consciousnesses.

3. At what moments are the four Wisdoms attained?

(1) Great Mirror Wisdom (Adarsajnana) – There are two doctrines.

First doctrine, incorrect [although it is taught in the Buddhabhumisastra]. – The Great Mirror Wisdom commences its manifestation at the moment of Vajropamasamadhi (Diamond Samadhi, *anantaryamarga*), because at that moment there are rejected the Bijas of the Vipakavijnana and, simultaneously with them, the most subtle Bijas of Jneyavarana; because, if the Great Mirror Wisdom had not been born at that moment, an eighth consciousness capable of bearing the pure Bijas would be lacking.

Second doctrine. – The Great Mirror Wisdom only commences its manifestation on the Path of Emancipation (*vimuktimarga*) which follows the Vajropamasamadhi and on which the Bodhisattva has just attained Buddhahood. In fact, the Bijas of Vipakavijnana are not yet rejected at the moment of this Samadhi since they are not in contradiction with the *anantaryamarga*. [They are simultaneous to it: they perish at the same time with it.]

In fact, the impure dharmas which do not represent a barrier (that is, the good-impure dharmas and the Vipakavijnana which is non-defined) and the pure mediocre dharmas (that is, the pure dharmas of the ten Bhumis) are only

所熏識無漏不增應成佛故，由斯此品從初成佛盡未來際相續不斷，持無漏種令不失故。

〔述記：卽前所言餘有漏是，謂善無記體非障有漏之法。〕
〔述記：無間生已四智圓明無所熏識，諸無漏法更不增長應成佛故。〕

平等性智相應心品，菩薩見道初現前位違二執故方得初起，後十地中執未斷故有漏等位或有間斷，法雲地後與淨第八相依相續盡未來際。

妙觀察智相應心品，生空觀品二乘見位亦得初起，此後展轉至無學位或至菩薩解行地終或至上位，若非有漏或無心時皆容現起。

〔述記：此卽初解生空觀品，漸悟入者至解行地終，頓悟者至無學位，或至上位者謂至菩薩十地位中，頓漸皆爾。〕

法空觀品菩薩見位方得初起，此後展轉乃至上位，若非有漏生空智果或無心時皆容現起。

成所作智相應心品，有義菩薩修道位中後得引故亦得初起。

in contradiction with the fruit of Buddha, not with Vajropamasamadhi. If, after the birth of Vajropamasamadhi, there no longer exists a perfumable eighth consciousness (the Vipakavijnana), and if pure dharmas no longer grow and increase, the Bodhisattva has attained Buddhahood. The four Wisdoms will then be in manifestation.

In consequence, it is at the moment when the Bodhisattva becomes a Buddha that the eighth consciousness is first associated with the Great Mirror Wisdom. As such, it remains until the end of time in an uninterrupted series, bearing the pure Bijas in such a manner that they are preserved forever, without being lost.

(2) Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana)

This Wisdom begins its manifestation in those Bodhisattvas who have entered the path of insight into Truth (Darsanamarga), since this path is in contradiction with the two 'adhesions' to Atman and dharmas (*klesavarana* and *jneyavarana*). However, in the course of the ten Bhumis, because the two clingings which belong to the seventh consciousness, Manas, have not yet been cut off, this Wisdom is interrupted occasionally when the sixth consciousness is impure. [Up to the seventh Bhumi, pure and impure thoughts are mixed together.] But after the tenth Bhumi, when the seventh consciousness and the pure eighth consciousness support and depend upon each other, this Universal Equality Wisdom will last without any interruption until the end of time.

(3) Profound Contemplation Wisdom (Pratyaveksanajnana)

This Wisdom is of two kinds, corresponding to the view of *pudgalasunyata* and to that of *dharmasunyata.*

a. The first kind, referring to the wisdom of Pudgalasunyata, begins to manifest itself also on the Darsanamarga (path of insight into Truth) of the Lesser Vehicle. It continues right up to the state of Asaiksa (whose realization of Truth is instantaneous) or to the end of the Adhimukticarya[1] of the Bodhisattvas (whose realization of Truth is gradual), or right up to the superior states (i.e., the ten Bhumis and Buddhas). It is capable of manifestation as long as the mind is not impure[2] and as long as the yogin is not absorbed in mindless meditation.

b. The second kind, referring to the wisdom of Dharmasunyata, is born at the moment of entry into the Darsanamarga of the Bodhisattvas: it continues right up to the superior states. It is capable of manifestation as long as the mind is not impure, as long as the wisdom of *Pudgalasunyata* and its fruit (Subsequent Wisdom) are not taking place, and as long as the Bodhisattva is not absorbed in mindless meditation.

(4) Perfect Achievement Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana)

a. According to one theory, this Wisdom can be born in the stage of meditation and self-cultivation (Bhavanamarga) of the Bodhisattvas, because it is brought about by the 'Subsequent Wisdom' (*prsthalabdhajnana*, which belongs to Manovijnana).

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[1] This is the stage of apprehending and following the teachings.

[2] Before the seventh Bhumi, the mind is sometimes impure.

有義成佛方得初起，以十地中依異熟識所變眼等非無漏故，有漏不共必俱同境，根發無漏識理不相應故，此二於境明昧異故。由斯此品要得成佛依無漏根方容現起，而數間斷，作意起故。

（四） 種性本有始起門

此四種性雖皆本有，而要熏發方得現行，因位漸增佛果圓滿，不增不減盡未來際，但從種生不熏成種，勿前佛德勝後佛故。

（五） 所緣何境界門

大圓鏡智相應心品，有義但緣眞如爲境，是無分別非後得智，行相所緣不可知故。

有義此品緣一切法，莊嚴論說大圓鏡智於一切境不愚迷故，佛地經說如來智鏡諸處境識衆像現故，又此決定緣無漏種及身土等諸影像故。行緣微細說不可知，如阿賴耶亦緣俗故。

b. According to the second theory, the Bodhisattva begins to manifest this Wisdom only when he has attained Buddhahood. In fact, in the course of the ten Bhumis, the consciousnesses which are based on the sense-organs (eye, ear, etc.) cannot be pure, since these organs are evolved by the Vipakavijnana, i.e., the eighth consciousness, which is not pure. That impure dharmas – which are the special supporting bases for consciousness, which are contemporaneous with it, and which aim at the same object as it does – should produce a pure consciousness is an impossibility. Between an impure sense organ and a pure consciousness there is, as regards the object, the difference between light and darkness. Consequently, this Wisdom of Perfect Achievement begins to manifest itself only when Buddhahood is attained, because in him alone are found the pure sense-organs which serve as the supporting basis for that Wisdom. It should be noted that this Wisdom is frequently interrupted, for it can only be born of 'active mental attention'.

4. Bijas of the four Wisdoms

The Bijas of all the four Wisdoms are innate and have existed from time without beginning; but, in order that these Wisdoms may actually manifest themselves, the Bijas must be 'perfumed'. In the course of the 'period of cause' (*hetu-avastha*: before the state of Buddhahood), the Bijas increase gradually; in the state of Buddhahood (*phalavastha*), and up to the end of time, they are perfect in all perfections: they neither increase nor decrease. The actual Wisdoms are born of their Bijas, but these Bijas are not created as a result of perfuming because the eighth consciousness of the Buddha is not perfumable. The reason for this is that, if they were perfumable, the ancient Buddhas would have been superior in moral qualities to the later Buddhas.

5. Object (*alambana*) of the Wisdoms

(1) Great Mirror Wisdom

Adarsajnana

First doctrine. – The mind associated with the Great Mirror Wisdom has as its object Bhutatathata only, because this Wisdom is the Fundamental Non-discriminating Wisdom (*Nirvikalpaka* Jnana), not the Subsequent Wisdom (*Prsthalabdha* Jnana); because its mode of activity (*akara*) and its object (*alambana*) are unknowable.

Second doctrine. – This mind has as its object all dharmas. According to the Mahayana-Sutralamkara Sastra, the Great Mirror Wisdom is free from errors in its perception of all objects. According to the Buddhabhumi Sutra, '[Just as images appear in a mirror, so], in the Mirror Wisdom of the Tathagata there appear all images of the six Ayatanas (eye, ear, etc.), the six Visayas (colour, sound, etc.), and the six consciousnesses (visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc.). [This is why Bhagavat is omniscient]'. Furthermore, the mind associated with this Wisdom definitely perceives the pure Bijas and images of bodies and lands.

緣眞如故是無分別，緣餘境故後得智攝。其體是一，隨用分二，了俗由證眞故說爲後得。餘一分二準此應知。

〔述記：因有二類種，果恒爲一種，生二用現行。〕

平等性智相應心，品有義但緣第八淨識，如染第七緣藏識故。有義但緣眞如爲境，緣一切法平等性故。有義偏緣眞俗爲境，佛地經說平等性智證得十種平等性故。莊嚴論說緣諸有情自他平等隨他勝解示現無邊佛影像故。由斯此品通緣眞俗二智所攝，於理無違。

妙觀察智相應心品，緣一切法自相共相，皆無障礙，二智所攝。

成所作智相應心品，有義但緣五種現境，莊嚴論說如來五根一一皆於五境轉故。有義此品亦能偏緣三世諸法，不違正理。佛地經說成所作智起作三業諸變化事，

Its mode of activity and its object are said to be unknowable because they are subtle; but, despite its subtlety, this mind, like the Alayavijnana, does perceive the Samvrti, i.e., the variety of dharmas.

When this Wisdom perceives Bhutatathata, it is Nirvikalpaka Jnana; when it perceives other objects, it is Prsthalabdha Jnana.

In its essential nature, it is unique; with respect to its activity, it is twofold. When it distinguishes the Samvrti, it is through the functioning of the Bhutatathata which it has realized: it is therefore said to be 'subsequent' (*prsthalabdha*). [In the state of cause, among the Bodhisattvas, the Bijas of the *nirvikalpaka* and *prsthalabdha* Jnanas are distinct. Among the Buddhas, the same Bijas produce the two actual Jnanas]. – This remark applies to the other Wisdoms.

(2) UNIVERSAL EQUALITY WISDOM

Samatajnana

a. First doctrine. – The mind associated with this Wisdom, which is pure Manas, bears on the pure eighth consciousness just as defiled Manas bears on the Alaya.

b. Second doctrine. – Its object is Bhutatathata only since it perceives the identity or equality (*samata*) of all dharmas (*sarvadharmasamata*).

c. The correct doctrine. – It bears both on Reality (*tattva*) and on the Samvrti. The Buddhabhumi Sutra teaches that the Universal Equality Wisdom attains the ten species of Samata (nature of equality). The Sutralamkara says that the Samatajnana, bearing on universal identity, on the equality between the self and other beings, manifests itself as innumerable images of Buddhas in harmony with the dispositions of sentient beings. Hence the mind associated with the Samatajnana bears on Reality and on the Samvrti; it is Nirvikalpaka or Prsthalabdha Jnana according to the case in question.

(3) PROFOUND CONTEMPLATION WISDOM

Pratyaveksanajnana

The mind associated with this Wisdom has a bearing on the individual and common characteristics of all dharmas without anything representing a barrier to it. It comes under the categories of both the Nirvikalpaka and the Prsthalabdha Jnanas.

(4) PERFECT ACHIEVEMENT WISDOM

Krtyanusthanajnana

First doctrine. – The mind associated with this Wisdom bears only on the five kinds of actual objects (colour, sound, etc.), because the Sutralamkara teaches that each of the five sense-organs of the Tathagata perceives all the five corresponding objects.

Second doctrine. – This mind has a bearing on all the dharmas of the three periods. In fact, the Buddhabhumi Sutra says that the Perfect Achievement

決擇有情心行差別，領受去來現在等義。若不徧緣無此能故。

〔述記義演：此能決擇所化衆生八萬四千心行差別。〕

然此心品隨意樂力或緣一法，或二或多，且說五根於五境轉，不言唯爾，故不相違。

隨作意生緣事相境起化業故，後得智攝。

（六） 緣境作用門

此四心品雖皆徧能緣一切法而用有異，謂鏡智品現自受用身淨土相持無漏種，平等智品現他受用身淨土相，成事智品能現變化身及土相，觀察智品觀察自他功能過失，雨大法雨破諸疑網利樂有情。

如是等門差別多種。

〔述記：諸智相見分別門，相應心所多少門，善無漏門，假實分別門，攝諸功德門。〕

此四心品名所生得，此所生得總名菩提，及前涅槃名所轉得。雖轉依義總有四種，而今但取二所轉得，頌說證得轉依言故。

Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana) manifests itself as innumerable and varied transformation bodies (Tathagatanirmanakayas) and their three varieties of deeds; that it assures itself of the 84,000 states of mind of sentient beings; and that it perceives the past, the future, and the present. This Wisdom would be incapable of such an employment if its range of perceptions were not universal.

In fact, the mind associated with this Wisdom, by the force of the intentions and predilections of the Buddha, bears either on one object (colour), or on two (colour and sound), or on many objects. As for the saying in the Sutralamkara that each of the five sense-organs of the Tathagata perceives all the five corresponding objects, this Sutra does not say that that is the entire range of activity of a Tathagata's sense-organs. Hence we do not contradict this text in thinking that the five consciousnesses associated with the Perfect Achievement Wisdom bear on the six objects, *i.e.*, colour, sound . . . dharmas.

Born as the result of an act of attention, bearing on the characteristics of things, manifesting itself as transformation bodies and their varieties of deeds, this Wisdom forms part of the Subsequent Wisdom (*prsthalabdhajnana*).

6. Activity of the four Wisdoms

Although all these four Wisdoms have a bearing on all dharmas, nevertheless, their activity presents varieties.

(1) The Mirror Wisdom (Adarsajnana) manifests the Svasambhogakaya (the functioning glorious body for a Buddha's own use) with its pure Land; it carries the pure Bijas (i.e., the pure qualities of the fruit of Buddha).

(2) The Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana) manifests the Parasambhogakaya (the functioning glorious body for the spiritual benefit of others) with its pure Land.

(3) The Perfect Achievement Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana) manifests the transformation body (Nirmanakaya) with its Land (pure or impure).

(4) The Profound Contemplation Wisdom (Pratyaveksanajnana) observes and examines the virtues and vices of the self and others; it rains the 'rain of the great Dharma'; it breaks through the net of doubts; it actualizes the well-being and happiness of all sentient beings.

Innumerable are the points of view under which one can examine the Wisdoms. [K'uei Chi: Which are their Bhagas; which are their associates; which are their moral species, etc.?]

The minds associated with these four Wisdoms are what the Bodhisattva 'obtains by producing'. They are designated, as a group, by the term 'Bodhi'. With Nirvana which is 'obtained by being revealed or made present to oneself', it is 'that which is obtained through inner transformation (asrayaparavrti)'. We have seen that the subject of inner transformation (Paravrti) can be examined from four points of view; but here one is concerned only with the two things obtained by Paravrti, because the Stanza says, 'Because of the abandonment of the crude dross of the two barriers. inner transformation (asrayaparavrti) is achieved.'

We have studied this stage of meditation and self-cultivation (Bhavanavastha)

此修習位說能證得，非已證得，因位攝故。

and explained that which the Bodhisattva realizes and obtains by it: he realizes Nirvana and obtains Bodhi. However this Bhavana indicates only the capacity for realization and attainment, not actual realization and attainment, for it belongs to the stage or period of 'cause' (*hetvavastha*). [We have to examine the final stage or period of 'fruit' (*phalavastha*), the stage or period of perfect achievement.]

第五章· 究竟位

法身

後究竟位，其相云何？

頌曰：

此卽無漏界， 不思議善常，
安樂解脫身， 大牟尼名法。

論曰：
前修習位所得轉依，應知卽是究竟位相。

此謂此前二轉依果，卽是究竟無漏界攝。

〔述記：言究竟者略有二義，一簡前四位名究竟，二簡二乘名究竟，二乘雖得菩提涅槃非究竟義非高勝故。〕

§ V. NISTHAVASTHA

The Stage of Ultimate Realization

THE DHARMAKAYA

What are the characteristics of the stage of final attainment or ultimate realization (Nisthavastha)?

The Stanza says:

30

This is the Pure Dhatu (the undefiled storehouse realm)

Which is inconceivable and incomprehensible, good and eternal,

Where one is in a state of blissfulness with one's emancipated body (*vimuktikaya*);

This is the Law of 'Great Silence' (*mahamuni*), the Dharmakaya, realized by the great Buddha, Sakyamuni.

The Treatise says:

It should be understood that the 'revolution' or inner transformation (*asrayaparavrtti*) which is achieved during the preceding stage of exercising cultivation represents the stage of final attainment or ultimate realization. The word 'this' in the Stanza refers to the two fruits (Nirvana and Mahabodhi) resulting from the revolution of the preceding stage. These fruits constitute the Pure Dhatu (undefiled storehouse realm) of final attainment (in contradistinction to the Dhatu of the four preceding stages of 'moral provisioning', etc., and to the Dhatu of the two Vehicles).

1. ANASRAVADHATU

The Pure Dhatu

[Translator's Note:

This is 'pure Dharmadhatu'.

The Buddhabhumi Sutra teaches that the *Buddhabhumi* is made up of five dharmas, namely, the pure Dharmadhatu and the four Transcendental Wisdoms. The Buddhabhumi Sastra studies this pure Dharmadhatu.

'Free from the impurities of Klesavarana and Jneyavarana; the true and non-erroneous nature of all dharmas; the cause which brings to birth, nourishes and supports the Aryadharmas; the true nature of all Tathagatas; pure in itself from the beginningless past; possessed of diverse qualities more numerous

諸漏永盡，非漏隨增，性淨，圓，明，故名無漏。

〔述記：非漏隨增者，即是顯非所緣縛義……離二縛義。〕
〔述記：餘無漏等，雖亦名無漏，非究竟無漏。〕

界是藏義，此中含容無邊希有大功德故。或是因義，能生五乘世出世間利樂事故。

清淨法界可唯無漏攝，四智心品如何唯無漏？

道諦攝故唯無漏攝，謂佛功德及身土等皆是無漏種性所生，有漏法種已永捨故。

雖有示現作生死身業煩惱等似苦集諦，而實無漏道諦所攝。

集論等說十五界等唯是有漏，如來豈無五根五識五外界等？

有義如來功德身土甚深微妙非有非無，離諸分別絕諸戲論，非界處等法門所攝，故與彼說理不相違。

〔述記：今三論諸師多爲此解。〕

有義如來五根五境妙定生故法界色攝，非佛五識，雖

than the atoms of the universes of the ten regions; without birth or destruction, like space; penetrating all dharmas and all beings; neither identical with the dharmas, nor different from them; neither *bhava* nor *abhava*; free from all distinguishing marks, conceptions, cogitation; which is only realized by the pure Aryajnana; having as its nature the Tathata which the two Voids reveal; which the Aryas realize partially; which the Buddhas realize completely; that is what is called the pure Dharmadhatu.']

This is called 'pure dhatu', *anasravadhatu*, 1. because all defiled elements are forever eliminated; 2. because it is not a place to which vices and passions can attach themselves; 3. because it is by nature immaculate whilst, among the saints of the two Vehicles, Jneyavarana remains; 4. because it is complete and perfect whilst the Saiksas only possess the causes of purity; and 5. because it is luminous in nature (in contrast with the realms of the saints of the two Vehicles or of the Bodhisattvas). [The other undefiled dharmas, though also described as 'undefiled', are really not perfectly undefiled.]

Dhatu (storehouse-realm) here has the meaning of storing up, because the great merits contained in it are infinite and sublime. Or perhaps it has the idea of cause, because it can produce the blessings and joys, both mundane and supramundane, of the five Vehicles.

All right, one will say, the pure Dharma-dhatu may truly be said to be exclusively undefiled (*anasrava*); but how can the mental attributes associated with the four transcendental wisdoms (Jnanas) be exclusively undefiled?

Because all these attributes are comprised in the Noble Truth of the Right Path (*margasatyr*). This means that the qualities, bodies, and worlds of the Buddha are brought to birth through undefiled Bijas, because the Buddha has completely rejected all Bijas of impure dharmas.

No doubt the Buddha manifests deeds, klesas, etc., which produce a body of Samsara, which leads one to say that there seems to be 'suffering' and the 'cause of suffering' (*dukkha* and *samudayasatyr*); but all these manifestations are really undefiled and form part of the Noble Truth of the Right Path.

The Abhidharmasamuccaya says that, among the eighteen Dhatus, fifteen are exclusively impure (*sasrava*), the five sense-organs (*caksurdhatu*, etc.), the five objects corresponding to them (*rupadhatu*, etc.), and the five sense-consciousnesses (*caksurvijnanadhatu*, etc.). Must one believe that the Tathagata, entirely pure (*anasrava*), has no sense-organs, sense-consciousnesses, and external Dhatus?

1. First doctrine. – [According to the 'Masters of the Three Treatises' (K'uei Chi)], the qualities, bodies and worlds of the Tathagata are very profound and mysterious, neither existent nor non-existent; entirely dissociated from all mental discrimination (Vikalpa), transcending all verbal descriptions, and not comprised at all among Skandhas, Dhatus, Ayatanas, etc. One may therefore say, without contradicting the Abhidharma, that the Buddha is not impure.

2. Second doctrine. – The five sense-organs and the five corresponding

依此變，然麤細異非五境攝，如來五識非五識界，經說佛心恆在定故，論說五識性散亂故。

〔述記：對法第一說五識身性散亂故。〕

成所作智何識相應？

第六相應，起化用故。

與觀察智性有何別？

彼觀諸法自共相等，此唯起化，故有差別。

此二智品應不並生，一類二識不俱起故。

許不並起於理無違，同體用分俱亦非失。

〔述記：如一意識見色聞聲。〕

〔述記義演：或前念起妙觀察智說法，後念起成事智現起化身，或前念起成事智現化身，後念起妙觀察智說法，然前後二智行用迅速狀似二智作用並起也。〕

或與第七淨識相應，依眼等根緣色等境是平等智作用差別，謂淨第七起他受用身土相者平等品攝，起變化者成事品攝。

豈不此品攝五識得？

非轉彼得體即是彼，如轉生死言得涅槃，不可涅槃同生死攝，是故於此不應為難。

有義如來功德身土如應攝在蘊處界中，彼三皆通有漏無漏。

objects of a Tathagata, proceeding from a wonderful meditation, are comprised in a Rupa which emerges from the Dharmadhatu (*dharmadhaturupa*). Although the five consciousnesses of non-Buddhas function in dependence upon the objects (bodies and worlds) which the Buddha develops, yet one must distinguish between the crude and the subtle; what the Buddha develops is subtle and is not included in the category of the five objects (*rupadhatu*, etc.)

As to the five consciousnesses of the Buddha, they are not comprised in the five *vijnanadhatus*, because the Sutra says that the mind of the Buddha is constantly absorbed in deep meditation, whereas, as noted in the Abhidharmasastra, the five consciousnesses [of ordinary sentient beings] belong to the plane of distraction and confusion.

The question arises: with which consciousness is the Perfect Achievement Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana) associated?

(1) With the sixth consciousness, because this Wisdom produces the transformation bodies and their multifarious activities (Nirmanas).

But, if it be so, what is the difference between this Wisdom and the Profound Contemplation Wisdom (Pratyaveksanajnana)?

The latter observes the individual and common characteristics of things, whereas the former creates only transformation bodies and their activities.

But these two Wisdoms should not arise simultaneously, because two consciousnesses of the same kind (e.g., two Manovijnanas) are not simultaneous.

It is not absurd to admit that these Wisdoms are not simultaneous; but, on the other hand, one single consciousness may simultaneously function in two manners. [One single Manovijnana sees colour and hears sound; the Pratyaveksana, in preaching the Dharma, and the Krtyanusthana, in the manifestation of Nirmanas, are at the same time associated with a Manovijnana.]

(2) Or else with the pure seventh consciousness. To perceive colour, etc., in dependence upon the sense-organs (eye, etc.) is the function of the Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana). The pure seventh consciousness, in so far as it creates the Parasambhogakaya and its 'land',[1] is comprised in the Samatajnana; in so far as it creates Nirmanas, it is included in the Perfect Achievement Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana).

But, one will say, this last Wisdom is obtained by the transformation (*paravrtti*) of the five consciousnesses, is it not? How, then, can it be associated with the seventh consciousness?

Although it is obtained by the transformation of the five consciousnesses, one cannot conclude that it is, by its own nature, one of the five consciousnesses. For instance, it is by the transformation of Samsara that Nirvana is attained. Would one say that Nirvana is included in Samsara?

3. Third doctrine, which is correct. – The 'meritorious qualities' (*gunas*) and the bodies and lands of the Tathagatas are comprised in the Skandhas, Ayatanas, and Dhatus, as it is fitting that they should be so comprised; but the Skandhas, etc., may be pure (*anasrava*) or impure (*sasrava*).

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[1] 'Land' used here in the sense of 'realm' or 'world', e.g., the Pure Land of Amitabha or Amita Buddha.

集論等說十五界等唯有漏者，彼依二乘麤淺境說，非說一切。謂餘成就十八界中唯有後三通無漏攝，佛成就者雖皆無漏，而非二乘所知境攝。

然餘處說佛功德等非界等者，不同二乘劣智所知界等相故，理必應爾。

所以者何？說有爲法皆蘊攝故，說一切法界處攝故，十九界等聖所遮故。若絕戲論便非界等，亦不應說卽無漏界善常安樂解脫身等。

〔述記：說十九界等無垢稱經之所遮。〕

又處處說轉無常蘊獲得常蘊，界處亦然，寧說如來非蘊處界，故言非者是密意說。

〔述記：涅槃經，莊嚴論，勝鬘等。〕

又說五識性散亂者，說餘成者，非佛所成。

故佛身中十八界等皆悉具足而純無漏。

此轉依果又不思議，超過尋思言議道故。微妙甚深自內證故。非諸世間喻所喻故。

此又是善，白法性故，清淨法界遠離生滅極安隱故，四智心品妙用無方極巧便故，二種皆有順益相故，違不善故，俱說爲善。

In fact, when the Abhidharmasamuccaya teaches that fifteen Dhatus are exclusively impure, it has in view the crude objects and superficial consciousnesses of the two Vehicles, not the fifteen Dhatus of the Tathagata. Among the eighteen Dhatus, organs-objects-consciousnesses (eye, colour, visual consciousness, etc.), of non-Buddhas (the two Vehicles and Bodhisattvas of the ten Lands), only the last three (Manas, Dharmas, Manovijnana) may be pure; but, as far as the Buddha is concerned, all the eighteen are pure and incomprehensible to the saints of the two Vehicles.

In fact, some other texts (Mahaprajna, etc.) say that the qualities, bodies, etc., of the Buddhas are not comprised in the Dhatus for the reason that these qualities, etc., do not bear any resemblance to the Dhatus which are known by the mediocre knowledge of the adherents of the two Vehicles.

It is certain that the qualities, bodies, etc., of the Buddha are comprised in the Dhatus. – Why? Because, according to the texts, all Samskrtas (conditioned dharmas) are comprised in the five Skandhas, all dharmas are comprised in the eighteen Dhatus and the twelve Ayatanas; there is no nineteenth Dhatu (Vimalakirti).

If the fruit of Buddha (*buddhaphala*), because it transcends verbal descriptions, is not Dhatu, etc., it should not be said that it is 'the Pure Dhatu, good, eternal, blissful, the body of emancipation', etc.

Again, many texts (Nirvanasutra, Srimalika, Sutralamkara) teach that the Bodhisattva, in becoming Buddha, transforms or abandons impermanent skandhas and acquires permanent skandhas. Similarly for the Dhatus and Ayatanas. Is it therefore permitted to say that the Buddha is not Skandhas-Ayatanas-Dhatus? When one says that it is not Skandhas, etc., it is an intentional declaration. [The meaning is that these Skandhas, etc., are not perceptible to inferior wisdoms].

Similarly, the declaration that 'the five consciousnesses belong to the plane of distraction and confusion' concerns the five consciousnesses of non-Buddhas.

Let us therefore conclude that the eighteen Dhatus are found in the body of the Buddha but are absolutely pure (*anasrava*).

The fruit of Asrayaparavrtti presents four characteristics:

1. It is 'inconceivable' and 'incomprehensible', because it is beyond mind and expression; because, sublime and profound, it is realized by the Bodhisattva in himself; and because no worldly comparison can give any idea of it.

2. It is good, because it is of the nature of white dharmas.

In fact, the pure Dharmadhatu (that is to say, the Tathata which is realized as the fruit of Buddhahood), exempt from birth and destruction, is very secure and solid.

As to the mental attributes associated with the four Wisdoms, their mysterious functions and activities are incomparable and extremely skilful.

The fruit of Asrayaparavrtti, whether *asamskrta* (Dharmadhatu) or *samskrta* (the four Wisdoms), is beneficent and opposed to the bad.

論說處等八唯無記，如來豈無五根三境？此中三釋，廣說如前。

一切如來身土等法皆滅道攝，故唯是善，聖說滅道唯善性故，說佛土等非苦集故，佛識所變有漏不善無記相等皆從無漏善種所生無漏善攝。

此又是常，無盡期故，清淨法界無生無滅性無變易，故說爲常。四智心品所依常故，無斷盡故，亦說爲常，非自性常，從因生故，生者歸滅一向記故，不見色心非無常故。然四智品由本願力所化有情無盡期故，窮未來際無斷無盡。

〔述記：其四智品體無斷及無盡故說常。無斷常者是不斷常義報身也，無盡常者是化身相續常義。〕

此又安樂，無逼惱故，清淨法界衆相寂靜故名安樂。四智心品永離惱害故名安樂。此二自性皆無逼惱，及能安樂一切有情，故二轉依俱名安樂。

解脫身

二乘所得二轉依果唯永遠離煩惱障縛無殊勝法，故但名解脫身。

It is true that, according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 'eight Ayatanas are exclusively non-defined, that is, the five sense-organs, smell, taste, and touch; but one cannot, on the basis of this declaration, conclude that these eight Ayatanas are lacking in the Buddha or that they are, in the Buddha, non-defined. The three explanations to be given here are the same as those given above for the fifteen exclusively impure Dhatus.

The body, the land, the Tathata, the four Wisdoms; everything that refers to the Tathagatas is exclusively good, because all this is comprised in the Noble Truths of the Cessation of Suffering (Nirodha) and the Right Path leading to it (Marga); because the Sutras and Sastras are agreed that these two Truths are exclusively good; because the Abhidharma, 6, declares that the Lands, etc., of Buddhas are neither Suffering (*duhkha*, painful and impure existence) nor Cause of Suffering (*samudaya*, cause of similar existence).

But, one may ask, does the consciousness of the Buddha not manifest itself in these good-impure or non-defined things, such as created bodies, etc.? – These things are, for people who see them, similar to good-impure or non-defined objects; but all that which the Buddha develops is, in itself, good and pure, for it proceeds from good and pure Bijas.

3. It is eternal, because it never exhausts itself.

As for the pure Dharmadhatu, it is exempt from birth and destruction, and its nature is immutable. Hence it is said to be eternal.

As for the four Wisdoms, their supporting basis [that is, the Tathata] being eternal, they are never interrupted, and they never exhaust themselves. Hence they, too, are said to be eternal, not that they are eternal in themselves, since they are produced by causes, since they are born, and it is an absolute declaration of the Bhagavat that 'that which is born must eventually be destroyed'. There is no Rupa, no Citta, which is not impermanent. But, given the force of the pious vow (*mahapranidhana*) to convert all sentient beings who are inexhaustible in number, the four Wisdoms will last up to the end of all future ages; the two bodies of Sambhoga are not interrupted and the bodies of Nirmana will renew themselves without end.

4. It is blissful, for it does not torment.

The pure Dharmadhatu is blissful, being the cessation of all perception and ideation.

The four Wisdoms are forever exempt from pain and suffering; hence they are described as blissful.

Mahabodhi and Nirvana, which are the two fruits of Asrayaparavrtti, are both described as blissful, because they are by nature non-tormenting and are capable of promoting the bliss and beatitude of all sentient beings.

2. VIMUKTIKAYA

The fruit of the two *paravrttis* obtained by the saints of the two Vehicles, inasmuch as it is forever disentangled from the bonds of Klesavarana, and as

牟尼名法身

大覺世尊成就無上寂默法故名大牟尼。此牟尼尊所得二果永離二障亦名法身，無量無邊力無畏等大功德法所莊嚴故。

體依聚義總說名身，故此法身五法爲性，非淨法界獨名法身，二轉依果皆此攝故。

一· 三身別相門

（一） 自性身

如是法身有三相別。一自性身，謂諸如來眞淨法界，受用變化平等所依，離相寂然絕諸戲論，具無邊際眞常功德，是一切法平等實性。卽此自性亦名法身，大功德法所依止故。

（二） 受用身

二受用身，此有二種，一自受用，謂諸如來三無數劫修集無量福慧資糧所起無邊眞實功德及極圓淨常偏色身，相續湛然盡未來際，恆自受用廣大法樂。

二他受用，謂諸如來由平等智示現微妙淨功德身居純淨土，爲住十地諸菩薩衆現大神通轉正法輪決衆疑網，令彼受用大乘法樂，合此二種名受用身。

it is not embellished by very distinguished dharmas [e.g., the ten powers], is only given the name of *vimuktikaya*, 'emancipated body'.

3. DHARMAKAYA

Bhagavat Mahabuddha, being possessed of the supreme qualities of Muni (tranquillity and silence), is named Mahamuni. The two fruits obtained by this Muni, being completely and forever dissociated from the two Avaranas, are designated not only by the term Vimuktikaya but also by the term Dharmakaya. They are in fact embellished by *dharmas* of great qualities (*mahagunadharmas*), immeasurable and infinite, for instance, the ten powers, the four intrepidities, etc.

The term *kaya* has the triple meaning of self-nature (svabhava), support (*asraya*), and accumulation (*samcaya*).

Therefore the Dharmakaya consists of five dharmas, namely, pure Dharmadhatu and the four Wisdoms. It is not only the pure Dharmadhatu that is named Dharmakaya, for the fruits of the two *paravrttis* are included in the Dharmakaya.

1. Three Kayas

The Dharmakaya is triple, consisting of three bodies (*kayas*) [which are all bodies of *mahagunadharmas*].

(1) *Svabhavikakaya*, the body of self-nature, [so named because it is the essential nature (*svabhava*) of the Buddhas]. It is the pure Dharmadhatu of the Tathagatas, the immutable supporting basis for the two Sambhogakayas and the Nirmanakaya, free from the ten nimittas, peaceful, beyond words and concepts, possessed of infinite real and eternal qualities. It is the immutable and identical nature of all dharmas.

This Svabhavikakaya receives also the name of Dharmakaya, because it is the supporting basis for *mahagunadharmas*.

(2) Sambhogakaya, which is of two kinds.

a. Svasambhogakaya. This consists of the infinite real qualities created by the accumulation of immeasurable merits and wisdom cultivated by the Tathagatas during three Asamkhyeyakalpas; it is a material body (*rupakaya*), perfect, pure, eternal and omnipresent; it forms a continuous series and is always profound and clear; it will last until the end of all future ages; it itself perpetually enjoys the ample beatitude of the Dharma [which is procured by infinite merits.]

b. Parasambhogakaya. The Tathagata, by means of his transcendental Wisdom of Universal Equality (*Samatajnana*), manifests a body possessed of subtle and pure qualities, which inhabits a completely pure land; this body, thanks to his Profound Contemplation Wisdom (*Pratyaveksanajnana*), displays for the Bodhisattvas of the ten Bhumis a spectacle of mystical and supernatural powers; turns the Wheel of Dharma, and breaks through the net of doubts, thus enabling the Bodhisattvas to enjoy the beatitude of the Mahayana Dharma.

These two bodies therefore constitute the Sambhogakaya, the 'body of beatitude'.

(三) 變化身

三變化身，謂諸如來由成事智變現無量隨類化身居淨穢土，爲未登地諸菩薩衆二乘異生稱彼機宜現通說法令各獲得諸利樂事。

二· 五法攝三身門

以五法性攝三身者，有義，初二攝自性身，經說眞如是法身故，論說轉去阿賴耶識得自性身，圓鏡智品轉去藏識而證得故。中二智品攝受用身，說平等智於純淨土爲諸菩薩現佛身故，說觀察智大集會中說法斷疑現自在故，說轉諸轉識得受用身故。後一智品攝變化身，說成事智於十方土現無量種難思化故。又智殊勝具攝三身，故知三身皆有實智。

〔述記：第一師經說眞如是法身者佛地經說，論說轉第八得自性者攝論第九說。……說平等智於純淨土爲諸菩薩現佛身者，莊嚴論說，說觀察智大集會中等者……亦在莊嚴論，亦有轉諸轉識得受用身者，是攝論智品說。說成事智於十方土現難思化故者，佛地論說，莊嚴論說。又攝論智殊勝具攝三身。〕

有義初一攝自性身，說自性身本性常故，說佛法身無生滅故，說證因得非生因故，又說法身諸佛共有，徧一切法猶若虛空，無相無爲非色心故。

〔述記：自性身本常者，莊嚴論說三種常，如佛地論第七等引。說佛法身無生滅者，佛地云，讚佛論說。然七十八解深密亦有此言，法身無生滅化身有起盡故。說證因得非生因者，世親菩薩金剛般若論說。又說法身諸佛共有等者，佛地論云諸經論說，即對法第一攝大乘智品等中亦有此說。〕

(3) Nirmanakaya. The Tathagatas, by means of their Wisdom of Perfect Achievement (*Krtyanusthanajnana*), cause to appear innumerable and varied transformation bodies (*nirmanakayas*), which inhabit pure and dirty lands in accordance with the nature and characteristics of the various classes of sentient beings. For the advantage of those Bodhisattvas who have not yet attained the Bhumis, the devotees of the two Vehicles, and the Prthagjanas, these Nirmanakayas, taking into account the needs of each one, display their supernatural powers and teach the Dharma in such a manner that all these people obtain well-being and good fortune.

2. The five Dharmas and the Bodies

First theory

(1) The Svabhavikakaya is composed of the Dharmadhatu and the first of the four Jnanas (Wisdoms), i.e., the Great Mirror Wisdom (Adarsajnana).

In fact, according to the Sutra (Buddhabhumi Sutra), the Bhutatathata is the Dharmakaya. And according to the Sastra (Samgraha, Asvabhava), in causing the Alayavijnana to cease through transformation, one obtains the Svabhavikakaya; the Mahadarsajnana causes a 'revolution' of the eighth consciousness and the Svabhavikakaya is obtained.

(2) The Sambhogakaya is composed of the two intermediate Wisdoms, that is, the Wisdom of Universal Equality (Samatajnana) and the Wisdom of Profound Contemplation (Pratyaveksanajnana).

In fact, according to the Sastra (Sutralamkara), the Universal Equality Wisdom, in the perfectly pure land, manifests the body of the Buddha before the Bodhisattvas, while the Profound Contemplation Wisdom, in the great assemblies, preaches the Dharma, cuts off doubts, and manifests its innate powers. The Sastra (Samgraha) says that the Sambhogakaya is obtained by the revolution or transformation of the seven Pravrttivijnanas.

(3) The Nirmanakaya is composed of the Wisdom of Perfect Achievement (Krtyanusthanajnana).

In fact, according to the Sastra (Sutralamkara), this Wisdom, in the universes of the ten cardinal points, manifests creations and transformations that are innumerable, varied, and incomprehensible. Again, according to the Sastra (Samgraha), the three Kayas (bodies) are composed of transcendental and excellent Wisdoms; it should therefore be understood that all the three Kayas consist of real Wisdom, real Mind.

Second Theory.

(1) The Svabhavikakaya is composed of the Dharmadhatu alone.

a. According to the treatises (Sutralamkara and Buddhabhumisastra), the Svabhavikakaya is by nature eternal.

b. According to many texts (Buddhastavasastra, Yogasastra, Samdhinirmocana, etc.), the Buddhadharmakaya is exempt from birth and destruction (while the Nirmanakaya is born and perishes).

然說轉去藏識得者，謂由轉滅第八識中二障麤重顯法身故。智殊勝中說法身者，是彼依止彼實性故。自性法身雖有眞實無邊功德而無爲故，不可說爲色心等物。

〔述記：智殊勝文者，亦可解，以法身是智依止彼智之實性故。〕

四智品中眞實功德鏡智所起常徧色身攝自受用，平等智品所現佛身攝他受用，成事智品所現隨類種種身相攝變化身。

說圓鏡智是受用佛，轉諸轉識得受用故。雖轉藏識亦得受用，然說轉彼顯法身故，於得受用略不說之。

〔述記：說圓鏡智是受用佛，此莊嚴論文。轉諸轉識得受用者攝論文。〕

又說法身無生無滅唯證因得非色心等，圓鏡智品與此相違，若非受用屬何身攝？

〔述記：圓鏡智品是實色心與此非色心違。〕

又受用身攝佛不共有爲實德，故四智品實有色心皆受用攝。

c. Vasubandhu in his Vajracchedikaprajnaparamitasastra teaches that this Body is obtained by causes which render it to be present, not by causes which produce it. [Hence it is *asamskrta*; hence it is pure Dharmadhatu].

d. Several texts (Abhidharma, Samgraha, Buddhabhumi) say that this Dharmakaya is common to all Tathagatas, penetrates all dharmas, and is similar to space, without distinguishing marks, without causes; it is neither Rupa nor Citta.

Refutation of objections. – According to the texts, this Body is obtained through the cessation of the Alayavijnana. The meaning is that, when one has transmuted and annihilated the crude dross, i.e., the crude and heavy Bijas, of the two Avaranas of the eighth consciousness, the Dharmakaya is manifested. According to certain texts, the Dharmakaya comes under the category of 'excellent and transcendental Wisdom': these texts express themselves in this manner because the Dharmakaya is the supporting basis for the Wisdoms and is their real nature. The Svabhavikadharmakaya, although possessing infinite qualities, real Rupas and real Cittas, is *asamskrta* (unconditioned non-active dharma): one cannot therefore say that it is Rupa or Citta.

(2) The Svasambhogakaya is composed of all the real qualities of the four Wisdoms and of the material body (*rupakaya*) produced by the Mirror Wisdom (Adarsajnana).

(3) The Parasambhogakaya is the Buddhakaya the manifestation of which is caused by the Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana).

(4) The Nirmanakaya is, by reason of the varieties of beings to be converted, the totality of bodies of different kinds which the Wisdom of Perfect Achievement (Krtyanusthanajnana) causes to appear.

[As to the Wisdom of Profound Contemplation (Pratyaveksanajnana), its relation to the last two bodies depends on the Bodhisattva who makes use of it for teaching the Dharma or for producing bodies for the benefit of other beings].

Explanation

(1) The Sutralamkara says that the Mirror Wisdom is the Sambhogakaya, and the Samgraha says that the Sambhogakaya is obtained through the revolution or transformation of the seven Pravrttivijnanas. In fact, the revolution of the Alayavijnana also produces the Sambhogakaya, but the Samgraha, teaching that the Dharmakaya is manifested by this revolution, omits to mention it as essential to the acquisition of the Samhogakaya.

The Mirror Wisdom should not be considered to be an element of the Dharmakaya. The Buddhastavasastra says, as mentioned above, that the Dharmakaya is exempt from birth and destruction; the Vajracchedikasastra says that there are no causes which produce it, but only causes which manifest it; that it is neither Rupa nor Citta. The characteristics of the Mirror Wisdom are opposite to this; it is therefore not integrated with the Dharmakaya. If it is not of the Sambhogakaya, to what body will it belong?

(2) The Svasambhogakaya comprehends all the special and real qualities

又他受用及變化身皆爲化他方便示現，故不可說實智爲體。

雖說化身智殊勝攝而似智現或智所起假說智名，體實非智。
〔述記：引攝論智殊勝攝三身文。〕

但說平等，成所作智能現受用三業化身，不說二身卽是二智，故此二智自受用攝。

然變化身及他受用雖無眞實心及心所，而有化現心心所法，無上覺者神力難思，故能化現無形質法。

若不爾者，云何如來現貪瞋等，久已斷故。云何聲聞及傍生等知如來心，如來實心等覺菩薩尚不知故。

由此經說化無量類皆令有心，又說如來成所作智化作三業。
〔述記：此涅槃經，下佛地經。〕

又說變化有依他心，依他實心相分現故。
〔述記：此解深密經文、七十八同。〕
〔述記義演：解深密經第五云，曼殊室利菩薩復白佛言，世尊如來化身當言有心爲無心耶？佛言告善男子非是有心亦非無心，何以故，無自依心故，有依他心故。〕

雖說變化無根心等，而依餘說不依如來，又化色根心心所法無根等用故不說有。

三・　三身功德各異門

如是三身雖皆具足無邊功德而各有異，謂自性身唯有眞實常樂我淨離諸雜染衆善所依無爲功德，無色心等差別相用，自受用身具無量種妙色心等眞實功德，若他受用及變化身唯具無邊似色心等利樂他用化相功德。

of the Buddha. Therefore all the real Rupa and Citta of the Buddha and the four Wisdoms are comprised in this Kaya.

(3)–(4). In fact, the Parasambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya are only manifestations, skilful expedients for the conversion of beings; it cannot be said of them that they are, by nature, real Wisdom.

The Samgraha says that the Nirmanakaya consists of excellent and transcendental Wisdom. This treatise expresses itself in this manner because the Nirmanakaya manifests itself with the appearances of Wisdom, or because it is produced by Wisdom. It is only by metaphor that one may call it Wisdom. Its substance is not Wisdom at all.

The texts teach that the Universal Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana) manifests the Parasambhogakaya and that the Perfect Achievement Wisdom (Krtyanusthanajnana) manifests the Nirmanakaya of triple activity. But they do not say that these two Bodies are Wisdom. Hence, these two Wisdoms are comprised in the Svasambhogakaya.

Although the Nirmanakaya and the Parasambhogakaya are not real Cittas and Caittas, nevertheless they manifest themselves as Cittas and Caittas, because the inconceivable spiritual powers of the supreme Buddha are capable of creating and manifesting dharmas without form and matter.

If it were not so, how could the Buddha manifest in His Nirmanakaya desire, hatred, and other passions which He has long since cut away? And how can the Sravakas and the animals know the thoughts of the Tathagata when the Sambodhibodhisattvas themselves do not know His real mind?

According to the Nirvanasutra, the Buddha creates innumerable kinds of fictitious beings possessed of mental activities.

According to the Buddhabhumi Sutra, the Krtyanusthanajnana of the Tathagata creates three kinds of deeds.

According to the Samdhinirmocana (Yogasastra, 78), the Nirmita, i.e., the being created by the power of creation of the mind of the Buddha, has 'a mind depending on another', because the Buddha causes to appear an image (*nimittabhaga*) which has its supporting basis in the real mind of another.

The texts say that the power of creation does not extend to the creation of sense-organs, mind and mental attributes: this declaration concerns the power of creation of non-Buddhas, – not that of the Tathagata; or else, if these texts deny such creations, it is because the organs, the mind and the mental attributes of created beings do not function as real organs, etc.

3. Different attributes of the three Bodies (Trikaya)

These three Kayas, although possessed of infinite meritorious qualities, are different from one another.

The Svabhavikakaya is absolutely real, eternal, blissful, supreme, and pure. Free from all contaminations, it is the supporting basis for all that is good. Possessed of unconditioned non-active qualities (hence eternal and exempt from birth and destruction), it has neither the character nor the activity of Rupa, Citta and Caittas.

四・　三身二利門

又自性身正自利攝，寂靜安樂無動作故。亦兼利他爲增上緣，令諸有情得利樂故。又與受用及變化身爲所依止，故俱利攝。自受用身唯屬自利，若他受用及變化身唯屬利他，爲他現故。

五・　三身所依土分別門

又自性身依法性土，雖此身土體無差別，而屬佛法相性異故。此佛身土俱非色攝，雖不可說形量小大，然隨事相其量無邊，譬如虛空偏一切處。

自受用身還依自土，謂圓鏡智相應淨識，由昔所修自利無漏純淨佛土因緣成熟，從初成佛盡未來際相續變爲純淨佛土，周圓無際衆寶莊嚴，自受用身常依而住。如淨土量身量亦爾，諸根相好一一無邊，無限善根所引生故。功德智慧既非色法，雖不可說形量大小，而依所證及所依身亦可說言偏一切處。他受用身亦依自土，謂平等智大慈悲力由昔所修利他無漏純淨佛土因緣成熟，隨住十地菩薩所宜變爲淨土，或小或大或劣或勝前後改轉，他受用身依之而住，能依身量亦無定限。若變化身依變化土，謂成事智大慈悲力由昔所

The Svasambhogakaya is possessed of immeasurable, multifarious real qualities, Rupa, Citta, Caittas.

As to the last two Bodies, namely, the Parasambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya, they are possessed of infinite apparent qualities which are active for the benefit and a happiness of others, – apparent Rupa, Citta and Caittas.

4. The three Bodies and the two Beneficiaries

The Svabhavikakaya, from the direct point of view, is 'for personal benefit' since it is peaceful, blissful, immobile and inactive. From the indirect point of view, it is also 'for the benefit of others' since it is the 'sovereign condition' (*adhipratyaya*) which causes sentient beings to obtain well-being and happiness. Furthermore, as the supporting basis for both the Sambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya, it is both for personal good and the good of others.

The Svasambhogakaya is solely for personal good, while the Parasambhogakaya and the Nirmanakaya are for the good of others since they are manifestations for others.

5. The three Bodies and their Lands

(1) The Svabhavikakaya or Dharmakaya (Tathata, pure Dharmadhatu) has the Dharmata as its Land or World. Although there is no difference in essential nature between the Body and the Land on which it depends for support, nevertheless, one may say that the Body is related to the Buddha while the Land is related to the Dharmata, since one can establish the distinction between the substance, i.e., the *svabhava* which is the Dharmata, and its manifestation, i.e., the *laksana* which is the Buddha.

Evidently neither this Body nor this Land is Rupa (matter or form). One cannot therefore say that their dimensions are large or small. However, taking into account things in general and their characteristics, one may say that their dimensions are infinite. Like space, they extend everywhere.

(2) The Svasambhogakaya 'returns and supports itself on its own Land'. [That is to say: the Body and the Land where it resides are one, there being no Land outside or apart from the Body]. The pure consciousness (i.e., the pure eighth consciousness), associated with the Mirror Wisdom (Adarsajnana), develops or transforms itself into a pure Buddhaland, perfect, without end, adorned with jewels. This development or transformation is the result of the maturity of the pure causes (*hetupratyaya*: pure Bijas) which produce a pure Buddhaland, causes which the Bodhisattva has formerly cultivated for his own good. This development or transformation commences at the moment when the Bodhisattva becomes Buddha and will last without interruption throughout all the eternity of time. The Svasambhogakaya rests on this Pure Land that has evolved and resides in it permanently.

Similar to the dimensions of the Land are the dimensions of the Body. Each of thirty-two distinguished marks (*laksanas*) and the eighty secondary features (*anuvyanjanas*) of this body of Buddha is infinite, for it proceeds from unlimited roots of excellence.

The meritorious qualities (*gunas*) of this Body and its wisdom (*jnanaprajna*)

修利他無漏淨穢佛土因緣成熟，隨未登地有情所宜化爲佛土或淨或穢或小或大前後改轉。佛變化身依之而住，能依身量亦無定限。

六· 三身諸佛所化身土同異門

自性身土一切如來同所證故，體無差別。自受用身及所依土雖一切佛各變不同，而皆無邊不相障礙。餘二身土隨諸如來所化有情，有共不共。所化共者，同處同時諸佛各變爲身爲土，形狀相似不相障礙，展轉相雜爲增上緣。令所化生自識變現，謂於一土有一佛身爲現神通說法饒益。於不共者，唯一佛變，諸有情類無始時來種姓法爾更相繫屬，或多屬一或一屬多。故所化生有共不共，不爾，多佛久住世間各事劬勞實爲無益，一佛能益一切生故。

are not dharmas of Rupa: one cannot attribute to them large or small dimensions or figures; but, inasmuch as the Svasambhogakaya has as its supporting basis the Dharmatakaya which extends everywhere, it may be said that it, too, extends everywhere. Similarly, the meritorious qualities are ubiquitous like the Body of Svasambhoga which supports them; the same is true in the case of the Wisdom, like the Tathata which it knows.

(3) The Parasambhogakaya alsQ rests on its own Land. By the power of great benevolence and compassion, by virtue of the maturity of the pure causes which produce a pure Buddhaland, causes which the Bodhisattva has formerly cultivated for the good of others, in conformity with the needs of the Bodhisattvas of the ten Bhumis, the Universal-Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana) transforms itself into a Pure Land, either small or large, either inferior or superior, subject to change and modification from time to time. It is on this Land that the Parasambhogakaya rests and resides.

The dimensions of this Body, like those of the Land on which it resides, are undetermined.

(4) The Nirmanakaya rests on a 'created' Land. By the power of great benevolence and compassion, by virtue of the maturity of the pure causes which produce a pure or tainted Buddhaland, causes which the Bodhisattva has formerly cultivated for the good of others, in conformity with the needs of those sentient beings who have not yet obtained a Bhumi, the Wisdom of Perfect Achievement (Krtyanusthanjnana) creates a Buddhaland, either pure or tainted, either small or great, subject to change and modification from time to time.

The Nirmanakaya of the Buddha rests on this Land and resides there. Its dimensions, like those of the Land, are not determined.

6. The multiple Buddhas and the Bodies

The Svabhavikakaya and its Land are 'realized' in an identical manner by all Tathagatas. No distinction is possible between the Svabhavikakaya of a Buddha and those of other Buddhas.

A Svasambhogakaya with its Land belongs to each Buddha as his own particular property: each, for himself, attains supreme enlightenment, develops a body and a land of personal Sambhoga. Although the transformations of these bodies and lands are different, yet all of them are infinite and do not represent obstacles to one another.

As to the last two bodies, they are relative to the sentient beings that the Buddhas have to convert. These beings, for their conversion, depend on several Buddhas or on one single Buddha. From this it follows that the last two bodies are either common to several Buddhas or peculiar to one Buddha.

What happens when the conversion of one single being depends on several Buddhas? – At the same time and in the same place, each of these Buddhas develops a Nirmanakaya and a land: all these 'creations' resemble one another in appearance and do not represent obstacles to one another. They interpenetrate and intermingle to serve as the 'sovereign condition' (*adhipatipratyaya*) which causes the being to be converted to see such and such a Nirmanakaya:

七· 身土能所變門

此諸身土若淨若穢無漏識上所變現者，同能變識俱善無漏。

純善無漏因緣所生，是道諦攝非苦集故。

蘊等識相不必皆同，三法因緣雜引生故。

有漏識上所變現者，同能變識皆是有漏，純從有漏因緣所生，是苦集攝，非滅道故。

善等識相不必皆同，三性因緣雜引生故，蘊等同異類此應知。不爾，應無五十二等。

the consciousness of this being manifests itself as a *nimitta* of Nirmanakaya. The individual becomes aware that in a certain land there is a Buddhakaya who displays supernatural powers and preaches the Dharma for his or her benefit.

When the beings to be converted are non-common, a single Buddha creates a Nirmanakaya for the beings who depend on him.

It is in the nature of things that certain karmic relations have existed between Buddhas and sentient beings since before the beginning of time; several Buddhas will together save a certain being; or a certain Buddha, all alone, will save several beings. The beings to be converted rely, therefore, either on one Buddha or on several Buddhas. If it were otherwise, what is the use of many Buddhas remaining together in the world for such long aeons, each working in his own way, since one single Buddha would be able to save all beings?

7. The manifestation of Bodies and Lands

These bodies and lands, pure or defiled, are manifested through the evolutions of taintless consciousness, in the same way as are pure or defiled dharmas evolved by ordinary consciousness. In common with their evolving consciousness, they are perfectly good and pure.

The reason is that that which is born of exclusively good and pure causes (*hetupratyaya*, Bijas) is comprised in the Noble Truth of the Right Path (Margasatyr), and not in that of Suffering or the Cause of Suffering (Duhkha or Samudayasatyr).

The *nimittas* of consciousness, Skandhas, etc., are not necessarily identical, because these three dharmas (Skandhas, Ayatanas, Dhatus) proceed from Bijas of different natures.

The bodies and lands that are manifested through the evolutions of impure consciousness are, in common with their evolving consciousness, exclusively impure, the reason being that that which is born of exclusively impure causes is comprised in the Noble Truth of Suffering or the Cause of Suffering and not in that of the Cessation of Suffering (Nirodhamarga).

The *nimittabhaga* of a good, bad, or non-defined consciousness (*darsanabhaga*) is not necessarily good, bad, or non-defined; because the *nimittabhaga* and the *darsanabhaga* may be derived from causes of different natures.

Similarly, it is not a general rule that the Nimittabhaga (Skandhas, etc.) should be of the same kind as the Darsanabhaga or of a different kind. If of the same kind, the distinction of the five Skandhas, the twelve Ayatanas, and the eighteen Dhatus would disappear.

第六章・ 唯識義

然相分等依識變現，非如識性依他中實。
不爾，唯識理應不成。許識內境俱實有故。

或識相見等從緣生，俱依他起，虛實如識。

唯言遣外，不遮內境，不爾眞如亦應非實。

內境與識既並非虛，如何但言唯識非境。

識唯內有，境亦通外，恐濫外故，但言唯識。

或諸愚夫迷執於境，起煩惱業生死沉淪，不解觀心勤求出離，哀愍彼故說唯識言，令自觀心解脫生死，非謂內境如外都無。

或相分等皆識爲性，由熏習力似多分生，眞如亦是識之實性，故除識性無別有法。此中識言亦說心所，心與心所，定相應故。

此論三分成立唯識，是故說爲成唯識論。

§ VI. VIJNAPTIMATRATA

The Nimittabhaga (perceived division), being a manifestation evolved on the basis of consciousness, is not, like consciousness itself, a real thing (Parinispanna) included in Paratantra or the 'nature of dependence on others'. Were it considered to be real, the principle of *Vijnaptimatrata*, 'Mere-Consciousness', would not be established, since both consciousness and the internal object (*artha*) would then be real.[1]

But there is another doctrine.

The Nimittabhaga, the Darsanabhaga, etc., are born of causes (i.e., of Bijas), all 'depending on others for production', like consciousness itself. They are therefore similar to consciousness itself in respect of their false or real nature.

The word *matra*, 'Mere-Consciousness', denies all external things (Parikalpita); it does not deny internal things (the two Bhagas); otherwise, this word would also deny the Bhutatathata, which would then be unreal.

But, one may ask, if internal things, like consciousness, are not false, why is it that people say mere-consciousness and not mere-object?

People say mere-consciousness and not mere-object:

1. Because consciousness is exclusively internal while objects are both internal and external. Fearing that sentient beings may admit the reality of external objects, the Buddha teaches *vijnaptimatrata*;

2. Because the ignorant misunderstand and cling to objects, produce klesha and karman, are sunk in Samsara, and do not exert themselves to obtain deliverance by the contemplation of the Mind. The Buddha, out of compassion, teaches *vijnaptimatrata* to enable them to obtain deliverance from Samsara by dedicating themselves to the contemplation of the Mind. But that is not to say that internal objects are absolutely non-existent in the same way as are external objects.

3. Or perhaps, – taking into account the system of Sthiramati which does not admit the Nimittabhaga and which recognizes only consciousness itself – internal objects (Darsanabhaga, etc.) have as their essential nature (substance, *avabhava*) consciousness itself (*svasamvittibhaga*). The latter, by the force of the perfuming energy (*vasana*), manifests itself as if it comprises many Bhagas. On the other hand, the Bhutatathata is the real nature of consciousness. Therefore there is no dharma which is outside consciousness. The term 'consciousness' also indicates the mental attributes which are associated with the mind.

The present treatise, which consists of three parts, Stanzas 1 and 2a, Stanzas 2b – 25, and Stanzas 26–30, establishes the doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata. It is

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[1] See Section on 'The Three Natures' in Book VIII.

亦說此論名淨唯識，顯唯識理極明淨故。

〔述記：言淨者，謂從喻顯。如眞如性雖本性淨若不修習淨無以彰顯，教理俱得如珠寶等性雖光潔若不磨瑩無以出光故也。如蘇迷盧雖寶所集無日輪廻照何以顯光，此論亦爾。〕

此本論名唯識三十，由三十頌顯唯識理乃得圓滿，非增減故。

已依聖教及正理，分別唯識性相義，所獲功德施羣生，願共速登無上覺。

therefore named Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-sastra, 'Treatise on the Establishment of Vijnaptimatrata'.

It is also named Vijnaptimatratavisuddhi, 'purification of Vijnaptimatrata', because it is a perfectly clear and pure exposition of the meaning of Vijnaptimatrata. [Just as Mount Sumeru, with all its jewels, has to wait for the noonday sun in order to shine with full brilliance, just as precious stones have to be cut and polished, so this doctrine of Vijnaptimatrata has to be 'purified' by the sacred teaching and logical reasoning . . . K'uei Chi].

The original work on which the present treatise is a commentary is named Vijnaptimatratasiddhi-trimsika, because, in thirty stanzas, it expounds the meaning of Vijnaptimatrata in its perfection, without adding anything to it or taking anything away from it.

The exposition of the nature and the characteristics of Vijnaptimatrata on the basis of the sacred teachings and right reäsoning has now been completed. May the merits of this work be bestowed on all living beings; and may all living beings attain Supreme Enlightenment together and with all possible speed.

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楞伽義記	一册	太虛大師口義
楞伽大義今釋	一册	南懷瑾述著
解深密經注	三册	錄瑜伽倫記
解深密經分別瑜伽品略釋	三册	韓清淨述
解深密經語體釋	二册	釋演培釋
大般涅槃經	二册	三藏法師曇無讖譯
瑜伽師地論	三十二册	彌勒菩薩說玄奘大師譯
瑜伽師地論記	三十册	釋遁倫集撰
瑜伽師地科句披尋記彙編	十六册	韓清淨科記
瑜伽師地論本地分中菩薩地初持瑜伽處戒品纂釋	二册	湯薌銘譯纂
大乘瑜伽眞實品敘表本文	一册	歐陽竟無輯

顯揚聖教論	四冊	無著菩薩造
大乘莊嚴經論	三冊	無著菩薩造三藏法師波羅頗迦羅密多羅譯
大乘密嚴經疏	四冊	三藏法師地婆訶羅譯
攝大乘論	一冊	無著菩薩造
攝大乘論釋	三冊	世親菩薩造
攝大乘論講記	二冊	釋印順講
攝大乘論疏	二冊	王恩洋疏
攝大乘論疏（見圓音月刊）		羅時憲疏
攝大乘隨錄	二冊	比丘忻車隨錄
十地經論	四冊	世親菩薩造
觀所緣緣論，掌中論等	一冊	陳那菩薩造
唯識二十頌	一冊	世親菩薩造
唯識二十論述記	二冊	窺基大師撰
唯識二十頌講記	一冊	釋演培講
二十唯誠論疏	一冊	黃恩洋著
成唯識寶生論	一冊	護法菩薩造
辯中邊論	一冊	世親菩薩造
辯中邊論述記	三冊	窺基大師撰
阿毗達磨俱舍論	六冊	世親菩薩造
大乘阿毗達磨集論	二冊	無著菩薩糅
大乘阿毗達磨雜集論	二冊	安慧菩薩糅
阿毗達磨雜集論述記	十二冊	窺基大師撰
成唯識論述記	二十冊	窺基大師撰
成唯識論演祕	七冊	沙門智周撰
成唯識論演祕釋	二冊	沙門如理撰
成唯識論義蘊	五冊	沙門道邑撰
唯識述記鈔祕蘊	四十冊	歐陽竟無集
唯識述記義演	三十二冊	沙門如理集
成唯識論述記集成編	十冊	日本湛慧撰（普慧大藏經刊行會校印）
成唯識論了義燈	八冊	苾芻慧沼述
成唯識論學記	四冊	沙門釋太賢集
成唯識論觀心法要	十冊	沙門智旭述

成唯識論音響補遺	十冊	釋紹覺音義，釋新伊合響，釋法嗣素補遺，
成唯識論隨疏	十二冊	沙門慧善隨疏
成唯識論測疏	一冊	沙門圓測撰
成唯識論掌中樞要	三冊	窺基大師撰
成唯識著述三種：（唯識樞要，唯識別鈔，唯識料簡）	七冊	窺基大師撰
大乘法苑義林章記	十冊	窺基大師撰
法苑義林章唯識章註	一冊	區陽竟無註
成唯識論文釋幷記	十卷	吳樹虛集說
八識規矩頌註發明	六冊	沙門本金發明
八識規矩頌講錄	一冊	太虛大師講
八識規矩頌註解	一冊	釋佛瑩編
八識規矩頌釋論	一冊	王恩洋著
八識規矩頌筆記	一冊	釋默如著
八識規矩母頌	一冊	元峯法師性起論釋
相宗八要直解	二冊	蕅益釋智旭解
相宗八要解	三冊	沙門明昱疏
法相唯識學	二冊	太虛太師著述
百法明門論解	一冊	窺基大師撰
百法明門論疏	一冊	沙門普光撰
大成五蘊論	一冊	世親菩薩造
大乘廣五蘊論	一冊	安慧菩薩造
顯識論 轉識論	共一冊	三藏法師眞諦譯
佛教各宗大意	二冊	黃懺華編述
相宗綱要	一冊	梅光羲編
宋永明禪師延壽集 宗鏡錄法相義節要	共一冊	梅光羲節要
唯識三十論要釋（燉煌本）	一冊	唐□□□撰
唯識三十論略解	一冊	韓清淨述
十義量	一冊	韓清淨述
唯識指掌	一冊	韓清淨述
百法義錄	二冊	梅光羲編

五重唯識觀注	一冊	梅光羲編
略述法相義	一冊	日本沙門聞證輯
內學	一冊	歐陽竟無集
大乘百法明門論疏	一冊	沙門義忠述
大乘百法明門論義記	一冊	沙門曇曠撰
唯識抉擇談	一冊	歐陽竟無演講
百法明門論，八識規矩頌輯解	一冊	香南氏輯解
唯識研究	一冊	周叔迦敘
唯識開蒙	二冊	釋雲峰集
成唯識論研習	一冊	釋普行撰
阿毘達磨法蘊足論	一冊	尊者大目乾連造
成唯識論研究次第	一冊	歐陽竟無演講
觀心覺夢鈔	一冊	沙門典壽撰
佛地經	一冊	玄奘大師譯
佛地經論	一冊	親光菩薩等造
佛性論	一冊	世親菩薩造
肇論	一冊	僧肇造，憨山大師釋
唯識通論	一冊	王恩洋稿
唯識今釋	一冊	繆鳳林述
大乘廣五蘊論注	一冊	蔣維喬註
大乘百法明門論文學觀	一冊	唐大圓著
唯識三十論	一冊	守培法師述
唯識三十論講話	一冊	井上玄眞著，白湖光言譯
大乘佛教思想論	一冊	木村泰賢著釋演培譯
唯識舉隅	一冊	羅時憲撰
唯識新裁擷彙	一冊	慈光雜誌社印行
唯識三頌講記	一冊	方論講解
唯識法相學要義道言篇	一冊	張廷榮著
新唯識論	四冊	熊十力造
佛家名相通釋	二冊	熊十力撰
大慈恩寺三藏法師傳	三冊	沙門釋彥悰述
紀念玄奘大師靈骨歸國奉安專輯	一冊	編輯委員會曾悟生等編
因明入正理論疏	二冊	窺基大師撰

因明正理門論述記	一册	沙門神泰撰
因明入論續疏	一册	沙慧沼續述
因明大疏删注	一册	熊十力撰
因明綱要	一册	呂澂述
因明新例	一册	周叔迦著
因明學	一册	虞愚徧
印度邏輯	一册	虞愚著
因明入理論隨錄	一册	沙門忻車隨錄
因明學	一册	陳望道編著

II

Books in Japanese

冠導增補成唯識論	十册	比丘旭雅著
成唯識論並述記帳中獨斷	三册	權田雷斧大阿闍梨猊下著

III

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IV

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THIS IS the first complete English translation of the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun*, the masterpiece of the charismatic Tripitaka-Master, Hsüan Tsang. The book is destined to form a landmark in the history of Buddhist studies. It is the result of nearly twenty years of patient research by a leading Chinese authority on religion and metaphysics. The value of the work is enhanced by the inclusion of the original Chinese text which is not easily available.

The *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* is a thorough and profound exploration of the human mind by introspection, meditation and contemplation on the part of a distinguished group of ancient Buddhist mystics. Its central theme is that all sense impressions of the phenomena of the universe are illusory and that nothing exists except in the consciousness.

As the great English Buddhist scholar, Edward Thomas, observed, Zen Buddhism (now so much in the limelight) evolved to a large extent out of the mystical side of Yogacara (Wei-shih). But not only did that book play an important part in the development of Zen. It can also make a distinguished contribution to the disciplines of psychology and philosophy. Much has been written by Western psychologists on the subconscious and the unconscious. But in many ways the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* anticipated these studies by well over a thousand years. Its teaching, for example, includes the concept of the *Alayavijnana*, or 'storehouse-consciousness'. And, to quote Edward Thomas once again, 'The store-consciousness . . . covers all that we now refer to as the subconscious and the unconscious. It is probable that the psychological facts of the subconscious gave rise to the concept of the store-consciousness.' However, he goes on, 'that is not, as in modern psychology, a mere extension of the group of facts that are included in the conscious. It is a metaphysical concept of a different order of being, an ultimate reality at the base of all phenomena.'

As an attempt to differentiate between reality and illusion, the *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* may also be regarded as a philosophical theory of knowledge. But again, it goes deeper and further than current Western theories. It points the way to the triumph over illusion and sets forth the steps to be taken on the holy path leading to Ultimate Reality or Enlightenment. This is perhaps one reason why great scholars of modern China, such as Chang T'ai-yen, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'iao, set great store by the study of that book and of other works of the Yogacara School.

But, whatever their reactions to the present publication, readers of all cultural and social levels will find that it opens up new avenues of thought, new areas for research, and perhaps even a new approach to life – oriented towards transcendental beauty, glory and excellence.

A NATIVE of Chungshan District, Kwangtung Province, the translator is a well-known scholar who now lives in Hong Kong. In his student days at Queen's College and later at the University there, he had a consistently brilliant record which culminated in a B.A. and M.A. degree.

After graduation, he continued to deepen his knowledge of philosophy, metaphysics and religion. His first major work, *An Exposition of the I-ching*, was published in 1970 and was well received by scholars. The present volume is his second major contribution to spiritual learning.

In recognition of his scholastic achievements, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, London, in 1964, and was made an Academician of the China Academy, Taipei, in 1968. For a time he served as Professor of Philosophy and Fellow of the Institute of Buddhist Philosophy at the College of Chinese Culture in Taipei.

Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun

成唯識論



Buddhagaya where the Lord Buddha
attained Enlightenment